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Abstract
The Act of Discovery: an Ethnography of the
Subject-Object Relation in Archaeological Practice
by
Matthew Edgeworth
All theory must ultimately be grounded in bodily action and perceptual experience.
The purpose of this thesis is to sketch out the ontological ground of archaeological
knowledge. Based mainly upon an ethnography of an excavation, the thesis focuses
on the act of discovery - the (temporal) relation between an (embodied) subject and
an (emerging) object, mediated through (the use of) tools. The cultural agency
of the archaeologist, in giving form to material patterns, is taken into account.
But so too is the 'resistance' of material evidence. It is in this subject-object
transaction that knowledge of the past is ultimately produced and reproduced.
However, we also have to consider why the act of discovery has remained hidden
within conventional theoretical discourse, and how it is that - in bringing the
ethno-archaeological perspective back to bear upon archaeology itself - it becomes
possible to 're-discover the act of discovery'.
Copyright © 1991 by Matthew Edgeworth
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should
be published without Matthew Edgeworth's prior written consent and information
derived from it should be acknowledged.
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Preface
A research project which started out under the title of "The Social Context of
Ritual Monuments in Neolithic Europe" and finishes up under the present heading
of "The Act of Discovery: an Etbnography of the Subject-Object Relation in
Archaeological Practice", requires some explanation of its development through
time. As originally conceived, the project was to consist of library-based research
into parallels between archaeological data from Neolithic sites and ethnographic
data from various sources (eg. Bloch 1971, 1986; Deacon and Wedgewood 1970).
Whatever transformations and inversions the research may have gone through since
then, this concern with analogy has provided a certain thread of continuity.
Disenchantment grew with the realisation that 'ethnographic analogies' work both
ways; they have a 'hidden agenda', effecting our view of the present as well as
our view of the past. Hodder (1982a:39) articulates the point well when he warns,
"there is a possibility that, having overrun and pillaged Australian, African and
American people militarily, economically and socially, we follow this up with an
'intellectual colonialism'.., we assume that our own 'developed'society is less rele-
vant in finding analogies for Neolithic Europe in 6000 BC than are 'undeveloped'
Africans or Australians." But although ethnoarchaeology has recently extended its
domain of study to cover the material culture of modern industrialised societies,
including our own, it still concerns itself with the more or less distant Other. The
material culture of archaeologists themselves remains exempt from ethnoarchaeo-
logical analysis.
The relation of otherness that pertains between ourselves and the object of study,
connected with the belief that our own scientific culture is somehow 'above' or
'beyond' sociological or anthropological investigation, affects everything we do and
see. Certainly in my first year of research I treated the ethnographic record as
10
literally a record, containing 'survivals' of past ways of life - and this may have
led me to see similarities between ethnographic and archaeological data where in
fact mainly differences prevail. Perhaps I made the mistake of equating distance
in space - or in cultural understanding - with distance in time (Fabian 1983). But
by linking European prehistory with contemporary cultures elsewhere there was
definitely a sense in which I was characterising those other cultures as 'the past
in the present' or 'the present in the past'. A deeper reading of ethnographic
literature, of course, indicates that the evolutionary assumptions informing my
approach were ill-founded. As Layton (1989:18) argues, "It is no longer possible
to make the comfortable assumption that non-Western peoples live in a timeless
present, that their cultures are inherently unchanging."
In any case, we clearly do draw from our own cultural experience in interpreting
archaeological remains. Implicit analogies are embedded in the most 'objective'
of data. Even to label a material item as a 'pottery sherd', for example, invokes
and presupposes a great deal of knowledge about how pots might be made, the
functions or purposes they might serve in the context of human action, and so on.
How does this 'common-sense' meaning get into archaeological data? Are the very
words we use to describe material objects the vehicles of tacit analogies? To what
extent do we draw from our own practical experience - as human agents ourselves
- in the perception, identification and description of artefacts?
All this led to a re-thinking of research strategy and a radical inversion of initial
objectives. Instead of using analogy as a method for comparing ethnographic and
archaeological data, I was now to carry out an ethnographic study of the role of
analogy in the production of data in archaeological excavation.
Fieldwork changed my views further. Before going into the field I had tended to
treat analogy as a mode of cognition - a mental process that takes place 'in the
head'. But it now became apparent that such ideational processes were inseparable
from the material practices of excavation. Analogies are enmeshed in the everyday
discovery, manipulation and recording of material evidence. The whole focus of
my research, then, shifted from theory to practice, and from analogy to agency.
In so far as the topic of analogy figures in the fieldwork report it is as practical
analogy or analogy-in-action.
11
This 'bringing down to earth' of theory necessarily involves a re-appraisal of the
relationship between theory and practice - of how theory is 'grounded' in practice.
In subsequent chapters it will be argued that the ontological ground of archaeolog-
ical knowledge is neither the objective material evidence (as empiricists insist) nor
subjective activity (as anti-empiricists imply) - but rather a practical transaction
between the subject and the object. To characterize this transaction I have used
the term "act of discovery" - which has a certain ring to it by virtue of the way
in which it combines contradictory terms (discovery normally being understood
as a passive rather than an active process). I take discovery to be a practical
activity involving both manual and intellectual skills. It entails work with and
upon material objects as well as cognitive objects. And it brings the theoretical
domain into direct contact with an external reality which resists, constrains and
forces modification of the ideational schemes brought to bear upon it.
By constituting archaeological excavation as a kind of 'craft', which involves the
transformation of (natural) raw material into (cultural) product, it becomes possi-
ble to explicate the normally implicit analogy that pertains between the activity of
archaeologists and the inferred activity of human agents in the distant past, which
enables archaeological interpretation to take place in the first instance. Bringing
to light the essential 'likeness' as well as 'difference' between ourselves and the
distant Other is the first requisite for a humanistic archaeology.
Emphasis throughout the fieldwork report will be on what diggers actuafly do and
how they do it. Whereas most theoretical accounts of archaeological practice are
prescriptive, the assumption here is that theory can learn a great deal from those
who make practical (as opposed to wholly written) contributions to the production
of archaeological knowledge, as well as the other way round. And the reader is
warned that little will be found in the following pages about the justification of
archaeological inferences - the principal concern of conventional epistemology. This
is not because validation is considered unimportant; it simply lies outside the range
of what has been attempted here. As Wittgenstein (1967a:para 217) puts it, "If I
have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.
Then I am inclined to say 'This is simply what I do' "...
12
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION: ESCAPING FROM THE TEXT
1.1 Basic Analogies or Root Metaphors
All sciences are structured in part by 'basic analogies' or 'root-metaphors' (Pepper
1942:38-9, Nisbet 1969:3-6, Turner 1974:23-31). The understanding of the uni-
verse as a MACHINE - characteristic of Newtonian physics - is an example of a
root-metaphor that structured an entire epoch of science and philosophy. Such
metaphors are undoubtedly useful. They enable us to select, highlight and organ-
ise certain aspects of observable reality - to explain that reality from a particular
point of view. But root-metaphors also exercise a constraining influence upon
scientific thought and practice. In highlighting certain aspects of reality, other
aspects may be neglected or hidden. Particular problems are identified and partic-
ular kinds of data are seen to be relevant to the solution of those problems. In the
sense that root-metaphors are reinforced by the continued collection of 'relevant'
data, they tend to be self-certifying and self-reproducing - tacitly upholding our
explicit knowledge of the world. Following Kuhn (1962), Nisbet (1969:6) argued
that scientific revolutions are often no more than replacements, at critical points
in history, of one foundation-metaphor by another. New metaphors tend to open
up whole new fields of research precisely because they draw attention to aspects
of reality neglected by previous metaphors.
The question therefore arises - what is the root-metaphor that structures archae-
ological knowledge? In this chapter it will be argued, following Patrik (1985),
that the central object and concept of archaeological knowledge - the archaeo-
logical record - is itself a root-metaphor. The understanding of material remains
as RECORD underlies most theoretical discussion and provides the parameters
within which methodological debate takes place (see Barrett 1987/8 for an at-
tempted escape from the record-metaphor). While this metaphor has highlighted
many important aspects of material evidence, it has simultaneously hidden equally
important aspects of archaeological practice. It has, in effect, 'covered over' the
14
act of discovery, the subject of this thesis. In order to bring the act of discovery
to light, a different root-metaphor or way of looking at things is required.
1.2 Material Remains as Material Record
The metaphor of material remains as RECORD is embedded in contemporary ar-
chaeological discourse. As any reading of the literature shows, material evidence is
often spoken of as a MANUSCRIPT, a TEXT, a PALIMPSEST or a CODE. The
landscape itself is an historical DOCUMENT - a TESTAMENT and a TESTIMO-
NIAL to the past. We can find out about the past by READING, DECODING,
DECIPHERING, TRANSLATING or TRANSCRIBING the record, for the record
is something that can TELL, INFORM, COMMUNICATE, ILLUMINATE and
REVEAL. It is a REPOSITORY OF FACTS, a STORE OF KNOWLEDGE and
a MINE OF INFORMATION. Knowledge is PRESERVED in the record. Like
a book, this record can be CONSULTED. When we excavate a site, there is a
sense in which we are TURNING THE PAGES of the past, working our way back
through the CHAPTERS, ANNALS and CHRONICLES of time.
Consider, for example, this passage in Barker's classic 'Techniques of Archaeolog-
ical Excavation' (Barker 1987:11-12):- "The soil is an historical document which
must be deciphered, translated and interpreted. The whole of our landscape, ru-
ral and urban, is a vast historical document. On its surface has accumulated a
continuous accretion of hundreds of thousands of acts of change, both natural and
human. Every archaeological site is itself a document. It can be read by a skilled
excavator."
The metaphor is, however, much more than a fertile source of figures of speech.
It implicates a certain common-sense way of thinking about the past. As Ayer
(1956:67) puts it, "The past is thought of as being 'there', fixed, unalterable,
indelibly recorded in the annals of time, whether we are able to decipher them
or not." Whereas the future is thought to be open, the past is closed. But the
metaphor of material remains as RECORD presents us with the possibility of
opening up, like a book so to speak, the past that is dead and gone. The concept of
the archaeological record refers not just to material remains alone; it emphasises the
relation between unobservable cause and observable effect. The very use of the term
'record' implies a notion of the 'recording-relation' between the 'record' and 'that
15
which is recorded' (ie. the past). Constituted in terms of the RECORD-metaphor,
the artefacts and ecofacts encountered during excavation are 'facts' in at least two
senses - 1) they are observable phenomena or empirical facts 2) they record past
events or meanings; that is, they are construed as facts about the unobservable
past. To skilled excavators and other empirically-minded archaeologists, then,
archaeological facts can be taken to speak not just for themselves, but also for the
past events or meanings they record.
The New Archaeologists (eg. Binford and Binford 1968, Watson et al 1971) chal-
lenged the conventional empiricism but retained the record-metaphor, developing
it into a methodological philosophy. The recording-relation between past cultural
dynamics and the archaeological statics observable in the material record was con-
ceived of as a causal link, governed by a complex set of laws. By specifying the
supposedly universal laws which operate in mediating the transition from dynamic
context to archaeological context, it was hoped that unambiguous links could be
established between cause and effect, and that inferences about cause could be
chained to a deductive form of argument. As Sabloff, Binford and Macanany
(1987:203) recently stated, "the most promising methodological undertaking... is
the strengthening of the procedures archaeologists employ to link inferentially the
archaeological record with the past dynamics that produced it."
Hodder's (1982c, 1985, 1986, 1987a) formulation of a post-processual archaeology
was developed as a response to the deficiencies of New Archaeology. He rightly
pointed out that the emphasis on deterministic laws governing human behaviour,
with cross-cultural applicability, leads to a disregard for socio-cultural variability.
In any case, very few 'universal' laws had actually been specified by the proces-
sualists. But Hodder's alternative model also retains the record-metaphor - albeit
in a slightly different form. The material record was now to be explicitly consti-
tuted as a TEXT, artefacts as material SYMBOLS or SIGNS, and material context
as CONTEXTUAL MEANING, which becomes accessible to symbolic and struc-
turalist analysis. By reading the text, the GRAMMAR, CODE and MEANING
of past human action can be brought to light. Reading past meanings is therefore
an interpretive endeavour rather than an objective science. (For a more detailed
comparative analysis of the use of the record-metaphor in Binford's and Hodder's
work, the reader is referred to Patrik 1985).
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But if Hodder's contextual archaeology emphasises cultural relativism and the
subjective task of 'reading' the record, while Binford's processual archaeology em-
phasises ecological determinism and scientific objectivity, there is nevertheless a
common ground underlying the differences - an axis of polarity that unites them in
their opposition to each other. Similarities in their respective approaches include
a concern with ethnoarchaeological research, as a means of gathering information
which can shed light on 'the formation processes of the archaeological record' (Bin-
ford 1967, 1976, 1978, 1980; Hodder 1982a, 1982b - see also Schiffer 1976, 1983).
Both accept the root-metaphor of material remains as RECORD (or TEXT).
This metaphor has proved to be a fertile and adaptable model for understanding
the way in which material remains can inform us about the past. From within its
general structure particular organisational schemes have been selected to express
a range of different - sometimes complementary, sometimes oppositional - points
of view. But it is noticeable that (at least up to about 1985) the record-metaphor
encompasses almost the entire domain of archaeological discourse. Implicit in
the normative empiricism, it becomes more explicit as we move towards the two
extremes of 'objectivity' (processualism) and 'subjectivity' (post-processualism).
Methodological debate tends to be a dialectic between these two poles, circum-
scribed by the metaphor of the material record. As Patterson (1989:561-2) puts it,
"The archaeologist and the archaeological record are gridded in to one another."
It falls to Linda Patrik (1985:56-7) to ask the pertinent question: "Might there
be a new model of archaeological evidence that does not borrow at all from the
concept of a record?"
1.3 From Reading to Writing the Past
Since 1985, however, two books by Shanks and Tilley (1987a, 1987b) have taken
and developed the post-processual model beyond its initial phase of structuralist
analysis. As they put it, "structuralism opened the way to an understanding of
material remains as being in some sense analogous to a text, a meaningful sig-
nifying system to be 'read' and interpreted" (Shanks and Tilley 1989:3). They
incorporated into their 'post-structuralist' philosophy Hodder's insight that the
reading of the material culture text is conditioned in part by the schemes of signi-
fication brought to bear upon the text by the reader, whose point of view is always
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historically and culturally situated; different readers may read a given text in dif-
ferent ways - there is no one correct reading, and no single 'truth' to be discovered
in the text (see Hodder 1987b). But Shanks and Tilley noted that archaeologists
are engaged in writing as well as reading. "Archaeology," they argued, "is not so
much a reading of the signs of the past, but a process in which these signs are
written into the present" (Shanks and Tilley 1989:4).
Once writing has been identified as "the real material practice of archaeology"
(ibid:49), the past becomes for Shanks and They something that is inscribed and
produced in the present day. "Any archaeological account involves the creation of a
past in a present and its understanding. Archaeology in this sense is a performative
and transformative endeavour, a transformation of the past in terms of the present"
(1987a 103-4). The past is not so much 'that which is recorded' by the record,
but rather 'that which is produced' in the writing of archaeological texts - the
product of inscriptive practices in the present day, and therefore also the product
of contemporary ideologies and relations of power, which are reproduced in and
through archaeological discourse. And just as there are different ways of reading
a text, so there are different ways of writing it. It follows that any writing of a
past is a political act - and it is one of the virtues of Shanks and Tiley's work that
they make their own political stance quite explicit. They conceive of their writing
as a kind of revolutionary practice, challenging the supposed political neutrality of
science - and the pasts that have been constructed under the name of 'objective
science'.
Despite the radical nature of their critique, however, it is clear that Shanks and
Tilley are still 'gridded in' to the metaphor of material remains as material record.
Consider, for example, their formulation of the relationship between artefact and
text (1989:5). The material culture encountered by archaeologists is defined as "a
multi-dimensional 'text' with a plurality of meanings" (which, in some fundamental
sense, is still understood to 'record' past human actions). The archaeological text
is defined as "an argumentative structure with 'material' quotations". And the
relationship between these two kinds of texts is mediated by the archaeologist in the
activity of writing. Yet in essence this is nothing more than a transformation of the
traditional concept of the archaeological record. The record is normally understood
as 1. the material record (eg. "the remains of prehistoric or historic cultures that
18
are visible or uncovered by archaeologists today" Sabloff et al 1987:203-4), and
2. the textual or representative record (eg. "the data amassed from survey and
excavation" Fagan 1980:6) - the second being understood as a more or less direct
copy, transcription, translation or extract of the first, mediated by the archaeologist
in the activity of reading (refer to quote from Barker, Section 1.2). Whether the
role of the archaeologist is constituted as reader or writer, we are led towards
the inevitable conclusion that "There is nothing outside of the text " ( Derrida
1977:158 , quoted in Yates 1990:220).
Because the post-processual movement has explicitly stressed "questions of repre-
sentation, style, textuality and writing" (Shanks and Tilley 1989:49), drawing its
interpretive framework from Barthes, Derrida, Ricoeur and other textual theorists
(see Bapty and Yates 1990, Tilley 1990), it has effectively situated itself inside the
metaphor of the TEXT, which has been extended to cover all realms of human
experience. There is, for them, literally no escape from the text. But it is impor-
tant to make clear that no avenues of escape are provided by their critics either.
Ironically, critiques of post-processualism tend to be framed in terms of the ob-
jectivist version of the metaphor of material remains as RECORD. Thus Renfrew
(1989:39), in his comments on Shanks and Tilley's work, states that "The material
record of the past, the actual remains, may indeed be claimed as 'value-free' and
lacking in observer-induced bias. That record is available, readily available: that
is the great strength of archaeology" (cf. the critique of Hodder in Binford 1987,
where similar recourse is taken to the concept of the material record). It is as
though the metaphor of RECORD/TEXT has become a valued commodity in its
own right, to be battled and fought over by rival camps. Each camp lays claim
to the metaphor that gave rise to both, and which at once unites and divides the
protagonists in their opposition to each other.
1.4 The Derivation of the Record Metaphor
A metaphor so deeply embedded at the heart of a system of thought is likely to
have a long history. Archaeology in its formative years borrowed many of its orig-
inal concepts from other, established, disciplines - such as History and Geology -
with both of which it still has strong conceptual links. In her penetrating com-
parative analysis of processual and contextual archaeologies, Patrik (1985:33-4)
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suggests that the concept of the archaeological record is derived from the concepts
of the historical record and the fossil record. She points out that New Archae-
ologists tend to draw from the notion of the fossil record (with its implications
of ecological determinism, direct recording-connections between cause and effect,
and the uniformitarian principle), while contextual archaeologists tend to draw
from the notion of the historical record (with its implications of authorship, style,
and hermeneutics). These two different kinds of record, moreover, are themselves
historically linked: "palaeontology initially derived its concept of the fossil record
from the metaphor of an historical record: the fossil record is like a book that
holds in its strata, as a book holds in its pages, the story of the earth, ancient
organisms, and their evolution. The metaphor originated with the belief that a
divine creator was responsible for the formation processes of the fossil record: just
as authors produce texts, the divine creator produced the earth and the creatures
on it" (Patrik 1985:34).
The historical origin of the record-metaphor in a pre-Darwinian religious cosmol-
ogy, however, does not explain its continuity through time, and its continued rele-
vance to archaeologists in the present day. If we ask the question, 'in what ways is
the record-metaphor grounded in and derived from ongoing cultural experience?', it
is not difficult to locate that part of everyday experience from which the metaphor
continues to emerge as the natural and common-sense frame for understanding ar-
chaeological evidence. As post-processualists have so cogently argued, reading and
writing are the real material practices of (academic) archaeology - which consist
more of the production of texts, the compilation of bibliographies, the reading of
relevant literature and the citation of references, than it does of the actual digging
of material remains. The field of textual discourse in which we as academics par-
ticipate is more than just a field; it is a way of life. To situate oneself within this
field is to internalise its conventions, skills and rationales - to acquire a practical
mastery of words, style and rhetoric. Only then is it possible to be a name, cited
in texts other than one's own. 'Homo Academicus' (Bourdieu 1988) is essentially
a textual being, whose activity takes place in an environment where the book is
the principal item of material culture. And books have a primary reference to
other books, whether or not they refer to any external reality outside of the text;
even excavation-reports are based mainly on a multiplicity of specialist reports,
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context-sheets, plans, and other inscriptions. Texts provide the setting, the inten-
tional product and the raison d'etre of the academic existence. And what could
be more natural, in this world circumscribed on all sides by the written word,
to characterise the world outside in terms of the metaphor of the RECORD or
TEXT? In the last analysis we all seek to understand things within the frame of
that which is most familiar. It is the achievement of the post-processualists that
they have brought this root-metaphor to the surface of archaeological discourse,
made it quite explicit, and turned it back to bear upon its source (much of the
force of their critique deriving from this reflexive turn) - so that in their work the
metaphor has reached its apotheosis. Oniy on the basis of their work is it possible
to constitute the textual metaphor as something 'to be escaped from'.
If roughly the same metaphor can be used to support both objectivist and subjec-
tivist claims, it is probably because real texts or records - from which the metaphor
is ultimately derived - encapsulate the subject-object dichotomy in a particularly
irresolveable form. A written record can be perceived either as a material ob-
ject in its own right, or as the vehicle for subjective meanings, depending on the
point of view of the perceiver. It is very difficult, however, to hold both points of
view simultaneously. Focus attention on the objective shape of the printed letters
and their meaning disappears. Shift attention back to the meaning of the words
and their objective form becomes 'fuzzy', then recedes out of direct consciousness.
Even the meaning apprehended by the reader can be regarded as objective fact or
subjective fiction - again, depending on the reader's point of view. And different
readers may read different meanings in the same text, whether or not those mean-
ings were intended by the writer. As Hodder (1987b:87) says of a review of his
book, Reading the Past "My book is a real thing (in the same way that archaeo-
logical data are real). And yet in reading Bell's reading of my book I realise that
he often did not see what I wrote or what I thought I wrote. The book is real but
different readers give it different realities." In the light of such remarks, it is easy
to see how the textual metaphor carries with it a whole (literary) metaphysics.
Many of the problems and disagreements involved in understanding (reading) or
producing (writing) the archaeological record may be nothing more and nothing
less than transformations of the paradox of the text, metaphorically transposed on
to material evidence.
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1.5 The Archaeological Record: A Matter of 'Fact'
In conventional empiricism, the material record is understood to be comprised of
various kinds of facts which record past events or meanings. A recording-relation
between cause and effect is taken to be an objective property of the material record
(so that, for example, the fact that this piece of worked flint or that sherd of pot-
tery are the products and instruments of past human agency can be regarded as
self-evident). Facts are simply uncovered and recorded by archaeologists in excava-
tion. And the representative record that archaeologists make of material remains
- comprised of plans, notes, photos, context-sheets, finds, samples, etc - is seen
to be practically equivalent to the material record, as it was encountered during
excavation. Since the latter is regarded as a translation or copy of the former,
the enormous gap between these two kinds of record is closed to the extent that
no distinction needs to be drawn in theoretical discourse. The term 'archaeolog-
ical record' collapses these two entities into one, so that 'facts' can be read from
excavation-reports in much the same way as they can be read from the mate-
rial record itself. Indeed, since the material facts have for the most part been
destroyed in the process of excavation, the corpus of facts which constitutes the
archaeological record is largely comprised of textual objects. A fact is a textual
object which can be taken to be equivalent to a material object. In some funda-
mental sense, such facts are understood to constitute the basic units of theoretical
analysis. When we speak of theories about the past being 'based' upon the facts,
what we actually mean is that our theories are based upon textual objects which we
call facts, according to a particular notion of the correspondence between textual
representations and their material object.
In their powerful critique of empiricist thought, the post-processualists (eg Shanks
and Tilley 1987a, 1987b, 1989) take an entirely different view of facts. Facts
are regarded as social - or, more specifically, textual - productions. They derive
their concreteness not so much from any resemblance to a reality outside of the
text, but rather from their context within an established field of textual discourse,
the manner and style in which they have been written, the authority of their
writers, and of course the point of view of the reader. Indeed, there is a sense
in which (as many literary theorists have argued), the reader's point of view is
constructed for the reader by the text. Through persuasion and rhetoric - most
22
effective when it seems neither persuasive nor rhetorical - the text constructs a
reality and persuades the reader (and, for that matter, the writer) to accept this
manufactured reality as objective 'fact' rather than fiction. As Shanks and Tilley
(1989:7) put it, "Language use does not merely imitate reality; rather, it helps to
constitute it." Hence they can argue that there is no such thing as a real past; the
past is something that is continually being created and transformed, through the
medium of texts, in the present day.
How do these two very different conceptions of fact arise? The etymology of the
word can help us here. Although the standard dictionary definition, 'anything that
comes to pass: truth: reality, or real state of things' corresponds roughly to the
empiricist notion of fact as something which exists independently of any subjective
interpretation of it, an etymological investigation suggests a different meaning. As
Knorr-Cetina (1981:4) points out, 'fact' is derived from the Latin factum-facere,
'to make' or 'to do', hence we have the associated words 'manufacture', 'factory'
and 'artefact'. This second underlying meaning of fact as 'something which is
made' perhaps more closely corresponds to the post-processualist view. What is
interesting is the way in which empiricists tend to highlight the first meaning while
rejecting the second completely (along with any notion of cultural or subjective
influence in the perception and recording of facts), and the post-processualists
tend to highlight the second meaning while rejecting the first (along with any
notion of an objective world 'out there' which might constrain our cultural and
subjective construction of reality). In this way the debate between them, viewed
as a dialectical totality, epitomizes and reproduces the subject-object dichotomy
which is the inevitable product of a textual metaphor.
The two meanings of 'fact' are contradictory so long as we remain locked into (the
polarised versions of) the textual metaphor. Shift metaphors, however, and the
contradiction disappears. If we focus attention on archaeological practice as work
or labour, for example, rather than as reading or writing, it makes sense to conceive
of facts as being manufactured or made while at the same time always being made
out of something. To say that facts are social constructions does not necessarily
imply that there is no external reality; this reality can still be construed as the
raw material out of which facts are made. Bhaskar (1989:77-8) therefore puts
forward a very different conception of scientific activity, "the paradigm being that
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of a sculptor at work, fashioning a product out of the material and with the tools
available": this is what he calls the "transformational model of social activity".
Work consists of a practical transaction between the subject and the object, and
between culture and nature. Far from being a free-floating system of meanings,
as post-processualists would have it, culture is always grounded, reproduced and
transformed in its transactions with nature - which is likewise transformed - in the
practical setting of work or labour.
In terms of this model, "Thought cannot now be viewed as a mechanical function
of given objects (as in empiricism): nor can the activity of creative subjects be
regarded as endowing the world with things (as in idealism)" (Bhaskar 1989:26).
Facts have both material and cognitive dimensions. They are social products,
fashioned out of the world-at-hand, but like all human artefacts - once made -
they tend to stand as things in their own right, so that "we tend to read the world
as if it were comprised of facts" (Bhaskar 1989:61). In this way Bhaskar not only
counters empiricism, but also explains it. "Facts are real, but they are historically
specific realities. The mystification attached to them derives from the condition
that, in our spontaneous way of thinking and in empiricism, the philosophy which
reflects this, the properties possessed by facts as social objects are transformed into
qualities belonging to them as natural things" (Bhaskar 1989:9).
The metaphor of work or labour, then, has been extended to cover human percep-
tual processes. In Bhaskar's scheme, facts are the result rather than the cause of
perception; the 'objective' meaning of things is constructed in perception in much
the same way as a sculptor or artisan fashions an artefact from a raw material -
so that the world increasingly comes to be comprised of objectifications of socio-
cultural and subjective meanings. That perception can be viewed as an active
performance (Ittelson and Cantril 1954, Neisser 1976, Gibson 1979), rather than
merely the passive reception and processing of incoming sense-data (as conven-
tional psychology would have it) has important implications for scientific episte-
mology. It is not just that perception is inter-meshed with bodily movement and
action; it is itself a kind of praxis. What is perceived depends in part upon the
cultural background, skill and experience of the perceiver, as well as what is 'actu-
ally there' to be perceived. Aquired cultural schemes draw our attention to some
aspects of the world encountered and not to others; in this sense the facts perceived
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to exist 'out there' are the products of cultural action. As Bhaskar (1989:60) puts
it, facts must be conceived "as potentialities of the conceptual schemes that gov-
ern our enquiries, which when actualised constitute discoveries. A fact, then, is
a potentiality actualized in discovery, sustained in practice... and objectified in
sense-perception."
This kind of analysis does not question the post-processualists' assertion that facts
are social constructions, but it does reject the notion that facts are wholly textual
creations. It directs our attention to an earlier stage of the scientific process which
precedes inscription. And in this it draws from the empiricists' insistence that all
knowledge must ultimately be grounded in our perceptual experience of the world.
The origin of the fact is sought neither in the creative activity of writing subjects
nor in the objective properties of nature, but rather in labour or perceptual labour,
in causal interchange with nature.
1.6 What the Record-Metaphor Hides
Bhaskar's paradigm of a 'sculptor at work' enables us to see what is neglected or
hidden by the metaphor of material remains as RECORD or TEXT. In terms of
the record-metaphor, empiricists tend to regard facts as things which are contained
in, uncovered and transcribed from the material record, quite independently of any
subjective or cultural contribution from the agents of discovery. It is of course well
known to anyone who has worked out in the field that in practice it is impossible to
separate subjective interpretation from objective fact; as Barker (1977:143) points
out, "observation is not an automatic process. It depends entirely upon the par-
ticular knowledge of the observer." Nevertheless, the record-metaphor plays down
the active role of the agents of discovery. The culturally-acquired skills, rationales
and techniques possessed by these agents - which enable them to constitute mate-
rial objects or patterns as 'facts' to be inscribed - are also played down. In so far
as their skills are highlighted at all, they are characterised as more like those of
a reader who passively 'takes' meaning from a text, than those of a sculptor who
actively 'applies' meaning, both manually and cognitively, to the material being
worked.
In Part I we will see how the agents of discovery (ie. the diggers who initially
come into contact with material evidence, manipulate it, and transform it into
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data) are effectively 'written out' of excavation-reports, and how their erasure is
strategically linked to the presentation of facts in those texts as being somehow
'interpretation-free' and 'theoretically-neutral'. For the representative record is
meant to be a literal transcription of the material record - the raw material for
theoretical analysis rather than the end-product of practical interpretations. Only
by excluding the agents of discovery from the text is it possible to preserve the
apparent 'objectivity' of recorded facts. But this has led to a significant blind
spot in archaeological epistemology. While there is a great deal of literature about
the formation-processes of the material record up to the act of discovery, and a
great deal of literature about the analytical procedures which follow on from the
act of discovery, there is very little literature (apart from prescriptive manuals of
excavation technique) about the act of discovery itself.
It is interesting that the same oversight has carried over into post-processualist
thought, which sustains the same 'squeezing out' of the act of discovery and the
agents of discovery. Although Shanks and Tilley (1989:2) explicitly set out to
"break down the divide.., between theory and practice", they are actually more
concerned to "emphasize theory as a practice" rather than the other way round.
In showing how writing is a kind of practice, they neglect to show how digging is
likewise a kind of theory. Writing, not digging, is regarded as the real material
practice of archaeology. Indeed, "It might be said that digging is a pathology of
archaeology. A major problem that has always dogged archaeology is the notion
that it is primarily about excavation" (Tiley 1989:275). In the post-processualist
analysis of the construction of archaeological facts, then, attention is directed to-
wards the academic structures within which the activity of writing takes place,
rather than the non-academic setting of digging and practical labour. No men-
tion is made of that most neglected and informal of archaeological institutions -
the digging circuit. It seems to have escaped the notice of textual theorists that
there are several hundred people involved in archaeological work in Britain who are
not themselves primarily concerned with the writing of texts, are rarely cited in
excavation-reports, and leave to work on other sites when the real (post-excavation)
work of textual production begins.
It is true that circuit-diggers draw plans, plot finds, lay out grids, take photographs,
write out context-sheets, etc - and indeed that most of the primary data for sub-
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sequent research are produced by them in the inscriptive practices of excavation
- but they also dig pits, postholes, ditches and other material features. They are
engaged in a multitude of manual practices which precede inscription. These prac-
tices take place out in the open air rather then in the artificial environment of
libraries and university departments - 'on the ground' rather then in the 'upper
stratosphere' of academic discourse. The trowel and the spade, not the book and
the pen, are the principal items of their material culture. And diggers do actually
come into contact with something that is not text, some kind of external reality
which - however much we may try to constitute it as a written record - has not
been written at all.
In so far as the event of excavation is considered by post-processuaiists, it tends to
be apprehended within the constraints of the textual metaphor. Thus in his paper,
Excavation as Theatre, Tilley (1989:278-9) characterizes the relation between ex-
cavation and the site-report as "an interpretive production for which the analogy
of the dramatic performance and its relation to a script seems peculiarly appro-
priate." And again, "The relationship between excavation and what gets written
resembles that between an individual speech utterance and an underlying set of
grammars. The excavation provides a set of grammars, often incoherent or con-
tradictory, both enabling and constraining the production of a text." Discourse
still holds sway over inarticulate practical labour. Yet the author acknowledges
that "There exist a series of real and incomensurable transformations between the
practices of digging a trench and the drawing, recording and interpretation of a
section, a disjunction between two very different material realities... There is no
clear passage from the activity of excavation to the activity of writing." In this way
we reach the limits of the explanatory power of the textual metaphor. If we are to
begin to understand the material reality of digging which precedes inscription, we
would have to replace the textual model with a more appropriate metaphor.
The problem with the post-processualist account is that it tends to exclude the
constraining role of the material object - the actual material remains which are
uncovered and worked upon during excavation - from the activity of creative sub-
jects (just as empiricists tend to exclude from their discourse the active role of the
subject in the constitution of objects). It is not, then, that the textual metaphor
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hides either the subject or the object, for both are separately stressed by post-
processualist and empiricist versions of the metaphor. What the metaphor hides
is the transaction between the subject and the object, as it takes place in the act of
discovery. This is why the event of excavation, constituted as intersubjective work
or labour upon material objects (rather than merely a process of transcription or
inscription) rarely appears in theoretical discourse.
1.7 Material Remains as Raw Material
The metaphor of material remains as RAW MATERIAL throws a very different
light upon archaeological practice. It plays down the recording-relation between
observable archaeological effects and past human action that was highlighted by
the empiricist version of the record-metaphor. Facts about the past are no longer
seen as properties of the material record or text, which only have to be (passively)
transcribed or read by archaeologists. Nor are facts regarded as wholly textual
creations, fashioned out of nothing but the signs and grammar of textual discourse.
On the contrary, facts about the past are (actively) produced in the present from
the RAW MATERIAL of material remains.
This alternative metaphor implicates the subsidiary metaphors of PRODUCERS
(archaeologists), PROCESSES OF PRODUCTION (archaeological practice) and
PRODUCT (facts, data, theories, knowledge about the past). As the products or
ARTEFACTS of excavation, facts can be said to be MADE, WROUGHT, CON-
STRUCTED, MANUFACTURED, SHAPED, WORKED and FASHIONED by
archaeologists. But like most human artefacts, they are the INSTRUMENTS and
TOOLS as well as the products of labour. Established facts, theories and models
can be used to shape further raw material, which means that knowledge is always
REPRODUCED in practice. However, the raw material - at once PLIABLE and
RESISTANT - constrains the form of the knowledge which is fashioned from it.
Importantly, the metaphor draws our attention to the SITE where the raw material
is initially encountered, and where the work of transformation takes place. The
site can be defined as the point of intersection between culture and nature - the
locus at which culture comes into contact with nature and nature is transformed
into culture. [The term 'nature' will be used in various ways in this thesis. For
the sense in which I mean it here, see Section 12.2. In the fieldwork report,
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'NATURE' in capital letters designates all those things which are situated outside
the 'CULTURAL' domain of archaeological knowledge and practices in the present
day, or the raw material which has yet to be assimilated into that domain - see
Section 4.2. This should be regarded as quite distinct from the way in which
archaeologists use the term to designate those things deemed not to be the effects
of past cultural activity - see Section 7.2.]
The site can also be defined as a transaction between the subject (as agent) and
the object (as patient) - in the context of which, as we shall see, the object can
act back upon the subject, and nature can act back on culture. We are no longer
concerned so much with the physical formation processes of the objective material
record, nor with the textual production of the written archaeological record. What
we are interested in are the formation processes, or processes of production and
reproduction, of archaeological knowledge, as these are grounded in practice at the
site of discovery.
This means taking our leave from those conventional epistemologies which con-
strue archaeological inference as wholly a matter of mental operations - induction,
deduction and the justification of propositions. And since we are no longer dealing
with a text, the hermeneutical approach of Derrida and Barthes is inappropriate.
The labour process theory of Marx (1973, 1976, Markus 1978), the existential
philosophy of Heidegger (1962), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Sartre (1957, 1976),
the phenomenological orientation of Schutz (1964, 1973), the more recent prac-
tice theory of Bourdieu (1977, 1990), the structuration theory of Giddens (1976,
1984) and the realist ontology sketched out by Bhaskar (1975, 1989), fit much
better into the internal structure of the metaphor and provide the philosophical
background for this thesis. All these writers are concerned in different ways with
human praxis; that is, with cultural activity grounded in some kind of practical
transaction with nature - this transaction taking on what phenomenologists have
called the "life-world" (Gurvitsch 1970, Schutz and Luckmann 1973) rather than
within the structures of a text.
It is the explicit aim of this thesis to use the alternative metaphor of material
remains as RAW MATERIAL to try and break down the oppositions that have
arisen in archaeological discourse between subject and object, idealism and mate-
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rialism. There is a very real danger, however, that in countering the precedence
that is normally accorded to theory over practice and text over life-world, these
dichotomies will merely be reproduced rather than overcome. In focusing upon the
practical labour of excavation, then, it is important to examine the ways in which
the text manifests itself in the life-world, and those ways in which practice is itself
a kind of theory-in-action.
The alternative metaphor changes our view of the past as well as the present.
Aspects of the 'constructivist' metaphor for understanding archaeological practice
have of course already appeared in post-processualist thought. Thus the past is
spoken of as a 'product', 'artefact', 'construction' or 'creation' of the present-day
(eg. there is "no such thing as a real past" Shanks and Tilley 1989:3). But at
the same time the post-processualists have never really escaped from the tradi-
tional textual metaphor, giving rise to contradictions that derive from the mixing
of metaphors. As Bender (1989:12) and Hodder (1989:15) point out, there is con-
siderable confusion about the relationship of the past to the present. Shanks and
Tilley tend to regard the past as being created in the present, but they also imply
the former existence of a real past that is somehow recorded (eg. "All traces of
the past are important" Tilley 1989:227). An implicit ontology seems to underlie
their anti-realist position, even if no explicit distinction is drawn between what
are after all two very different kinds of pasts - the past which we create and the
past which is presupposed to have really occurred. Since we are engaged in disen-
tangling the constructivist metaphor from the textual metaphor, let us make this
distinction quite explicit here. The past which is presupposed to have 'actually
happened' irrespective of what archaeologists say about it, should be regarded as
logically distinct from the knowledge of the past which archaeologists construct.
The second is clearly a product of archaeological practice in the present-day and
the recent past; the first (except in so far as it is presupposed) is not a product of
the present in any way at all.
The distinction becomes clearer when framed in terms of Bhaskar's ontology.
Bhaskar (1978, 1989:16-18, 26) distinguishes between 1. the intransitive objects of
knowledge: those things which exist (or existed) independently of, but are presup-
posed by, scientific knowledge and practices. 2. the transitive objects of knowledge:
the established facts, models, theories, techniques, cognitive and material tools of
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scientific knowledge. Importantly, the intransitive objects can only be charac-
tensed by the same names as those of transitive objects. Thus the past - the real
past which is presupposed to have actually happened and is therefore unalterable
- is an intransitive object of knowledge. But it can only be characterised in terms
of the facts or theories we have about the past, which are the transitive objects
of knowledge. As science itself is a socially and historically situated activity, the
transitive objects of scientific knowledge are also social and historical entities that
change through time. Hence we find that our knowledge of the past is subject, as
Shanks and Tilley have pointed out, to any number of transformations - depending
on the cultural standpoint of those who inscribe this knowledge. But the past, the
real past, cannot be changed.
Bhaskar's ontological scheme, which simply insists that existence must precede
theory rather than the other way round, can be extended to resolve a further and
not altogether unrelated confusion that has arisen in archaeological discourse. We
are accustomed to thinking of material remains and data as synonymous terms,
referring to the same reality. But the new metaphor forces us to draw a distinction
here. As Sullivan (1978:189) points out, material remains are not data. Material
remains (at least up to the moment of discovery) exist independently of archaeolog-
ical practice; data, on the other hand, are the products of archaeological practice.
Data are generated or produced from material remains in practice. Another way
of putting it is that, prior to their discovery, material remains existed outside of
the cultural domain of archaeology - even if, in the act of discovery, they are trans-
formed into cultural objects. Data, however, are cultural through and through.
Material remains are the raw material out of which data are fashioned.
By merging the concepts of material remains and data, conventional epistemology
has effectively 'squeezed out' the need for a theory of archaeological practice. This
is one of the ways in which the record-metaphor has 'covered over' the act of
discovery - and the active role of the agents of discovery in the constitution of data
or facts. But the metaphor of material remains as RAW MATERIAL separates
the two concepts and opens up the theoretical space between them. It draws
our attention to the "cluster of material and cognitive practices" (Harre 1986:6)
through which data are produced in the event of excavation.
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1.8 From Inside to Outside Perspective
Root-metaphors carry metaphysical implications. They not only provide ways of
thinking about the world, but also ways of seeing it; that is, they constitute for
us a cognitive standpoint or point of view, and hence a particular perspective for
apprehending reality. Change root-metaphors and one's point of view changes
accordingly. It is sometimes said that metaphysical questions should be left to
one side, and that we should simply get on with the job of doing archaeology (see,
for example, Watson 1973:209). But this is really just a strategy for defending
an established and entrenched metaphysics. To those who adopt this strategy we
could say, rather as Wiffiam Blake said to the angel in Marriage of Heaven and
Hell (plate 19), "All that we saw was owing to your metaphysics."
The conventional metaphor of material remains as RECORD or TEXT involves
taking the perspective of an archaeologist observing or reading material remains.
Material remains are, as it were, placed in the foreground. The archaeologist, as
the one doing the observing or reading, is placed in the background. That is,
whenever we think in terms of the record-metaphor we are conceptually situating
ourselves inside the subject-object relation, constituting ourselves as subject in
relation to the objective material record. The metaphor of material remains as
RAW MATERIAL, on the other hand, constitutes as its object the processes of
production through which a producer transforms a raw material into a product
(ie. the practices of excavation through which the archaeologist transforms mate-
rial remains into data). it is the subject-object relation itself that is objectified,
and we find ourselves - as the true subject - conceptually situated outside of this
relation. The idea of an ethnography of archaeology, which may seem practically
incomprehensible and outrageous from the first point of view, flows quite naturally
from the second.
The record-metaphor is perhaps the more appropriate cognitive framework to
adopt for the task of actually doing archaeology, since this task - as we shall
see - involves the objectification of material remains and a taking-for-granted of
one's own subjective contribution to the constitution of the object. But it is not
necessarily the most appropriate framework to use in giving an account of archae-
ological practice. An objective perspective on the workings of science cannot be
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attained from a viewpoint situated inside the very activities that one seeks to de-
scribe. Indeed, the creed of scientific objectivity would seem to oblige us to take
up an outside perspective on scientific practices. As Bourdieu (1988:7) puts it,
"the principle virtue of the scientific work of objectification... consists in its al-
lowing us to objectify objectification." The raw material metaphor, then, provides
a more appropriate cognitive orientation for the study of archaeological practice.
But it has the interesting effect of locating this study beyond the parameters of
archaeological discourse. Circumscribed by the metaphor of the record or text and
polarised by the subject-object dichotomy, the sphere of archaeological discourse
contains no precedent for "an ethnography of the subject-object relation in archae-
ological practice." To find precedents for this type of work, we have to move into
the separate disciplines of social anthropology and the sociology of science.
1.9 Recent Work in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
The sociology of knowledge has its roots in the writings of Marx and Durkheim,
but only recently has it moved away from the Durkheimian view that science,
and the knowledge it produces, is somehow exempt from sociological explanation.
The paradox has come to light that, if science is truly to explain or describe the
world, it ultimately has to explain itself as a (constitutive) part of that world.
Bringing scientific explanation back to bear upon itself, with all the problems of
reflexivity that this entails, is the explicit aim of the new field of sociology of
scientific knowledge. As defined by Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983:2), the field
consists of "a vigorous and systematic attempt to subject natural and technological
scientific knowledge to the same scrutiny which has long been brought to bear on
other systems of beliefs, such as religious and philosophical knowledge or political
thought."
For a general overview of this field the reader is referred to Mulkay (1979), Knorr-
Cetina (1981:Ch.1), Barnes and Edge (1982) and Woolgar (1988a). Running
throughout this work is an insistence that science is a historically and cultur-
ally situated phenomenon, and that scientific knowledge is not entirely determined
by natural evidence or data. Social factors play a major role in the construction
of knowledge. Indeed, the assertion that knowledge is a social construction is rad-
ically opposed to the conventional view of knowledge as being purely descriptive,
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with a one-to-one correspondence with nature. "Accordingly, the study of scien-
tific knowledge is primarily seen to involve an investigation of how scientific objects
are produced in the laboratory rather than a study of how facts are preserved in
scientific statements about nature" (Knorr-Cetina 1983:119, my italics).
Ethnography has emerged as the most important investigative method in this re-
search programme. A number of ethnographies of laboratory science, in which the
sociologist enters the laboratory as a 'naive' participant-observer, have produced
accounts of scientific practice very different from those presented by conventional
epistemologies. The emphasis tends to be on what scientists actually do, rather
than what philosophers of science say about what they do - on how they do it,
rather than why. A major achievement of these laboratory studies has been to
bring to light the role of craft knowledge (sometimes referred to as 'tacit skills',
'practical competence', 'embodied expertise' or 'knowing-how') in scientific work.
This non-verbal component, precisely because it cannot be verbalized, simply does
not appear in conventional accounts of science (though see Polanyi 1958). Lab-
oratory ethnographies carried out by Latour and Woolgar (1979), Knorr-Cetina
(1981) and Lynch (1985) provide precedents for the ethuography of archaeological
practice presented in Part II of this thesis.
It is important, however, to recognise the different settings of material practices
in natural science and archaeology. In the natural sciences, the 'site' of knowledge
production is the artificial environment of the laboratory itself. As Knorr-Cetina
(1983:119) puts it, "In the laboratory scientists operate upon (and within) a highly
preconstructed artifactual reality. It is clear that measurement instruments are the
products of human effort, as are articles, books, and the graphs and print-outs pro-
duced. But the source materials with which scientists work are also preconstructed
'Raw' materials which enter the laboratory are carefully selected and 'prepared'
before they are subjected to 'scientific' tests." Compare this with an archaeological
site. Here the material evidence, far from being a speck on a microscope slide or a
track in a bubble-chamber, comprises part of the landscape itself - the setting in
which the archaeologist works. And the degree of instrumentation is correspond-
ingly small, a relatively simple technology of spades, trowels, etc, being substituted
for the vastly more complex array of instruments in a laboratory.
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This has important implications for the research orientation of the ethnographer.
To the ethnographer of laboratory work "the laboratory displays itself as a site of
action from which 'nature' is as much as possible excluded rather than included"
(Knorr-Cetina 1983:119). The perceived absence of 'nature', 'reality', or truly
'raw' material leads to the view that the knowledge produced in the laboratory is
entirely a social product, unconstrained by any resistance from the natural world
(see Woolgar 1988a:54-69 for an outline of this extreme relativist position). In-
deed, it could be said that sociologists of science have failed to locate the point
at which culture intersects with nature in scientific practice. And in so far as the
subject-object relation is apprehended, the object appears always as the product
or instrument rather than the raw material of human action.
An ethnographer of archaeological practice, on the other hand, is in a much better
position to study the relation between culture and nature. While the intersubjec-
tive activity of excavation is clearly a cultural phenomenon, and the data produced
in this activity are cultural products, the material evidence itself- the natural object
or raw material of archaeological practice - is also open to view. Indeed, excava-
tion appears quite plainly to the ethnographer as a transaction between culture
and nature (this transaction consisting of multiple subject-object transactions) in
which raw material is transformed into product. On this very different kind of
'site', then, there is an opportunity to look not just at the production and repro-
duction of knowledge, but also at the ways in which raw material might constrain
or change the knowledge that is constructed and applied. The possibility therefore
arises of overcoming the extreme relativist position that has come to characterise
both post-processual archaeology and the sociology of science.
1.10 Text Versus Practice in Social Anthropology
Shanks and Tilley's observation that writing is the principal activity of academic
archaeologists can be applied to ethnographers too (Clifford and Marcus 1986,
Geertz 1988). Cushman and Marcus (1982) have pointed to the ways in which
'ethnographic realism' is constructed as well as represented by the report or mono-
graph, and have drawn attention to the rhetorical aspects of ethnographic writing.
In terms of literary theory, fieldwork itself can be seen as mainly an inscriptive
practice, with notebooks and tape-recorders being the major items of material
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culture, and the eventual production of a text providing the rationale for doing
fieldwork in the first instance. There are signs, however, that anthropologists are
beginning to counter some of the more extreme claims of the 'post-modern' liter-
ary theorists. As Spencer (1989:145) argues, "anthropology is as much a way of
working - a kind of practical activity - as it is a way of writing."
Clifford Geertz was influential in introducing literary theory into ethnography, and
he remains the most often-quoted anthropologist in post-processual archaeology. It
is not just that his own ethnographic writing - see, for example, "Deep Play: Notes
on the Balinese Cockfight" (Geertz 1973:412-53) - eschews the 'neutral' tone of con-
ventional ethnographic reporting for a more highly-crafted literary style. Cultural
action itself is constituted as a kind of text. Geertz (1973:452) defines culture as
"an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologists strain to
read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong." Cultural mean-
ings come to be inscribed or stored in material symbols, which are "as public as
marriage and as observable as agriculture" (Geertz 1973:91). These public mean-
ings guide the actions, beliefs and attitudes of the members of a particular culture;
they also render the cultural text meaningful or 'readable' to the anthropologist
who studies them. Like a book, the cultural text is "a stratified hierarchy of mean-
ingful structures" (Geertz 1973:7), making a 'thick' or 'deep' reading possible. In
these ways Geertz uses a textual metaphor to constitute the anthropologist as both
reader and writer - the translator of cultural meanings from one textual medium
to another. This translation is never a direct copy or transcription, however; the
ethnographer 'fashions' his own textual product, hence the claim that ethnography
is a kind of 'fiction' (Geertz 1973:15).
Geertz played a major part in establishing ethnography as an interpretive en-
deavour, rather than straightforward description. This has had knock-on effects
in archaeology. Hodder's 'reading the past' and Shanks and Tilley's 'writing the
past' owe much to Geertz. But his textual metaphor leaves us with a static model
of culture. It constitutes the cultural text as a structure in its own right, tran-
scending individual actions. Social agents or subjects appear only as actors playing
out a pre-given cultural script (compare with Tilley's conception of 'excavation as
theatre' - summarized in section 1.6). There is no account of how subjects might
create or re-create their own cultural meanings, or how the pre-given text might be
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transformed through the everyday actions and interactions of individual subjects.
Subjects are subordinated to text, like characters in a novel. As Scholte (1986:10)
points out, Geertz fails to answer the questions "How is meaning constituted? By
whom? For whom? At whose expense?" The textual metaphor hides the active
role of the agents of production.
"Structuration theory" (Giddens 1976, 1984) and "theory of practice" (Bourdieu
1977, 1990) represents a very different approach to the problem of culture in current
social theory. It accepts that human action or practice is conditioned by social
structures, but it also sees social structures as the product of practices. This is
what Giddens (1984:25) calls the "duality of structure". Duality of structure is also
a duality of practice; practice is at once the product and (re)producer of structures.
Thus the focus shifts from how cultural meanings condition human action to how
those meanings are produced and re-produced in practice. Instead of a one way
structuration principle we have a dialectic, and this dialectic is situated in human
action itself. The crucial effect of this focus on practice is that it shifts the problem
of culture out of the timeless world of the text and into the temporal process
of bodily existence. Bourdieu's (1977:72) concept of 'habitus' as the mediating
principle between structure and practice is similar in many respects to the concept
of 'craft knowledge' or 'embodied expertise' that appears in the sociology of science.
It places the body, and the practical knowledge acquired and applied by the body,
at the very centre of theory of practice.
In so far as post-processual archaeology draws its theoretical framework from what
is often called the 'postmodernist discourse', it is noticeable that much greater
weight is given to the hermeneutical approach of the literary theorists (see Tilley
1990) - much less to practice theorists such as Bourdieu and Giddens. Emphasis
on the body and practical action is to a certain extent incompatible with the
textual metaphor. When practice theory is invoked at all (Shanks and Tilley
1982, Hodder 1986:70-74, Barrett 1987/8), it is applied only to interpretation of
material remains and past human action. As Hodder (1986:73) argues, "Bourdieu's
theory of practice presents an implicit invitation to archaeologists to come to an
understanding of the principles lying behind other cultural practices through an
examination of and involvement in objects arranged in space and in contexts of use"
(my italics). Yet this is to miss the point. The point of theory of practice is that it
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applies just as much to the practicioners of anthropology and archaeology - to our
own practices - as it does to some distant Other. Indeed, to understand the Other
we also have to understand the relationship that exists between ourselves and the
object of our study, for as observers of the past we tend to "introduce into the object
the principles of... [our]... relation to the object" (Bourdieu 1977:2). To apprehend
the relation through which the object is constituted, moreover, we would have to
step backwards, as it were, "to objectify the objectifying subject" (Bourdieu 1988:
xii) and examine the social conditions of the production of objective knowledge.
If this step is not taken, theory of practice loses much of its essential force.
Practice theory, then, provides the basic rationale for carrying out an ethnography
of archaeological excavation. 1mportantly, the purpose of such an investigation
is not to undermine or invalidate the knowledge that is produced in excavation
practices. On the contrary, the purpose is to examine the social conditions that
make the production of archaeological knowledge possible. And a shift in focus
away from static structures onto practical action does not imply a lack of concern
with cultural meanings: "the transcending issue... is not meaning or praxis, but the
meaning of constitutive practices and the praxis of constituted meanings" (Scholte
1986:10). Many of the gains of Geertz's interpretive anthropology, in so far as they
can be detached from the textual metaphor, can therefore be taken on board. The
concept of 'material symbols' (Geertz 1973:91) is entirely compatible with theory
of practice once we get away from the idea that the public meanings stored in the
cultural text are always fixed and unchangeable. Silverman (1990:126) compares
the concrete material symbols of Geertz with the more fluid ritual symbols of
Turner, which are understood to emit "multivocality, complexity of associations,
ambiguity, open-endedness" (Turner 1975:155), and which have different meanings
for the various participants in the ritual drama, depending on their point of view.
It is not that either Geertz or Turner are necessarily wrong, however. The crucial
issue to be explored in an ethnography of archaeological practice is how it is that
fluid, ambiguous meanings come to be fixed into concrete, unambiguous public
realities.
Another point of difference between Turner and Geertz, which has important impli-
cations for theory of practice, is that while Geertz focuses on the 'textual' meaning
of symbols, Turner insists that symbols have "an operational meaning as well as
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an interpretation" (Turner 1968:17). That is, they are things to handle and ma-
nipulate as well as things to 'read'. In some fundamental sense, the meaning of a
symbol is understood to be contained, not so much in the thing itself, but in its
use. "For the symbol... is the product of interaction between human actors... In a
real sense the meaning of the symbol is bound up with all these interactions., for it
would have no meaningful, cultural existence without this collaboration" (Turner
1968:3-4).
This idea was introduced into archaeology through Hodder's (1982b) important
ethnoarchaeological study, Symbols in Action. But if we are interested in the
ways in which people ascribe meaning to or extract meaning from material things
in practice, we do not necessarily have to journey far in time or space. There
are material symbols 'in action' on an archaeological site just as there are in the
villages of the Baringo. Indeed, it could be said that, of all peoples, archaeologists
are the manipulators of material symbols par excellence.
1.11 The Irony of an Ethnography of Archaeology
Ethnoarchaeology (Stiles 1975, Gould 1978, 1980, Gould and Schiffer 1981, Hodder
1982a:ch2) is the method normally associated with the study of material culture
in present-day contexts. Initially conceived as a means of gathering comparative
data which could be used to shed light on archaeological evidence, it has developed
into a discipline in its own right, which Rathje (1981:51-2) defines as the study
of "the interaction between material culture and human behaviour, regardless of
time and space."
But let us turn this method inside-out and upside-down, and bring it back to
bear upon its source. The fieldwork research presented in this thesis is a form of
ethno-archaeology, but in an ironic sense. In so far as the focus is on material
culture, it is on our own rather than that of a distant Other. For it is often
forgotten that, in appropriating the material cultures of others for archaeological or
ethnographic research, these become our material culture - and in the context of our
research practices come to be invested with cultural meanings very different from
the meanings they possessed in their original context of use. Ethnoarchaeological
literature, though it extends to discussions of material culture in modern Western
society, is curiously silent about the material symbols of (ethno-)archaeology itself.
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Ethnography of archaeology, as the reflexive or ironic form of ethnoarchaeology,
takes an outside perspective looking in rather than an inside perspective looking
out. This reversal of the anthropological perspective has interesting effects and
implications. For instead of travelling outwards to look at cultural activities which,
from our point of view, seem exotic and strange - translating these into our own
categories of thought - the journey takes an inwards direction, into our common-
sense world, trying to penetrate into that which we normally take to be natural and
self-evident. To an anthropologist who chooses to study his own world (and the
digging-circuit is my world - since I worked for five years as a digger before coming
to university), the aim is to "exoticise the domestic" rather than to "domesticate
the exotic", through "a break with the initial relation of intimacy with modes
of life and thought which remain opaque to him because they are too familiar"
(Bourdieu 1988:xi).
Bourdieu (ibid) goes on to argue that "the movement towards the originary, and
the ordinary, world, should be the culmination of a movement towards alien and
extraordinary worlds." As Marcus and Fischer (1986:111) point out, ethnographers
of other cultures have always had a "hidden agenda" of critique of their own
culture. This critique is made quite explicit by turning the very methods and
perspectives employed in scientific observation back to bear upon the culture of
scientific observation itself. But this is not to deny the importance of conventional
ethnographic work. 'Looking in' and 'looking out' are complementary perspectives
in the anthropological project, broadly conceived. Marcus and Fischer (1986:x)
put it like this: "Such exploration in anthropology lies in the move from a simple
interest in the description of cultural others to a more balanced purpose of cultural
critique which plays off other cultural realities against our own in order to gain a
more adequate knowledge of them all."
In so far as this thesis attempts a 'cultural critique', however, it is directed at the
theoretical and epistemological structures which represent (or conspicuously fail
to represent) digging practices - rather than at the digging practices themselves.
For one of the things which theory always takes for granted is the act of discovery
- the context of practical labour in which data are initially produced and theory is
ultimately grounded. As concrete human action, the act of discovery is as complex
and mysterious and as difficult to understand as any other material practice in
40
which agents equipped with symbolic faculties are engaged. Yet theory tends to
regard the act of discovery as literally just the un-covering of material evidence,
as if the covers were merely pulled back to reveal the facts. Excavation is seen as
mundane, ordinary, run-of-the mill, matter-of-fact, and of little theoretical interest.
And as a corollary of this, the people who dig up the evidence from the ground
- who actively recognise and select out relevant objects and patterns from a field
of background 'noise', who manipulate and explore the unfolding evidence and
transform it into meaningful data - are regarded, as far as theory is concerned, as
little more than 'manual' (as opposed to 'intellectual') workers. In this way the act
of discovery has itself been 'covered over' in theoretical discourse. An ethnography
of archaeological practice, then, necessarily involves us in a re-discovery of the act
of discovery.
The reader will find that the concept of the act of discovery (like the act of dis-
covery itself) is elusive and 'slippery' - difficult to grasp and easy to lose hold of -
simply because it refuses to respect traditional dichotomies of thought. As long as
we think on terms of subject/object, ideas/material, theory/practice, mind/body
and similar Cartesian oppositions, the act of discovery cannot be apprehended as
such. it is possible to be immersed in the act of discovery without being able to
grasp it objectively. And even by taking a step backwards to stand outside looking
in, it is easy to lose sight of. Focus attention on a material object without a sub-
ject, or subjects removed from the object of their labour, and the act of discovery
disappears. This is because the act of discovery is the transaction between the sub-
ject and the object - a practical activity of the embodied subject upon an emerging
object in which theory is "brought down to earth", involving both manual and in-
tellectu4 skills. My fieldwork represents a concentrated attempt to apprehend the
act of discovery - at the expense, perhaps, of giving a full ethnographic account of
life on the digging circuit. Political and social aspects of excavation are explored
only in so far as they bear directly upon the actual discovery and manipulation of
material evidence.
The problem for the ethnographer of the familiar world is precisely the inverse
of that of the ethnographer of alien cultures. Characteristically, the latter spends
many months or years learning the local language and immersing him- or her-self in
cultural activity before a deep understanding of a society is gained. The problem
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is to 'get into' a way of life different from one's own. But the ethnographer of
the familiar, by way of contrast, has to make a conscious effort to suspend (or
'put into brackets', as 1-lusserl would say) his own taken-for-granted concepts, in
order to 'stand outside' of a system of cultural meanings that he normally inhabits.
This effort to de-familiarise is difficult to sustain for long. My experience was that
the most productive period of fieldwork occurred right at the start, rather than
towards the end. No excuses are made, then, for the unusually short time (11
weeks) spent out in the field.
Irony is an essential 'tool of the trade' in the writing-kit of an ethnographer of
the familiar. A sense of irony derives from the operation of turning the outward-
looking gaze back in on itself. Thus this thesis could be described as a study in
'ethnoarchaeology', 'contextual archaeology', 'social archaeology', or 'processual
archaeology', but only because (through a kind of ironic twist) it brings the ethno-
graphic perspective to bear upon the cultural context or social setting of the process
of archaeology itself - and in this way unites these disparate approaches into one
by focusing precisely on that which they all take for granted. The intended effect
of irony, of course, is surprise. As Marcus and Fischer (1986:111) point out, the
"relativizing of taken-for-granted concepts... and the beliefs that lend certainty
to everyday life may have the effect of "disorientating the reader and altering
perception." One of the many achievements of Geertz was to highlight the power
of anthropology and archaeology to surprise: "It has been the office of others to
reassure; ours to unsettle. Australopithicines, Tricksters, Clicks, Megaliths - we
hawk the anomalous, peddle the strange. Merchants of astonishment" (Geertz
1984:274). But it is generally only the distant Other that amazes. If only we could
suspend for a moment our own taken-for-granted concepts and beliefs, there is
much to be found which is surprising, even astonishing, in our everyday practices
also.
1.12 The Problem of Analogy
A movement away from abstract theory towards practice does not mean leav-
ing behind the problems that have arisen in theoretical discourse. Indeed, the
ethnographic method can be used to transport theoretical problems back into the
practical domain, where they take on a different aspect. Conceptually re-locating
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(and transforming) problems in this way has precedents in Marxist thought. Ac-
cording to Marx (1967:400-402), "The question whether human thinking can reach
objective truth is not a question of theory but a practical question"... "All myster-
ies which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice
and the comprehension of this practice."
Archaeological inference is normally regarded as a wholly theoretical concern -
a matter of argument, logic and the justification of propositions - with the data
produced in excavation providing the 'raw material' for theoretical analysis. But
inference is not just something that is written or argued; it is also something that
people do. So I shall shift various questions of inference away from the world
of texts and theories, and relocate them in the world of practical action and the
everyday events of excavation.
One reason for this strategy of bringing theory down to earth, and grounding it
in the practical events which occur 'on the ground', is the sheer intransigence
of theoretical problems, when dealt with solely on a theoretical level. Take the
problem of analogy as an example. It tends to be framed as 'how can we use
ethnographic analogies to shed light on archaeological data?' or 'how can we in-
terpret archaeological data without using analogy?' (for a comprehensive critical
review of the considerable body of literature on analogy in archaeological interpre-
tation, see Wylie 1984). But supposing, in the events of excavation, that the very
act of perception is an analogical process, that analogue models - drawn from our
own experience - are embedded in the observation, manipulation and recording of
material remains. This would mean that the data which are the basic units of
theoretical analysis are themselves the products of analogy (Hodder 1982a 11-12).
To give an adequate account of the role of analogy, then, we would have to, as it
were, move on to the other side of data. We would have to look at the processes
of the production of data, in excavation practice.
The problem of analogy seems a particularly appropriate theoretical issue to trans-
port out into the field, in the light of the growing body of literature which indicates
that analogy and metaphor are embedded in human language, cognition and praxis
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Arbib and Hesse 1986:147-70, Johnson 1987). Although
the role of analogy in archaeological interpretation has in the past been a con-
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tentious issue that has polarized the archaeological community - with some critics
(eg. Freeman 1968, Gould 1980) arguing that the analogical method is unscientific
and misleading and should therefore be eliminated - most of the leading figures in
the current methodological debate recognise that analogy plays an important role
in the interpretation of material remains. Thus Hodder (1982a:12) states that "the
archaeologist has to draw on knowledge of his own or other contemporary societies
in order to clothe the skeleton remains from the past in the flesh and blood of
living , functioning and acting people. The drawing of analogies would thus seem
to play a central role in archaeological reasoning." Sabloff, Binford and Macanany
(1987:208) argue that "it is how analogies are derived, how they are used, and
how they are integrated in broader research strategies that are among the critical
questions to be faced by archaeologists today." And Shanks and Tilley (1987a:20)
state that "The truth of the past is metaphorical."
None of these authors, however, make the step of grounding analogy in bodily
action and perception. The body is the crucial term missing from their accounts.
To Shanks and Tilley metaphor (and indeed 'the truth of the past' which is con-
structed through metaphor) is largely a linguistic and literary phenomenon. To
most archaeologists, including Hodder and Sabloff et al., analogy is principally
a form of theoretical reasoning and mode of argument - rather than a cognitive
faculty embedded in human praxis (but see Hodder 1982a:11-12). In much of the
philosophical work on analogy, too, analogy is regarded as a purely cognitive or
ideational process. Thus Uemov (1970) defines analogy as "association by simi-
larity, on the basis of which one notion evokes another" and goes on to outline
the forms of argument which can be used to represent this cognitive function.
Leatherdale (1974:32) comes much closer to an understanding of analogy as a
practical process when he says that "The basis of progress in science is not an
analogical argument.., but an analogical perception which involves the importation
of analogues from discrete areas of experience into the area of experience under
investigation, so that hitherto unremarked analogies are seen and novel inferences
suggested."
In Chapters 8 and 9 of the fieldwork report it will be argued that a kind of prac-
tical analogy lies at the heart of the inferences which archaeologists make in the
practices of excavation. These analogies condition the perception, recognition,
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selection, identification and manipulation of material evidence, and the transfor-
mation of that evidence into data. As creative practical operations, analogies-in-
action facilitate the production of original knowledge about the past, as well as
the reproduction of existing knowledge. They not only constrain archaeological
interpretation; they also enable archaeological interpretation to take place in the
first instance.
To locate the role of analogy in the production (rather than in the justification)
of knowledge is to take the question of analogy from theory to practice, from text
to lifeworld, from abstract inference to inference-in-action, and from subjective
thought to the transaction between the subject and the object. Another way of
putting it is that analogy can be found at work in the mud and the rain and the
reality of the material practices of excavation just as it can be found in academic
discourse and analysis. And we find that these practical analogies are quite dif-
ferent from the analogies represented in archaeological texts (eg. Binford 1967;
Hodder 1982a:72-92). It is only in texts, after all, that analogies and models are
frozen into static schemes. In action, analogies have a temporal structure, in the
sense that they are continually shifting and changing to take account of emerging
evidence. They are part and parcel of the temporal process of excavation.
1.13 A Time for Experiment
In this introductory chapter I have tried to show how 'root-metaphors' may con-
dition our theoretical stance within the world, our point of view upon it, and our
approach towards it. This applies as much to my own research as to anyone else's
- hence the effort to make explicit the metaphor which lies behind this research
project, and gives rise to the idea of an ethnography of archaeological practice.
That such a project is possible at all owes much to the questioning of established
theory and the opening up of new spaces for experimental research accomplished
by the post-modernists. "What is happening," say Marcus and Fischer (1986:ix),
"seems to us to be a pregnant moment in which every individual project of ethno-
graphic research and writing is potentially an experiment." Although the textual
model of culture favoured by these authors is rejected here, many of their insights
on writing have to be taken on board. In the sense that presenting a piece of
academic research involves an act of writing and the subsequent production of a
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book or thesis, there really is no escape from the text. So much a part of our lives,
we tend to take the text - and the conventions of rhetoric and narrative that are
reproduced in the writing of it - completely for granted. This makes it important
for all of us, to some degree at least, to interrogate the ideology of representation
in the very act of representing (Woolgar 1988b,14-34). And in doing so, as Sperber
(1985:33) argues, "each ethnographer should re-think the ethnographic genre."
But ontological doubt should not necessarily lead us into the virtual reality of
an all-encompassing textual metaphor. The post-modern sensibility, as Boyne
(1988:527) points out, also involves "a shift of emphasis from epistemology to
ontology.., a de-privileging shift from knowledge to experience, from theory to
practice, from mind to body". It is this underlying current of post-modernist
thought that presents a possible means of 'escaping from the text'.
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Part I
A Textual Analysis
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Chapter II
THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF TEXTS: THE TEXTS OF
ARCHAEOLOGY
2.1 The Other Side of Data
In Section 1.5 it was pointed out that, when archaeologists speak of theories about
the past being 'based' upon the facts contained in the archaeological record, they
are often referring not so much to the material record, but rather to the (tex-
tual) record that has been made of material evidence. In an important sense this
record - comprised of excavation reports, archives, etc - is regarded as the 'ground'
of theoretical knowledge. Theories can be inducted from or tested against that
record, which is seen to be practically equivalent to the material evidence it rep-
resents. Thousands of books, reports, theses, etc, have been written based almost
entirely on the textual record, without recourse or reference to any reaiity or 'facts'
outside of the text. Indeed there is a sense in which archaeological data do not
aquire full factual status until they have been represented in textual form. As
Colonel Pitt-Rivers (1898:28) put it long ago, "a discovery dates only from the
time of the record of it, and not from the time of its being found in the soil."
Underlying this textual 'ground', however, is a constellation of practical activities
through which the facts contained in the record have been meaningfully-constituted
and processed (eg. the systematic excavation of a site; the production of plans,
photos, context-sheets and other forms of textual data; the post-excavation work
of sorting and classification; the laboratory analysis of materials; the writing of
specialist reports; the synthesis of all this information into a comprehensive corpus
of facts; the writing and publication of the excavation report). Most important
of these is the 'act of discovery' - the initial encounter between archaeologists and
material remains - as it occurs in the context of manual digging practices out on
site.
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Yet the text hides the practical origins of the facts it represents. In order to
establish its equivalence to the material evidence 'out there', the text covers over
the active role of the agents of discovery (the diggers themselves) in the formation
of facts. Any reader of excavation reports who seeks to find out how its facts were
brought to light, recognised, fashioned, transformed into data, etc, would be in a
similar position to that of an archaeologist who - with only material form, style
and context to go on - wants to know how an artefact was made in the distant past.
The agents of discovery are not to be found in the text any more than the makers
of artefacts are to be found in the material record. Their former existence and
agency can only be inferred on the basis of traces which have survived the ravages
of time, together with analogies drawn from our own experience. In this ironic
sense an analysis of an excavation report can be characterised as an 'archaeology
of text'. Our purpose is to dig down through the layers of textual meaning to
uncover the origins of facts in the act of discovery, and to find out how the act of
discovery came to be buried in the first instance.
2.2 The Excavation Report and Textual Conventions
The excavation report selected for analysis in this chapter "Eight Ring-Ditches at
Four Crosses, Llandysilio, Powys, 1981-85" by Warriow et al, published in PPS
52, 1986, pp 53-87. It has been chosen for critique not because of any faults or ex-
cesses, but rather because it corresponds to established conventions of archaeologi-
cal report writing (as outlined, for example, in Grinsell, Rahtz and Price-Wiliiams
1974) and can be taken as a standard example of the excavation-report genre. The
temptation to draw examples from a number of different reports has been avoided.
Such is the similarity in style and organisation across a whole range of reports,
that it is possible to take one as fairly typical of most of the others. Almost any
modern excavation report from Britain could have been selected for the critique
which will be developed here.
2.3 Setting, Citation and Authority
The setting of the excavation report in a serious academic journal such as The
Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society is not only an important indicator of the
factual status claimed for the evidence; it also effectively encourages or directs
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the reader to take what is written as authoritative fact. The journal itself lends
authority to the report. The reader can be sure that the report has already passed
through a series of rigorous vetting and editorial procedures. We know that all such
articles are refereed and commented on by leading experts in the relevant fields,
with any errors of fact corrected. The authority vested in the report by these
invisible others predisposes us to accept the facticity of that which is presented.
Just as the journal is lent authority by citation of the names of prominent academic
figures (for evidence of the high academic standing of this particular journal, see
the list of members of the Council of the Prehistoric Society, opposite the table
of contents), so the status of the report itself is heightened by the citation of
names (see the list of contributors on p.953 and acknowledgements on p.87). Most
of the people cited in the report, it should be pointed out, were not involved in
the actual excavation itself; their contribution involved analysis of data that were
already given. They are the authors of specialist reports rather than the producers
of original data. Their citation serves to instruct the reader further upon the
legitimacy of the report, for many are well-known and respected 'experts', with
letters and publications to their name. In effect, each brings to the report the
stamp of approval from a particular institution or subdiscipline, informing the
reader that the evidence presented in the report has already been integrated into
the various specialized domains of archaeological knowledge that are personified by
the contributors. (For a more general sociological account of the citation process,
see Cronin, 1984).
By way of contrast, the workers who actually excavated the site - who achieved the
transformation of material remains into data - are not cited (with the exception
of directors, site supervisors and photographers). While specialists who did not
take part in the excavation have been "written in" to the report, these have essen-
tially been "written out". Few clues remain that could testify to the participation
of Manpower Services Commission workers, for example. From the available ev-
idence (two references to funding by MSC on p53 and pS7), the reader without
direct experience of excavation practice is hardly likely to guess that such workers
probably formed the larger part of the labour force, and indeed that much of the
data dealt with by the experts was produced by them in the first instance.
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Two main reasons can be identified to explain this omission. Firstly, the digging
and description of material remains is normally regarded as unproblematical - ie.
not the province of experts (in contrast to subsequent analysis and interpretation
of data produced in excavation - which is the province of experts). Only expert
knowledge is acknowledged by citation. In this way archaeological texts tend to
draw attention away from the production/producers of data, reproducing the tradi-
tional dichotomy between theory and practice and the precedence usually accorded
to theory over practice.
Secondly, MSC workers - and diggers in general - exist outside of the academic
reward system that tends to operate in and through texts. For while citations
clearly mobiise the authority and reputation of others in support of the text, en-
hancing the facticity of what is written, they simultaneously increase the academic
standing of the individuals cited. As Bourdieu (1975) has shown, the academic
world is caught up in cycles of mutual credit and counter-credit, where the capital
at stake is not money but prestige. Not being a part of the academic world, and
not being an author of texts, the average digger does not function in this reward
system.
An important point to emerge from this discussion on setting and citation, then,
is that the text is not only a vehicle for the presentation of facts; it is also a vehicle
for the reproduction of the political structure of the archaeological establishment
itself. These two functions, moreover, are inextricably connected. A fact needs
to be supported and legitimated by authoritative individuals for it to come fully
into being as a textual entity. But at the same time these individuals derive their
authority, in part, from their association with facts. Thus it is by reference to the
social and political dimension of facts that we can explain the presence or absence
of agents in the excavation report (cf. Woolgar 1988a:69 - I am drawing heavily
here from Woolgar's analysis of scientific texts).
2.4 Style as Persuasion
In any text, the style of writing adopted by the author(s) is a major factor in
creating the degree of realism that is conveyed to the reader. Because style is not
'in' the words themselves, but rather in the choice of words and the manner of
their delivery, it is a particularly useful device for persuading the reader of the
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authenticity of what is said, while at the same time - as Latour and Woolgar
(1979:240) point out - persuading the reader that (s)he has not been persuaded.
Such rhetorical persuasion is perhaps more a matter of convention than intention.
There may be no intent to persuade on the part of the author, whose mode of
writing is pre-ordained by established textual conventions.
Excavation reports are characterised by a style which can only be described as
'matter-of-fact'. Although the reader is not actually told in so many words, (s)he
is left in little doubt about the status of the information as 'hard fact'. The
following extract will serve as an example:-
"The ring-ditch was about 13m in diameter, 2.4-3.2m wide, and about im
deep from the gravel surface, with eroded upper edges beginning at a height
of about 0.5m above the base of the ditch. It contained three main layers of
ifil ... The primary layers of fill (4) were generally coarse in texture, leading
to yellowish-grey or olive-grey sandy gravels of the primary fill, and including
lenses of clean material weathered from the side of the ditch. The secondary
ifiling of the ditch (3) was fairly uniform dark yellowish-brown (10 YR 5/8)
sandy silt, to a yellowish-brown (1OYR 5/4) very fine sandy silt...." (p60, para
4)
This extract can be compared with an almost identical passage from a different re-
port cited by Hodder (1989:268): as Hodder points out (in an interesting historical
analysis of changes of style in archaeological writing), any recent excavation report
can provide similar examples. Both style and content of such accounts convey
very well the idea that archaeological practice is simply a matter of measurement
and description. The technical language employed carries the implication that
quantitative techniques of measurement (eg. with tape-measure or Munsell Colour
Chart) rather than qualitative methods of interpretation were used. This enables
the textual voice to speak with assurance about the accuracy of the data - to
imply 'this is exactly how things were'. The mass of fine detail strengthens this
impression.
However, the impression of realism is achieved only at a cost. Let us consider what
is left out from this kind of narrative. There is no account of:-
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Agency	 Agent
1. the writing of incipient facts into the text writer
2. the processing of data prior to writing 	 post-x worker
3. selection of 'relevant' data for recording 	 recorder
4. manipulation of material prior to recording digger
There seems to be something about the textual representation of facts that requires
the removal of all but the barest reference to the role of the agent in the constitution
of facts. "The writer and the excavator are absent, hidden within codes and
institutions" (Hodder 1989;271). By erasing or covering over the four layers of
agency listed above, the text reassures us that the facts are not the products of
our own actions or inventions. The reality constructed for the reader by the text is
made that much more real; the gap between the reader and the material evidence
described is closed. Mention of the intermediary agents would widen this gap, and
severely erode the cultivated impression that the text is practically equivalent to
a reality 'out there'. As Woolgar (1988a:69) argues, the role of the agent is of
considerable strategic importance in scientific discourse. But if we are going to
bring to light these hidden layers of agency, we should not stop at level 1. To do so
would be to fall into the post-processualist trap of believing that facts are wholly
textual creations. There are further layers, more difficult to discern in the text
because more deeply buried. And it is these hidden layers of agency that we are
primarily concerned with uncovering here.
2.5 A Stylistic Device
A further, related, effect of heightened realism - and the comcomniitant playing
down of the active role of the agent in the constitution of facts - is achieved by
the stylistic device of 'letting the facts speak for themselves'. This device is made
possible by the metaphor of material remains as material record (see Chapter
1). Since material remains are understood to constitute a record of past human
energy, all the archaeologist has to do is to 'read' the record. The record 'suggests'
or 'indicates' information about the past to the archaeologist:-
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"slight irregularities matched in the same segments of different circles.., suggest
that they were laid out simultaneously" (p.56, para.8).
"the evidence of fencing... suggests that the circles may have had several possible
functions" (p.57, para.5).
"There were no indications of a burial accompanying the weapons" (p.61,
para.9).
"the concentration [of charcoal] suggests some activity more or less contempo-
rary with the construction of the pit" (p. 64, para.4).
"there was a notable bias [in artefact distribution] towards the south-west side
of the site, suggesting that this side was accorded some special significance"
(p. 64, para.2).
These inferences about human agency in the unobservable past (including, as in
the last quote, inferences about past ideas) seem to follow or flow effortlessly
from the facts. The reader is given the impression that there are no problems
of inference in archaeological interpretation. We can learn about the past simply
by the observation or reading of material remains, as if information about human
behaviour is an objective property of the record. But to achieve this impression,
all but the merest shadow of an agent of inference has been omitted from the text.
2.6 The Metaphor of Discovery
Woolgar (1988a:55) points out that the 'metaphor of discovery' is embedded in
scientific discourse. Certainly the metaphor of archaeological practice as discovery
(that is, as a passive rather than an active procedure) is embedded in archaeo-
logical texts, and is closely linked to the metaphor of material remains as record.
Facts are regarded as a natural property of the material record, 'preserved' or
'contained' in the landscape. They only have to be 'un-covered' or 'dis-covered' by
the archaeologist. In removing the covers, the facts are 'revealed':-
"Excavation of the ring-ditches.. .has revealed a long and complex pattern of
development" (p.53, abstract).
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"The excavation of the three stretches of pit alignment revealed details of mor-
phology" (p.55, para.5).
"The single ring-ditch.. .was found upon excavation to be accompanied by a
small 'satellite'." (p.57, para.'?).
"the 'satellite'.. .was a purely fortuitous discovery made during the course of
the excavation" (p.61, para. 10).
Note the co-occurrence of verbs pertaining to the discovery of evidence and the
term 'excavation'. The dictionary definition of 'excavate' is 'to hollow or scoop out:
to dig out: to lay bare by digging'. The term implies the removal of something
from something else. It highlights that aspect of archaeological practice which
conforms to the metaphor of discovery - the removal of layers and the laying bare
of the layers below. This aspect is graphically illustrated in Photo (a), Plate 13
(opp.p56) where diggers are shown peeling off a spit of soil as if removing the
covers from a cricket pitch. The other photos, Plates 13-16, show the discovered
objects and patterns which have been revealed through this process of 'excavation
as revelation'.
The metaphor of discovery is not simply a matter of words; it is a conceptual
scheme which organizes the writing of the whole text (for all the evidence in the text
is presented as a discovered object which was merely 'un-covered' and 'revealed').
The discovered evidence is constituted by the metaphor as something that exists
quite independently of any agent of discovery. As Woolgar (1988a:55) argues, "The
image derives in part from the notion of geographical discovery. One travels to a
distant place and finds (comes upon or otherwise stumbles over) what was already
there... The rhetoric of this ontology portrays the objects of discovery as fixed,
but the agents of discovery as merely transitory."
What the metaphor of discovery hides, of course, is the active role of the agent
of discovery in looking or searching for relevant objects or patterns, and the close
connection between the mode of exploration and the form of discovered evidence.
It is not just a case of finding what is looked for - though it is certainly true that
anticipatory schemes are involved in the recognition and identification of relevant
object. Archaeological excavation is essentially an opening up of a domain that
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Site 2 (p57-61)
earlier activity
barrow
later activity
Site 1 (p55-57)
buried soil
central pit and p-h
central stake setting
stake-circles 1-6
surviving mound
ring-ditch
later activity
Site 3 (p64-68)
Phase 1. Middle to Late Neolithic
Phase 2. Beaker to Early Bronze Age
Phase 3. Early Bronze Age
was previously hidden, and this act of opening always entails physical manipulation
of material evidence. Discovered objects brought to light are a product not only
of human or natural agency in the past, but also of the agency of excavation
itself (see Bhaskar 1989:15-17 for an account of the scientist as a causal agent in
the constitution of empirical regularities observed in experimental science). The
emergence of evidence is invariably accomplished through the application of a range
of material and cognitive tools deployed by diggers in the act of discovery. Yet
their active and skilled contribution to the constitution of discovered evidence is
precisely what is played down and hidden by the metaphor of discovery.
2.7 De-temporalization
Closely related to the 'writing out' or erasure of the agent of discovery is the de-
temporalization of the excavation process. De-temporalization is a function of the
way events and evidence are ordered in the narrative (Woolgar 1988a:77, see also
Hodder 1989:271). By obliterating the sequences or chains of events which actually
occurred iii excavation, the text cultivates an image of the site as it was before
archaeological intervention - as something 'out there' which can be apprehended
by the reader quite independently of any agent of discovery. Consider, for example,
the order in which the text deals with discovered evidence:-
This is, of course, almost exactly the reverse of the order in which the evidence was
excavated. In post-excavation work and the writing of the text, then, a switch has
been made from 'real time' to 'theoretical time'. Data from the excavation has been
taken out of the temporal sequence in which it was recovered and fundamentally
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re-organized to fit into the chronological schemes and categories of archaeologi-
cal theory. This may be a necessary operation as far as theoretical analysis is
concerned, but let us consider what is lost in the re-organization of data.
What is lost is an account of the ways in which the events of excavation are inex-
tricably linked together through time and space in causal sequences - ie. how one
intepretation/decision/ action/observation leads on to another. Every moment in
the sequence presents a range of possible interpretations and strategies for action;
if a different step had been taken at one moment, then all subsequent events would
have been different too. The inversion of sequence removes these connections be-
tween events. Items of evidence whose interpretations were contingent upon each
other, and which were bound together in an unfolding-through-time digging expe-
rience, are split up and treated as separate objects - then recombined in different
ways. This has the effect of negating the possibility of other paths the excavation
could have followed - other evidence that might have been brought to light if a
different decision had been taken here or a different course of action taken there,
other interpretations that might have been made, other reports that might have
been written. AU the uncertainties and surprises of excavation have been ironed
out by the text. It is implied that any team of archaeologists would have discovered
exactly the same facts - that the complex series and sequences of events, and the
cumulative interpretation of material remains encountered, would have been more
or less the same no matter who excavated the site. In removing the agent and the
act of discovery from the text, then, time and any sense of excavation as temporal
process has also been erased.
2.8 Categories and Prototypes
A quality of timelessness is an attribute of any record or text. Words or facts are
frozen or suspended in time, 'preserved' from the flux and change of everyday life.
Since the metaphor of the archaeological record encompasses both the material
record and the representative or textual record, and indeed makes out these two
kinds of record to be practically equivalent to each other, we can explore the
(usually implicit) analogy that pertains between them here. For just as objects
are fixed within the static layers and stratigraphy of the material record, so they
come to be fixed within the static categories and classifications of the representative
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record. Once admitted into one of these categories, it would take a labour-intensive
excavation of the text to dig them out again.
Examples of the assimilation of new facts into the existing body of knowledge
include:-
"the slack profile and the simple rim [of the round-bottomed bowl] is broadly
comparable to vessels of the Ebbsfieet series (cf. a vessel from Capel Garman,
Gwynedd; Lynch 1969, fig57,23)" (p.71, para.S)
"The decorated bowl clearly falls within the Mortlake style of Peterborough
Ware" (p.71, para.S)
"The sherds from Site 2 which show a combination of comb-shaped and incised
decoration (p7) are similar to a sherd from a Beaker pit at Collfryn, Llansantf-
fraid Deuddior, Powys (Britnell, forthcoming) associated with a radiocarbon
date of 1835+85bc(CAR572)" (p.72, para.2).
"The presence of finger-printed sherds and comb-stamped decoration with
oblique motifs suggests a general attribution to a late stylistic Beaker phase
(cf.sherds from Trelystan:Britnell 1982,165-66)" (p.72, para.2).
"Other Welsh examples [of jet buttons] are known from Ysgwennant, Clwyd
(Savoury 1972, fig.17,f-g; Savoury 1980, fig.50; associated with a Southern
Beaker), Merthyr Mawr Warren, Glamorgan (Savoury 1980, 70) Peny Bone,
Anglesey (Lynch 1970, fig4O; associated with a jet necklace) and Merddyn
Gwyn, Anglesey (Lynch 1970, Fig.34; associated with a long-necked Beaker)"
(p.79, para.2).
Many such examples can be found in the section on 'Finds' and the concluding
'Discussion' (p71-86). In each case, the discovered object is admitted into a cat-
egory of other, similar objects which are already documented. The category can
be described as a network of associations and ideas about date, function, purpose,
etc, of a particular kind of object. The documented object serves as a model or
'prototype' to which the discovered object has to conform in certain respects in
order to be admitted to the category. Once admitted, the discovered object may
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itself subsequently become a prototype, cited in other excavation-reports to legiti-
mate and make sense of further new discoveries. In this way established categories
are reproduced through the publication of new data.
PRoTOTPE
E'I SCOVERED
O8ET
Note how reference to previously published documents can support and legitimate
the claim of the discovered object to be accorded full factual status, can lend
credence to the text, and can add to the impression of 'realism' that the text
conveys to the reader. Indeed, it might be said that the degree of realism achieved
by the text is a measure of how successfully the data from Four Crosses have been
integrated into the pre-existing (conventional) scheme of knowledge - of which the
report is both product and reproducer. In this respect it is interesting to compare
the accounts cited above - where discovered objects can be readily assimilated into
established categories - with the following account of a 'stone object' for which no
appropriate category seems to exist:
"Whether the shape is natural or not, it seems likely that it had been delib-
erately deposited with the burial either as a talisman or even conceivably as a
tool" (p.79, para.3).
Without an appropriate categorization - and therefore without even a name - the
factual status of this object is insecure. Its meaning is fluid rather than fixed:
its possible function can only be guessed at. There is no documented object or
prototype to legitimate its inclusion in the text. Hence the textual voice shifts
from a tone of certainty to a tone of uncertainty. As an opposite case, the example
highlights the power of linkages with other textual objects in authorizing or 'lending
credentials to' a new fact as it emerges into the textual domain. But it also provides
a fleeting glimpse or suggestion of some pre-textual moment when all meanings
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were fluid and uncertain.
The static structures of the text hide and cover over the act of discovery - where
meanings are open-ended and unfold through time. As the moment in time when
material evidence emerges from the timeless material record to be forged into the
timeless representative record, the act of discovery is necessarily 'squeezed out' by
the text. Only by excluding real time can the text purport to be broadly equivalent
to the material record it represents. Time is the essence of the act of discovery.
Timelessness is the essence of records and texts.
2.9 Inferential Meanings
The 'matter-of-fact' style of the excavation-report gives the impression that it
consists simply of a description of material evidence. But this description is itself
an interpretation of the evidence in terms of past human behaviour. References
to human agency in the past are studded throughout the text - even if they only
emerge when the reader specifically looks for them. The more we look, however,
the more we find that the meaning of the evidence described has already been fixed
for us in advance of our reading of it:-
"The pit was orientated north-east to south-west, with steep sides and a flat
base, and had been cut down through the subsoil into the underlying gravel. The
pit was ifiled with an homogenous brown clayey loam (7.5 YR 5/8), containing
numerous small pebbles and some scattered framents of charcoal, probably
representing the backfill of material originally dug from the pit" (p.56, para.2).
"The pipe lay at the centre of the overlying barrow-mound, the five outer stake
settings and the ring-ditch, all of which may have been set out by reference
to it. The purpose of the post may thus have been quite short-lived, but its
substantial dimensions suggest that it was retained as a marker which projected
above the top of the mound" (p.56, para.5).
"The gravel was fairly compact; few stake-holes penetrated it for more than
one or two centimetres, and although some of the points were slightly angled, it
seemed they were intended to be vertical... The buried soil remained essentially
intact between Stake Circles 2 and 5, and since the original stakes had almost
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invariably been driven down through the soil horizon to the surface of the
underlying gravel, the differences in depth... suggest that the barrow itself had
been sited on a low natural mound having a slightly thicker depth of subsoil"
(p.57, para.1).
Such extracts refer not just to human activities in the past (the digging of pits,
the setting out of post-circles, the driving into the ground of stakes, the siting
of mounds or barrows, etc), but also to the intentions and purposes entailed in
those activities. A whole range of assumptions about the nature of human agency
underlies the description of material evidence. These become more apparent when
we consider that even to identify an object or pattern as artefact implies intentional
human labour as the causal agency responsible for observable effects (see Chapter
8). Thus to identify a feature as a 'stake-hole' implies the former existence of an
agent who drove in the stake; to identify a feature as a 'pit' implies the former
existence of an agent who dug the pit; and so on. When this is taken into account,
even the driest and most 'factual' of passages in the text are based upon multiple
inferences about past human action:-
"The outer five stake-circles were concentric with the ring-ditch and the post-
setting in the central pit. Some of the stake-holes of the outer circles were
missing on the eastern side of the barrow, almost certainly due to the poor
state of preservation of the mound and burial soil at this point" (p.56, para.8).
References to past human agency, then, do not just 'follow from' the evidence
presented in the text; nor are they merely interspersed with the evidence; rather
they are embedded in the very words that are used to describe material phenomena.
Where do these inferential meanings originate? The textual voice seems to imply
that such meanings were somehow contained or preserved in the material record
itself, and have carried over into the representative record through a process of
translation. Post-processualists would argue that meanings about the past are
created in the writing of the text. But the active meaning-giving role of the agents
of discovery, the diggers themselves, is never considered - simply because they have
been 'written out' of excavation-reports and theoretical discourse. The idea that
diggers - as practical reasoners, manipulators and explorers of material evidence
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- meaningfully constitute the data they produce is completely foreign to theory,
which appropriates all meaning-giving activity to itself.
2.10 A Return to the Lifeworid
In this chapter we have used archaeology as a metaphor for the deconstruction or
'excavation' of archaeological texts. It has been found, however, that there are
limitations as to what such a deconstruction can accomplish. There are 'layers' of
archaeological activity which are so deeply 'buried' or 'covered over' by the text
that no textual analysis can bring them to light. The act of discovery, the agents
of discovery, the temporality of discovery - and all the uncertainties, surprises,
disappointments and anticipations of excavation practice - have been smoothed
out by the text. The genesis of facts in the flux and process of perceptual experi-
ence does not figure in the excavation report. Instead a timeless reality has been
constructed for the reader, in which meanings are fixed rather than fluid, closed
rather than open-ended, and certain rather than uncertain. While the facts and
meanings which are the products of the act of discovery have survived the writing
process, all that remains of the act of discovery itself is its absence. Only a reader
who has actually participated in an excavation at some time or other can 'fill in
the gaps', drawing analogies from his or her own experience to infer the former
activity of the agents of discovery.
Thus the text which purports to represent or describe the world has the effect of
alienating the reader from that world, as it is encountered in perception. It takes for
granted the cognitive and perceptual conditions that make knowledge of the world
possible in the first instance. As Street (1989:367, paraphrasing Tylor 1987) puts
it, "Writing is the 'culprit' since, through the double separation it effects between
signs, the sounds they stand for and the 'things' these in turn represent, writing
shifts the locus of reality away from the world itself and towards the system of
signs through which we come to 'know' it. In a literate culture we know the world,
thezi, not through our senses but through signs, which thus displace the subject
from the world and alienate him of her from it." If this argument is accepted then
there are basically two strategies open to us. The first is to constitute scientific
discourse as a kind of 'poetics', forever removed from the lifeworld of bodily action
and experience. The second is to attempt to break through the webs of textual
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meaning in which we are suspended, and to re-discover the perceptual experience
of the world that precedes writing. It is this latter strategy that will be adopted
here.
This means extending the range of the archaeological metaphor beyond textual
analysis and into the practical realm. As it happens, phenomenologists and exis-
tentialists have always made much use of the archaeological metaphor. Merleau-
Ponty (1964:5), for example, argues that "we must rediscover the structure of the
perceived world through a process similar to that of an archaeologist. For the struc-
ture of the perceived world is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge"
(see also Pickles 1985:29). This notion of the sedimentation of knowledge is derived
from Husserl, whose phenomenological slogan "Back to the things themselves!" -
has a peculiar ring to it when applied to archaeology, like the sound of spade on
stone (because a phenomenology of archaeology necessarily involves bringing the
archaeological metaphor back to bear upon its source). Husserl's pupil, Heidegger,
used a kind of archaeological metaphor as a model for understanding perception
itself. In Being and Time (1962) he characterises perception as an 'uncovering' or
'opening' of the world, in which entities that were 'hidden', 'buried' or 'covered
over' are 'torn out of hidden-ness', 'struck by open-ness' and 'break into space'. A
transaction or encounter occurs between the perceiver and the perceived, with a
mixture of activity and passivity in each (Olafson 1987:56-9). It is this encounter
that Heidegger calls 'Being-there' or 'Being-in-the-world'.
Heidegger's notion of the "clearing" - as the space opened up by the perceiver from
which entities emerge to be encountered - reappears in this thesis as the 'material
field'. The material field bears only a passing resemblance to material evidence
that is represented in archaeological texts. It has a hardness and a coldness to
it, a texture and a resistance to the touch. It includes the tools which are used
to work material evidence, as well as the evidence itself. Far from being static,
it unfolds through time as it is being cleared or opened by diggers in the act of
discovery. Indeed, the temporal structure of the material field derives from the
situation and actions of diggers within and upon it. This clearing is the 'site' of
the act of discovery.
To set out to explore the ontological ground of archaeological knowledge, we have
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first of all had to clear a space for such an enterprise within theoretical discourse
itself, and to open up that part of the world which texts have closed for us. Prising
apart the bars of our textual prison has been a major preoccupation of this chapter
and the last. In so far as this has been accomplished, an 'escape from the text'
implies nothing less than a bodily escape - albeit only a partial and temporary one.
To my mind, ethnography and phenomenology go hand in hand, since both involve
an immersion in the lifeworid. Both can be used as methods of exploration - means
of opening up the social and familiar worlds - in the same way as excavation is a
means of opening up and exploring the material domain.
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Part II
Fieldwork Report
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Chapter III
THE SITE
"It is possible to step down from the sovereign viewpoint from which
objective idealism orders the world... To do this, one has to situate
oneself within real activity as such... one has to return to practice,
the site of the dialectic between the opus operatum and the modus
operandi." (Bourdicu 199O:5)
3.1 Some Background Information
This account of archaeological practice is based upon a field study of a particular
excavation in Britain, and is written from notes taken out in the field. During
the winter of 1989-90 I worked on the excavation as a 'participant-observer', for a
total of 11 weeks over a three month period. Although I missed the first few weeks
of the dig, I arrived just as the last of the topsoil was being removed, and (apart
from a short break mid-way through) was therefore able to witness and take part
in the excavation proper more or less from beginning to end.
The site was located on gravel terraces overlooking an estuary, in a rural setting. (It
is important to make clear from the outset that by 'site' archaeologists do not mean
merely 'situation of'. The site is the object as well as the locus of archaeological
activity. It is that part of the landscape which, imbued with significance, is itself
surrounded by the general environment.) The archaeological significance of the
site was first recognised from aerial photographs, which showed a complex of crop-
marks over a region of about 400 square metres; some of these were provisionally
interpreted as pit-scatters, field enclosure ditches and trackways (of multi-period
date). Of most interest, however, was a cluster of about 30 circular features or
'ring-ditches', varying from 6-12 metres in diameter, in one corner of the area.
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These were thought likely to be of Bronze Age date, though there was a slight
possibility that they could be of Anglo-Saxon origin.
The decision to excavate was prompted by the impending destruction of the site
through mineral extraction, giving the dig a 'rescue' character. The cluster of
ring-ditches was chosen for a programme of selective excavation, partly because of
its archaeological interest, but also because this area was closest to the advancing
quarry-edge. (No account is given here of the intensive negotiations - between the
county archaeological unit and landowner, mineral extraction company, funding
bodies, etc - which must have conditioned the location and size of the excavation
trench.) A large area of about 120 x 60 metres was opened up, with one side of
the trench running alongside the quarry.
The excavation team consisted of three staff members (R, T, and W) plus seven
temporary diggers on short-term contracts (A, B, D, E, G, H, and L), most of
whom had worked for some time on the 'digging circuit'. As experienced excava-
tors, all possessed varying degrees of skill and competence in the everyday tasks of
excavation; there were no novices on this site. I was fortunate to have the help and
co-operation of all these archaeologists during my fieldwork. My arrival on the site
brought the full complement of archaeologists to eleven. It is important to point
out that I too was an experienced excavator (having once spent several years work-
ing on the digging-circuit); this experience both helped and hindered my research,
in ways which will become clear in the course of this report. A very different report
would have been written by an etlinographer coming to archaeological practice for
the first time.
Upon my arrival, the site (which can henceforward be regarded as that area
enclosed and bounded by the edges of the excavation-trench) had already been
stripped of most of the modern plough-soil by mechanical means. The last ves-
tiges of plough-soil were now being removed by an extensive hoeing operation;
my first few days on site were spent joining the line of diggers engaged in this
backbreaking labour. Many of the expected archaeological patterns which showed
up on the aerial photographs were now visible on the surface or in the process of
coming to light. In the north-eastern half of the site, the dark fills and outlines of
features showed up quite clearly against the background of orange (natural) gray-
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els. Towards the south-west, however, features tended to be obscured by spreads
of brick-earth (pen-glacial deposits similar in colour and texture to archaeological
fills, and difficult to tell apart from them).
Fig 1 shows a sketch of the site after general hoeing of the site had been completed,
prior to the excavation of features. It is based partly upon the 1:50 plan of the site
which archaeologists themselves completed over the next few weeks, though should
not be taken by the reader to be equivalent to that plan. Like all the sketches in
this fieldwork report, scales and directions given are approximate only.
To help the reader understand the sketch of the site, a brief description of the
features depicted is necessary. It is important to point out, however, that even at
this early stage of excavation it is impossible to separate the material evidence from
the meamng or significance that it has for archaeologists. A description med in
the language of Munsell Colour Codes, for example, would simply not do justice to
the ways in which archaeologists perceive the site. The following account reflects
my general understanding of the site after my first few days of work, as it was
conveyed to me in conversations with archaeologists. It is based mainly on talks
with T (who explained the aerial photographs to me), R (who gave me a site tour)
and H and L (who I worked alongside during general hoeing).
1. identification of features: The linear feature which crosses the site
from SE-NW is known to be a 'modern trackway'. All other straight lin-
ear features are thought to be 'enclosure-ditches' of various periods. The
ring-shaped features are obviously 'ring-ditches' - the ploughed down re-
mains of 'burial mounds' or 'barrows'. The entire group of ring-ditches
comprises a 'barrow-cemetery'. Features marked on the sketch as black
dots are thought to be 'cremation-burials'; many of these have burnt ma-
terial and broken outlines of pottery vessels visible on the ground surface.
The irregular shaped features scattered across the site have not been identi-
fied yet; they could be 'inhumation-pits', 'rubbish pits' or natural features,
though those enclosed by ring-ditches are thought likely to be burial pits.
All identifications are of course provisional, and have yet to be tested by
excavation.
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Figure 1: Rough Plan of the Site
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2. spatial and temporal ordering of features: The ring-ditches are
'grouped together' into a cemetery; their distribution suggests that there
was considerable continuity in the use of the cemetery. (No ring-ditch cuts
or is cut by its neighbours; if there had been any overlapping, this would
have suggested different periods of barrow building.) The 3 ring-ditches
slightly 'set apart' from the others, however, could represent a different
phase or tradition of burial. As well as 'respecting' each other, the ring-
ditches also appear to respect ( ie. are all situated on one side of) the
straight linear feature or ditch which crosses the site from the SW-NE; this
feature could be a 'boundary ditch' of the cemetery - or, alternatively, a
ditch dug at a later date around an existing barrow field. Whether bounded
or unbounded, however, the cemetery is understood to have been 'an area
set apart for the burial of the dead', with the settlement situated elsewhere.
Within and 'enclosed by' some of the ring-ditches are 'central' pit-like fea-
tures which are thought likely to contain inhumation-burials (around which
the ditches were dug and over which the barrows were constructed). Most of
the cremation burials, on the other hand, are situated outside and between
the ring-ditches - suggesting that they were deposited after the harrows had
been built and that they represent a later form of burial rite. The excep-
tional case of two cremations enclosed by a ring-ditch might, it is supposed,
represent a transitional form of burial, combining the earlier technique of
ring-ditch building with the later technique of cremation (and indicating
some continuity between them). Many of the cremations are 'grouped to-
gether into clusters', in much the same way as the ring-ditches are grouped
together into a cemetery, suggesting that certain areas were the 'foci' of
mortuary activity, with members of the same family or group buried in
close proximity to each other.
That such an account is possible at all suggests that archaeologists do not expe-
rience the site solely in terms of its material form and properties. Nor do they
experience it as simply the aggregate of individual items of evidence, unrelated
to each other. The site is always experienced as a meaningful and interrelated
set of phenomena. And since we cannot discuss the site at all without - implic-
ity or explicity - taking into account its significance for us, let us briefly examine
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the dimensions or layers of meaning that, inter-bedded with material phenomena,
constitute the site.
3.2 The Meaning of the Site
First of all we should note that the archaeologists' perception and understanding
of the site is already a description of it - in the sense that most of the material
patterns have names which describe them more or less exactly (eg. 'features', 'cuts',
'ring-ditches', 'pits', 'barrow-cemetery', etc). This is not just a case of attaching
a label to something that was initially perceived as a non-linguistic entity. As
any excavator will testify, in their first encounter with a material pattern they
often really do see the 'cut' of a 'ditch' emerge from the ground as it is being
worked. They really do see 'postholes' and 'pits' rather than just discolourations
or differential textural patterns in the soil. It is difficult to separate language from
perception, or the act of recognising significant patterns from the act of naming
(and in naming, interpreting) them. And when we reflect upon the names that are
used, we find that a great deal more is known about the material evidence than is
visible on the ground surface.
When archaeologists identify a soil configuration as an "archaeological feature",
for example, it is assumed or implied that the (observable) pattern is the product
or effect of human agency at some time in the distant (unobservable) past. If the
feature is identified as a "ditch", a whole range of tacit assumptions are invoked
concerning the nature of this causal agency - the kind of practical activity involved
in digging a ditch, or the functions that a ditch might serve within a human com-
munity. And if a group of features is identified as a "cemetery" then an even more
wide-ranging set of assumptions about human mortuary, ritual, and symbolic prac-
tices is brought into play. Each name has a semantic field of associations, concepts,
values, resonances, beliefs connected with it; the object named is perceived within
the context of this semantic field.
We should also note that material patterns as they appear to archaeologists are
meaningfully-related to each other in space. The relations between features are
as real as the features themselves. Cremations are 'grouped together' into clus-
ters; ring-ditches are 'grouped together' into a cemetery. There are relations of
inclusion/exclusion, inside/outside, centre/periphery, etc. Thus some ring-ditches
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are seen to "enclose" possible inhumation-pits, and the cemetery as a whole is
"bounded" by a possible boundary-ditch. The meaning of the site is intermeshed
with these spatial relations (eg. a pit like feature enclosed by a ring-ditch is
perceived quite differently from similar features situated outside; its situation or
context is an important part of its meaning). From these spatial relations, more-
over, archaeologists can discern relations of temporality or sequence. It is a well
known archaeological principle that, where one feature can be seen to cut another
feature ( eg. a pit cut into a ring-ditch), the former is later than the latter. But
archaeologists can also discern temporal relations from the evidence of features
that do not cut each other (eg. the distribution of cremations outside and between
the ring-ditches suggests that they are a later form of burial). Such observations
do not always refer to a succession of different activities, separated in time; some-
times they refer to sequences of actions within a single activity (eg. in the case
of burial pits enclosed by ring-ditches - the digging of the pit, the deposition of
mortuary remains, the excavation of the ditch and the construction of the mound
over the burial are all understood to have taken place within an ordered sequence
of intentional human labour).
If an archaeological understanding of the site includes inferences about unobserv-
able patterns of human behaviour in the past, and relations which cannot be
grasped as things in themselves, it also refers to unobservable parts of the mate-
rial site itself. L said to me, "we've really only scraped the surface so far." The
huge bulk of the site lies under the surface, like a submerged presence, buried and
hidden from view. All observable patterns seem to shade off into this invisible
region. The surface of the site is scattered with objects which - embedded in the
soil - are only partially visible, or partially occluded by intervening layers. In much
the same way, the cuts (outlines) of features are also experienced as incomplete;
that is, as two-dimensional manifestations of patterns which are known to have
three-dimensional form. Cuts not only extend horizontally into the sides of the
excavation-trench (eg. the 5 ring-ditches truncated by the SE edge); they also
extend downwards, sloping out of sight or dipping under gravel spreads and the
dark fills of features. In these ways, the site reveals itself to the skilled eye while
at the same time hiding the greater part of itself.
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Yet just as the human eye tends to complete the circle of a ring-ditch where only
half or less of its circumpherence is open to view, anticipating the continuations of
the inner and outer cuts beyond the realm of the visible, so the vertical extensions
of cuts are also anticipated. All features marked in Fig 1 (ring-ditches, cremation
pits, ditches, etc) are expected to have cuts which can be followed down to an
anticipated base. Thus archaeologists can identify a "cremation-burial" (ie. a
cremation-urn within a pit), pre-dicting and pre-figuring its three dimensional
form from the slightest traces on the horizontal ground surface. For the most part,
of course, the extensions of patterns into the invisible region are not known with
any certainty; they are constituted as things 'to be looked for', 'to be tested', or
'to be discovered' rather than things that are already known.
These preliminary remarks will serve to introduce the reader to the complexity of
archaeological perception and reasoning, and the multi-dimensional character of
the site as it is experienced. Importantly, the site is characterized as much by the
unobservable or the invisible as by the material patterns which can actually be
seen on the ground surface. The relevance of this point will become clear when we
come to examine the nature of the excavation itself - for excavation is essentially
a changing of the relations between the visible and the invisible domains. It is
a making visible or bringing to light. As such the activity of excavation has a
fundamental orientation towards the invisible domain.
3.3 Excavation Strategy
Archaeologists evaluating a site are concerned not only with 'what things are' but
also 'what to do with them'. If all the material patterns shown in Fig.1 can be
described as objects of significance, they can also be described as objects of inten-
tion; indeed, the significance or meaning of these patterns is inextricably bound
up with the intentions, projects and purposes of archaeologists themselves. Every
significant pattern has a project associated with it (though there are patterns,
such as animal burrows, modern ploughmarks, etc, which are not associated with
a project; accordingly these have not been marked on the sketch, or indeed on any
of the plans of the site). Objects appear to us as significant precisely because they
can be incorporated into our projects. It is intended to explore by excavation just
about all the patterns depicted in Fig.1.
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The first task to be undertaken once hoeing is completed, T told me, is to ex-
cavate the cremation-pits and to remove the contents (the urns containing burial
remains) as soon as possible. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, most of
the cremations are known to be stratigraphically later than the ring-ditches (it is a
fundamental principle of excavation that layers or features are excavated in the re-
verse order to that in which they were deposited or cut). Secondly, the excavation
team has been granted a special licence empowering them to remove all human
remains from the site; indeed, they have a legal responsibility to do so. Thirdly,
many of the cremation-vessels and their contents are now partially exposed to the
open-air and inevitable damage from frost, wind and rain. The plan is to remove
the cremation-vessels to the more sheltered environment of a conservation labora-
tory, where their contents will be excavated, analysed and recorded by conservators
in a quite separate, more delicate, excavation.
Once the cremations have been dealt with, the intention is to cut segments through
all of the ditches, both circular and straight, with the primary aim of obtaining
dating evidence (but also to record the profile and stratigraphy of the features, and
to take samples of the fills). Some of the ring-ditches will be completely excavated.
The areas enclosed by ring-ditches are to be examined closely for evidence of struc-
tures (eg. postholes, etc), and it is hoped that the pit-like features inside some
of the ring-ditches will prove, on investigation, to contain inhumation burials and
other grave contents (likely to provide firm dating evidence not just for the pits,
but also for the ditches surrounding them, and the barrow-cemetery as a whole).
It is also intended to excavate the many pit-like features, situated outside of the
ring-ditches, whose status as 'archaeological' or 'natural' has yet to be ascertained.
The south-western half of the site is especially problematical, as it is difficult to
distinguish archaeological fills from their (natural) setting of brick-earth. T thinks
it likely that many features in this area have not been identified as yet: it might
be necessary to remove a much deeper spit of soil from those regions where the
brick-earth is most prevalent, in order to be able to see these anticipated patterns.
At present the deadline set by the mineral extraction company for the end of the
excavation is the last week of December (this will subsequently be extended to
the beginning of February). The strategy for partial sampling of the site through
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excavation has been designed to fit in with this deadline. It is a working strat-
egy, not a programme fixed in advance, and as such is flexible and open-ended.
Everyone recognizes that, as excavation proceeds, strategy may have to be consid-
erably modified to take account of emerging, unexpected, evidence. [As it turned
out, however, the excavation developed along a trajectory that was to a large ex-
tent prefigured by initial strategy at the start of the dig. A phase of intensive
work upon cremation-burials was followed by a phase of digging segments through
ditches and other features. This was followed by a final phase of activity directed
mainly towards locating features which might have been missed first time round,
by the digging of shallow trenches through brick-earth deposits. All these phases
overlapped with each other, with preceding phases still in progress as each new
phase was begun.]
3.4 The Setting of the Site
A major characteristic of any site is its setting - the background against which
all activity on the site takes place. This site was situated in relatively flat, open
countryside with a distant horizon visible on three sides. To the north-west and
north-east were large fields, bordered by woodland. To the south-west, just beyond
the edge of the site, was the sand-quarry - from which the noise of cranes and trucks
at work continually reminded us of the impending destruction of the material
evidence. Beyond the quarry, the land sloped gently down towards the estuary
- and it was across the waters of the estuary that, on clear winter evenings, we
occasionally witnessed the most spectacular of sunsets, which signalled the end of
the working day. (Anyone who worked on the dig will remember these sunsets,
together with the surrounding countryside and the general atmosphere of place, as
an integral part of "the site".)
A band of woodland ran parallel to the south-eastern edge of the site. Here, in
a clearing amongst the trees, the temporary huts of the excavation team (plan-
ning hut, finds hut, toolshed, tea-hut) had been constructed. In many ways this
cluster of sheds provided the centre or focus of archaeological activity. Most tasks
began and finished here, not just in the mundane sense that the tools with which
to accomplish the task had to be collected and returned. Materials for the pro-
duction of data also bad to be collected (eg. draughting paper, context-sheets,
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Figure 2: The Site in its Setting
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finds-bags, etc), and all the finished products of excavation practice (plans, com-
pleted context-sheets, finds, soil-samples, etc) were brought back to the huts for
temporary storage. Another way of putting it is that all paths converged and ra-
diated out from here; workers set out from the huts at the start of the day to their
various tasks on different parts of the site, returned at teabreak, set out again,
returned at lunchtime, set out again, and so on - a pattern of comings and go-
ings reflected, and given material form, by the network of planks or walkways laid
out on the surface of the site, all ultimately leading to and from the huts in the
clearing.
The network of planks (the configuration of which was constantly changing) also
led to the spoil-heap, situated just outside the south-west corner of the site. If
those parts of the material evidence which were extracted, packaged, labelled and
taken to the huts for safekeeping (eg. finds, soil-samples, cremation-urns, etc) can
be described as ordered and meaningfully-related items of data, then the spoil-
heap was comprised of exactly the opposite. This was where unwanted material
was brought, by means of bucket and wheel-barrow, to be dumped. Such material
had generally been trowelled, hoed, shovelled or otherwise excavated away in the
process of uncovering meaningful evidence - and can therefore be characterised
negatively as having the quality of non-meaning. It was discarded precisely because
it did not fit in with the projects of the archaeologists, or because no further project
could be found for it. In this respect it is a kind of anti-data. As opposed to the
material carried to the huts, which represents order, the spoil-heap is that neglected
adjunct of the site which must be seen to represent chaos and disorder.
A footpath/farm track ran alongside the south-east and north-eastern sides of
the excavation-trench, leading to the nearest village about two miles away. Local
people using this footpath would often stop to ask us what we were doing, how we
were getting on, whether we had found anything interesting, etc. Many of these
became regular visitors, who followed the course of the excavation over several
months. Of most interest, however, were our initial contacts with such visitors.
Coming upon an archaeological excavation for the first time, their questions and
comments (one man asked us what we were building) revealed a perception of the
site quite different from our own. Material patterns which were obvious to us,
such as the dark fills of ring-ditches that stood out from the background of natural
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gravels, were not at all obvious to them. Sometimes it took a considerable effort
on our part to get them to see such patterns. Indeed, it became apparent that
they perceived the site as a more or less undifferentiated surface of mud and stones
- with no outstanding features - and comprised neither of objects of significance
nor objects of intention. The layman's perspective provides an important contrast
to the archaeological perspective described earlier. To someone who is situated
outside of the shared system of skills, projects, values and other taken-for-granted
knowledge (that binds a group of individuals together into an excavation team),
the site itself may be devoid of significance or meaning.
Conversations between archaeologists and laymen can be characterised as inter-
actions between insiders and outsiders, not just in the sense that archaeologists
possess inside knowledge whereas laymen do not, but also in the sense that these
conversations generally took place with the archaeologists standing inside the
excavation-trench, and the lay-man or lay-woman standing on the footpath outside
it. These were two-way transactions. Through regular visits laymen became to
some extent insiders - began to see the significant patterns, learn their descrip-
tion, and understand our purposes in excavating the site. Conversely, through
being visited archaeologists became to some extent outsiders - to glimpse what
the site might look like in the absence of a description. Questions such as "what
are those bits of wood for?" - referring to the many wooden pegs driven into the
ground, marking out the site grid (which, unless we were actually using them, did
not normally figure prominently in our perception of the site) - had the startling
effect, at least for me, of suddenly making opaque the otherwise quite transparent
grid-like spaces within which our everyday activities were situated, orientated and
organized.
Interactions between insiders and outsiders formed an important part of the back-
ground or setting of my own research. On the one hand the layman's perspective,
or truly naive point of view, was something I was constantly striving to attain -
though my past experience of working on the digging circuit made it impossible to
achieve. On the other hand it was necessary to penetrate into the intersubjective
meanings and activities of excavation in order to begin to understand them. This
paradox or tension will reappear in various forms throughout the thesis; it char-
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acterised the whole experience of conducting fieldwork research, and is inherent in
the ethnographic method of 'participant-observation'.
3.5 The Presence of the Ethnographer on Site
Perhaps the most important period in any ethnographic project is the researcher's
entry into the field. In order to study any kind of cultural activity at first hand
the researcher first of all has to be accepted, or at least tolerated, by members of
the group in question. Usually permission to conduct fieldwork has already been
granted by the relevant authorities (in this case, the assistant county archaeological
officer), but it is the agreement of people out in the field that is perhaps more
important. For without their help and co-operation nothing is possible.
Accordingly, the first two weeks were devoted mainly to becoming a participant
- working from nine to five as an ordinary digger, and suspending for the time
being my prospective role as an observer (though a journal of the day's events was
written up in the evenings). It was not until the tenth working day, several days
after the excavation of features had begnn, that I judged it appropriate to put my
research strategy into action and start conducting interviews. During this initial
period I had the opportunity to outline my research to the excavation-team, both
collectively and individually. Their reactions and comments were a significant
factor in shaping the manner in which I subsequently carried out the research.
Some had reservations, for example, about the very idea of being constituted as
the object of investigation, by "a spectator, sitting on the side of the trench". It
was clear that, in order to gain their respect and secure their help I would have to
- as one digger put it - "push as many wheelbarrows as anyone else".
Another significant factor in shaping fieldwork strategy was the character of the site
itself. I had originally intended to focus attention on particular areas of the site,
recording in detail the sequence of events as excavation proceeded down through
the build-up of archaeological layers until natural was reached. However (apart
from within the features themselves) there was no deep stratigraphy on this site.
In removing the ploughsoil the 'natural' - gravel, sand and brick-earth deposits -
had for the most part already been brought to light. The only archaeological layers
visible were the fills of features cut into the natural. This effectively forced me to
take a more geographical perspective upon the spatial organization of activity
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across the site as a whole. A very different ethnography would have been 'written
of a deep-stratigraphy excavation, such as those on urban sites.
The sheer expanse of the site was a problem; there was so much going on at any
given time, and these activities were spread out over a surface area larger than
a football-pitch. "How could human behaviour be described?" asks Wittgenstein
(1967b: para 567); "Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans,
as they are all mixed up together... not what one man is doing now, an individual
action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which
we see any action." The problem is that the ethnographer, like anybody else, is an
embodied and situated observer; wherever he is, there are many places where he is
not, and a multitude of events which cannot be observed and recorded at first hand.
The fieldwork strategy, conceived during the first two weeks, and subsequently put
into practice, was designed to at least partially overcome these difficulties. It had
three basic components:-
1. Participation. My active role as a more or less full-time digger clearly had to
be retained. It was not only a condition (specified in my initial application to the
county council) for my being on the site in the first instance; it was also a condition
for any meaningful dialogue or understanding to develop between myself and other
workers. Furthermore, it was only by working on archaeological material - hoeing,
trowelling, or otherwise digging into it - that I was able to acquire a 'feel' for the
site. On average I worked as a digger, on designated tasks, for about six hours
a day. This had the effect of situating me right in the midst of the 'hurly-burly'
of everyday activity, rather than looking in on it from the outside viewpoint of a
detached observer.
2. Interviews/Observation. For up to two hours a day (usually between after-
noon tea-break and sunset), I left the area I was working on and walked around
the site, asking other diggers about their work. Doing 'the rounds' in this way
soon became a matter of routine, not just for me but also for the workers visited.
In visiting a particular part of the site, I would generally ask the digger(s) working
there to tell me about the material field they were working upon, the nature of
their task in excavating it, the way in which it had been tackled so far, the prob-
lems encountered, the plans for further excavation, and so on. Every interview
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was different, since the questions and answers related specifically to the unique
configuration of material evidence directly in view, but the general idea was to
gather information about 1. the history, 2. the present circumstances, and 3. the
future orientation of the excavation of that part of the site. An interview could
last anything from ten minutes to half an hour, after which I drew a sketch of the
material field - with particular emphasis on the features or patterns which had
figured in our conversation. While I was drawing the sketch, the worker usually
picked up his or her tools and returned to work; the position of the worker within
the material field, the tools (s)he was using, etc, were recorded on the sketch, and
this was often accompanied by a brief description of what the worker was doing
at that time. Then I would leave to conduct another interview elsewhere. On a
good day 4-6 such interviews might take place (though this number was frequently
reduced through bad weather, pressing archaeological tasks of my own, and other
factors). This process would be repeated the next day, when I would try to in-
terview those diggers not visited the day before. Eventually I would come back
to the first digger, and the cycle of interviews would begin all over again. In this
way I was able to keep in touch with what each worker was doing, and the kind of
evidence that was emerging across the site as a whole.
3. Recording. Rough notes and sketches taken during interviews were written
up in the evenings onto 'recorded event' sheets, which were numbered according
to the actual sequence in which they took place. These numbers were plotted on a
rough plan of the site, to mark the location of the interviews. Over and above this
system of recording I also kept a fieldwork journal; one to two hours were spent
each evening writing down the events, impressions, experiences and ideas which
had occurred during the day. Thus there are 3 basic layers or levels of recording -
rough notes (RN), recorded events (RE) and fieldwork journal (FJ) - supplemented
by miscellaneous items such as photographs and charts.
3.6 Methods of Recording and Analysis
Fig.3 shows those interviews or recorded events which were conducted during a
period of one month (10.11.89 - 12.12.89). When marked on the plan, recorded
events fall naturally into separate sequences for each task or part of the site exca-
vated. Some of the sequences are quite short, or indeed consist of just one recorded
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Figure 3: Interviews Conducted on Site (10.11.89 - 12.12.89)
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event; in these cases the task was usually accomplished quite quickly. Longer se-
quences, on the other hand, tend to reflect tasks which dealt with more complex
or problematic evidence, and hence took more time. These longer sequences were
particularly illuminating to me. Because in each interview workers were effectively
'filling in the gaps' - relating what had happened before my arrival, and what was
intended or expected to happen after I had gone - the sequences provided a more
or less continuous account of the excavation of that part of the site through times
Once the system got going, the starting point for each conversation would usu-
ally be the developments which had taken place since my last visit. There would
invariably be a displacement or lack of fit between what had actually happened,
and what had been planned or anticipated to happen at the time of the previ-
ous interview. Unexpected evidence had almost always emerged in the meantime,
changing the actual course of events from their planned trajectory. These 'zones of
displacement' within sequences provided the means for apprehending the crucial
part played by emerging evidence in the unfolding of archaeological practice.
In subsequent analysis, recorded event sheets could be re-arranged into other se-
quences and groupings. They could be ordered sequentially, for example, with
regard to the workers who carried out the tasks in question:-
A 5 15 27 30 40 54 61 67
B 6 16 18 26 29 34 39 44 55 62 69
Dli 4 23 33 40 49 59
E 7 22 37 41	 53
G 17 20 32 36 52 56 66
H 3 25 38 43 50 58 63 65 71
L 2 9 13 17 21 31 35 42 46 51 60 70
WI 8 11 24
* 110 12 14 19 28 45 48 64 68
Figure 4: Workers Interviewed (10.11.89 - 12.12.89)
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Arranged in this way (Fig.4), each sequence represents the continuing dialogue
between myself and an individual worker as (s)he moved around the site from one
task to another. [* marks a special category of recorded event, where I effectively
tried to 'interview myself' - or at least to give an account of the material field I was
working upon, the tools and techniques I was using, etc. One reason for attempting
this self-interrogation was simply that, as an active participant for most of the time,
I had to include my own activity as part of the activity I had come to study. To
interview oneself is of course a contradiction in terms. But this 'subjective' exercise
provided a useful counterbalance to the more 'objective' method of interviewing
and observing others: it also opened up an unexpected avenue for exploring the
'inter-subjective' or social dimension of the material practices of excavation - see
Section 6:4]
Recorded event sheets could also be grouped according to feature-type, which
enabled a comparative analysis to be made of the kinds of practical inferences
involved in the excavation of particular types of features:-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13
cremations I 15 16 18 25 26 27 38 43 48 51 53 57
ring-ditches
fire-pits
59 60 70
17 21 22 23 24 29 30 31 32 33 34 36
37 39 40 41 42 44 45 46 47 48 52 54
55 56 61 62 64 65 66 67 68 69 71
12 14 49 50 52 58
other pits	 20 35 64
ditches	 19 28
natural featuresl 20 35 44 53 55 56 57 59 63 66 66 68
Figure 5: Types of Features
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as the object of study while others have been left, as it were, in the background.
The reader will notice, for example, that all the recorded events are located out
on site, rather than in the planning-hut, tea-hut, hostel, or elsewhere (see Fig.3).
They mostly represent interviews with ordinary diggers, rather than supervisors
and director (see Fig.4). And such interviews invariably took place while the
worker was actually involved in the excavation/recording of material evidence;
indeed, the interviews always refer to a particular set of evidence or material field
being worked at that time (see Fig.5). Thus there has been a deliberate focusing
of attention upon what would normally be regarded as the mundane or routine
events of excavation. And a great deal of emphasis has been placed on praxis or
action - on what workers actually do - more so, perhaps, than on what they say
about what they do (hence the reliance on notetaking and sketching rather than
tape-recording).
The purpose of the investigation was to study the act of discovery. As a working
definition, the 'act of discovery' can be said to be the initial encounter, or trans-
action, between a subject and a material object as it emerges from the ground in
the context of archaeological practice. By definition, the act of discovery always
involves at least 1. an agent or subject (usually an ordinary digger) 2. an object
(a 'find', feature or other archaeological pattern) 3. a material field (from which
the object emerges) and 4. a context of work or labour (in which the subject, the
object and the material field are bound together in some sort of relation to each
other). The rest of this thesis will be concerned with sketching out the structure of
the act of discovery. Fieldwork method was conceived, designed, bounded, applied
and adapted with this purpose in mind.
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Chapter IV
CRAFT ACTIVITIES AND 'TOOLS OF THE TRADE'
"The craft character of the production of data is of some philosoph
ical significance, for it is on this phase that the scientist makes new
contact with the external world, or achieves a new organization of
his conceptual objects." (Ravetz 1971 :81)
4.1 Excavation as a Craft Skill
Archaeological excavation bears a considerable likeness to traditional craft prac-
tices. In many respects, it is a craft. (For an approach to the sociology of knowl-
edge based on the notion of craft, or occupational technique, see Bensman and
Liienfleld 1973).
The dictionary definition of craft is "dexterity; art; skilled trade; occupation". It
is a specialized kind of work that can only be carried out by a skilled practitioner.
The craftsman - or craftswoman - generally works with a particular set of tools
and a particular range of raw materials. (S)he has an intimate knowledge of both
of these, and how to manipulate them in relation to each other - knowledge which
was acquired largely through practical experience of working with these tools on
this material. Excavation skills are just like this. Competence at everyday tasks
has little to do with academic qualifications or formal training, but has everything
to do with practical experience. For this reason we find that skilled excavators
always have many months or years of experience of digging out in the field.
When excavation is conceived of as a craft, it is no longer possible to consider
the skills of excavation in isolation from the tools through which those skills are
applied. Indeed, the ontological ground of archaeological knowledge is precisely
the practical interaction between archaeologists and material remains which tends
to be mediated through the use of tools. The first part of this chapter, then, sets
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out to give a basic typology of implements employed in excavation practice - in
the transformation of material phenomena into data.
4.2 Two categories. Tools-for-NATURE: tools-for-CULTURE
A basic two-fold classification of tools (and of the activities in which they are
used) can be made on the basis of the way archaeologists themselves order their
equipment. Take, for example, the overnight storage of tools in the toolshed and
the planning-hut:-
1. toolshed: spades, shovels, forks, hoes, mattocks, pick-axes, buckets, brushes,
etc (wheelbarrows leaning against the outside).
2. planning-hut: pencils, pens, markers, rulers, erasers, compasses, tape-
measures, scales, ranging rods, cameras, theodolite, tripods, staff, string, nails,
plum-bobs, spirit-levels, planning-boards, etc (planning-frames leaning against
the outside; grid-pegs stacked nearby).
Category 1 consists of tools for digging into the earth, and the associated tasks of
cleaning surfaces and carrying spoil away; these activites can be called material
transactions (this term, and also the term 'social transaction' which will be used
later in the thesis, is borrowed from Bhaskar 1989:156). Category 2, on the other
hand, is comprised of tools for measuring and recording - the representation of
material evidence in the form of drawings, photos and numerical/linguistic signs.
These activities can be called acts of inscription.
This mundane distinction has important ontological implications. The toolshed
contains equipment for negotiating NATURE (by 'NATURE' I mean the material
evidence which, at least up to the moment of discovery, existed independently of
archaeological practice): the planning hut contains equipment for the production
and reproduction of CULTURE (by 'CULTURE' I mean the system of signs, signi-
fications, representations, meanings, schemes, etc, which constitutes archaeological
knowledge and is the product of practices).
This opposition of tools-for-NATURE: tools-for-CULTURE can be experienced by
visiting both the toolshed and the planning hut in turn. The toolshed has the
earthy smell and neglected air reminiscent of a gardener's shed. There are no win-
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dows; it is dark and damp inside. Amidst the profusion of tools there is little room
for more than one person to enter at the same time. Indeed, workers tend to enter
the toolshed only to collect or deposit tools. The planning hut is quite different
from this. It is well-lit, well organised, and the scene of constant activity. Usually
one or two people (often the director and supervisor) are at work cross-referencing
data or discussing some aspect of excavation strategy. Diggers continually come in
to check context-sheets, set up planning-boards, write out labels, etc. A portable
telephone links up with the central offices of the excavation unit. On the wails are
various plans, notices, memos, safety instructions. The shelves are filled by exca-
vation reports, technical manuals, files of completed context-sheets (repositories of
established knowledge) as well as stacks of blank context-sheets, planning paper,
empty notebooks (provisions for knowledge yet to be established).
4.3 Material Transactions: Acts of Inscription
During everyday excavation practice, material transactions (MT) and acts of in-
scription (I) are actually quite discrete activities. Consider, for example, the for-
malised procedure for dealing with small features, such as pits and postholes:-
1. cleaning over of feature to delineate outline of cut (MT)
2. pre-x photo taken (I)
3. pre-x plan drawn (I)
4. half-sectioning (or quadranting) of feature (MT)
5. photo taken (I)
6. section(s) drawn (I)
7. removal of remaining fill and cleaning of excavated feature (MT)
8. post-x photo taken (I)
9. post-x plan drawn (I)
[Here we consider only those acts of inscription which involve the pictorial repre-
sentation of evidence. Other acts of inscription - the writing of descriptions on
context-sheets, the bagging and labelling of samples and finds, etc - may occur
during any of the stages outlined above].
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Each type of activity has its own particular tool-kit. For material transactions
(1,4,7) trowel, hoe, spade, shovel, metal leaf, bucket and wheelbarrow (tools-for-
NATURE) may be used. Acts of inscription, on the other hand, always involve the
use of drawing or writing equipment; this is supplemented in photography (2,5,8)
by camera, scales, direction arrow, placard, plastic letters, etc, in planning (3,9)
by frame and tape-measures, and in section-drawing (6) by plum-bob, spirit-level,
datum-line, hand-tape and so on (tools-for-CULTURE).
Of particular interest is the transition from material transaction to an act of inscrip-
tion; the following example illustrates stages 1 and 2 of the excavation procedure:-
A is excavating a segment of a ring-ditch, trowelling down and removing the upper layer
in spits, while following down the sides of the ditch at the same time.
1. During removal of the upper fill, as the last of it was peeled off onto what seemed
like a separate layer, A discovered a smaller feature, which she thinks is a posthole, cut
into the lower fill. In her own words:- "The top layer of the ditch was taken off, coming
down onto the lighter lower fill, but the top layer seemed to go deeper here..., at first
I thought it must be root-damage. As I cleaned down more onto the lower fill, though,
the darker material was still there ... it had clear edges and was obviously a feature.., it
didn't run off in all directions like a root-disturbance would."
A trowelled over the new feature to delineate the circular outline as far as possible,
completed removal of the upper fill of the ditch, and cleaned over the whole of the ditch-
segment and the immediate vicinity - in preparation for photography. In a cleaning
operation which took about ten minutes to accomplish, all loose crumbs of earth, trowel-
marks, footprints, etc, were removed or erased.
2. When the supervisor (R) arrived to take the photographs, all the tools which A
had been using (trowel, hand-shovel, bucket, wheelbarrow, planks, kneeling mat, etc)
were put out of the way, on R's instructions. R gave the possible posthole a separate
feature number; this number, together with the ditch segment number and the site code,
was marked with plastic letters on a small placard. The placard, scale and direction
arrow were carefully placed by R on, in and next to the newly discovered feature. The
photographer took several pictures from various angles (some while standing on a chair),
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moving the scale and placard around accordingly, and enlisting A's help to do so. When
R had finished, A went off to set up her planning equipment.
[RE 61]
4.4 The Primacy of Material Transactions
RE 61 demonstrates what can be regarded as a general principle - that acts of
inscription are always preceded by material transactions. In this case the 'pre-
x' photography and planning (of the newly discovered feature) is pre-figured by
the exploratory manual operations in which the significant pattern emerged to
be discovered, cleaned, delineated and highlighted. Indeed, it was in these initial
encounters that the significance of the evidence was provisionally evaluated (ie.
whether it really is a 'feature' with a 'cut', rather than a 'root disturbance'). The
decision to take the pre-x photo, and thus to set in motion the full excavation
procedure, is a product of this practical evaluation. All acts of inscription are
secondary in this way. For evidence to be planned or photographed it first of all
has to be brought to light, shaped and highlighted; for a section to be drawn it
first of all has to be placed and cut. In each case, as in this one, the evidence has
already been practically constituted as an object of archaeological knowledge, prior
to and in preparation for the act of inscription.
The transition from material transaction to act of inscription is marked by a
wholesale exchange of tools. In all photographic events, the tools-for-NATURE
are placed to one side (so they do not figure in the photograph), to be replaced
by various tools-for-CULTURE. This removal of a certain type of tool from the
scene applies as much to the background as to the foreground. Workers engaged
in excavating other features nearby may be asked to clear away their tools and
stand aside for the duration of the photographic event. Generally speaking, only
tools-for-CULTURE are meant to figure in the photograph itself.
Associated with the exchange of tools is a shift from an engaged to a disengaged,
or detached, mode of observation. In the material transaction, when the feature
emerged from the ditch-fill to be discovered and worked over by A, the worker
was actively engaged in direct manipulation of the material field. In the act of
inscription, by way of contrast, the photographer stands back (often on a chair)
from the evidence being recorded. This standing back is also characteristic of
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planning events. When A comes to plan this particular feature, for instance, she
will look through a planning frame laid on the surface rather as the photographer
looks through his camera, measuring by eye and representing by hand patterns
which have already been constituted on the ground, in a material transaction.
[This is not to say that planning is always a straightforward matter. The planner
often encounters evidence which is too incomplete or incomprehensible for an ad-
equate representation to be made of it. But such problems are usually resolved by
putting down the pencil and planning board, moving the planning frame out of
the way, picking up a trowel, shifting back in to an engaged mode of observation,
and making sense of the problematic evidence through the practical manipulation
of it. In these instances, then, a return to material transactions facilitates the
re-constitution of the object].
The crucial point here is that in material transactions the excavator is dealing
with a changing field of phenomena. Because A is engaged in working upon the
material field, patterns emerge, develop and disappear in kaleidoscope fashion.
Her own interpretations of the unfolding evidence have a similar fluidity ("at first
I thought it must be root-damage. As I cleaned down more onto the lower fill,
though, the darker material was still there.. it had clear edges and was obviously
a feature"). Indeed, interpretation and evidence seem to be bound together in a
dialectical relation - a relation which unravels through time, and which is mediated
by the very manipulation of the evidence in hand. Such a relation would appear
to be integral to the process of 'making sense' of the material field.
In the act of inscription, on the other hand, the worker is dealing with a static
field of phenomena. The material field is static precisely because the observer is
not engaged in manipulating it, and is studying it in a detached manner, which
places the object at a distance. The dialectical relation characteristic of material
transactions has to some extent been suspended, or frozen, for the duration of
the recording-event. Interpretation, however, is still open-ended. How deep is the
feature? Does it really have a 'cut' or is it simply a layer within the ditch-fill?
What kind of artefactual material might it contain? These and other questions
will be resolved, one way or another, in subsequent material transactions.
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The primacy of material transactions is also apparent in other everyday events
and activities. Finds, for example, tend to emerge during the actual digging of
the material field - in the context of an ongoing practical task upon a surface
or feature. The act of inscription (the bagging and labelling of the find - and
the subsequent plotting of its position by a planner and collection by the finds
assistant) is entirely secondary to the emergence and practical recognition of the
object, in a material transaction. What we have here is a double-transformation.
In the material transaction the emergent (material) object becomes an object of
significance (which has both material and cognitive dimensions). In the act of
inscription a third (textual) dimension is added, so that the significance object is
transformed again into an item of data.
In sampling events, too, the act of inscription (the writing of the site code, context
number, date, etc. on the bag) is prefigured by the exploratory manual operations
in which the layer to be sampled was discovered and delineated - constituted as
a significant object in itself, distinct from other layers. Usually the significance
of the layer derives from its context (eg within a feature), which has also been
subject to numerous material transactions. The material transaction comes to an
end when a selected portion of the layer is removed from the ground and deposited
in the bag, the trowel and shovel are put down, a marker-pen picked up - and the
act of inscription begins.
Similarly, the filling in of context-sheets (the writing of a general description of a
layer or feature) always pre-supposes that the entity being described has already
been clearly differentiated from other soil horizons: the bounding of the entity has
generally been accomplished in a material transaction. In this activity, however,
the act of inscription cannot be separated so neatly from material transactions -
mainly because a description has to be given of the texture and consistency (ie.
the 'feel') of soil, as well as its appearance. This means that the observer has to
continually shift back into an engaged mode of observation (picking up the trowel
or using the hands to manipulate the evidence, scraping the surface, gouging out
pieces of soil on the tip of the trowel, breaking pieces open and rolling them between
finger and thumb, and so on) then shifting back out again into the disengaged mode
(putting down the trowel and picking up the pen) to achieve the act of inscription.
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Even in these - what might be called the micro-processes of site-recording - the
accomplishment of the act of inscription is causally dependent upon the prior
undertaking of a material transaction. For it is impossible to write about the
texture or consistency of soil without first entering into a direct encounter with
the material (texture is "the feel of the soil to the fingers"; consistence is "the way
in which a soil responds to handling" Limbrey 1975: 259-268) - that is, a practical
relation between the material and the observer. Indeed, acts of inscription usually
involve the observer in a disengagement from this practical relation.
From the original category distinction between tools-for-NATURE and tools-for
CULTURE, then, two quite discrete types of activity have been identified:-
Material
	 Acts of Inscription
	
function manipulation of evic	 production of data
	
observation	 engaged, active	 disengaged, passive
	
material stat	 unfolding, changing	 static, unchanging
effect	 constitution of evidence representation of evidence
Both of these activities are processes of transformation. In each case, the agent of
transformation stands as mediator on the threshold of two worlds. In the act of
inscription, the recorder mediates between the practical and textual domains (the
realms of action and representation respectively) and has to have a degree of mas-
tery in both. The ability to plan, for example, presupposes not only a knowledge
of the conventional forms of representation, and how to use them, but also the
practical ability to 'see' the patterns of significance on the ground. However, such
patterns have already been practically constituted (as meaningful entities) - in a
material transaction. It is in material transactions, therefore, that the mediation
of CULTURE:NATURE is accomplished.
4.5 Locating the Act of Discovery
The following pages will focus mainly on material transactions rather than acts of
inscription. This is not because planning, photography, writing, etc are unimpor-
tant parts of excavation activity; it is simply because the act of discovery generally
occurs prior to these inscriptive practices. Indeed, it will be argued in Chapter
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11 that the tools-for-CULTURE employed in inscription invariably force a closure
on the act of discovery. Bearing in mind the ontological primacy of tools-for-
NATURE, then, let us take a closer look at the principal tool employed in material
transactions.
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Chapter V
THE BODY AND THE MATERIAL FIELD: AN
ONTOLOGY OF THE TROWEL
"Before instrumental techniques there is the ensemble of techniques
of the body." (Marcel Mauss 1979:104)
5.1 The Pointed Trowel
The pointed trowel (also known as the 'plasterer's trowel') is a special case of
Category 1. Unlike other implements used for material transactions it is rarely
stored in the tool-shed. On the contrary, it is a personal possession which tends
to be carried on the person even when not is use, and is taken home after work.
Arriving on site as I did, unforgiveably, without a trowel of my own, I sometimes
had to ask other diggers to lend me theirs for a short time, and I soon realised that
to be lent a trowel is something of a honour. To ask to borrow one is often to be
told of its history - the various sites on which it has been used, stories associated
with it, and any previous owners the trowel may have had. To lose or damage
somebody else's trowel, I gathered, would be worse than a crime. A well-worn
trowel is taken to symbolize the experience and skill of the digger; no-one likes to
start a dig with a new trowel. The more scarred and notched the handle, and the
more worn the blade, the more prized the trowel seems to be. Clearly it is not just
a functional implement - the instrument of a practical intention directed elsewhere
- but also an object of significance in itself. There are other items of equipment
(eg pocket knives, pencil cases, etc), it is true, which are also personal belongings,
but none have quite the value accorded to the trowel.
In excavation, the trowel is the preferred tool for all material transactions which
require particular care and skill. A metal leaf, teaspoon or small wooden stick may
be used if especially delicate or difficult-to-get-at materials are being worked, but
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this is an exception to the general rule. Spades, mattocks, hoes, etc, are employed
for rough-and-ready tasks - but whenever a significant pattern or object begins to
emerge from the material field in the course of this work, out comes the trowel for
a more detailed investigation.
In skilled hands it is an extraordinarily versatile instrument. Depending on the
nature of the material being worked, it can be used to smooth, scrape, shave, ifick,
cut, chop, incise, pick, gauge, lever, etc, in tasks as diverse as cleaning surfaces,
taking off spits, delineating soil boundaries, following down the sides of features,
emptying out fill, cutting sections, disembedding finds, and so on. It is a tool
not just for the dis-covering of layers and the revelation of evidence, but also for
the active exploration of the material field. A subtle investigation with the tip of
the trowel can ascertain the angle of soil-boundaries that slope down out of sight,
and therefore the relationship between layers or features that - from a disengaged
point of view - seem to merge into each other. Such practical evaluations (as to
which layer is stratigraphically above or below other layers, or which feature cuts
another) always have important implications for unfolding excavation strategy (as
to which layer or feature should be excavated next).
The trowel, then, is the tool most suited to practical excavation tasks, and to
the nature of the raw material. In this sense it is equivalent to the blacksmith's
hammer, the carpenter's saw, the tailor's scissors, or the leather-worker's needle.
But even in terms of practical utility alone, leaving any sentimental value aside,
each trowel has a quality which can only be described as personaL When I asked
diggers what was so special about their trowels, characteristic replies were "You
just get used to your own trowel... somebody else's just doesn't seem the same",
"You get used to the shape and weight of it - I know it like the back of my hand",
or "If I'm using my own trowel, I can concentrate better on what I'm doing".
It is certainly true that, whereas all new trowels tend to look alike, the well-worn
trowels in use on this excavation differed markedly from each other in form. There
were long thin blades with sharpened points, unsymmetrical blades with the wear
all on one side, rounded blades, leaf-shaped blades, and blades which had been
worn down to the size of a teaspoon. Clearly the form of the trowel is not just the
product of how it was made (or any subsequent re-fashioning or sharpening of it
97
by its owner) but also the result of how it has been used, and for how long, and
the kind of material on which it has been used. Certain types of material wear
down a trowel more than others. Different techniques of trowelling are employed
according to the nature of the material being worked, the nature of the task, and
also according to the individual digging 'style' of the troweller: each technique put
into practice tends to wear down the trowel in a particular way (see Fig 6).
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Figure 6: The Form of the Trowel 1
In this sense the trowel really does come to embody the personal style and history
of its owner; its form expresses the sum total of the material transactions in which
trowel and owner have jointly participated. As Marx would say, the tool is the
worker's labour - his mode of production - in an objectified form. But of course the
arrows in the diagram should point both ways. The material which shapes the tool
can only do so when it is being shaped by the tool: the form of the tool adapts to the
style and technique of the worker only as the worker gets tised to handling the tool,
in the practical context of a material transaction. Thus the very form of the trowel
expresses the dialectical relation - the ontological relation of NATURE:CULTURE
- which has been identified as characteristic of the troweller's mode of activity (see
Fig 7).
Paradoxically, when the trowel is actually in use and mediates between the CUL-
TURAL and NATURAL domains, it ceases to be an object-in-itself. It becomes,
as it were, an extension of the body - a means of communication with the envi-
ronment in the same way that the arm or the hand is. Most diggers are familiar
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Figure 7: The Form of the Trowel 2
with the experience of perceiving with or through the trowel. The impact of the
blade as it strikes the earth, the texture and consistency of the material being
worked, the 'feel' of the material generally, are tactile impressions which seem - to
the skilled troweller - to be located at the edge of the blade, rather than in the
fingers or the palm of the hand. The skill of using the trowel has become natu-
ralized through practice - integrated into repertoires of bodily action to the extent
that it seems the natural way of doing things (whereas to a novice the unlearnt
skill seems wholly unnatural). Thus we have the paradox of what seems to be the
most natural actually being the most cultural (Douglas 1972). Incorporated into
the subject's activity, the trowel is neither the object of at-tention nor the object
of in-tention, but the means by which the subject uncovers, brings to light, shapes
and constitutes the object. It points beyond itself to that part of the material field
which, as it is being worked, is the (unfolding) object of the troweller's labour.
5.2 The Temporal Structure of the Material Field
Instead of speaking of the material field as an abstract entity, however, let us look
at a concrete example of a material field actually encountered in excavation. The
following example is drawn from RE 40, though almost any of the recorded events
dealing with material transactions could have been used to illustrate the argument
which will be developed here. (The reader is invited to search through the text
for supplementary examples for most of the themes explored in this fieldwork
report). Conversely, each example used tends to illustrate a number of different
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themes, though only one may be drawn out at that particular place in the text.
To demonstrate this, RE 40 has been more or less arbitrarily chosen as a 'core'
event, to which we will return at various junctures, each time focusing attention
on a particular aspect of the event. Here we are concerned specifically with the
temporal structure of the material field, under the moving blade of the trowel.
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Figure 8: Sketch of RE 40
( For explanation of symbols used in this and other sketches, and a brief account of my
reasons for including these rough drawings in the fieldwork report, the reader is referred
to Notes on Sketches; Appendix I)
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Commentary;- A and D are trowelling over a surface area of about 8 x 5 m, taking off a
spit of 2-3 cnis of soil, in order to locate and delineate the outline of a ring-ditch which
has recently been discovered. Because of the similarity in colour and consistency betwen
the ditch-fill and the surrounding brick-earth, this outline is very indistinct and difficult
to see. In order to follow the cut along, A continually steps back from her work to
look at the ring-ditch from a distance, then returns to detailed trowelling. In the centre
of the area enclosed by the ring-ditch are 3 cremation-pits. One has been completely
excavated, its contents removed; the other two have been half-sectioned and still contain
cremation vessels. Excavation of these features will continue at a later date, when the
more important task of delineating the enclosing ring-ditch has been accomplished.
[RE O1
For our purposes, the material field can be divided up into 1) pre-constituted
objects: that is, the various kinds of entities that have already been constitued
as objects of significance. These include the three cremation-burials and the many
artefacts which have been discovered, bagged and left in situ to await planning. 2)
emerging objects, such as the ring-ditch, which is still being worked and has yet
to be fully delineated 3) objects yet to emerge, which though hidden and not
yet visible, are nevertheless present in an immanent sense, as objects of intention.
These include those which are more or less expected, such as the continuation
of the ring-ditch outline; those which are half-expected, such as the arrowhead
that A will find when she comes to take out the upper fill of the ring-ditch (RE
67, Section 8.2), and those which are completely unexpected, which may never
materialise, but always threaten to undermine the established interpretations of
1. 4) the background, against which significant objects emerge to stand out as
'figures'.
A told me that the purpose of the work was "to find and delineate the ring-
ditch that encloses the central cremations". This statement of purpose refers to
the four components of the material field outlined above. But it also refers to
the corresponding components of the workers' knowledge of the material field:-
1) established knowledge (eg. of the fact that there is a ring-ditch enclosing
the cremations). 2) emerging knowledge (eg. of the precise course and nature
of the ring-ditch outline that A is uncovering at this moment. 3) anticipatory
knowledge (eg. the expectation that a further continuation of the ring-ditch is
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there to be located and delineated). 4) background knowledge (the acquired
skills, rationales, etc, that enable anticipations to be made of objects yet-to-emerge,
and recognitions or identifications to be made of emerging objects - and against
which significant objects of all kinds stand out as 'figures').
If it is possible in theory to draw a clear distinction between the objects of knowledge
on the one hand, and the knowledge of objects which subjects possess on the other
hand, things are not so clear-cut in practice. For when the troweller is actively
engaged in a material transaction the intentum - the entity intended - and the
intentio - the act of intending in which the worker is engaged - are, as it were, two
sides of the same coin. While it is actually being worked, the material field itself
has an intentional structure, for it is imbued with meaning in relation to the very
projects and tasks that are brought to bear upon it. The material background and
the worker's background knowledge together form the horizon within which the
object emerges, takes form and stands out as an object of significance.
One of the most important characteristics of [the worker's knowledge and percep-
tion of] the material field is its changeability. If we stood directly behind A and
looked over her shoulder, for example, we would see that the focus of her attention
is not the material field as a whole, but rather the small area of ground which is
being worked over at that moment. Most of the material field uncovered so far has,
as it were, receded into the background. In this small area, beneath the moving
blade of the trowel, emerging objects (such as the continuation of the ring-ditch
outline) are being transformed into pre-constituted objects, which can be left be-
hind as A moves backwards, and objects yet-to-emerge are being simultaneously
brought to light as emerging objects. Her attention is fixed, not so much on the
part of the material field which is fully visible and already known, but rather on
that part which is emerging, is in a state of incipience, and is actually in the process
of becoming known.
This account of changeability, of course, presupposes a measure of continuity in [the
worker's perceptual understanding of] the material field. The ring-ditch outline,
for example, is along different parts of its length at once a pre-constituted object
(1), an emerging object (2), and an object yet to emerge (3). (1) and (3) are either
receding into or emerging out of the background (4); only (2) is in the zone of focal
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attention. But on the basis of (1), A's intention is directed towards (3) - that is,
her purpose is to find the anticipated continuation of the ring-ditch outline which,
at least up to the last movement of the trowel, has not yet been brought to light.
The troweller's labour is orientated, therefore, primarily towards the future - that
is, towards anticipated objects yet to emerge. Each scraping action with the trowel
is motivated by a set of objectives, or points to which the troweller aims and works,
and is based upon a set of predictions as to what is likely to be found. In this
sense trowelling is a kind of projection into the future; the strategies for action
implemented now will have irrevocable consequences for subsequent experience.
It follows from this that at any given moment strategies for action are to some
extent projected from the past. The past is always present, like a kind of horizon,
within which perceptions and actions are performed. The material field is itself an
historical product, and it is the inside knowledge and experience of the unfolding
of the material field accumulated by A and D - the historical agents in this case -
that enables them to set objectives, make predictions and work out strategies.
The shifting zone of focal attention, then, far from being a succession of isolated
'now' moments, is a flow of awareness, directed from the past towards the future.
But if every scraping action with the trowel is based upon predictions, every such
action is also a testing of predictions. And the general character of objects-yet-to-
emerge is that their precise form, the exact configuration they will take in actuality,
can never be fully predicted in advance. Thus the ring-ditch outline being followed
along by A does not always emerge as anticipated, but frequently veers away
from its expected course, or disappears altogether. In these instances A has to
modify ongoing strategy - to trowel deeper, to move to one side, to go back over
work already done, etc - that is, to actively search for the recaltritant pattern. It
is precisely this unexpectedness and recaltritance of the unfolding material field
that gives the present moment its sense of immediacy; the present can be defined
as the direct contact or encounter with a world which is not entirely shaped by
past actions and anticipations of the future - and which therefore always has the
capacity to surprise. The fact that the world as encountered presents a degree of
resistance to the projects, purposes and plans that are brought to bear upon it will
be crucial to our understanding of the act of discovery.
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For the most part, however, emerging objects are at least half-expected; it is ac-
tually quite rare for wholly unexpected objects to emerge in excavation practice.
Diggers can negotiate the twists and turns of emerging patterns, improvising strat-
egy as they go along, almost as a matter of routine. Thus material transactions
are generally experienced as smooth and continuous operations. Such continuity in
perception and action is quite remarkable, given that attention has such a shifting
character (given also that emerging objects have not been seen by human eye or
touched by human hand within living memory, prior to their appearance in the
moment of discovery). For the slightest manipulation of the material field with the
trowel brings a host of possible objects of significance into view, over which the
eye ranges, fixing on some for detailed examination and passing over others. To
bring an object into focus (perhaps to trowel around it, follow it down or along,
clean it over, or pick it up) is to send all the others receding into the background.
The slightest movement of the eye, head or body changes the structure of the per-
ceptual field radically, yet still - as patterns emerge, wax, wane, vanish - the field
retains a significant degree of continuity through time. We are all familiar with
the character of our everyday perception, even if it is so much a part of our lives
that we tend to take it completely for granted.
The point is that all material transactions, all acts of discovery, take place within
this zone of shifting attention, immediately in front of the body. The body -
and any tools which have been assimilated to the body - is always there in the
background, rarely attended to as an object in itself. It is only when the body
gets in the way, as in cleaning the last bits of spoil out of a constricted space in
which the worker is standing, or when it lacks the necessary skifi to carry out the
task-in-hand, that the body forces itself upon attention. Then it seems clumsy
and inefficient, and the attention directed upon it makes it still more difficult to
concentrate on the task being performed. (The novice using a trowel for the first
time, or to a lesser extent the experienced digger using an unfamiliar trowel, may
experience similar difficulties - only overcome through practice). But for the most
part the body's perceptual and manipulatory skills can be taken for granted, and
attention directed outwards onto the objective environment. When this natural
attitude is adopted the body is, as it were, "the hither zone of corporeality.., against
which the object as the goal of our action stands out or the void in front of which
it may come to light" (Merleau-Ponty 1962:102).
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The temporal structure of the material field, then, derives from the action of this
embodied subject (or subjects). This is what Marx (1973:361) meant when he
said that "Labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things,
their temporally, as their formation by living time." Turning back to look at the
sketch of the material field, we can now see that the most important elements
in the depiction are A and D themselves. They are situated at the threshold
between that part of the material field which is already known and that part
which is hidden, yet-to-emerge, and still to be explored. The lines of spoil in front
of them - which mark the temporal limits of the known world and the boundary of
CULTURE:NATURE - are curtains of immanence, continually being pulled back
to bring further patterns to light. In some fundamental sense, the way in which
these patterns will manifest themselves depends upon what A and D actually do.
5.3 Rhythms of the Body
Note that, if by a kind of theoretical abstraction, we should remove these agents
from their field of action, the material field immediately loses its temporal struc-
ture. Note too that this temporal structure is also lost the moment the worker
disengages from the task-in-hand, as when A occasionally stands back to look at
the ring-ditch as a whole and to reflect upon the work accomplished so far. This
corresponds with a shift in the attitude or stance of the worker. From a kneeling
position she steps back to adopt an upright posture, standing outside looking in,
whereas formerly she was the very centre of the action-field and the very embod-
iment of action. Trowelling seems to involve multiple shifts from an engaged to
a disengaged mode of observation and vice-versa, which means that material ev-
idence tends to emerge in a stop:start fashion. It 'stops' when A disengages; it
'starts' again when she re-engages in the material transaction.
The unfolding of the material field is intimately bound up with the rhythms of
everyday life and work. One of these rhythms is the interplay between material
transactions and acts of inscription. Acts of inscription constitute more or less
regular breaks or intervals in the routine of material transactions, while at the
same time being a part of general routine themselves. But as soon as we 'stop' to
record material evidence, the material field 'stops' also. An entire epistemology has
been founded on the vision of the static material field, as seen from a disengaged
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point of view (conveyed to the reader of excavation-reports through the medium
of plans, photographs and other data, the production of which always involves a
switch from material transaction to act of inscription and hence a disengagement
from the material field).
Cycles of night/day, or tea-break/lunch-break/tea-break, also impose a regular
pattern of pauses, of greater or shorter duration, upon excavation activity (though
this pattern is frequently disrupted by bad weather and other unpredictable fac-
tors). In this sense rhythms of engagement:disengagement coincide with rhythms
of work:rest. And when archaeologists are at rest, or absent from the site, the
material field is at rest too. There is a direct relation between the activity or
non-activity of workers and the state of the material field. It is not just that the
material field is static when workers are not there; a process of increased disorder
sets in. After only a short time patterns of significance begin to fade (due to the
effects of rain, wind-blown dust, or drying out of the soil). At night surface lay-
ers are likely to freeze, and over longer periods sections may collapse or sides of
features cave in. This process of increased disorder is reversed only when workers
return to their material fields and re-engage in material transactions.
The more mundane or routine a working activity, the more important rhythm
becomes. Material transactions such as trowelling have their own characteristic
tempo. All trowelling is necessarily half work and half rest, or half engagement
and half disengagement. The sweep of the trowel along the ground surface and
towards the body is followed by a reverse sweep above the ground and away from
the body - which is then followed by a sweep towards the body, and so on. It is
a back and forth motion, a movement and a return. Watch a skilled troweller at
work and observe the rhythm. The back and forth motion, performed at speed,
constitutes a kind of metronome for the task in hand - and hence a metronome also
for the material field being trowelled. Material patterns emerge, change and vanish
in short intermittent bursts. The fact that the temporal structure of the material
field is synchronized with the rhythms of the body has important implications for
this analysis of excavation practice.
5.4 Technique
Rhythm is integral to the technique of trowelling (it is precisely a lack of rhythm
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that characterises the work of a novice, who has not mastered technique). But
there is more to technique than tempo. In his seminal work on techniques of the
body, Marcel Mauss (1979:104) provides us with this definition: "I call technique
an action which is effective and traditional (and you will see that in this it is no
different from a magical, religous or symbolic action). It has to be effective and
traditionaL There is no technique and no transmission in the absence of tradition."
In some respects this is a very narrow definition of technique. Trowelling technique,
for example, could be described as the application of a considered, controlled and
directed force, adjusted in the very moment of action to take account of the par-
ticular characteristics (both visual and tactile) of the material being worked. Part
habit, part improvisation, it is essentially a dialectic between the worker and the
material, mediated through the use of the trowel. But Mauss's definition has the
merit of drawing our attention to the conventional or traditional procedures em-
bedded in technical actions, reminding us that mastery of technique is something
which may be learnt from and passed on to others - belonging to the social group
as well as to the individual. Every technical act, it might be said, is always a social
act; social conventions come into play with every movement of the trowel. And
these conventions are concerned just as much with not-doing (eg. not trowelling
too deep) as with what is actually done. With Mauss's definition in mind, then,
let us look at a particular example of skilled trowelling technique, in relation to a
particular material field which is being worked by means of the trowel.
At present E is trowelling a im wide strip within a larger area, taking off a spit of 2-3
cms, as he follows along the inner cut of a ring-ditch. The strip is continually being
extended in length as further portions of the cut are delineated and E moves backwards
to follow its expected course. The already trowelled strip in front of him has a smooth
and polished finish, from which the 'cut' (the soil boundary between the darker ditch-fill
and the natural gravels) stands out quite clearly. The area behind him and beneath him,
however, is covered with 'tread', footprints and vestiges of plough-soil; it is this area
which is being continually brought under the trowel as E moves backwards, and from
which the cut of the ring-ditch emerges. (For sketch of material field, see Fig 9, Section
5.5)
But each scraping action with the trowel not only opens up a new part of the material
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field, bringing new patterns to light (while at the same time leaving a ridge and a thin
line of spoil in the wake of the point of the trowel); it also erases or 'trowels out' the
ridge and line created by the previous trowel-stroke. Nearly every trowel-stroke seems
to have this double-function. The total operation, performed at speed, has the effect
of erasing the principal traces of the trowelling operation itself
[RE 22]
The work of a skilled troweller can be compared with that of a novice - new to the
tool and the art of using it, unfamiliar with archaeological materials and practices.
(There were no such novices on this site; in talking of the the novice I am drawing
from experience of working on other excavations). The novice invariably obscures
and smudges rather than highlights significant patterns; the material field shows
instead a pattern of trowel-marks and ridges, as well as loose crumbs of dislodged
soil, where every action with the trowel has left its trace. The ridges catch the
light and cast shadows over the surface, obscuring significant patterns further. On
the other hand, the mark of a skilled troweller is a surface which shows no mark or
trace of having been worked - except that all significant patterns are highlighted,
all soil boundaries sharpened, so that they stand out as figures from the general
background.
The task of highlighting significant patterns, then, is inextricably bound up with
the task of removing the traces of the agency that highlighted it. In this sense each
trowel-stroke has a double-effect, at once revealing and hiding aspects of the world.
What is revealed is the evidence for human agency in the distant past; what is
hidden is the evidence of our own agency in bringing those patterns to light in the
present day. The troweller proceeds with his work like a fugitive crossing a terrain
of sand or snow, brushing away his tracks as he goes. By subtle sleight of hand,
he erases all trace of his own subjective activity from the objective material field.
'It is art to conceal art', as the saying goes, expressing in common-sense wisdom a
paradox that lies at the heart of scientific as well as artistic production. Our own
skill or artistry in manipulating the world causes that skill to become objectively
hidden to us, so that the product we fashion from a raw material appears to us
as the raw material itself, independent of any apprehending subject. This effect is
possible only by means of a traditional act, in which all the acquired and practised
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skill of the worker is brought to bear upon the material being worked - even if
the act is performed as a matter of routine, and even if the effect of the act is to
make the material appear as though it is not the effect of any agency or artisanship
in the present day at all. It is in this regard that a technique is equivalent to a
magical, religious or symbolic action.
5.5 Practical Reasoning
Mauss's definition of technique suggests that technical acts have an ideational
content: they are cognitive as well as material practices. In the last analysis
it is impossible to separate the cognitive and material acts of excavation, since
every active manipulation of material evidence is part of the process of 'making
sense' of that evidence. it is important, however, to draw a clear distinction
between practical problem-solving or practical reasoning, and the kind of analytical
problem-solving that is more characteristic of the academic and textual domains.
To do this, let us stay with RE 22 and consider E's activity in the context of the
problem he is trying to solve:-
Commentary:- E told me that the purpose of the task was to delineate precisely the
edges of the ring-ditch, so it could be decided where the best places would be to cut
segments through the ditch. He had started work in the north corner of the area, as
this was where the ditch-outline stood out most clearly. Taking off a spit of 1-2cms,
he had followed the inner and outer cuts along until they disappeared in a spread of
brick-earth, whereupon the removal of a much deeper spit of soil became necessary. It
had taken about half an hour of hard work, E said, to make some sense of this part of
the area, and to find what he thought might be the outer cut of the ditch as it turned
towards the south-east. In doing so he also discovered what could be the cut of an as yet
unidentified feature, which he thinks is probably natural. E stressed, however, that he
was not certain about any of these patterns. The soil boundary between the brick-earth
and the gravel was fairly clear, but he was not sure yet if this really was a feature in
the brick-earth; nor was he sure about the division or cut between the possible feature
and the ring-ditch fill. What worried him most was that, if the inner and outer cuts
of the ring-ditch (as he had delineated them) were correct, then this would mean that
the ring-ditch made almost a right-angled turn. As he put it "this is not what you'd
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Figure 9: Sketch of RE 22
normally expect" (most ring-ditchs in our experience, on this and other sites, are more
or less circular in form).
In order to clarify the situation, E is now trying to delineate the cuts of the ditch in the
other half of the area (at present he is working on the inner cut). Once this is done he
will be able to follow these cuts back into the problematic region, which will have to be
re-trowelled - in the opposite direction to before - until questions about the shape of the
ring ditch and its relationships to adjacent soil contexts are resolved. Because E plans
to take another spit off the area as a whole, he is now trowelling to a slightly deeper
level, removing at least an extra centimetre of soil.
[RE 22]
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As Aristotle argued, practical reasoning differs from theoretical reasoning in that
it leads up to an act, or an intention to act; that is, its conclusion is an action.
Practical reasons provide the grounds for action. To this we can add that practical
reasoning often starts in action too, and that the whole reasoning process may
be embedded in action. Without in any way implying that practical reasoning is
somehow a-theoretical - for all human reasoning has both practical and theoretical
dimensions - we can say that reasoning only becomes 'theoretical' (in the sense in
which we normally understand the word) when it is abstracted out of the tempo-
ral context of bodily action and experience, to be framed in the form of explicit
propositions or arguments in analytical space.
In the above example we are dealing with a practical space rather than an ana-
lytical one. The problem to be solved manifests itself in a concrete situation or
field of action in which the agent is located. As in RE 40, this field is comprised
of pre-constituted objects, emerging objects, objects-yet-to-emerge, and a back-
ground against which the objects stand out - and all of these have both material
and cognitive dimensions. The material field, and the problem which the material
field presents, has a temporal structure. It changes through time, and subsidiary
problems arise in the course of time. Each action performed - every scrape with
the trowel - alters the structure of the material field by bringing hitherto unseen
patterns to light, and therefore alters the structure of the problem also. (For what
began as a fairly simple task of cleaning over and delineating a feature has now
become a complex problem, involving unforeseen variables - such as the possible
feature that E discovered next to the ring-ditch - and a lack of fit between ex-
pectations as to what a ring-ditch should look like and its actual shape at the
present moment). This means that the strategy for solving the problem has to be
continually modified in the course of action to take account of these changes (eg.
E's plan to follow the cuts back into the problematic brick-earth region, working
in the opposite direction and re-trowelling an already worked area, is at once a
continuation of previous strategy and a response to aspects of the problem which
have emerged through time, and could not have been envisaged when work began).
Importantly, the problem involves not just 'what things are' but also 'what to
do with them'. Objects within the action field have "action-meanings" (Ittelson
and Cantril 1954:21, Kwant 1965:169). That is, the field is comprised of things
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to work with, to work upon, to grasp, to manipulate, to explore, or to transform.
These include the tools (the trowel, shovel and bucket) which E is using, as well
as the material he is using them upon. Tools are obvious examples of things which
have meanings that are only fully actualised in use; archaeological materials have
action-meanings related to those of tools. In this particular instance we have 'a
ring-ditch to be delineated', 'a cut to be followed along', 'a surface to be scraped
clean', 'a feature to be trowelled over', 'a relationship to be defined', etc. And it is
not just significant objects that have action-meanings. Because most of the objects
of intention are hidden from view by intervening layers of plough-soil and tread, or
are obscured by brick-earth, these layers are constituted negatively as 'objects to
be removed'. Thus we have 'spits to be taken off', 'regions to be explored', 'areas
to be opened', etc. The objects-yet-to-emerge which are hidden by intervening
layers - the principal intentional objects of excavation practice - are anticipated as
'objects to be discovered'. It is this last category of action-meanings that provides
the rationale for excavation in the first instance.
Another way of putting it is that the practical space of the action-field is full of
possibilities - not just material possibiites, or ways in which the material evidence
might manifest itself if explored further, but also possibilities for action. These
two kinds of possibility, moreover, are inextricably interconnected. At any given
moment there are any number of possible strategies, or courses of action, that E
could take, and each one will lead inexorably to a different manifestation of the
material evidence, a different future. It is a mark of the skilled troweller that he
can recognise the appropriate course of action, can 'see what has to be done' (a
common phrase amongst diggers). Action-meanings, like other kinds of objective
meaning, are not merely mental phenomena in the head; they are out there in the
world, and can actually be seen by the skilled agent.
Note then that action meanings, though objectified in the material field, are prop-
erly speaking relationships between the subject and the object (or rather the agent
and the patient). They have a referential structure that includes the abilities, skills,
knowledge and projects of the subject, as well as material objects on the ground.
A novice without the necessary know-how, or indeed a layman coining upon an ar-
chaeological excavation for the first time, would simply not be able to understand
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- or see - the material field in these practical terms. And a material field without
a subject would be completely devoid of action-meanings.
Note also that as excavation proceeds and E's purposes and projects change to
take account of emerging evidence, action-meanings change too (eg. 'the surface
to be scraped clean' in the problematic region has now become 'a feature to be
investigated' and 'a relationship to be defined'. If the possible feature is found
to be of archaeological significance, this part of the material field and its action-
meanings are likely to undergo a series of transformations in the future, when
the feature is excavated - eg. 'a fill to be emptied out', 'a cut to be followed
down', 'a section to be cut', 'a section to be cleaned', 'a section to be recorded', 'a
section to be removed', 'a sample to be taken', etc). Finally we should note that
action-meanings refer to each other through time and space, since they are held
together by the overall project of the worker. Each action-meaning makes sense
only in relation to other action-meanings which preceded it, are contemporary
with it, or are projected into the future on the basis of it. It is the total referential
structure of action-meanings that binds the material, the tools and the worker into
an encompassing 'action-field'.
In practical situations, then, the problem-solver proceeds by means of action -
through exploration and transformation of his environment. What distinguishes
his activity from that of analytical problem-solving is his direct engagement with
the problem in its material form - shaping it through the use of tools, removing
this and revealing that, following some patterns along and leaving others behind.
Accordingly the problem (even if it started out as a theoretical problem) takes
shape in instrumental terms, and is solved through instrumental means. Practical
solutions are therefore always transformations of the material field, which can
only be accomplished through work or labour. (For the partial resolution and
transformation of this particular problem, see RE 37-41, Section 9.6)
5.6 The Referential Structure of the Trowel-in-Use
This chapter has focused on the principal tool of excavation, not so much as an
object in its own right, but rather in its context of use. No attempt has been
made, therefore, to describe in detail the objective form and properties of the tool
- eg. its measurements, the materials of which it is made, etc - for in this respect
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the archaeologist's trowel is little different from the plasterer's trowel. To try and
quantify the trowel in this way would be to miss the point. The meaning of a
tool is not contained in the object itself, but in its use, and to understand it is
to understand the work to which it contributes. Only when we have ourselves
acquired the 'knack' of using the trowel for the tasks for which it is intended, can
we say that we truly understand it. The meaning is literally something we have to
'grasp', in the most practical sense of the word.
The trowel-in-use has a referential structure that relates it to many other kinds
of entities-in-use; its meaning points beyond itself in all directions. It points, first
of all, to the objective material field; that is, the material being worked - not
just the emerging patterns of significance directly in view, but also the anticipated
patterns which the trowel is about to uncover. In this respect the meaning of the
trowel consists of the way it is used (has been used, will be used) in relation to
this material.
Secondly, the trowel-in-use points towards other items of equipment - what Heideg-
ger (1962:97) calls the "totality of equipment". Diggers rarely use the trowel on its
own; it is used in conjunction with a shovel, a finds tray, a bucket, a wheelbarrow,
the network of planks or walkways that leads to the huts in the clearing and to the
spoil-heap. Each kind of activity (troweffing, photography, planning, etc) has its
own particular tool-kit, and the meaning of any one tool is inextricably bound up
with the meaning of all the others. The tool-kits in turn are also related to each
other; thus a surface may be trowelled so that it can be planned and photographed,
or planned and photographed so that it can be trowelled away. Abstract a tool
out of this context of total equipment and it loses part of its meaning.
But if the trowel can be said to point towards other entities within the action-
field, so that (to use the famous Heideggerian example) it refers to them in the
same way as a hammer to a nail and a nail to a board, it must also point away
from something. What does it point away from? It points away from the subject
whose very presence and intentional labour upon the object holds the action-field
together. Sartre (1957) developed an entire existential philosophy around this
notion of pointing or deixis, by conceiving of the subject as the indicator and the
object as indicated. Polanyi (1967:10) also argued that consciousness has a "from
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- to" structure. Whatever the merits of the pointing metaphor, it is certainly the
case that, from the point of view of the worker engaged in a material transaction,
the body is always and necessarily situated on the background.
Since the trowel-in-use points away from the body, the skills of the body are also
placed in the background - as are the traditional (ie social and historical) proce-
dures, rationales, beliefs, ways of thinking, ways of seeing and ways of doing that
are part and parcel of any skifi. The meaning of the trowel is actuaiised only in the
hands of an experienced worker who has the 'knack' or 'know-how' of trowelling.
Place a trowel in the hands of a novice and much of its instrumental value dis-
appears, existing in potentia only. Nevertheless, every novice has the capacity to
learn how to use the trowel, to acquire the skill through practice and training - by
getting the body used to handling the trowel in relation to archaeological materials.
The meaning of the trowel has a fundamental orientation towards (or rather away
from) the hand and the capabilities of the human body generally. Take the trowel
out of the practical space of the body and it becomes a mere thing) no longer an
instrument to be grasped and used, devoid of action-meanings.
The trowel-in-use also points away from the intentions, purposes and projects of
the worker (and, through the worker, those of the excavation-team as a whole). It
makes no sense to speak of the function or meaning of the trowel outside of the
context of intentional labour, for the trowel-in-use is the instrument and conductor
of intentions; it is through the medium of the tool that intentions are put into
practice. There is therefore no necessity for us to regard intentions as purely mental
phenomena; as Marx (1976:508) argued, "the labour process unites the labour of
the hand with that of the head." In a very real sense the skilled worker 'thinks
with the hands and the trowel - until he detaches himself from the task-in-hand
to consider the material field from a distance. In practice it is difficult to separate
cognition from perception and action. Indeed, when we look at a troweller's activity
we are observing thoughts, perceptions and intentions in action.
It is not so much, then, that the troweller's actions are somehow a-theoretical,
existing outside of the theoretical domain. It is rather that, in the context of
the troweller's practical activity, theory is grounded - is literally brought down to
earth. This is where theory is 'lived' with the body - theory transposed into an
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exploratory mode. For every scraping action with the trowel opens up a new region
of the world and constitutes our "original contact" (Merleau-Ponty 1962:xvi) with
the objects of our knowledge, as these emerge from the ground in the context of
practical labour. Indeed, objects emerge and take form in our perception only (in
a dialectical fashion) as we give form to them, by acting upon the material field in
particular ways, through the application of material and cognitive tools, and the
performance of a range of practical skills.
When we study this ontological ground, we find that there is no moment in our
experience when the world can be said to be comprised of neutral facts or theory-
free data. As Gurvitsh (1970:50) argues, "the perception of a thing... is not to be
understood as though a sense or meaning were superveniently bestowed or imposed
upon a mere corporal object which, prior to that imposition, was devoid of all
sense." Significant objects are anticipated, at least half-expected, even before they
arrive. When they emerge from hiddenness they are to a certain extent already
known, already understood, and in a meaningful relationship to other entities.
They take their palace as CULTURAL objects in a CULTURAL world where a
place has already been assigned to them. But if it is rare, in perception, for
wholly unexpected or unfamiliar objects to be encountered, there is nevertheless
always something strange, unique or different about any object we encounter for
the first time - some kind of resistance in the emergent object that challenges our
preconceived notions about it, disrupts our projects, and declines to let us shape it
as we please (eg. the ring-ditch that refuses to be round, RE 22). A situation arises
where either the problematic evidence has to be shaped, manually and cognitively,
to fit accepted schemes, or those schemes themselves have to be re-shaped to
accommodate the object - or, more usually perhaps, a mutual transformation of
both sides of the practical equation takes place. it is this existential moment,
and only this moment - when, through the medium of the trowel or some other
tool, CULTURE encounters that which is not-CULTURE (and both NATURE and
CULTURE are transformed in the transaction between them) - that can properly
be called the act of discovery.
5.7 The Trowel as Material Symbol
At the start of the chapter it was noted that the trowel can be an object of
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significance in itself, can have a personal value for its owner, even when not in
use. This would seem to contradict the assertion (Section 5.6) that the meaning of
the trowel is its use. A closer examination, however, will show that the personal
significance accorded to the trowel is its use-value, but seen from a disengaged
(rather than engaged) perspective. What has changed is the situation and point
of view of the owner. When not in use the trowel is no longer an extension of the
body or the instrument of its intentions, but an object in its own right, detachable
from the body. Its temporality is gone, or rather has been solidified into the form
of a material symboL
The trowel symbolises the owner's acquired skill, her accumulated experience, her
history of working on archaeological sites, and the close working relationship forged
between owner and trowel in past material transactions (which explains why a
well-worn trowel is likely to be highly prized, and a new trowel not at all). This
is the 'model of' (Geertz 1973:91) aspect of the trowel as material symbol. But
the trowel also symbolises the power that such skill and experience confers on the
owner - power to open up and explore a part of the world which would otherwise
have remained hidden, to make sense of and to understand that world. In some
fundamental sense, the owner's causal potency as an active source of meaningful
effects has come to be objectified in the material form of the trowel, which therefore
has an orientation towards future material transactions, on this and other sites.
This is the 'model for' (Geertz:ibid) aspect of the trowel as material symbol. In this
respect a personal trowel is an object of power, a fact always intuitively grasped
by diggers themselves. Even when not in use, then, the trowel refers us back to
the ontological ground of the action-field.
117
Chapter VI
SOCIAL TRANSACTIONS
"The goal is to penetrate the obscurity of everyday practices, or ways
of operating or doing things... This does not imply a return to indi-
viduality. Analysis shows that a relation (always social) determines
its terms, and not the reverse, and that each individual is a locus in
which a plurality of such relational determinations abound." (Certeau
1984:xi)
6.1 Work as Socially-Mediated Activity
The last chapter was concerned with sketching out the basic structure of the act
of discovery - in terms of the (temporal) relation between the (embodied and
situated) subject and the (emerging) object, mediated through (the use of) tools.
Such material transactions, however, always take place within the wider context
of a network of social interactions or inter-subjective activity (which also unfolds
through time); the object emerges and takes form within this social milieu. The
observation that human transactions with NATURE are socially mediated as well
as materially mediated adds a whole new dimension to this analysis of the subject-
object relation.
Interpretations and identifications of material evidence are never solely the product
of the practical reasoning of one individual or subject. Unfolding interpretations
of emerging objects and strategies for dealing with them are continually discussed,
and re-formulated in discussion, by co-members of the excavation team. Such
exchanges will be called social transactions - that is, interactions between two
or more workers, mediated principally (but not exclusively) by spoken language.
Social transactions always involve reference to some aspect of the objective world;
the objective world referred to, however, is by no means a fixed and concrete
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entity. Indeed, discussions often bring about a clash of opinions on the meaning or
relevance of discovered objects and the best way to excavate them further, represent
them on plan, etc. These discussions generally proceed dialectically towards some
kind of compromise or consensus.
6.2 Co-operative Labour
Social transactions cannot be reduced entirely to linguistic exchanges, however.
There is a non-linguistic matrix of action (Bloor 1983:32) upon which all social
transactions are founded. When we looked at RE4O in Section 5.2, we concentrated
mainly on A's activity - but there were of course two diggers at work on the one
material field. Although A and D were working on different parts of the field,
and their individual tasks varied accordingly, there is definitely a sense in which
both were engaged in the same task and shared a common intent - ie. to clean
over a certain area of ground surface in order to locate the ring-ditch outline. To
this end they were clearly co-operating with each other (eg. both trowelling in the
same direction, to the same depth, to the same limits of the trowelled area, etc).
All collective working seems to have this character of causing subjects to relate to
co-subjects in their joint activity - and it is through these co-operative relations (as
they unfold in the actual material practice of excavation) that an inter-subjective
or CULTURAL understanding of the emerging NATURAL object of their labour
is constructed.
Co-operative relations are complex, having both spatial and temporal dimensions,
linking person to person and person to environment through time. It is not simply
a case of A and D having been given the same set of instructions by the supervisor;
many things have happened, many modifications have had to be made to exca-
vation strategy to take account of emerging evidence, since the last supervisory
visit. Partners working in close proximity to each other on the same material field
share:-
1) a common spatial environment [ "a certain sector of the outer world is
equally accessible... The same things are within reach, within sight... Within
this common horizon there are objects of common interest and common relevance;
things to work with or upon, actually or potentially." Schutz 1964:109]
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2) an unfolding present, which means that the perceptions, actions, intentions
and expectations of one partner are synchronised with those of the other, at any
given moment during the flow of experience.
3) a common purpose, or orientation towards the future, bound up with antici-
pations as to what will happen, or what is likely to be found, as well as common
strategies for finding expected evidence.
4) common assumptions and skills, derived from past cultural experience,
about the nature of the objective world and ways of acting within and upon it.
Co-operation is only possible when partners can to some extent take the same
things for granted (as 'common-sense'). In this case, for instance, A and D can
take it as given that the patterns being brought to light are of an archaeological
character - indicative of human activity in the past - a point which would not be
at all obvious to a layman or outsider.
To these four dimensions of co-operative relations (which correspond broadly to
the four components of the material field outlined in Section 5.2) a fifth should be
added:-
5) experience of the other. Each partner experiences the other as an intentional
agent embodied within a mutually intelligible environment. The relative smooth-
ness of joint operations owes much to the way in which, in ongoing practice, both
participants are to some extent aware of what the other is doing, thinking, seeing,
intending, and about to do. When A suddenly stops trowelling and picks up a
stone, for example, both D and I know that she has noticed an object of potential
archaeological significance, that she is looking at it closely to see if it really is
a worked flint, and accordingly whether she should keep it as a recorded find or
throw it away. A, moreover, knows that we know, and does not feel it necessary
to explain the purpose behind her actions. This is a simple example of the way
we routinely attribute intentional and perceptual 'inner' states to other people on
the basis of what they do (see Heider 1958, Tagiuri and Petrullo 1958). It is diffi-
cult to overestimate the importance of this inter-personal understanding (Weber's
vestehen) in contributing to an implicit consensus about the relative objectivity of
patterns in the material environment [ "even when we see only the glance of the
other person directed towards an object, we get the impression that he perceives
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it. This pre-supposes that we experience the other as living in the same world as
ourselves and as perceiving approximately the same things as we would from that
position." Heider 1958:60].
In a complex process of joint labour - such as trowelling - an interplay develops,
where the perceptions of each partner are continually modified to take account of
the perceptions the other is perceived to have, and their actions and intentions are
likewise orientated in relation to each other's actions and intentions, as well as in
relation to the material field:-
During trowelling, A uncovered what looked like the cut of an as yet unidentified feature.
D saw this, and went back to an already trowelled region alongside her to try and find
the continuation of the cut. He couldn't find it. A seemed to decide on the basis of
this that what she thought was a cut was in fact nothing of the kind; she stopped trying
to delineate it and went back to routine trowelling again. D returned to his former
position.
[RE4O]
This fairly matter-of-fact description of a mundane event, which lasted little more
than a minute, contains an implicit network of inter-personal relations. Because
no word was spoken, co-operation was made possible by a constant exchange of
attributional perceptions. To give some examples of these:- D observed from A's
actions that A perceived a pattern of significance, and he could see what A's
intention was in trying to delineate it. When he went to help, A observed that D
could not find the continuation of the cut, which both partners - on the basis of
past experience - would have expected to find if the pattern really was the edge of
a feature. D observed that A could not see it either. Both partners, exchanging
glances, could see that the other's original perception of the pattern as indicative
of an archaeological feature had now changed. By mutual and silent consent, the
objectivity of this particular pattern of material evidence was diminished. The
pattern faded away into the background, to be forgotten, as the partners returned
to their previous tasks.
[Not all co-operative labour is silent, of course. Partners usually talk to each other
while they work - using language to direct each other's attention to aspects of the
unfolding evidence, to discuss the meaning of discovered objects, to formulate or
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re-formulate strategies, or perhaps to talk and joke about other things entirely.
Language (as signifier) undoubtedly play a major role in the inter-subjective con-
struction of objective meaning (as signified), and in co-ordinating activites in rela-
tion to the objective material field. But linguistic communication is always founded
upon the inter-personal understanding or 'common-sense' described above. This
does not mean both partners have exactly the same perceptions and intentions.
As embodied and situated agents occupying different positions in space, each with
their own individual history or background, they necessarily see things from differ-
ent points of view. Divisions of meaning and purpose often arise in the context of
joint labour - as when one partner perceives the other to be troweffing down to the
wrong depth, or failing to spot a significant object. Such divisions of meaning are
usually resolved through dialogue. Intentions and perceptions that were implicit
in action can be made explicit in words, and some kind of compromise between
divergent projects arrived at. Nevertheless, there is still much practical truth in
the proverb, actions speak louder than words.]
Also implicit in the description, we should remember, are the perceptions of the
ethnographer, who was able to make sense of the performance only by attributing
intentions and perceptions to the workers involved. Without these attributions
the performance would have been practically incomprehensible, and more or less
indescribable except as a mere sequence of bodily movements. It should be re-
membered, too, that the presence of an observer standing in the backgound -
particularly one with a notebook (which might make the subjects feel as though
they are the object of the note-taker's gaze: see Sartre 1957:252ff on 'the Look')
- has some effect upon the intentions, perceptions and actions of those who are
being observed.
Our perceptual experience, then, can be described as a complex and shifting net-
work of meaningful relationships - between persons, between persons and environ-
ment, and between other entities within the environment. The perceiver (whether
archaeologist observing material remains, or ethnographer observing archaeolo-
gists observing material remains) is an active participant within this field. As
Merleau-Ponty (1962:xx) puts it, "we witness every minute the miracle of related
experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is worked,
for we are ourselves this network of relationships."
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6.3 The Ethnographic Interview
If we turn our attention now away from the component events of RE4O, which
took place within particular sectors of the trowelled area, and stand back as A
so often does to look at the material field as a whole (refer to Fig 8, Section
5.2), we can compare the diggers' perception of their field of action with that of a
relative outsider, coming to the scene from a different part of the site. Perhaps the
most significant pattern within this field is the ring-ditch, the uncovering of which
provides the raison d'etre and the intentional object of their activity. Yet when I
first approached, I could not see the ring-ditch at all, and had to ask A and D
whether it was really there.
They admitted that the cut of the ditch was difficult to see at first, 'until you get
your eye in' - because of the similarity in colour and texture between the ditch-
fill and the surrounding brick-earth. They told me that, even to them, the ditch
appeared and disappeared according to the light and the moisture in the soil. It was
best seen, they said, in the bright sun of early morning, but it never stood out well
enough to photograph or plot precisely on a plan. Despite its ephemeral nature,
however, they both insisted it was 'definitely there'. A said that sometimes she
could see the edge of the ditch clearly as she was trowelling it, but then it quickly
became obscured by wind-blown dust and the drying out of the soil. Even so,
she added that the differentiation between fill and surrounding earth was more a
case of 'something you could feel', while working on it, rather than something you
could see. A drew the approximate course of the cut on my sketch for me. Then
she pointed to a place on the ground where she could see the cut, following the
known course along with her finger. I looked closely but still could not see it. A
suggested that I stand back and look at the distribution of finds across the area as
a whole. I followed this advice. The finds formed a roughly circular band around
the central cremations - as soon as I noticed this I saw the inner and outer cuts of
the ring-ditch emerge from the general back grouncL
The ethnographic interview itself, then, is an example of a social transaction, and
was one of the many ways in which I was able to gain entry into the inter-subjective
understanding and common perception of the site. To arrive at a certain part of the
site, and to listen to archaeologists explaining their work to me, while simultane-
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ously watching the patterns of significance emerge from formerly undifferentiated
surfaces of mud and stones, was a frequent experience during fieldwork. This
particular case illustrates the power of speech in directing another's attention to
relevant aspects of the material field, facilitating a kind of mutual perception, and
increasing the sense in which we all share a common world, a common reality.
If the interview was, for me, a form of cultural immersion in miniature - where
I was made a party to the knowledge of the material field which A and D had
acquired through their joint practice and discussion - it is also the case that they
had to orientate themselves towards my perspective, as in the following exchange:-
I asked D to tell me about the north of the area, which he had just trowelled. "There's
nothing there", he told me. "But what about those black lines?" I asked him. "Which
black lines?" was his response. I walked over and pointed directly at one of the plough-
marks [refer to Fig 8, Section 5.2]. He suddenly realised what I meant, and looked
surprised that I should ask about these patterns at all. "They're just ploughmarks,
that's all".
[RE 40]
These (modern) plough-marks were the only patterns - apart from the excavated
cremation pits - which stood out quite clearly from the ground surface when I first
arrived to speak to A and D. Yet they had not figured in the diggers' account
of the material field. They belong to the many and various kinds of patterns
which, once identified, are not perceived to be relevant to archaeological enquiry
- ie. which do not need to be planned, photographed, sampled, half-sectioned,
recorded on context-sheets, or explored further. It was possible to tell that they
had once been cleaned over carefully by trowel, and that D had checked to make
sure they really were traces of modern ploughing activity rather than indications
of an archaeological feature. But in so far as they had been the object of attention
at all, they had since receded into the background. It was my deliberately naive
question that brought these patterns to the digger's attention once again.
The interview, then, is a dialectical process (and any sketches or notes taken by
the ethnographer are a product of this dialectic) - a mixing of perspectives into
some kind of 'mutual sight', the original and now obsolete meaning of the word
inter-view. All social transactions have this dialectical character, this mingling of
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outlooks - tending always towards a consensus about the nature or meaning of the
objective world.
6.4 Visits
As it happened, the ethnographic interview fitted quite well into normal patterns
of social interaction. Although individual tasks were usually place-specific, there
was considerable movement of workers from one material field to another. Peri-
ods of concentrated work in small bounded regions [each worker's material field
was effectively bounded by the 'limits of trowelling' - see sketches] tended to be
punctuated by occasional visits from or to other workers on different parts of the
site. Sometimes the purpose of these casual visits was to borrow a tool, or pick
up some item for recording, but they were usually motivated by an interest in
what was happening and what was being discovered in other areas; they provided
the opportunity for discussion about emerging evidence, problems encountered in
excavation, and so on.
A distinctive kind of visit is that made by the supervisor or director: supervisory
visits differ from casual visits in certain important respects. In casual visits the
visitor usually travels from one familiar material field (his or her place of work)
to another field which is less well known, but the social transaction is essentially
an egalitarian one; the participants in the transaction are equals. In supervisory
visits, on the other hand, the ultimate point of departure is the planning-hut.
The planning hut is the organizational centre for the excavation as a whole. Situ-
ated just outside the excavation trench, with a window overlooking the site, it is
linked by phone to the outside world and the unit offices (see Section 4.2). This
is where overall strategy is devised, modified and coordinated. The purpose of
the supervisory visit is to implement this strategy in events on the ground - by
dispensing tasks, monitoring their progress, and guiding ongoing work according
to general policy. Supervisory visits are therefore characterised to a certain ex-
tent by relations of authority and subordination - that is, by relations of power.
(This does not mean, however, that such visits are wholly prescriptive; it is partly
through supervisor-worker transactions that happenings on the ground feed back
into the planning-hut and the general scheme of things, so that overall strategy is
continually adjusted to take account of emerging evidence.)
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This network of visits provided an interesting opportunity for my own research.
As well as walking around the site asking other archaeologists about their work,
I could also stay where I was and let others come to me. This method had sev-
eral advantages. To some extent it reversed the respective roles of ethnographer
and ethnographised; I was the one being observed; they were the ones doing the
observing and commenting upon my work. This time it was mainly through their
volition, not mine, that the meetings took place at all. They decided what to
talk about, and for how long, according to the aspects of the material field that
interested them. Unlike the ethnographic interview proper, such meetings did not
impose an 'ethnographic' structure upon everyday interactions, but took place as
if I was an ordinary digger (participant) rather than an ethnographer (observer).
In order to retain the spontaneity of conversations, I never took notes during these
visits, but tried to write down what was said or done as soon as possible after the
event. Each recorded event of this kind, then, was actually a sequence of visits by
various people, occurring at irregular intervals during my work upon a particular
material field. In order to appreciate something of the character of visits, and the
contribution that each worker makes to the constitution of the object, let us follow
one of these sequences through. (Supervisory visits are marked by an asterisk.)
[Commentary: An irregular patch of dark soil with charcoal flecks, roughly oval in shape
and about 35 x 65cms, had earlier been uncovered during the general hoeing of the site.
It had been cleaned over by trowel, provisionally interpreted as a cremation-burial,
and plotted on the 1:50 plan. Some days later, I was given the task of excavating the
feature. I cleaned over the feature and surrounding gravel in order to delineate the cut
or outline more precisely, then drew it onto the pre-x plan. I also drew a sketch in my
notebook at this stage of excavation for future reference (Fig.10).]
1. (Thurs 1.3Opm) R caine over to take the pre-x photograph, after which he took a
close look at the feature, picking up a trowel and scraping the surface (as he searched
for indications of a pottery vessel). He pointed out to me that, because no pottery
outline was visible (most of the cremations encountered so far had been truncated by
modern ploughing, so that the pottery vessel usually showed in section on the ground
surface), this was likely to be an un-urned cremation. He asked if I had dug an un-
urned cremation before. When I said no, he said there was quite a different excavation
procedure for this kind of cremation. In his own words:- "If they dug the pit and placed
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the cremation straight in it, without putting it into a vessel, there may not be any
difference between cremation material and fill at this depth...the cremation might go
right up to the edge of the pit... so you should start digging from the section rather than
from the pottery outline as you usually do."
[I put a section-line across the feature and began to remove one half of the fill, taking
off a spit at a time. There was still no sign of a pottery vessel. Nor were any fragments
of burnt bone encountered, as might have been expected if indeed this was a cremation.
However, the dark fill soon peeled off onto a solid mass of charcoal or burnt wood. This
object appeared to be contained within the dark fill (the fill in turn being contained
by the side or cut of the feature which - as I followed it down by trowel - was found
to slope gently down underneath the burnt object). As more fill was removed and the
object began to take form, I wondered whether the object itself, as well as the pit, was
man-made. It had an irregular form, but the probability that it had been intentionally
burnt, and also the likelihood that it had been deliberately deposited in the pit, seemed
to argue against it being a wholly natural object. I drew a sketch of it (Fig.1l), and
went back to the toolshed to pick up a finer instrument with which to clean the object.]
2 .* (Thurs 4.00pm). In passing the planning-hut I called in and told R that the feature
was not a cremation after all; he came back with me to see for himself. After asking
various questions about the layer of dark soil I had partially removed ('did the layer go
right up to the side of the feature?', 'did you find any pottery or bone?', etc), he picked
up the trowel, scraped carefully over the surface of the wooden object, then stood back
and looked at the feature as a whole. He said that he didn't think that the object was
an artefact in its own right, as it was much too irregular in shape, but that it could be
the remains (truncated by later ploughing) of a funeral-pyre. He pointed out that, in a
cremation-cemetery, "they must have burnt their dead somewhere". He told me to clean
over the object gently with a metal-leaf, and to make sure to take a radio-carbon sample
if the object itself was not to be kept intact.
3. (Thurs 4.25pm) Shortly after R left, D passed by while taking back his tools to the
toolshed for the night. Upon first glance at the object within the feature, he asked me if
it was an un-urned cremation (that is, a cremation which has been placed in a skin-
vessel or bag which has since decayed away, leaving the cremation as a discrete deposit
seperate from the surrounding fill; this sense of the term 'un-urned' differs slightly from
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the sense in which R used it in 1). I pointed out to D that this could not be the
case, as the object was clearly a piece of burnt wood; I tapped it lightly with the trowel
to demonstrate this. When I told D that it could be the remains of a funeral-pyre,
however, he disagreeed. He said it was much more likely that it was "just a burnt tree-
stump". Slightly taken aback by this suggestion, I argued that the sides of the feature
were regular and cleanly-cut, as if man-made. But D pointed out that the shape of the
feature in horizontal section was in fact quite irregular, as if a natural tree-root hole. At
this juncture W arrived. Listening to our respective points of view, he attempted to
mediate between them, suggesting that both explanations could be partially correct. He
said men could have dug a pit around a tree and set a fire at the base of the stump, in
order to remove it (perhaps for agricultural reasons).
[Further cleaning of the wooden object, however, showed that what had seemed to be
a single object was in fact comprised of many smaller pieces of wood, which had stuck
together into a charcoal mass as the result of some past burning event (see Fig.12) Some
of these pieces, moreover, were square in section and had obviously been worked]
4* (Fri 9.00am) Early the next morning T - who had been told by R in the planning
hut about the possibility of the feature being the remains of a funeral pyre - came over
to have a look. I gave him a quick account of excavation so far, as well as of the various
explanations of the evidence that had been put forward. He picked up a trowel and
scraped over some of the surfaces. He said that at least the cleaning of the object had
shown that it was not a tree-stump, and that it looked as though it was "the remains
of a fire, scooped into a hollow" with some worked wood having been used as fuel: the
important question was whether it was ancient or modern, especially as there was a
similar feature cut into (and therefore later than) a trackway known to be modern in
another part of the site. But there was still a possibility, he said, that it was contemporary
with the cremations, and was in some way related to the mortuary activity associated
with the cemetery. He surmised that there could have been "an area set aside for the
burning of bodies within the cemetery" and said that, when excavation and recording of
this feature was completed, it might be worth trowelling a spit off the surrounding area
of gravel, to see if there might be other similar features in the vicinity which had not
been noticed during general hoeing.
[RE 12/14]
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6.5 The Merging of Perspectives
This sequence of visits took place within a period of about three hours working
time, during the half-sectioning of the feature (the fourth stage of excavation pro-
cedure outlined in Section 4.3). All the conversations related specifically to the
material field bounded by the limits of trowelling, as marked on the accompany-
ing sketches; indeed, the conversations were held on the spot, with the evidence
referred to being within sight and within reach, so that there was a direct connec-
tion between the spoken word, its meaning, and our perceptual experience of the
evidence in question.
The boundaries of the event, or sequence of visits, are however partly the result
of an artificial closure imposed by the ethnographer. The sequence has been ab-
stracted out of an ongoing process of interaction, and was in reality open-ended.
Note that the feature was already constituted as a significant object (in previous
material and social transactions - such as the general hoeing of the site) before the
sequence began. Note also that the nature of this (inter-subjective) significance is
extremely fluid, and has by no means been fixed by the time the sequence ends.
Even during the sequence itself, many conversations took place - in the tea-hut,
the planning hut, or on other parts of the site - which referred to this particular
pattern of evidence, either directly or obliquely. Here we have considered only
those conversations that occurred in situ; we must not forget that language also
provides the means for detaching significances from the material field, so that it
can be talked about at second-hand, and even someone who has never seen the
evidence in question can comprehend and contribute towards its inter-subjective
meaning.
Every social transaction is also open-ended in so far as the conversations, while
referring specifically to the bounded material field directly in view, may refer as well
(implicitly or explicitly) to other parts of the site. When D identifies the object as a
burnt tree-stump (3), for example, he implicitly refers to other features which have
already been identified as natural tree-holes. Similarly, the interpretation of the
feature as the remains of a funeral-pyre (2,4) only makes sense when the evidence
is viewed in relation to other features - that is, within the overall context of a
ring-ditch/cremation cemetery. In fact archaeologists always perceive objects in
130
terms of their relationships with other objects in the temporal and spatial vicinity.
T makes such a relationship quite explicit when, in considering the possibility of
the feature being a modern fire (4), he draws a comparison with a similar feature,
which itself is understood in relation to the larger feature (a modern trackway),
into which it is cut.
Conversations also refer to knowledge and skills acquired from working on different
sites, or to basic archaeological rationales that can be taken-for-granted by all the
parties concerned. For example, when R gives his initial set of instructions for
digging the feature, which he then took to be an un-urned cremation (1), he was
drawing from years of experience of dealing with such features, and was engaged
in imparting this practical knowledge to me, who had never dug an un-urned
cremation before. In order to do so, however, he assumed that I already possessed
basic excavation skills (ie. the ability to locate and follow down sides of features,
to recognize and deal appropriately with any stratigraphy encountered, to modify
strategy if need be to take account of emerging evidence, etc). If I had been a
newcomer to excavation, R would have had to give a much more detailed set of
instructions, explaining the meaning of terms and physically demonstrating how
certain skills are put into practice. But such knowledge can to most intents and
purposes be taken for granted by experienced practitioners, as a kind of 'common
sense', and literally 'goes without saying' in conversations which take place on site.
If there is always a fund of shared or mutual knowledge tacitly present in any con-
versation, it is also the case that there are variations in the knowledge that people
take for granted. Each visitor's personal background and excavation experience
is to some extent unique, so that they have an individual 'style' of acting upon
and perceiving the world. The way in which the interpretation of the evidence
shifts during the sequence of visits illustrates this variation, for each visitor brings
to the evidence a slightly different set of rationales, a slightly different perspec-
tive, constituting the evidence according to their particular point of view. In this
sense too, then, the phenomenal field is kaleidoscopic in its shifts and changes
(see discussion, Section 4.4.) - even when the material field is not being worked.
For although the arrival of the visitor usually prompts the worker to disengage
from the task-in-hand, so that the material field loses its temporal structure for
the duration of the visit, the visitor nevertheless brings new ways of looking at
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the object, and in conversation directs the worker's attention to aspects of the
evidence that were previously unnoticed or neglected. The material field referred
to by discussion becomes, as it were, a field of competing meanings.
These meanings, however, are not fixed and dogmatic, but fluid and negotiable.
As in the ethnographic interview, the conversations held during visits facilitate a
merging of perspectives into some kind of 'mutual sight', tending always towards a
consensus about the objectivity of the evidence in question, if not the exact nature
of its significance. This is a two-way process. The initial impressions of the visitor
(coming to the scene as a relative outsider from a different part of the site) challenge
the worker's assumptions, but on the other hand the experience of the worker (who
speaks as an insider, perhaps after many hours in direct physical contact with the
material) can give the visitor some idea of the 'feel' of the evidence, as well as an
account of the emergence of the object up to that time. The conversation with
D (3) illustrates this dialectic. D's suggestion that the charcoal mass was just a
burnt tree-stump constituted the object for me in a wholly new and unexpected
way, challenging the very status of the evidence as an 'archaeological' feature,
which I had previously taken for granted. This was not simply a new way of
interpreting the material field, but a new way of looking at it; the appearance of
the material field changed radically at that moment. It was not, however, the only
way of looking at it, for it was possible to shift back in to old ways of seeing in
order to justify the work I had done so far. In this instance the arrival of a third
party, W, brought about a merging of the two alternative perspectives.
[The only conversation in which this dialectic was not present was 1. The initial
supervisory visit is often wholly prescriptive, with a set of instructions being given
to the worker by the supervisor. But in subsequent supervisory visits (2,4), a
dialectic progressively develops. As the worker engages in direct manipulation of
the evidence, a great deal of (practical) knowledge about the 'feel' of the material
is accumulated, and the supervisor generally takes more and more notice of what
the worker has to say. For it is well-known on site that the person who has actually
dealt with the evidence at first-hand, has witnessed the emergence of it through
time, and indeed has brought about its emergence through his own actions upon
the material field, knows more about that particular pattern of evidence - in a
practical sense - than anyone else. The importance of touching and manipulating
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the evidence, as opposed to merely visually observing it, is illustrated by the way
in which supervisors visiting a field invariably pick up a trowel and engage in
a brief material transaction (1,2,4), in order to get some additional idea of the
all-important 'feel' of the material.]
Each visitor, then, contributes to the worker's perceptual experience of the object
of his labour, bringing knowledge to bear upon it from other parts of the site, while
at the same time acquiring new knowledge about the site from the worker visited,
and at the end of the social transaction taking this knowledge away to bear upon
his or her own work elsewhere. In this dialectical fashion, through a multitude
of visits and other social interactions, the experiences of individual workers in
bounded regions of the site come to be shared by the community of archaeologists
across the site as a whole. The site is experienced as a single material field, within
which all the members of the excavation share (in a way that admits division of
labour, divisions of meaning, and variations in approach) a common purpose, a
common set of values, common techniques and strategies, and a common way of
looking at things. Engaged in the same overall task, we are all bound together by
a system of co-operative relations in much the same way as A and D are in RE4O
(Section 6.2).
If the work of any one member of the excavation team is a product of this co-
operative endeavour, with all other members making direct or indirect contribu-
tions, and if the objective meaning of the particular material field being worked
is an inter-subjective construction, we should not forget the central role played by
the worker himself. For the worker stands, like a kind of axis rnundi, at the centre
of a field of competing meanings. It is his task, in the last analysis, to negotiate
these meanings through the practical exploration of the material evidence on the
ground - by actually putting the various interpretations into practice and testing
them against the material evidence. Every intepretation generates anticipations
concerning evidence which is yet to emerge, and strategies for finding the contin-
uations of patterns that can confirm or refute that interpretation. In other words,
the worker himself sorts through the conflicting meanings by re-engaging in the
exploratory mode of observations characteristic of material transactions.
This practical exploration is veridical, involving the displacement of some interpre-
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tive schemes, their modification and even replacement by others, to take account
of emerging evidence. The inital identification of the feature as a cremation-burial
(1,3), for example, was soon shown to be mistaken, for none of the anticipated
burnt bone or other cremated material was forthcoming (it was correct, however,
in so far as it predicted a man-made feature containing a large object, a 'cut'
which could be followed down and a fill which could be emptied out). The rad-
ical re-interpretation of the feature as a tree-hole with burnt stump (3) was also
shown to be wrong, for the burnt object was subsequently found to be comprised
of many smaller objects, some of which had been worked. At present the most
likely explanation is that the pattern of evidence is the result of a man-made fire
within a man-made pit (although whether ancient or modern remains uncertain).
This is very different to what we expected to find when excavation of the feature
was begun.
In this way it can be seen that the object itself has not passively submitted to the
inter-subjective meanings brought to bear upon it, but on the contrary has con-
tinually confounded or surprised those interpretations, forcing re-interpretation.
Problems have arisen because of a lack of fit between our anticipations of evidence
about-to-emerge and the emerging evidence itself: thus we find that the conver-
sations in 2, 3 and 4 have a problem-solving character, and each problem solved
involves a re-organisation of the schemes that previously constituted our percep-
tual experience of the object. This in turn effects changes in the way we approach
and act upon the material world, the way we look for meaning within it, and there-
fore also what we actually see in future acts of discovery. For already T is talking
about opening up a much wider area (4), on the basis of the evidence which has
emerged in the last three hours, in order to see whether there might be similar
features (funeral pyres) in the vicinity. (As it happened, no further features of this
kind were found nearby, but other "fire-pits" were later discovered elsewhere on
the site; these discoveries were to some extent pre-figured by the act of discovery
described here.)
The object itself, then, both takes and gives meaning; it acts back and restructures
the very inter-subjective schemes and strategies for action that gave it form in our
perception in the first instance. The example ifiustrates an important point - the
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act of discovery not only reproduces existing knowledge, it also provides the setting
for the production of original knowledge about the nature of the objective world.
6.6 Individual Action as Social Action
Two types of social relations have been identified in this chapter - 1) the 'horizontal'
or egalitarian relations that characterise transactions between fellow-diggers (and
the network of which, due to the movement of workers from site to site, extends
outwards across the digging-circuit as a whole). 2) the 'vertical' relations that
characterize transactions between these ordinary diggers and supervisor or director
(the hierarchy of which extends upwards through the unit offices and into the higher
echelons of the archaeological establishment). The social dimension of material
tru&c*tor
transactions - and the material dimension of socia1,. makes it impossible to treat
everyday tasks performed by individuals as interactions between just one person
and the environment. In some ways the individual worker acts as an instrument
of the social group (not just the excavation team, but the entire cultural system of
archaeology in this country) - performing its tasks, on its objects, for its purposes
- which means that every material transaction is always a social encounter with
the material world.
Even when the act of discovery is considered in this light, however, it is the troweller
(not the planner, photographer, supervisor, director, analyst, or reader of the
excavation report) who initially encounters the material evidence as it emerges
from a state of hiddenness - comes into direct bodily contact with it, manipulates,
shapes and constitutes it, and through this manipulation brings further evidence
to light. It is the troweller, for all his lowly status, who transforms the emerging
evidence from a NATURAL to a CULTURAL object. That is, it is upon the
shoulder of the troweller that falls the principal burden of making sense of emerging
evidence for the social group. "We must never forget," writes Bhaskar (1989:156),
"the immense effort... designed precisely to create or induce the conditions under
which ground for a theoretical judgement will become available. Such practical
activity, comprising social transactions between human beings and their material
transactions with nature, constitutes the woof and warp of getting into 'the logical
space of reasons', of justifying and being able to justify what one says."
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Chapter VII
A MOMENT FOR REFLECTION
"Knowledge does not only depend, as an elementary relativism sug-
gests, on the particular viewpoint that a 'situated and dated' observer
takes up vis-a-vis the object. A much more fundamental alteration
- and a much more pernicious one, because, being constitutive of
the operation of knowing, it tends to go unnoticed - is performed
on practice by the sheer fact of taking up a viewpoint on it and so
constituting it as an object." (Bourdieu 1990:27)
7.1 Subject-Object and Culture-Nature Relations
A common practice amongst the diggers on this site was - when engaged in a
difficult or routine practical task - to occasionally disengage from the task-in-hand,
to take a few steps back beyond the limits of the material field being worked, to
look at the material field from a distance, and from this perspective to take stock
of the problems encountered so far and the best way of dealing with them from
then on, before re-engaging in the material transaction with a clearer sense of
purpose. As we are now almost half way through this fieldwork report, it seems
an opportune moment to take a similar break. The reader is invited, so to speak,
to lean upon his or her spade for the time being, and consider the ground we have
uncovered so far.
One of the difficulties we have encountered in speaking of the subject-object re-
lation has clearly been the ambiguity of the words themselves. The subject of an
investigation, for example, can be 1) the investigator, or 2) the investigated, which
can also be called the object. Such ambiguity is compounded when the object of
the investigation is comprised of human subjects and their inter-subjective activity
upon an object of their own - especially when, as in the last chapter, they turn
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their gaze upon the investigator himself and his activity, which then becomes the
object of their critical attention. Existentialists would argue, of course, that this
paradox - far from being a linguistic flaw - is a fundamental feature of human
existence in the world which is merely reflected in language.
A similar ambiguity came to light in our analysis of the trowel. The trowel-in-use
is to all intents and purposes a part or extension of the body, but when not in
use can be detached from the body to become just another thing in the external
environment. This suggests, as Gibson (1979:41) points out, that the boundary
between the body and the environment "is not fixed at the surface of the skin but
can shift." It does not take a philosopher to see that the paradox of the tool - dealt
with extensively by other authors (Ingold 1986:1-78, Polanyi 1959:30-1, 1967:16-
19) - is a transformation of the subject-object paradox, deriving from the tool's
mediating role in that relation.
Three further paradoxes have been brought to light, all concerning the relation be-
tween nature and culture. The first has its locus in the body itself; what seems to
come most naturally to the body is in fact the most cultural, comprised of skills that
have been instilled into bodily habit and routine through training and practice.
This paradox arises from the basic anthropological fact that a man or a woman is
at once both a natural and a cultural being. The second has its locus in the activity
through which humans interact with their environment. In Chapter 4 we drew a
fundamental distinction between CULTURE - the knowledge which archaeologists
have acquired of material evidence - and NATURE - the material evidence yet-to-
be-discovered which is the intentional object of archaeological practice, but which
at present exists quite independently of that knowledge and those practices. The
paradox here is that the moment a NATURAL object emerges it is transformed - in
the very act of discovery (a transaction which Marx characterised at the 'humani-
sation of nature' and the 'naturalization of man') - into a CULTURAL object. We
cannot apprehend NATURE independently of our CULTURAL schemes or tools.
The third paradox has its locus in the objective material field. Significant patterns
perceived by archaeologists may not be perceived at all by laymen or outsiders.
Contrast with the layman's perspective highlights the social character of archaeo-
logical perception. As Douglas (1973:15) argues, "Each person confronted with a
system of ends and means (not necessarily a tidy or coherent system) seems to face
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the order of nature, objective and independent of human wishes. But the moral
order and the knowledge which sustains it are created by social conventions. If
their man-made origins were not hidden, they would be stripped of some of their
authority." In other words, the very facts of the objective world which seem the
most natural and self-evident (in the light of embodied knowledge and skills which
are always and necessarily placed in the background) are in fact the most cultural.
Thus we have three culture-nature paradoxes - one for each term of the subject-
object relation and one for the relation itself. The subject-object relation is the
culture-nature relation, or rather the same relation transposed into a different key:-
Su'BEcT -
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Figure 13: Three Paradoxes
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the relation between the subject
and the object (as it manifests itself, for example, in the act of discovery) is the
locus for the transaction between culture and nature, a much larger relation which
encompasses all the material and social transactions of the social group. It has been
the mistake of philosophers (eg. Ben-Zeev 1990) to abstract the first relation out
of the context of the second, for the subject-object relation is always historically
and culturally situated. And it has been the mistake of anthropologists (of the
structuralist and functionalist schools) to abstract the second relation out of the
context of the first, for it is in the practical setting of the transaction between
the subject and the object - and the multiplicity of such transactions - that the
culture: nature relation is transformed.
This we now find ourselves in a position similar to that of E in RE22 (Section 5.5).
What began as a straightforward task of scraping over the surface to highlight the
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relevant patterns has gradually turned into a complex problem. The evidence we
have brought to light has twisted and turned in unexpected ways, and now seems
to shoot off in all directions, so that if ever we thought the act of discovery would
be a simple thing to describe, we have had something of an empirical shock. In
fact the one thing we can now say with any certainty about the act of discovery is
that it is profoundly paradoxical, and nothing is certain any more.
7.2 From the Point of View of the Archaeologist
These paradoxes, far from levelling out, are likely to deepen in subsequent pages.
So far we have reflected upon only those aspects of the subject-object and culture-
nature relations that, in one form or another, are characteristic of human existence
generally. But when we consider archaeological practice as a specific mode of
cultural existence, from the point of view of an archaeologist, we find that the
natural object of labour consists of the remains or traces of other cultures - which
presupposes a further (objectifed) nature-culture relation. This takes the form of
a distinction, made quite explicit by archaeologists, between 'natural' evidence on
the one hand and 'archaeological' or 'artefactual' evidence on the other hand.
We first encountered this distinction in Chapter 3, while considering the patterns
shown on the rough plan (Fig 1). Generally speaking, only 'archaeological' pat-
terns have been marked on the sketch; the 'natural' is the background against
which these patterns stand out. (The same applies to those plans which archaeol-
ogists themselves draw of the site). In RE22 (Section 5.5) and RE4O (Section 5.2)
diggers were engaged in effecting the emergence of such patterns so that they stood
out against the background of 'natural' brick-earth and gravels. The distinction
appears in a temporal as well as a spatial form. In RE61 (Section 4.3), for exam-
ple, A discovered what she initially took to be a 'natural' root-disturbance within
the fill of an 'archaeological' feature, but as she explored further and the pattern
began to take form it achieved the transition from 'natural' to 'archaeological' sta-
tus. The reverse happened in RE12/14.3 (Section 6.4), when the 'archaeological'
status of a feature was challenged by D, who put forward a 'natural' explanation
for the same evidence - although subsequent excavation proved it to be 'archaeo-
logical' after all. In these cases the transition from 'natural' to 'archaeological', or
vice-versa, has something of the character of a gestalt-switch for the perceiver(s).
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As we come to look at further concrete examples of excavation practice, we will see
that this distinction between culture and nature, objectified in the material field,
is fundamental to all archaeological perception and reasoning.
The term 'archaeological' - as it is used by excavators in the field and applied to
material evidence - means something like 'the product or effect of human/cultural
agency at some time in the distant past.' (Its antonym, 'natural', means 'the prod-
uct or effect of non-human or natural agency.') The very identification of an object
or pattern as 'archaeological',then, presupposes yet another subject-object relation
and yet another culture-nature relation - and, as it were, projects these into the
past. That is, it presupposes the former existence of a subject or agent who made
the object, with the (cultural) tools and resources at his/her disposal, out of the
(natural) materials available. Practical reasoning involves a constant shifting to
and from this deep level of inference. In RE12/14 (Section 6.4), for instance, R
based his instructions for how the feature should be excavated on an assessment
of how the feature, then thought to be a cremation burial, was originally formed
( "If they dug the pit and put the cremation straight in it, without putting it
into a vessel..." RE12/14:1). Later on in the same sequence, R re-interpreted the
half-excavated feature as possibly the remains of a funeral-pyre ( "they must have
burnt their dead somewhere" RE12/14:2), and this prompted a slight change in
excavation strategy. Shortly after this (RE12/14:3) W invoked a scenario wherein
men dug a pit around a tree and set fire to the base of stump, in order to remove
it. Finally, towards the end of the sequence (RE12/14:4) T returned to the pos-
sibility of the feature being a funeral-pyre, surmising that there could have been
"an area set aside for the burning of bodies within the cemetery", and on the basis
of this devising a strategy for opening up more of the site. All of these examples
invoke or imply the former existence of embodied subjects (bound together in some
sort of cultural relation to each other) who dug pits, removed trees, burnt bod-
ies and performed other kinds of intentional labour upon their objective (natural)
environment - and who are held to be the causal agents responsible for observ-
able 'archaeological' effects. Whenever this kind of practical inference surfaces in
subsequent examples it will be referred to by the writer as deep inference.
Deep inference always involves 1. a subject (or a group of subjects) who makes
the inference 2. a material object (or pattern of objects) which serves as the
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vehicle for the inference 3. a subject (or group of subjects) who the inference is
about. The inferred subject is usually credited with a mastery of the basic skills
of the body normally associated with human agency, as well as the causal powers
these skills confer to effect changes in his or her natural and cultural environment.
In an important, if paradoxical, sense the inferred subject (or group of subjects)
constitutes the real object of archaeological interpretation. The real subject, the
archaeologist, is always in the background.
7.3 From the Point of View of the Ethnographer
The ability to engage in deep inference on an 'archaeological' object (or even to
see the object as being of 'archaeological' significance in the first instance - for this
act of perception itself involves the ability to constitute the object as the product
or effect of past human agency) is of course a skill which has to be learnt and
practised. But like any skill, to perform it properly one has to take the skill for
granted - to put it into the background as it were - in order to focus attention
on the task-on-hand. In this way the archaeologist is able to objectify the object
itself, the significance of the object, and the inference about the object, as a single
common-sense fact about the world; that is, as self-evident or natural.
As a participant for most of the time, deeply immersed in the cultural activity of
excavation, the ethnographer, too, experienced 'archaeological' facts as natural and
common-sense. It takes a kind of stepping back, or a conceptual re-location of one's
point of view outside of the bounds of common-sense, to see these natural facts as
the accomplishment of cultural skills - and to be able to apply to archaeological
activity the same fundamental distinction (CULTURE:NATURE) that archaeolo-
gists apply to their material object ( 'archaeological':'natural'). In this report such
a distancing, or stepping back, takes the form of a further subject-object relation -
set up by the very presence of an ethnographic observer on site. The object now is
the (subject-object) relation between archaeologists and 'archaeological' material,
and the subject is the ethnographer himself. For it is only by taking up this kind
of perspective, symbolized by Photo 1 below, that one can bring to light the most
common-sense fact of all - that every subject necessarily takes a point of view upon
its objects, that these objects are constituted as such from that point of view, and
that the body (with all the cultural skills it has acquired and any instruments
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or tools it has temporarily assimilated) is always placed in the background. This
applies as much to the ethnographer as it does to archaeologists. It goes without
saying that the ethnographer's shadow, though rarely glimpsed, is cast over all the
events described in this fieldwork report.
2
Photo 1: The Shadow of the Ethnographer
This photograph was taken from the top of the scaffolding tower (then situated just in front
of the planning hut), facing north. It depicts a part of the site as it was after general hoeing,
before the excavation of features had begun. Many of the 'archaeological' patterns, especially
ring-ditches, show up clearly on the ground surface. Two archaeologists are to work surveying
these patterns - the object of their labour. But constituting their activity as the object of his
investigation is the ethnographer (together with another archaeologist) - whose shadow fails
on the site and impairs the objective scene ahead. There is also the shadow of the scaffolding
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tower itself, which at the moment provides the ethnographer's vantage-point, or point of
view.
7.4 From The Point Of View Of The Writer
In the writing up of the report a further distancing has taken place - not just in the
sense that the 'I' or subject who carried out the fieldwork has now been constituted
by the writer as one of the objects of critical attention. A major threshold has
been crossed, a transition made, from the world of everyday practice and experi-
ence to the world of writing, reading and analytical thought - a wholly different
kind of practice which involves the taking of a 'disembodied' or 'transcendental'
perspective. From this (cultural) perspective it is all too easy to constitute the
everyday practical domain as the natural world where one may conduct fieldwork,
carry out investigations, test theories, and collect facts or data, before returning
to the cultural realm to present these facts in a report. But just as practice is a
kind of theory-in-action, so theorising is itself a kind of practice. Contrary to the
illusion cultivated by the text that this report is a direct (cultural) representation
of its natural object (a sense of immediacy and proximity that is easy to con-
vey by means of such literary devices as the 'ethnographic present') it is actually
an account based principally on other texts - the rough notes, recorded events,
sketches, photos, charts, etc, that together comprise the sole material remains of
the fieldwork experience. All these are arrayed on the desk before me, along with
pens, paper, scissors, tipp-ex, staplers and other instruments and materials of the
writer's craft. Also on the desk, of course, is the text itself - half-written and
continually being re-written, its final form and structure uncertain. And behind
these, needless to say, is the writer himself.
7.5 From the Point of View of the Reader
It is a mark of the skifi of the reader that (s)he can routinely negotiate the edifice
of subject-object (and culture-nature) relations constructed by any text without
even thinking about how (s)he does it - so that in reading this fieldwork report, for
example, (s)he occasionally seems to be standing on the site itself, seeing things
through the ethnographer's eyes or engaging with the material evidence via an
archaeologist's trowel. To a skilled reader the text is quite transparent, and the
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vast gulf which separates the text from its object is narrowed to the extent that the
one seems the equivalent of the other. Indeed, the meaning of the events described
seems to reside in the text itself, independently of the reader. It is only when the
cultural skills that make such a deep reading possible, and that come so naturally to
the reader, are brought to critical attention - when the reader stops, for a moment's
reflection, to try and work out how it is that (s)he manages to make sense of these
black squiggles on a piece of paper - that the text can suddenly become opaque and
momentarily impenetrable, rather as it might be to someone who has not learnt
to read or who does not speak the language in which it is written.
But if the reader needs to place herself or himself in the background in order to
be able to read, so does the writer in order to be able to write, the ethnographer
in order to conduct fieldwork, and the archaeologist in order to interpret material
remains. For this reason, the first three of these will henceforward be banished into
the background from whence they came, and only referred to in (conventionally
acceptable) ways that do not deflect our attention from the principal object of the
investigation.
The next two chapters, then, will be pre-occupied with the problem of how archae-
ologists recognise 'archaeological' objects - the products or effects of the agency of
past human subjects - and distinguish these from 'natural' objects. This is clearly
something that archaeologists are highly skilled at doing - so much so, in fact, that
any readers who are themselves practising archaeologists might find the very asking
of the question incredibly naive. It is, one might say (and diggers did indeed say
to me), simply a matter of common-sense. Such readers are reminded, however,
that the philosophical question of how to define the difference between artefactual
and natural objects has exercised the minds of Aristotle, Leibniz and Marx, and
continues to puzzle philosophers today (eg. Monod 1972:15-31, Losonsky 1990).
Thus we have a situation where what comes quite naturally, as a common-sense
practical skill, to experienced archaeologists digging out in the field, is more or less
unfathomable to analytical thought and linguistic expression - itself an interesting
variant of the culture-nature paradox described earlier. As Bourdieu (1990:86)
puts it, "Practice has a logic which is not that of a logician." With this paradox
in mind, let us return to the site and re-engage with the task-in-hand.
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Chapter VIII
DISCOVERED ARTEFACTS AND THE AGENTS OF
DISCOVERY
"A man's interests are the selective agents and these are to a great
extent socially determined, for it is generally the value attached to an
object by all members of the social group that directs the attention
of an individual towards it." (Evans-Pritchard, quoted in Douglas
1980:29)
8.1 'Finds'
If the planning-hut can be said to have a principle orientation towards CULTURE,
and the tool-shed a principal orientation towards NATURE (see Section 4.2), then
the finds-hut has an orientation towards both the CULTURAL and the NATURAL
domains.
The finds-hut is dimly-lit; it has the same earthy smell, reminiscent of a gardener's
shed, that the tool-shed has. But it also has a table and a chair, where one person
(the finds assistant, who also worked as an ordinary digger) could occasionally
be found at work sorting objects, marking bags, writing out labels, etc. On the
table are numerous marker-pens, notebooks, labels and transparent plastic bags of
various sizes - all these are CULTURAL provisions for NATURAL objects yet-to-
be-discovered. Also on the table is a cardboard box, containing all the 'recorded
finds' or 'small finds' (potsherds, worked ifints, fragments of bone, etc) which
have been recovered from excavation so far, each individually bagged and labelled.
Under the table and stacked just behind the door are a number of soil-samples,
and next to these are three or four cremation-vessels encased in their protective
packing. All these formerly belonged to the NATURAL domain - were buried and
hidden from view, and existed quite independently of archaeological knowledge
and practice - but have recently been transformed, in the act of discovery, into
CULTURAL objects.
145
That these objects have already been assimilated into the CULTURAL domain
can be demonstrated in the following way. Each recorded-find or soil-sample is
accompanied by a label, marked on the bag, detailing site-code, date of excavation,
layer or feature in which the object was found or from which the sample was
taken, grid co-ordinates, levels, etc. These signs and symbols refer on the one
hand to the object itself and its archaeological context, and on the other hand
to the recording system which includes all the plans, descriptions, notes, section-
drawings, photographs and other representations of the site - which itself ultimately
links up to the larger corpus of archaeological knowledge covering many excavated
sites. The point is that the meaning or significance of a recorded find or sample
has come to be inextricably bound up with the written label that accompanies
it. Take the label away and the find - though perhaps still of some archaeological
interest - becomes an unprovenanced object, of no further usefulness for research
purposes. The soil sample becomes simply a bag of earth.
The transformation of discovered artefacts into textual objects has generally been
accomplished, in a series of acts of inscription, by the finds assistant. It is her task
to walk around the site at least once a day in order to label, triangulate, plot, level
and collect all those finds which diggers have uncovered during excavation and left
on the spot where they were found. However, the very fact that they have been left
for collection pre-supposes that they have already been constituted as significant
(ie. CULTURAL ) objects. The transition of the object from the NATURAL to
the CULTURAL domain - its transformation into an object of significance - has
always taken place in the act of discovery itself.
When I asked diggers how they recognized 'finds' they would often point to the
objective properties of the find itself - this sherd of pottery or that worked flint
- explaining the material features that had attracted their attention to it, and
which distinguished it from other, natural, objects. But if I pressed the question
by pointing out that a layman or a novice might not be able to tell the difference
their answers were less assured. Characteristic replies were "Its just something I've
learned how to do", "I've been told what to look for on other sites I've worked on
before", or "I really can't say how I do it - I just know, that's all". The following
extract of dialogue is taken from RE4O, and the reader is referred back to the sketch
of the material field and the accompanying commentary for that event (Section
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5.2). Twenty to thirty finds, marked on the sketch by a cross, are scattered over
the trowelled surface. These are mostly worked ffints or small fragments of pot
which have been placed in a finds bag, with the bag nailed to the spot where the
object was found. The total distribution pattern of the finds is quite important in
this case, because most of them come from the ring-ditch fill which is so difficult to
distinguish from the surrounding brick-earth: by occasionally standing back and
looking at the pattern of finds from a distance A is able to 'pick out' the ring-ditch
outline, making it much easier to follow along by trowel. I asked A and D how
they recognized the tiny fragments of pot in the first instance:-
1. D. "... you probably look at ten, twelve, maybe fifteen possible finds, before finding a
definite one... On this bit, there are many red stones that look like pot... you're always
picking them up only to throw them away again."
2. Q . "But how do you actually recognize something for what it is?"
3. D. "Its just something you can do, like riding a bike..."
4. A. "...or breathing - but unlike breathing, you have to learn how to do it".
5. Q . "Don't you have to concentrate to be able to do it?"
6. A. "You're on auto-pilot for most of the time - then a find comes along which forces
you to concentrate for however long it takes, then you go back on auto-pilot again... When
I'm trowelling, I tend to think of other things, like what to have for dinner tonight... I
only stop to concentrate when a find comes along.., then I go back to thinking about
other things again."
7. Q . "Is it like driving a car, say, where you can talk and daydream while driving at
the same time?"
8. A. "A bit like that... the only thing I can't do at the same time as trowelling is talk,
because I like to look at someone while I'm talking to them."
9. Q . "So you need to use your eyes for trowelling then?"
10. A. "Yes, obviously."
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11. Q . "But some skills, like playing a guitar for instance, can be performed blindfold.
Why can't trowelling?"
12.A. "Because the guitar is always there...it doesn't change while you're playing it..."
13. Q . "... but the ground you're trowelling does?"
14. A. "Yes."
[RE4O]
This conversation illustrates some important points. First of all, a certain tension
is evident if one reads between the words, and this tension arises from the fact that
A and D consider the questions to be naive. Indeed, the questions are concerned
with what the workers and myself already know, and thus seem to be anti-common
sense, almost absurd. Nevertheless, the workers' replies can shed considerable light
on the character of everyday discovery.
Perhaps the main point to emerge is that the discovery of artefacts always occurs
in a context of action - in this case, the trowelling over of a surface. Usually this
activity is directed towards the resolution of a particular set of practical problems
(eg. locating and following the cut of the ring-ditch): finds "come along" in the
course of this problem-solving activity. This means that we cannot separate the
discovery of artefacts from the digging operation in which the discovery occurs,
any more than we can separate it from the material field in which artefacts are
discovered. Most of the artefacts found are very small; it is unlikely that they
would have been noticed at all if the area had been worked over with spade or
mattock. Trowelling requires the excavator to kneel and bend forward, with eyes
close to the ground, and moreover limits the speed with which earth can be shifted.
It is detailed work, condusive to the finding of small artefacts. In this interview, I
made the mistake of trying to talk about discovery in the abstract (1-6), but this
was soon corrected by the diggers themselves, so that we ended up talking about
discovery in relation to trowelling (6-14).
It is also apparent that much of the work is regarded by diggers as routine:- "its just
something you can do - like riding a bike" (3). As with any skill, once mastered, it
can be performed to some extent "on auto-pilot" (6). It seems to come naturally
in the same way as breathing does, "but unlike breathing, you have to learn how
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to do it" (4). Routine aspects of the work seem to include the trowelling operation
itself, the monitoring of the many thousands of objects which pass through the
troweller's visual field during trowelling, and the picking up and examination of
the "many red stones that look like pot" (1).
Another important point to emerge concerns the nature of the material being
worked. Because it is being worked, the ground is always "changing" (12-14).
Part of the skill of trowelling is continuously monitoring this changing field for
artefacts. Finds, then, are not usually picked out from a static field of phenomena;
the act of discovery always occurs in time. Characteristically, the significant object
is recognised or apprehended en passant, as it emerges from the material field, and
shortly before (in the absence of an act of recognition) it would have disappeared
into the troweller's shovel, bucket, or wheelbarrow.
Lastly it is clear that - at least according to the digger's own account of her
cognitive processes (6) - the act of recognition involves a shift in attention, or
change in cognitive state. Attention is directed away from whatever was being
thought about at the time, like "what to have for dinner tonight", and focused on
to the object itself. The emergence of the object precipitates a shift from a routine
mode of operation to another mode entirely, where full powers of concentration are
brought to bear upon this one particular component of the phenomenal field.
8.2 The Act of Recognition
Because literally hundreds of small stones and other objects momentarily come
under routine scrutiny, as they appear and disappear in a cascade of earth scraped
up and swept back by the moving trowel, the act of recognizing or 'picking out' a
particular object seemed to me to be a crucial kind of event. In the midst of routine
work, upon routine things, some aspect of the world suddenly emerges - always
with a degree of unexpectedness - to engage attention and to disrupt routine.
An encounter occurs, which is qualitatively different from normal encounters with
material evidence.
Diggers often described this encounter as a kind of 'leaping out' or 'falling out' of
the relevant object from the soil being worked; "it just seemed to pop out of the
ground", "it leapt out at me", "it was just suddenly there" or "it seemed to fall
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out of the earth nicely". Most diggers, I think, are familiar with the occasional
experience of relevant objects seeming to 'jump out' at them - instantly recognising
these as artefacts. How can we account for this common experience?
In a sense, of course, objects really do jump or fall out of the soil on occasions. As
Limbrey (1975:271) remarks, the soil naturally breaks away from any archaeological
objects contained within it if it is made - by subtle action with the trowel - to part
along its structural planes. When the cascade of earth swept back by the trowel
comes to rest, the artefact is often just sitting there - 'staring us in the face' as it
were - on top of the pile of spoil. It is also the case that artefacts frequently lie
upon the boundaries between layers, or on the base or sides of features (the gradual
descent of the object over time, through worm-action and other natural forces,
having been brought to a halt by a more compact surface of soil). In following
along these soil-boundaries, as archaeologists do, taking off the layer above to come
down onto the layer below, the moving blade of the trowel sometimes catches the
underside of the object - sending it spinning through the air to land near the
archaeologist's boot. Not all significant objects emerge in this fashion (some are
still partially embedded in the soil or layer below when initially uncovered), but the
emergence of many is quite dramatic and sudden, and this goes some way towards
explaining the sensation that diggers have of artefacts 'jumping out' at them.
It is not a total explanation, however - for all sorts of objects could be said to jump
out at archaeologists in this sense. Why should artefacts leap out and not the
many thousands of similar-looking stones? To help answer the question, consider
the following anecdote:-
For six weeks a major topic of conversation on site was the absence or non-appearance of
arrowheads - exactly the kind of artefact one would expect to find on a Bronze Age ring-
ditch cemetery. It became a standing joke amongst the diggers that a giant arrowhead
would have to fall out of the sky and hit us on the head before we actually discovered one.
Eventually, however, a small leaf-arrowhead was found while A was taking out the upper
fill of a ring-ditch. It was an occasion for some celebration. The object was passed from
hand to hand, as we all caine over to admire its highly-wrought workmanship. When I
asked A what had drawn her attention to it, she said "There was something about the
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sheen of it... it seemed to fall out of the earth nicely." She told me that she immediately
recognised it as a worked flint, and on picking it up realised it was an arrowhead.
[RE67]
Although the emergence of the arrowhead in this particular place and at this par-
ticular time was quite unexpected, the anecdote shows that everyone expected that
arrowheads would emerge at some time and some place - it was only a question of
when and where. Indeed, we were all actively searching for arrowheads as we went
about our everyday activities. The arrowhead, it might be said, was a cognitive
object or object of intention even before it was found - in the sense that a schema
for arrowheads (what they look like, what they were for, where they are likely to
be found, how to go about finding them, etc) pre-existed and pre-figured the emer-
gence of the actual object itself. In quite a different sense, of course, we could say
that up until the moment of discovery the arrowhead was simply a material object,
buried and hidden from view, existing quite independently of the archaeological
knowledge and practices. These two kinds of object (CULTURAL and NATURAL
respectively) were quite separate and distinct, but were both brought together in
the act of discovery. The act of discovery can be described, at least in this instance,
as a meeting-ground of an expectation and its material conditions of satisfaction.
It is an encounter between the CULTURAL and NATURAL domains, in which the
arrowhead as cognitive object is suddenly given material form, and the arrowhead
as material object is transformed into a material symbol, with both material and
cognitive dimensions.
This perhaps helps us to explain more completely why significant objects some-
times seem to 'jump out' of the ground being worked. For it is not just that the
object itself may suddenly emerge to catch the digger's attention - puffing her
attention towards it as it were. It is just as much the case that the digger's antic-
ipatory schemes leap out to grasp or 'apprehend' (lay hold of, catch the meaning
of, arrest) the object, imbueing her experience of it with a particular intensity. If
for the most part our cognitive processes can be taken-for-granted and placed in
the background, so that we can focus our attention upon the objective world and
the task-in-hand, this is one of the few practical instances when we can actually
apprehend our cognitive processes in action.
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This does not imply, however, that anticipatory schemes are wholly subjective
phenomena. Although A has clearly internalised the CULTURAL schemes for
recognising and interpreting archaeological objects, these schemes are present -
brought out into the open as it were - in the many conversations about the
absence of arrowheads that preceded the act of discovery. It is in social transactions
that cognitive schemes come to be shared by the social group - the community of
archaeologists as a whole - or are passed on from the social group to individual
workers. Thus there was a general air of expectancy (that arrowheads would be
found), a sense of impending discovery, shared by all the archaeologists on site.
Anticipatory schemes, then, are inter-subjective phenomena.
It is not just a case of these inter-subjective schemes conditioning the act of discov-
ery. It is also a case of the act of discovery re-inforcing the inter-subjective schemes
that gave it meaning in the first instance. Note how the finding of the arrowhead
(which ranks as a relatively spectacular find) was itself a social event, in which our
expectations of finding arrowheads in ring-ditch fills were strengthened. We all
went away with the experience of actually seeing and handling a real arrowhead
fresh in our minds - to re-double our efforts to find similar objects on other parts
of the site. In this sense the discovered artefact as material symbol is not just a
model of (ie. of archaeologists' cumulative experience of previous arrowheads en-
countered) but also a model for (ie. for further acts of discovery of the same kind).
Another way of putting it is that the act of discovery, itself partly the product of
existing knowledge, reproduces and re-affirms that knowledge in practice. Several
more arrowheads were to be found in subsequent weeks.
8.3 Material Context
Part of the model of aspect of the arrowhead is derived from its material context.
One expects to find arrowheads in Bronze Age ring-ditch fills (because many have
been found in such contexts before) - whereas one would not, for example, expect
to find them in natural brick-earth deposits. When digging a ring-ditch, therefore,
one is 'on the lookout' for arrowheads (this is part of the model for aspect of
ring-ditches); if an arrowhead is found, its discovery is partly the product of this
active searching. However, the discovered object may also have implications for the
interpretation of the material context in which it was found, and the strategy for
152
dealing with that evidence. This is part of the model for aspect of the discovered
object (and the model of aspect of the material context), as illustrated by the
following sequence of events:-
1. Towards the end of the dig, B was given the task of cutting a segment through a ring-
ditch. The ditch, however, was almost impossible to distinguish from the surrounding
brick-earth, into which it had been cut. In order to locate the ring-ditch, then, B had
to dig a box-section through the brick-earth, in an area where part of the ditch was
expected to be found, to a depth of about lOcms. Even at this depth, however, the
cuts of the ditch were difficult to locate, and B had to dig a second box-section inside
the first one. This showed up the sides and base of the ditch in vertical section, on the
basis of which B was able to follow the sides along, empty out the fill and complete the
excavation of the segment. When I arrived, B was engaged in cleaning up the area for
planning and photography (see Fig.14).
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Figure 14: Sketch of RE76
The reason for my visit to this part of the site was that I had just been to the planning-
hut, where T showed myself and other workers a recently discovered barbed-and-tanged
arrowhead. As the arrowhead was found by B, I wanted to ask him how he recognised
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it, where it came from, etc. B said that the arrowhead had actually been around for
several days without being noticed. He had been absorbed in the difficult task of trying
to work out first of all whether the ring-ditch was really there, then - once he had located
it - following the sides along and distinguishing between the ditch-fill and the fill of a
natural feature that (as it turned out) proved to be cut by the ditch. All this time,
working within the constricted space of the box-section, there had been a sharp stone,
sticking out of one of the vertical sections. B said he had not really thought about it
or looked at it closely, but after he had scratched himself on it a few times he decided
to pull it out and "get rid of it once and for all". As soon as he pulled the object out,
however, he realised straight away that it was an arrowhead.
[RE76J
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Figure 15: Sketch of RE9O
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2. Two days later I returned to this part of the site. B had completed the recording of
the ring-ditch segment and, after consultation with T, had turned his attention to the
possible feature in the area where the arrowhead was found. B said he had originally
taken this patch of dark soil to be a root-disturbance within the brick-earth - but the
discovery of the arrowhead changed all that. The dark soil had no clear outline or
cut; however, the presence of the arrowhead within it suggested to B that it was an
archaeological rather than a natural feature. B was now trowelling over this area to
delineate the anticipated cut. The plan was to open up another box-section, as an
extension of this one, to try and pick up the continuation of the feature.
[RE84]
3. The next working day I made a further visit. B had opened up another box-section as
planned, and was still in the process of following along the cuts of what had turned out to
be a second ring-ditch (in a place where no ring-ditch was expected to be). Several more
finds, mostly burnt flints, had come to light. It was now quite clear that the arrowhead
had come from the fill of this second ring-ditch (see Fig.15)
[RE90]
This example might at first seem to represent an opposite case. Far from jumping
out, the object in question was partially visible for several days - embedded in the
vertical section with the tip protruding - and only emerged fully when it was actu-
ally pulled out by B. It does show us, however, how a potentially significant object
might be experienced in the absence of an act of recognition. All of B's attention
(and intention) was directed towards the ring-ditch and associated patterns, which
can be described as the unfolding objects of his labour. The sharp stone stick-
ing out of the section was for the most part confined to the background as more
or less irrelevant to his projects and purposes; the object remained a NATURAL
one, unassimilated into the CULTURAL domain. B had several encounters with
the object (when he scratched himself on it) before the act of discovery proper,
but if the object could be said to have emerged out of the background on these
occasions, it was only to be constituted negatively as a hindrance and a nuisance -
an object of non-significance. And it was this property of getting in the way that
eventually prompted B to pull the object out, with every intention of throwing it
into the bucket of spoil and "getting rid of it once and for all". Thus the example
illustrates the point that the emergence of a material object on its own, in the
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absence of a recognition, does not constitute an act of discovery. (The reverse also
holds true, of course; a recognition in the absence of an appropriate material object
would not constitute an act of discovey either). The act of discovery is always an
encounter between the material and cognitive domains, mediated by the body in
practice. In this instance it occurred when B pulled the object out of the section
and suddenly saw it as an arrowhead for the first time. In a flash, so to speak, the
object achieved the transition from NATURAL to CULTURAL, from 'natural' to
'archaeological', and from an object of non-significance to a material symbol (with
both material and cognitive dimensions).
What is especially interesting in this example in the way in which the emergence
of the arrowhead was not expected in the particular material context (the patch of
dark soil, thought to be a root-disturbance within the natural brick-earth). This
perhaps explains why the object was not immediately recognized as significant by
B. One does not look for relevant objects in material contexts which are themselves
more or less irrelevant to one's projects and purposes. But when the arrowhead
did emerge to be recognized in the act of discovery (as a genuine surprise), its
transformation from 'natural' to 'archaeological' brought about a corresponding
transformation in the status of its material context. Suddenly the patch of dark
soil (formerly in the background, now constituted as an object of attention) was
being considered as a possible 'archaeological' feature. Strategies for testing out
this interpretation were put into practice, and B started actively searching for the
(now anticipated) cut of the feature. A whole new area was opened up to enable
B to follow this cut along, and in the course of his practical activity the feature
gradually took form as a second ring-ditch, from which further artefactual material
was discovered. The finding of the arrowhead can be regarded as a pivotal event,
shaping a whole series of subsequent events.
Whereas in the former example (RE67) the excavation of a ring-ditch led to the
discovery of an arrowhead (showing how the model for aspect of ring-ditches is
inextricably bound up with the model of aspect of arrowheads), in this instance
the discovery of an arrowhead led to the identification and excavation of a ring-
ditch (showing how the model for aspect of arrowheads is inextricably bound up
with the model of aspect of ring-ditches). All material symbols are related to other
material symbols in this (spatial and temporal) fashion. Material symbols are never
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just self-contained units of meaning, or individual things quite separate from other
things. They derive their meaning partly from their context - and from other
material symbols encountered before in that context, in the sequence of practical
events leading up to the moment of discovery. They also give meaning back to
the context, and to objects-yet-to-be encountered in subsequent events. (And by
'giving meaning' I do not mean that they are merely models for interpretation; they
are models for action - generating predictions about what is likely to be found and
strategies for bringing these anticipated objects to light. We do not just observe a
field of material symbols; we actively manipulate that field). In these ways every
discovered object either reproduces or transforms existing knowledge.
8.4 Use-Values
Not all the meaning of discovered objects is enmeshed with their context, of course.
The fact that they are discrete entities with bounded surfaces which are detacheable
from the material field - and can sometimes 'jump out' of the ground in our first
perception of them - means that they stand to a certain extent as things in their
own right. Their meaning is still context-dependent, but dependent upon an in-
ferred or attributed context rather than an actual one.
An arrowhead, for example, is always understood in terms of a whole field of
assumptions about human agency, and the functions that an arrowhead might
serve in the context of human action. As the name itself implies, an arrowhead is
conceived of as being attacheable to an arrow-shaft; this arrow (comprised of shaft,
head, flights, etc) is taken to be a missile which can be shot from a bow at a target.
Holding the bow and aiming the arrow, one might say, is a hypothetical human
agent - for it is a matter of common-sense that only human-beings are capable
of the motor-movements, intentions-in-action, and reflexive monitoring of actions
required to make and operate a bow and arrow. Underlying the identification of
the arrowhead, then, is a conception of the object-in-use; not just the arrowhead
by itself, but the arrowhead as part of a total instrumental complex related to an
objective environment ( ie. bow-and-arrow used in relation to a target ). And
this instrumental complex, far from being conceived of as a collection of dead
things, is conceived of in terms of action-meanings, within the practical space of
the body; that is, it is comprised of things to grasp, to manipulate, to hold and use
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in particular ways, as the instruments and conductors of human intentions. For it
is only when one understands roughly what it is like, or must be like, to perform
the practical sequence of bodily actions constitutive of the activity of archery -
holding the bow, fixing the arrow, selecting the target, pulling back the string,
taking aim, and releasing the arrow at exactly the right moment along its planned
trajectory - that it is possible to fully grasp the meaning of an arrowhead.
It is not just arrowheads, of course, that are conceived of and perceived in terms of
action-meanings. Most discovered artefacts have "affordances" (Gibson 1979:127-
43) which relate the action-possibilities of the object to the action-possibilities of
the human body. Just as an arrowhead is something 'to be shot from a bow at
a target' (implying a particular stance of the body and sequence of actions), so
a pottery vessel is understood as something 'to put things in', 'to pour things
out of', 'to cook things with', etc. Some of the cremation-urns found on this site
had handles or lugs 'for picking up and carrying the vessel'. Handles are obvious
examples of things which "afford" possibilities for action to the perceiver. As
Rosch (1978:33) explains, "Inseparable from the perceived attributes of objects
are the ways in which humans habitually use or interact with those objects... For
example, when performing the action of sitting down on a chair, a sequence of
body and muscular movements are made that are inseperable from the nature of
the attributes of chairs - legs, seat, back, etc." This kind of perception, then, is
not confined to archaeological discovery; it is integral to everyday life.
Perceived affordances of objects are 'objective' in the sense that they are observed
to be 'out there' in the environment. But they also carry an implicit reference to
the perceiving subject ("An affordance... points both ways, to the environment
and to the observer" Gibson 1979:141). In particular, they implicitly refer to the
action-possibilities of the body of the observer and, as Heidegger (1962) would ar-
gue, to the projects of that being. Different life-forms are likely to perceive different
affordances in the same object because their bodies afford different possibilities for
action and therefore different projects within which the object could be put to
use. It is unlikely, for example, that a non-human life-form could perceive the
affordances (action-meanings, use-values) of arrowheads that have been identified
in this chapter. This is an important point, because it means that the percep-
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tion of the quality of artefactuality (in this case the instrumental character of an
arrowhead) is to some extent species-specific.
The question arises as to whether the perception of affordances is conditioned by
cultural factors, given that the projects and purposes of observers vary from culture
to culture. In this thesis it is argued that it is; archaeologists are much more skilled
at perceiving the affordances of the objects they dig up than novices or laymen.
Indeed, Daniel (1950:26) and Hodder ( 1982a:32) point out that until the advent
of archaeology, arrowheads and other stone tools tended to be perceived as natural
or supernatural objects ( eg. 'thunderbolts' ) rather than human artefacts. The
apparent paradox of natural artefacts is taken up and examined in Appendix B,
which compares the perception of artefacts by archaeologists today with historical
accounts of the discovery of similar objects by rural people in former times. Al-
though the latter interpreted such objects within a very different system of cultural
meanings, there is nevertheless a common basis of understanding underlying the
differences - since objects were still perceived in relation to the action-possibilities
of the human body. The reader is referred to the appendices for a more detailed
comparative analysis.
8.5 Design
Whenever an arrowhead was discovered on this site, workers tended to come in
from all sides to take a look at it. The arrowhead became the objective focus of a
social transaction (and many subsequent social transactions), in which the object
was passed from hand to hand, its meaning discussed. Each worker would hold it,
turn it over with the fingers, feel the sharpness of the point and edges, occasionally
bringing it closer to the eye for a more detailed examination, then pass it on to
someone else. Comments would be made about its efficacy as a weapon or hunting
implement, how it could have been attached to an arrow-shaft, how it was made,
even why it was thrown away ( eg. because it had been broken in use, and had lost
its instrumental value for the user) - each worker building upon or disagreeing with
the comments made so far. They were able to work out, through this discussion
and inspection, not only the method employed by the maker of the artefact in
dislodging individual flakes (eg. hammering or percussion-flaking - both methods
implying a particular instrumental complex and stance of the body), but also the
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angle of blow, and roughly the sequence in which the knapping operation as a
whole was performed. They were also able to distinguish between the marks of
this initial manufacture, any subsequent re-touching, wear deriving from use, and
(in the case of the barbed-and-tangled arrowhead) the breaking of the artefact
which put it out of action and caused it to be thrown away. That is, conversations
referred to the object in an inferred causal context of human agency - a context
of manufacture and a context of deposition as well as a context of use - always in
terms of action-meanings and in relation to the action-possibilities of the human
body. Indeed, it is only possible to 'make sense' of an arrowhead in these practical
terms. This is deep inference at work.
That deep inference is possible at all suggests that the perceived affordances of
objects are not static and fixed, but shift as the object is manipulated and examined
in more and more detail. The perception of the arrowhead's efficacy as a projectile
for piercing and wounding, for example, changes as soon as we notice that the
artefact has been 'broken'. There are some affordances, moreover, which attract
our attention more than others; the arrowhead actually affords all sorts of things (
eg. incising, scraping, pricking, etc), but it is its shootability that somehow defines
its very being as an arrowhead. That is the function for which it seems so perfectly
suited that it must have been designed for that purpose.
Thus it is that perhaps the most outstanding quality displayed by the arrowhead
- the quality we most admire - is its craftsmanship ( the skill and care with which
it was fashioned, the intentions-in-action of which it is a product, the beauty of
its design ). If its function and purpose ( or affordance is immediately obvious
to us, so too is the fact that it has been made; its status as an artefact - the
product as well as the instrument of human labour - is self-evident. The highly
wrought surfaces seem to speak to us of human handiwork ( not just the physical
activity of tool-making but also the cognitive work that is intermeshed with manual
labour). When we look at a dressed stone tool, Bachelard (1964:31) reminds us,
"it is impossible to resist the idea that each well-placed facet was obtained by a
reduction in force, by an inhibited, restrained, directed force, in short, by a psycho-
analysed force" (ie. by the controlled technique of a purposeful and reflexive agent,
practised in the art, adjusting each blow to take account of the particular features
encountered in the material being worked). It is equally impossible to resist the
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idea that the maker of the artefact enacted a pre-conceived plan of what (s)he
was going to produce - not merely a mental template of what it would look like,
but especially a conception of what it would be used for - and that this plan, or
set of intentions, was the motive force behind the selection and fashioning of the
raw material. In other words, the discoverer always tacitly understands that the
artefact was a cognitive as well as a material object - a material symbol - for agents
in the past (just as it is, within a very different system of cultural meanings, for
archaeologists in the present). The artefact, after all, is the artisan's labour, or
intentions-in-action, in an objectified form. It is an antecedent cognitive object
(the 'model of' other artefacts of the same kind, put into practice as a 'model for')
projected onto the world and fashioned out of the material at hand.
All this is implicitly assumed when we speak of the 'design' of the artefact. Design
can be taken to mean 1) an objective property of the artefact, 2) the subject-object
transaction through which the artefact was fashioned, or 3) the subjective plan or
model of the artefact, which pre-figured its existence. Like affordances, design
is not merely inferred; it can actually be observed in the material by a human
perceiver. All kinds of archaeological objects exhibit design. Take for example the
many cremation-urns found on this site. Their functional shape shows an intention
to make and use them as 'containers' and the handles or lugs affixed to some of
them show they were designed for 'picking up and carrying in the hands'. We can
actually see that the vessels were made with these and other purposes in mind.
(The perception of design, then, is often linked with the perception of affordances
- but not necessarily so. The function and symbolic significance of the fingernail
decoration encircling some of the urns, for example, can only be guessed at: the
decoration does not 'afford' anything as such. Yet its design is self-evident.)
Neisser (1976:9) argues that the perception of affordances must involve some active
contribution to the constitution of the object on the part of the perceiving subject.
The same is true for the perception of design. The subject draws from his or her
own practical experience to interpretively constitute the object in perception. As
Rosch (1978:33) suggests, we perceive the sit-on-ability of chairs only because we
are used to using chairs in this way. This applies also to the affordances of many
of the objects encountered on an archaeological dig. Pots, handles, knives, etc, are
mundane items of everyday social life; we are so used to using them (to contain,
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to hold, to cut ) that we take our knowledge of how to use them completely
for granted. And our mastery of instruments means that we are also masters of
design All human beings are designers and creators; even such a mundane activity
as cooking involves the transformation of a natural raw material into a cultural
product ( Levi-Strauss 1969 ). We may not make the same things as people in
the past, but we are all skilled at using the hands to manipulate and fashion
materials, through the use of tools, in such a way as to realise our intentions in
material form. It is precisely this 'common-sense' knowledge, or 'knowing how' -
analogically-derived from our own practical experience - that enables us to perceive
the qualities of instrumentality and design in discovered objects.
If it is by implicit reference to our own activity (as users and makers of artefacts
ourselves) that we recognise the traces of human agency in the material form of
objects from different cultures, different times, then the analogy also works the
other way. It is not just the pathos of some other's existence that we perceive
in the discovered artefact ( the perceived fact that the relation of belonging that
once pertained between maker and artefact, or user and instrument, has been
broken ) - but also the pathos of our own. The artefact confronts us with our
own mortality, the impermanence of human life, the certainty of death. It reminds
us that the many relations of belonging that link us to our work, tools, material
possessions, family, friends and culture will likewise be broken - and shows that
our own artefacts are likely not only to outlast us, but to outlast also the system
of meanings and values that sustains our activity. Archaeological interpretation is
ultimately founded upon this common humanity, underlying cultural differences,
between ourselves and people in the past.
8.6 Practical Analogy: the Anatomy of Deep Inference
In the case of artefacts such as arrowheads, deep inference is concerned with 1.
the context of manufacture ( ie. the transformation of a natural raw material
into a cultural object). 2. the context of use, and 3. the context of deposition
( ie. the transition of the cultural object back into nature). This is the 'life' of
the artefact, so to speak, beginning with 1 and ending with 3. The arrowhead is
conceived of in 1 as the product (and intended instrument) of human labour and
in 2 as the instrument of such labour (while in 3 it is understood to have taken on,
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by the very fact of being lost, broken or discarded, an anti-instrumental value).
Not all artefacts, however, can be said to be both the product and instrument of
human labour. It is possible to recognize an object as an artefact - by the traces of
human agency discerned upon it - without being certain of its instrumental value.
Also, many of the by-products of human labour clearly had no instrumental value
whatsoever. Thus a considerable number of stone artefacts found on this site were
labelled simply as 'worked flints' - a label which implies human workmanship but
does not (as the name 'arrowhead' does) specify the function or purpose of the
artefact.
The category of 'worked flints' is a broad one which includes arrowheads and
other tools such as scrapers, blades, etc. - but it also includes flint tools or frag-
ments of tools of unknown purpose and function, as well as the waste-products of
tool-making activity. Fig 16 shows how ifints tended to be classified (in general
conversation) on this site:-
WORKED FLINTS
I	 I	 I	 i	 I
CORES FLAKES SCRAPERS BLADES ARROWHEADS OTHERS
I	 I
I	 II	 LEAF- BARBED-
I	 SHAPED AND-TANGED
raw materials	 '	 intentional products and instruments
and waste-products I
Figure 16: The Category of Worked Flints
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Usually discovered flint artefacts were identified and labelled on the second of these
levels; that is, in terms of their function (eg. 'scrapers', 'blades', 'arrowheads', etc).
Sometimes a more specialised identification was given based on shape (eg. 'leaf-
arrowhead'). But an arrowhead or blade would only occasionally be referred to as
a 'worked ifint', simply because its status as an artefact that had been worked was
self-evident and obvious. The second level, then, consists of what Rosch (1978:32)
calls "basic level" concepts and objects. However, objects which had no apparent
function yet had clearly been intentionally worked, such as flakes and cores, were
often referred to as 'worked flints'. The following example illustrates the kind of
practical analogy that underlies the identification of a discovered object as having
been 'worked':-
During the trowelling of an area to delineate the cut of a ring-ditch, a task which had
taken D several hours, the only find had been a flint-flake. I pointed out to D that
many similar flints must have passed before his eyes in this time: why has he kept this
flint and not the others?
1. D replied that this flint had been "worked" - that it had been "struck off" from a flint
core in the making of an implement. (As he told me this he demonstrated the relevant
hammering actions, holding an imaginary hammerstone in one hand and an imaginary
core in the other).
2. I asked him how he differentiated between a worked and an unworked flint.
3. D (searched on the ground for an unworked flint to use as a comparison, found one,
handed both flints to me and) said that, if I looked closely, I would see a percussion-mark
on one of the stones "where it has been hammered". He pointed out the absence of any
such features on the other stone.
4. I asked whether he had to look hard in order to find a worked flint.
5. D said that, in this case, no. As soon as he saw it he knew it had been worked. In
fact the flint seemed to "jump out" of the soil as he was trowelling it, and he 'couldn't
miss it".
[RE23]
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Perhaps what is most apparent in this exchange is just how much D knows about
the discovered object. This knowledge extends not only to the identification of
the object as an artefact, but also how it was produced, and the kind of agency
responsible for its production. His account invoked the former existence of a raw
material (the ffint core), a tool for working the raw material (the hammerstone) and
an intentional product (the implement), from which the ifint flake itself was a waste
product. It also invokes the former existence of a wielder of the hammerstone, a
striker of the core, a maker of the implement - and this agent is credited with the
ability to intend a product, as well as with the basic manipulatory skills required
to carry out those intentions. Indeed, while D is talking (1), his own body is
re-creating some of the motor-movements which would be necessary in order to
strike a flake from a core.
There was definitely a sense in which this gestural drama, and the explanation it
supported, did not depend upon the presence of the ffint-flake any more than it
did upon presence of the core or the hammerstone. It was something D already
knew, before the object was discovered - a practical performance of a pre-existing
conceptual scheme. Even though D may have no personal experience of knapping
flints, he has clearly internalized the conventional archaeological wisdom (which is
based ultimately on numerous experimental and ethnographic studies - see Hodder
1982a:11-12) about how flint artefacts are manufactured. Indeed, so much a part of
'common-sense' has this knowledge become that it is integrated into body schema
as a kind of 'knowing how' as well as a 'knowing that' (Ryle 1949), and can be
demonstrated naturally, as it were, without D really having to focus attention on
what he was articulating by means of gesture. The example illustrates the way in
which theoretical knowledge is 'lived' by the body and 'grounded' in the bodily
practices and perceptions involved in the act of discovery. The discovered object
seemed to "jump out" precisely because it was apprehended and recognised in
terms of this embodied scheme of past human action.
In the act of discovery, then, we can observe knowledge-in-action; not knowledge
as a corpus of facts and static schemes, but knowledge as a process. The flint
core, the hammerstone, the implement being fashioned, the flint flake and even
the inferred subject - whose intentional activity is understood to give the action-
field its cohesion and temporality - are all cognitive objects (cognitive tools might
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be a better way of putting it) at D's disposal in making sense of material evidence
encountered. D assimilates these cognitive objects to the body, constitutes them
in terms of bodily powers and capabilities, sets them into motion according to some
temporal scheme of bodily action (showing, incidentally, that cognitive objects can
be 'manipulated' in much the same way as material objects can). He recreates the
sequence of actions of some past human agent, the inferred subject, by reference
to his own body.
This bodily reference is present in all archaeological interpretation, but is not
usually made explicit; certainly the intimate connection between our understanding
of human agency in the past and our practical common-sense knowledge of how
we use our own bodies rarely surfaces in theoretical discourse. But just as theory
is tacitly present in bodily action and perceptual experience, effecting everything
that we do and see, so the body is tacitly present in analytical thought (see Johnson
1927). Indeed, if it were not for the underlying concept of the body - derived from
practice - archaeological interpretation of any kind would not be possible. One of
the purposes of this thesis, then, is to bring this buried concept to light.
Note how, in the scenario invoked by D, the instrumental values of the hammer-
stone, the flint core and the intended implement are all understood in relation to
each other. The hammerstone is used to strike the core in such a way that the
finished product will be suitable for a particular purpose or function of its own.
Thus the context of use of the hammerstone is inextricably bound up with the
context of manufacture of the intended implement, the context of use of which is
already present, as an intention and a guiding scheme of action, in its own manu-
facture. The flint flake itself derives its anti-instrumental value (ie as something to
be chipped away) in relation to these other tools and their action-meanings. The
hammerstone's context of use and the intended implement's context of manufacture
is very probably the waste-product's context of deposition.
Importantly, if the referential structure of tools-in-use always point towards the
purposes to which they can be put ( eg. the hammerstone points towards the
striking of the core, the fashioning of the implement and ultimately to the intended
function of this implement) they always point away from the body - the user of
instruments, the maker of artefacts, the enactor of intentions. There must be an
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embodied subject to wield the hammerstone, to grasp the core and to intend the
finished product. Take away the inferred subject and the whole scenario invoked
by D collapses back into this one material object - the flint flake - which sparked
off the process of deep inference in the first instance. Not even this, for without
the cognitive tools and schemes at his disposal for interpreting material evidence,
D would perhaps never have recognised the object as significant and picked it out
from a shifting field of similar-looking stones to begin with.
To recognize an object as an artefact (the instrument/product of human agency)
is to situate it conceptually or actually within the practical space of the body.
Artefactuality is not a quantifiable property of an object; it is the relation between
an object and a subject, or inferred subject, who has some kind of project (or,
in the case of waste-products, some kind of anti-project) for it. Archaeologists, of
course, are not only concerned with working out the projects of past human agents;
they also have their own wider projects for discovered objects, quite different from
those of the inferred subject. In a very real sense material evidence appropriated
for archaeological purposes become the artefacts of the present-day, whether or
not they were the artefacts of previous cultures. Such objects as arrowheads and
worked flint flakes are, as it were, double-artefacts. This two-fold artefactuality,
and the irony implied, should be borne in mind by the reader in making sense of
this fieldwork report.
8.7 Deep Inference in Action
If it is possible for an object to be the product without being the instrument of
human labour (as in the case of the ifint flake), it is also possible for an object
to be the instrument without being the intentional product of any manufacturing
process. Some hammerstones, for example, are recognized as artefacts not because
they show traces of having been 'worked' (though some do), but rather because
they show traces of having been used to 'work' other material. In these instances
deep inference refers to the context of use rather than any context of manufacture
(though it does refer to the context of manufacture of those raw materials and
intentional products which are presupposed to have been worked by means of the
hammerstone). But again, the body is the fundamental datum against which the
quality of artefactuality is assessed.
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Consider, for example, what happens when a digger encounters an object that
could be a 'hammerstone' or could be 'natural'. It may be unclear whether the
shape and features of the stone are the result of human or natural agency. How
does the archaeologist evaluate such an object? Generally speaking, (s)he picks it
up, (s)he tries out the various ways of holding the object, (s)he judges the centre
of gravity, (s)he sees how the object would feel and perform in the hand if it was
a striking implement. In other words, the apprehending subject brings his or her
own practical experience to to bear upon the object, constitutes and evaluates it
in terms of that experience. (S)he sees how (s)he would use the object, in order
to judge how an agent in the past might have used it. It is a kind of practical
experiment, and the results of that experiment determine whether the object will
be retained as a recorded find, to achieve the transition into data, or whether it will
be consigned to the spoil-heap. (In the particular example I am thinking of, the
potentially significant object emerged in a context of joint labour. It temporarily
became the subject of discussion, was inspected by several diggers, evaluated as
natural by mutual consent, and accordingly thrown into the wheelbarrow and
forgotten).
All discovered artefacts, if they are indeed to achieve the transition into data,
have to pass such practical examinations - and for every one that passes there
are many that fail. One has to remember that in the course of their everyday
activity diggers are constantly 'on the look out' for artefacts; they encounter, pick
up and scrutinise literally scores of possible finds, perhaps only retaining one or
two. This means that many objects make only a very brief appearance inside the
CULTURAL domain. One might say that their 'life' as artefacts - their passage
from context of manufacture through context of use to context of deposition - is
very short. Or one might say that such discarded objects are analogous to the
flint-flake chipped away from the raw material to make the intended implement.
For they take on an anti-instrumental character - as more or less irrelevant to our
projects - that shows up the instrumental value (in terms of present-day purposes)
of those finds that are actually retained. This active process of selection clearly
involves the application of some criteria of relevance. And while diggers may judge
relevance in various ways (eg. by comparing the material form and properties of
discovered objects with others encountered before, or read about in texts), the
principle standard or criterion is the body itself. The central role of the body
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can be analysed in terms of four logically distinct (but practically inseparable)
functions:-
1. The object emerges and takes form in perception within the context
of bodily action. It is the embodied subject, after all, who uncovers and
encounters the object, recognises it, picks it up, manipulates and explores
it. Archaeologists generally make much use of the sense of touch, alongside
vision, to evaluate material evidence. Observation is active (rather than
passive), engaged (rather than disengaged) - a dialectic of exploration and
discovery that unfolds through time, and is mediated through direct bod-
ily contact with the object in question. In these senses the body can be
described as the vehicle of practical analogies.
2. Embodied perceptual schemes, cognitive tools and practical skills enable
the subject to recognize the object as an artefact. The subject draws from
personal experience, as an embodied agent himself or herself, to interpre-
tively constitute the object in terms of past human agency. (S)he brings
the body's action-field to the object, and assimilates the object into this
action-field. Imbued with action-meanings, the object is assessed and eval-
uated by reference to the action-possibilities of the body itself. In these
senses the body can be described as the sotzrce of practical analogies.
3. The inferring subject conceives of the artefact not in relation to his or
her own body, but in relation to that of the inferred subject, or past human
agent, who is thought or presupposed to have manufactured and used the
artefact. This agent is credited with basic perceptual-motor and symbolic
powers normally associated with the human body. The intentional activity
of this agent, in making or using the artefact, is held to be the causal
context in which the artefact - as the effect of this activity - originated. In
these senses the body (inferred) can be described as the target of practical
analogies
4. In so far as an analogy takes place between the source and the target, the
body itself is the datum without which no analogy (and no deep inference)
could occur. As RE23 shows, the body may be the locus of the analogy.
Because the analogy is situated in the body (or rather in the transaction
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between the embodied subject and the object) - which is always and nec-
essarily placed in the background - the whole process may be largely tacit,
underlying language and explicit problem-solving. Any amount of theo-
retical knowledge may be grounded, reproduced and transformed in this
process. In these senses the body can be described as the basis of practical
analogies.
Vehicle, source, target and basis are of course analytical abstractions which in
practice collapse back into a unified action-complex - the transaction between the
embodied subject and the object. The analogical reconstruction of past human
action is part of this transaction. It takes place in the here and now; there is
no 'message' or 'meaning' received from the past via the object; nor does the
object in any way retain past cultural meanings. If the object as encountered is
intrinsically meaningful, it is because it is constituted, in perception, in terms of
the (embodied) theoretical and practical knowledge brought to bear upon it by
the perceiving subject. In this way it is transformed into a CULTURAL object -
appropriated into our own system of meanings and projects.
In the process of exploration, however, the object itself may surprise or contradict
the practical schemes applied to it, so that these schemes are modified in practice
to take account of the object, redirecting further exploration of it. Ideas and object
mutually fashion each other, and both emerge from the transaction in some way
transformed. Importantly, even an unfamiliar or unexpected object - unparalleled
in our experience - can be practically constituted in terms of the potentialities and
possibilities of the human body. For the unfamiliar object can be manipulated and
explored in the light of a whole range of anticipations, questions and strategies for
action that our practical analogies generate. Every time we pick up an object,
turning it over in our hands and directing our attention first to this aspect and
then to that (its overall form and 'feel', a well as its particular details) - in order
to see whether it has been worked, and if so how it could have been made, the
manner in which it might have been used or held, the kind of material on which it
could have been used, the function it could have performed, etc - we are exploring
the possibilities of the object by reference to our own body. As Monod (1972:15)
argues. "It is by reference to our own activity, conscious and projective, intentional
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and purposive - it is as makers of artefacts - that we judge of a given object's
'naturalness' or 'artificialness'."
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Chapter IX
"ARCHAEOLOGICAL" VERSUS "NATURAL"
"The first and the most fundamental distinction accomplished by
human-activity-in-the-world is the one between the realm shaped by
human praxis and all the rest" (Bauman 1973:12k).
9.1 The 'Natural'
The "natural" is one of the most important categories of evidence encountered
in excavation practice, yet is rarely constituted as an object of attention in itself
(though 'natural' evidence such as pollen or carbon 14 extracted from 'archaeo-
logical' contexts may be the object of subsequent analysis). It usually appears
as the negative form or antonym of "archaeological", "artificial" or "artefactual"
evidence. Archaeological patterns of significance are 'set in', 'surrounded by' and
'excavated from' the natural. The natural is the background from which archae-
ological objects emerge and stand out. It is the surface that is excavated down
to in the digging of archaeological features. It can also be the description applied
to objects and patterns for which no positive identification or significance can be
found in terms of schemes of past human agency. Turning back to look at the
rough plan of the site (Fig. 1), we see that the natural is the whiteness of the
page, highlighted only negatively by the inked-in archaeological patterns. And
its meaning is inextricably bound up with that of its opposite; "natural" means
'non-archaeological', 'non-artefactual' and 'not the effect of past cultural action'.
9.2 Natural Counterparts of Discovered Artefacts
For every artefact discovered, as D points out in RE4O (Section 8.1), there are
a considerable number of objects picked up and examined, only to be discarded
as natural. And for every object picked up, there are countless other objects -
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constituted negatively as non-artefacts by the very absence of an act of recognition.
It is in this sense that the term "natural' s , as it is used by archaeologists out in
the field, overlaps in meaning with the term 'NATURAL' which I have used in this
thesis. Objects which are neither recognised nor accorded significance because they
show no traces of past cultural action are not assimilated into the CULTURAL
domain of archaeological knowledge and practices. As Bauman (1973:124) puts
it, "It is true that 'picking up' through naming ... leaves substantial parts of
reality in its 'pristine', pre-cultural state, unnamed and culturally irrelevant and
neglected.. .these conceptual unbeings cannot possibly jeopardise the orderliness of
the culturally tamed and assimilated part of the universe."
Some of these 'conceptual unbeings' may actually be the effects of past human
action. It is the fact that they are not recognised as such that renders them as
'natural' or 'NATURAL'. I experienced (the absence of) these conceptual unbeings
during my first few days on site. Joining the line of diggers hoeing away the last
of the ploughsoil down onto the gravel surface beneath, I was told to look out for
worked ffints and small fragments of pottery (which might indicate the location of
as yet unseen archaeological features). No matter how hard I looked, however, not
a single artefact emerged from the strip of ground I was working. The strips either
side of me gradually came to be scattered with labels pinpointing the provenance
of finds discovered by other workers. My strip, by comparison to theirs, remained
embarrassingly devoid of labels.
This experience made me acutely aware that the fact that there was 'nothing there'
was due, at least in part, to my own lack of skifi in recognising significant objects.
Being somewhat out of practice, and new to this particular site, I had temporarily
lost the 'knack' of picking out artefacts by eye from a field of natural objects. As
other workers reassuringly pointed out, it takes time to 'get your eye in'. Sure
enough, after several days I was finding as many artefacts as anyone else. But
the anecdote illustrates an important point. What we perceive is always relative
to our (culturally acquired and practised) skill of perceiving. Once mastered, the
skill tends to be taken for granted and performed as a matter of routine; it is only
when we do not have the skill, or are engaged in the difficult process of acquiring
it, that the skilled character of perception becomes at all apparent to us. And no
matter what our level of skill may be, there will always be 'conceptual unbeings' -
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potentially significant objects that fail to make the transition from the NATURAL
to CULTURAL domains and simply do not figure in our experience.
An 'out of practice' worker is liable not just to overlook or fail to recognise artefacts,
but also to mistake natural objects for artefactual ones. During the excavation of
segments through the ditches in the northern corner of the site (RE19, RE28), for
example, I picked out from the ditch-fills a number of objects which I took to be
worked flint flakes and cores. But periodic supervisory visits, and inspections of
the contents of the finds-tray by R and T, showed that I was mistaken. On several
occasions they picked up and examined my 'finds' one by one, only to discard them
almost immediately as 'natural'. It took some time before my eye became adept
at distinguishing 'real' worked flints from the many similar-looking natural stones.
In this example, as in the last, the skill of others is the fundamental datum against
one's own level of skifi can be measured and improved.
Exactly how the eye tells the difference between natural objects and artefacts is
difficult to put into words. For almost every objective property of material evidence
that might be said to indicate past human action can also be caused by natural
agencies. The characteristic flaking or multi-faceted appearance of worked ffints is
similar to flaking caused by frost-shattering. So called 'bulbs of percussion' can be
produced by sea or glacial action as well as by the purposeful blows of a human
agent. And the edges of ifint flakes can be chipped through geological processes
as well as through deliberate fashioning. It is true that a practised eye can use
such clues as the degree of weathering to distinguish between archaeological and
geological patterning. But in the last analysis it is not the objective properties
of material evidence that characterise either 'archaeological' or 'natural'. What
characterises an artefact is 1. its perceived use-value and/or 2. its perceived
craftsmanship or design, or the perception that an intelligent and intentional force
was responsible for observed patterning (see discussion in Section 8.5). And it is
precisely the absence of these qualities that characterises natural objects. Hence
(if we take for granted the skill of perceiving the quality of design in material
evidence) it can be said that "As a general rule naturally chipped flints are easily
distinguished from the works of man, for they lack logical design, flake-scars occur
in uneconomical profusion, the edges have a bruised appearance, and the flake
surfaces are usually scratched" (Oakley 1963:10, my italics).
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It is not, however, simply a matter of human artefacts exhibiting design whereas
natural objects do not. For nature does consistently produce patterns that might
seem to indicate some form of design. Observations of design in nature have led
philosophers (eg. Monod 1972:30-1) to argue for a teleonomic principle at work in
the natural order of things, and theologians to argue for the existence of a God
or 'Designer' (see the 'argument from design' summarized in Hudson 1974:55-66).
Natural objects encountered in excavation that might be taken to exhibit design
- and might therefore be mistaken by an untrained eye to be artificial - include
spherical pebbles, quartz crystals, belemnites, ammonites, etc. But practised ar-
chaeologists rarely make this kind of mistake. As a matter of practical skill, they
can easily distinguish between intentional (cultural) design and unintentional (nat-
ural) design.
So far we have considered the archaeological/natural opposition in regard to 'finds'
and non-finds'. It has been difficult for us to apprehend the important category
distinction between archaeological and natural. For the natural only appears mo-
mentarily as the discovered object which is briefly mistaken for an artefact and
then, upon the mistake being realised, thrown away. Artefacts often seem to 'jump
out' or 'stand out' from the natural background - their artefactual status imme-
diately obvious to the discoverer in the first perception of them - so that they are
just 'suddenly there' in fully fledged being as named and meaningful entities, prior
to any conscious justification of the initial recognition.
Not all material evidence encountered in excavation, however, consists of discrete
objects with bounded surfaces which are detacheable from the material field. The
principle objects of archaeological investigation are "features" rather than "finds".
Indeed, finds usually emerge more or less incidentally during the excavation of
features or other material contexts. Unlike finds, features such as ditches, pits and
postholes emerge only gradually through time as they are being worked, and the
manner and form of their emergence is inextricably bound up with the strategies,
methods and techniques of excavation used in bringing them to light. Features
can never be apprehended in their entirety at any given moment, since every ex-
ploratory movement of the trowel at once opens up some new aspect and destroys
some previous aspect. Hence the task of distinguishing archaeological features
from natural features - such as glacial hollows, tree root holes, animal burrows, etc
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- also unfolds through time. This makes it somewhat easier for the ethnographer
to study not only the objectified relation between archaeological and natural ev-
idence, but also the dialectic between the subject and the emerging object. The
whole perceptual process is 'spread out' over the course of hours or days rather
than encapsulated in the single moment of an instantaneous recognition. It is to
the excavation of features, then, that we now turn.
9.3 Archaeological and Natural Features
Let us consider first of all the interpretation of features as they appear - for ex-
ample, on the rough plan of the site (Fig.1) - after the removal of the overlying
ploughsoil but before excavation proper. Only the surface manifestations, or hori-
zontal outlines, of features are visible; their three-dimensional form is hidden from
view. But already archaeological features 'stand out' from the natural. The many
circular features or 'ring-ditches', for instance, are instantly recognisable as archae-
ological rather than natural patterns. One reason for this familiarity is that they
originally manifested themselves as crop-marks and are therefore already known;
indeed, their identification from aerial photographs provided the rationale for the
excavation in the first instance. A second reason is that ring-ditches and ring-
ditch cemeteries are established objects of archaeological knowledge - encountered
on previous excavations elsewhere and heavily documented in archaeological liter-
ature. New objects of the same kind are assimilated into the established category.
A third reason why these patterns should appear as familiar to us is that their
form and distribution has a 'regularity' and 'design' which might seem to indicate
that they are the intentional effects of past human action. But as soon as we
constitute material evidence in terms of past cultural agency we find that we are
implicitly referring to nature - the negative counterpart of culture. For the fourth
(and most easily overlooked) reason why we instantly recognise these forms as
cultural products is that there is no known natural cause in our experience which
could be held to have given rise to these material effects.
Much the same could be said of the straight ditches (and the modern trackway).
The very 'straightness' of these patterns - like the 'roundness' of the ring-ditches
- leads us to perceive them as the products of intentional human labour. Their
artefactual status is self-evident to us, but only because we know from experience
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that straight parallel lines and right-angled junctures are 'unnatural' forms in this
context.
There are also material forms (which, for the most part, have not been planned
and recorded) whose status as 'natural' or 'non-archaeological' is equally obvious.
Known tree root holes and animal burrows, for example, show an irregularity of
shape and a certain lack of definition which contrasts with the (relatively) well-
defined and regular outlines of archaeological features. Amorphous patches of
gravel and brick earth do not even have a 'shape' as such. Some of these patterns
have been temporarily constituted as possible objects of significance, cleaned over
by trowel, but not recorded on any plan because their status as 'natural' rather than
'archaeological' has been positively ascertained. Others have simply not figured
in our experience. Showing no trace or sign of past human action, exhibiting no
intelligent or regular design, such patterns are constituted negatively as objects of
non-significance by the very fact of never attracting our attention, or emerging out
of the background into the foreground of the perceptual field.
In this way it can be seen that 'archaeological' and 'natural' are mutually opposed
and complementary categories of material evidence - two poles on the same axis
of objective meaning. If 'natural' means 'non-archaeological' then 'archaeological'
means 'unnatural'. To identify what something is in these terms is to identify
what it is not, and every identification of material evidence as one or the other
reproduces this most fundamental of category distinctions.
9.4 Archaeo1ogica1?-Natura1
One way to apprehend the (cognitive and material) boundary between 'archaeo-
logical' and 'natural', of course, is to look at those patterns whose status as one
or the other is uncertain, or those occasions when a particular item of evidence
makes the transition form 'natural' to 'archaeological' or vice-versa. Consider, for
example, the many 'pit-like' features marked on the plan. At the start of the ex-
cavation these were thought likely to be inhumation-burials, pits, or some other
kind of archaeological feature - especially those which were more or less regular
in shape with clearly defined outlines or cuts. But digging subsequently showed
most of these 'archaeological' patterns to be 'natural' configurations. it is worth
looking more closely at how this change in interpretation came about.
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The first of the 'pit-like' features to be investigated was situated in the midst of
the cemetery area between two ring-ditches. It was excavated by G, and visited
twice by the ethnographer during the course of its excavation (RE17, RE2O):-
The feature was sub-rectangular in horizontal outline, and measured about 2.5 x 1.5 m.
When I first approached, G had already cleaned over the feature by trowel to delineate
the 'cut', then divided the feature into quadrants with string; she had just started taking
out the fill of the first quadrant. G told me she thought the feature was "very likely
an inhumation-grave", given its shape and size. The sides of the feature were easy to
find - the grey silt fill peeling off onto bright orange (natural) gravels - which led G to
believe that they had been "deliberately cut" rather than caused by any natural agency.
No finds had emerged so far, but a few charcoal flecks within the fill seemed to indicate
that this was indeed an archaeological feature.
[RE17]
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Figure 17: Sketch of RE2O
Upon my return two working days later, G had completed the excavation of two quad-
rants - to reveal a steep-sided feature, about 5Ocms deep, perhaps the most important
characteristic of which was the absence of the anticipated burial remains (see Fig. 17).
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G told me that everyone was disappointed this feature had not turned out to be an
inhumation grave. After consultation with R and T, moreover, it had been decided
that the feature was "natural" - and not "archaeological" at all. The fill consisted of
just one layer of homogenous grey silt, very clean and compacted, with no finds. Only
a few flecks of charcoal had been found within the layer just below the ground surface,
but G now thought these had infiltrated into the fill through tree-root disturbance. The
feature itself, however, was of "pen-glacial origin".
After recording, excavation of the remaining two quadrants is not intended.
[RE2O}
I later asked T about how such features were formed, and how they came to have
such well-defined outlines and sides if they were not man-made. He explained that
in the last glaciation permafrost opened up fissures or cracks in the gravel surface,
which then filled up naturally with silt and clay deposits. The sides of these natural
fissures; he said, could easily be mistaken for man-made 'cuts'; it is the character
of the fill that indicates its natural origin [FJ329]. T's remarks demonstrate that
archaeologists routinely infer non-human or natural causes for observable effects,
and that these 'natural inferences' provide a counterpart to inferences about past
human agency.
Shortly after RE2O, L began to excavate a similar feature, which had also initially
been thought to be an inhumation burial - especially as it was situated within the
interior of a ring-ditch. But events recorded in RE17/RE2O had already changed
this view. Similarities in the character of the fills indicated that this feature was
likely to be natural too - almost certainly glacial in origin. L told me that the
purpose of excavating it was to "test" and "make sure" of the revised interpretation.
I visited L again when she had just completed the excavation of two quadrants and
was engaged in cleaning the surrounds of the feature with a trowel in preparation
for photography (RE35):-
As expected, the feature had turned out to be remarkably similar to the feature excavated
by G in RE2O. Although more irregular in shape, the feature had steep gravel sides and
a homogenous fill of clean and compact grey silt. It too was about 50 cms deep. And
no artefactual material had been found within the fill. L said she was now completely
certain that the feature was natural, "like G's feature".
179
3r.cL 7
0	 I
•f p (o'( %N.&*Q.. ScJ._
-
	
- —
	 I
	
I	 r
	
I	 I
/	
'-'--I	 \
.ft1	 /	 /	
'T)-'l	
ro.i(/
	
/	
/I/---1/ i-I
.—.S.-,I_
//
,N — —
Figure 18: Sketch of RE35
I asked L when she decided it was natural rather than archaeological. She said that "It
did look at one point as if it was getting suspiciously regular, but then it became more
irregular again. If it had become square, it would have been less likely to be natural." She
was unable to pinpoint an exact moment when the natural status of the feature became
clear; the interpretation, she said, was not made suddenly but developed gradually as
digging progressed. She also said that there was no single reason for considering the
feature to be natural, but rather a multiplicity of reasons which, taken together, proved
fairly conclusive (she cited the irregularity of its shape, the homogenuity of the fill, and
the lack of finds).
[RE35]
Of course, a feature may have all the characteristics cited by L and still be 'ar-
chaeological' rather than 'natural'. Exactly how we tell the difference is difficult
to articulate in words. The difficulty became apparent on a further occasion, while
I was talking to T and W about this issue in the planning-hut. T argued that
the statigraphy of the fill and the inclusions within it had much to do with the
identification of a feature as 'archaeological'. If the fill is packed with charcoal
and pottery, for example, one can be fairly certain that the feature is man-made.
He said that the texture or 'feel" of the material was also important. However,
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he pointed out that there was a danger in judging a feature by its fill; clearly a
glacial hollow which was already there could have been used by people for various
purposes and thus acquired an archaeological fill. And many archaeological fea-
tures can be filled entirely by natural processes, such as silting or accumulation
of wind-blown dust. W, on the other hand, argued that the 'regularity of the
cut' was the most important indicator of human workmanship - especially if the
feature was square, rectangular, circular, or some other geometric shape. But he
stressed that a feature still has to "look right" and "feel right" for it to be taken
as archaeological; it can look right even if the cut is irregular and look wrong even
if the cut is regular. He concluded by saying that "some of us probably knew once
how we do it, but not any more...it's just something we can do." [FJ327-8].
W's insight - that telling the difference between archaeological and natural features
is something that we do, even if we may not be able to articulate how we do it - is
at odds with the usual strategy of defining the difference in terms of the objective
properties of material evidence. Material evidence not only has to conform to
certain objective criteria before it can be identified as 'archaeological'; it also has
to "look right"; and "feel right" to the apprehending subject. The object, in other
words, appears as 'archaeological' or 'natural' only in relation to the discerning
skill of the perceiver. And like all skills, once mastered, this skill can essentially be
taken for granted. Asking how such a skifi is performed is a bit like asking cyclists
how they retain their balance on a moving bicycle; they know very well how it is
done in a practical sense, but explaining how it is done is another matter entirely.
If skills can be characterised as structured abilities, then these structures are not
static and fixed but rather develop through time. As they are being practised
they are continually honed or sharpened (against the material upon which they
are brought to bear). Thus the ability to distinguish between archaeological and
natural patterns, though initially learnt elsewhere on other sites, has been improved
through working here on this site, on this material, on these features. For after
several of the pit-like features had been excavated, and most of us had gained first-
hand experience of digging them, we ceased to see them as archaeological patterns
and learned to recognise them as natural at first glance, from surface appearances
alone. This had important implications for excavation strategy. As the deadline for
the end of the excavation approached, it became increasingly necessary to select for
181
investigation those features which were thought most likely to be of archaeological
significance. Known archaeological features such as ring-ditches, cremations, post-
holes, etc, were given priority. Natural features, or features almost certain to be
natural, were low on the list. Many of the remaining 'pen-glacial' features, then,
were not excavated.
A few were, however, and it is interesting to consider why these were chosen for
special attention. Towards the end of the dig, for example, I was given the task of
excavating a feature which everybody on the site knew to be natural. But although
it looked natural to us, it would probably look like a "grave" to someone who did
not have the actual experience of digging this type of feature - for it was situated
inside (ie. enclosed by) a ring-ditch, and was roughly rectangular in shape. T
explained that the significant location of the feature meant that it was essential
to test out our assumption that it was natural, if only for the sake of the reader
of the excavation-report. Anyone looking at the plan of the site in the report,
he added, would ask questions about why a feature in the interior of a ring-ditch
had not been investigated and sampled [FJ329-31]. Thus we have a disjunction
between the acquired expertise or 'knowing how' of workers out in the field, and
the 'knowing that' requirements of the reader of the subsequent report. 'For the
sake of the reader' the feature was duly excavated, recorded and sampled. But this
only told us what we already knew - that the feature was natural.
Another feature easily taken to be of archaeological significance because of its
situation (relative to other features) and its (geometric) form, was a sub-circular
'appendage' to a ring-ditch. This feature had fascinated us since it first appeared
during hoeing. I visited it during the early stage of its excavation by G:-
At present G is cutting a segment through the ring-ditch, and has just started taking
out the fill. She pians to extend the segment backwards and to her left so that the section
will show the stratigraphic relationship between the ring-ditch and the 'appendage'.
G tells me that the feature "looks archaeological because of its circular form." Whether
it really is an 'appendage', an intrinsic part of or addition to the larger feature, she
is not sure. It could be something to do with the mortuary ritual associated with the
ring-ditch, she says, but it could also be a small ring-ditch in its own right. On the other
hand, as she points out, it could be natural. "It is just to early to say."
182
(fidii rcLS4Q.t
/	 1'
/	 /	 I
II	
/_.;	 "	 I
I
— . 1—	 - i_. -. — .!&+te.-(	 '	 . 1
I	 sc4—''
\	 L_7Lt .
'-------- L)
•	 \	 I
-.	 - -. - . - . -- - • ___L
0	 I
Figure 19: Sketch of RE66
[RE66J
The situation described in this recorded event, then, is a kind of practical conun-
drum, which can oniy be resolved through further exploration of the material field.
The status of the feature as archaeological or natural is uncertain, as is the strati-
graphic relationship between the 'appendage' and the ring-ditch. Unfortunately I
missed the further developments on this part of the site, but T later told me what
happened (FJ327). He said that the section was extended through the appendage,
the outer edge of which was found to slope down sharply, heading under the ring-
ditch, forming what appeared to be one side of a large bowl-shaped depression.
This established that the feature was cut by (earlier than) the ring-ditch. It was
filled, moreover, by the same compacted grey silt that we had come to associate
with natural pen-glacial features; like those other features, there were no finds.
The sand and gravel which, in effect, formed the inner circle of the appendage,
was shown to be simply a shallow patch or spread lying on top of the grey silt.
The feature, therefore - much to everyone's disappointment - had turned out to be
natural.
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These periglacial features were unusual for natural features in the sense that they
had fairly well-defined sides and edges. Usually when a suspected archaeological
feature turns out to be natural in the course of digging it, the 'cut' being followed
along by trowel may not only fail to bottom out, but also veer away in erratic
and unpredictable directions, disappear completely, or become impossible to dis-
tinguish from other soil boundaries. There is a general progression from form to
formlessness - and it is precisely this gradual dissipation of form that leads the
worker to suppose that (s)he is dealing with natural, rather than archaeological,
patterns (see the account of the animal burrow in RE11, Section 9.8).
The opposite occurs when archaeological patterns emerge from what was previously
taken to be natural. In these instances, formlessness gives way to form - or, to put
it another way, a figure takes shape where before there was only an indifferentiated
background. Let us now turn our attention away from archaeological—natural
transitions and towards natura1— archaeological transitions.
9.5 ,Natura1?—Archaeo1ogica1
In Chapter 5 it was stated that RE4O would be used as a kind of 'core' event, to
which we would return again and again to illustrate various themes. It has been
cited in discussions of temporality (Section 5.2), changing perspectives (Sections
6.2 and 6.3) and the discovery of finds in time (Section 8.1). But it might be said
that, in using RE4O in this way, the event itself has been abstracted out of the
flux and flow of ongoing practice. It has been reified by the text into a thing in its
own right - a concretized moment divorced from temporal process. There is little
the writer can do about this de-temporalization, since it is a function of textual
representation itself. But here an attempt will be made to at least partially remedy
the situation, as we consider the history of RE4O.
As already noted, the most significant aspect of the material field being worked
by A and D is the ring-ditch (see sketch and commentary, Section 5.2). The ring-
ditch, however, has not always been visible; it is in fact a fairly recent discovery.
Indeed, A initially arrived on this part of the site to excavate some cremation-
burials, with no idea that there was a ring-ditch enclosing these burials. How
was the ring-ditch discovered? To answer this question, we have to refer back to
previous events in the recorded event sequence. RE 5, 15, 27, 30, 40, 54, 61, 67
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together comprise the sequence for the excavation of this area. We pick up the
sequence at RE27:-
A has been working on this area for some time. Three cremation-burials were located
here, all of which A has half-sectioned, and recorded at this stage of excavation. One of
them (F1027) has been completely excavated, though the cremation vessel itself awaits
'lifting' by the conservators. This group of cremations, situated away from the main
group of ring ditches (like those situated between the ring ditches) is thought to represent
a later form of burial rite (see Fig.20).
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Figure 20: Sketch of RE27
A problem had arisen during the half-sectioning of F1004, however. The feature appeared
to cut through, or be cut by, a layer of black material, which made it difficult to find the
sides of the feature at that point. A thinks that this black material originates from a
tree root hole or some other natural disturbance, but there is a slight possibility that it
is an un-urned cremation. It has no precise edges or outline yet, so the immediate task is
to trowel the area around F1004, find the true extent of the possible feature, and clarify
its 'cut' if it has one.
[RE27]
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When I returned to this part of the site a few days later, A was no longer concerned
with the black material, which had been shown to have no precise edges and seemed to
be just a spread of natural organic material from animal or tree-root disturbance. In
extending the area to find the extent of this material however, she had come across what
appeared to be the cut of a linear feature, whose existence was not known or suspected
before. It was this that now occupied her attention. Though barely distinguishable
from the background of natural brick-earth, and more a matter of 'feel' than vision, the
cut seems to be curving around the cremation-pits. A thinks it is the inner cut of a
ring-ditch enclosing the burials; a conviction strengthened by the many finds that have
already emerged from what she takes to be the ditch-fill. The plan now is to follow the
cuts of the ditch along, which means extending the area far beyond its present limits (D
has been detailed by T to come and help A with this task).
[RE3O]
See R.E40 (Section 5.2), RE61 (Section 4.3) and RE67 (Section 8.2) for further develop-
ments.
Note how one thing has led on to another. It was the excavation of known archaeo-
logical features (the cremation pits) that brought to light a possible archaeological
feature (the black material) which, as it happened, turned out to be natural. And
it was in following along this natural layer, when its status as archaeological or
natural was uncertain, that a further and very important archaeological feature
(the ring-ditch enclosing the cremations) began to emerge from what was hitherto
taken to be a wholly natural background of brick-earth.
The sequence illustrates the transition from form to formlessness (of the possi-
ble feature which turned out to be natural) and the transition from formlessness
to form (of the ring-ditch outline). Indeed, in the case of the ring-ditch we are
witnessing the forming of an archaeological pattern of significance. Only a tiny
proportion of its surface outline is perceptible, and even this is difficult to see;
to apprehend it at all demands something of a skilled perceptual accomplishment
on the part of the perceiver. But the provisional recognition of it as a significant
pattern serves as the basis or rationale for further exploration. And as exploration
proceeds, the unfolding evidence (the discovery of finds in the fill, the continuation
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of the cut that emerges as A trowels along its anticipated course) is tending to
confirm rather than refute the initial hypothesis.
Just as each discovery is contingent upon the sequence of previous discoveries that
led up to that moment, so each discovery prepares the ground for further discov-
eries. The continuation of the ring-ditch cuts that A and D will have uncovered
in RE4O, the small feature that A will find (RE61), and the arrowhead she will
discover (RE67) within the fill of the ditch - are all future events that would never
'happen' if it were not for the events described in RE 27/30. The discovery of the
ring-ditch was a pivotal event, shaping all subsequent events on this part of the
site.
9.6 Global ArchaeologicaL-Natural Transitions
Discoveries linked together in causal sequences on bounded parts of the site are
also linked, both spatially and temporally, to discoveries taking place across the
site as a whole. Supervisory visits and other social transactions ensure a constant
cross-fertilization of interpretations of emerging evidence on different parts of the
site. It is through these channels that, occasionally, the finding of one worker
in one bounded region comes to effect the findings of all other workers in other
regions. When the perception and understanding of a commonly encountered type
of material evidence by all members of the excavation-team undergoes a radical
change, I call this a 'global' change - simply because it involves a modification or
shift in world-view of the social group as a whole.
To give a concrete example of the cross-site linkages that come about, and an
archaeological4-natural transition that (though it originated with one worker on
one part of the site) had 'global' effects and implications, let us leave the history
of RE4O to one side. We turn now to the future of the other recorded event that
was cited in Chapter 5 - RE22. This event was used as an instance of practical
problem-solving or practical reasoning (Section 5.5). We left E in an open-ended
and unresolved situation, trying to 'work out' an unfolding practical problem that
had arisen in the course of cleaning over (the surface manifestations of) a ring
ditch. RE22, 37 and 41 form the recorded sequence for this part of the site. We
pick up the sequence at RE37, with E engaged in the digging of segments through
the ditch:-
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One segment has already been excavated, sampled and recorded. The ditch was shown
to be round-bottomed, about 30 cms deep, with the fill consisting of just a single layer
of brown silt. The gravel sides of the ditch, E tells me, were easy to find and to follow
down; digging the segment was 'no problem at all'.
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Figure 21: Sketch of RE37
E is now digging a second segment through the ditch, working backwards from the
section. He tells me he thinks he has found the sides, but is worried about them because
they are 'unsymmetrical' - with one side much steeper than the other, Why is he worried
about a lack of symmetry? "Because you expect a ditch to be more or less symmetrical...
it doesn't look right how it is... If you're cutting a ditch you generally cut it in a certain
way... not like this." Nevertheless, the brown fill seems to peel off cleanly onto these
gravel sides, so E will continue to follow them down and along. It looks as though this
segment will have roughly the same shape and dimensions as the first segment.
[rtE37]
Comparing Fig.21 with Fig.9 (Section 5.5) we see that the material field has been
extended and transformed since we last encountered it in RE22. Perhaps the main
point to note is that the ring-ditch no longer exhibits a right-angled turn. De-
tailed troweffing by E had shown the right-angle to have been caused by recent
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ploughing activity disturbing the upper ditch-fill; he found the true (circular) out-
line by taking off deeper spits of soil in this region. The possible archaeological
feature which figured in E's problem-solving activity at that time was found to
be a natural configuration within the brick-earth, and has long since faded away
into the background. Since then other possible features have emerged to engage
E's attention, such as the four pit-like outlines marked on the sketch (similar
in many respects to the 'pen-glacial' features encountered elsewhere on site and
therefore thought likely to be natural, though this interpretation will need checking
out). What has happened since our last visit, then, is that the action-field and its
action-meanings - which comprised the practical 'problem' to be solved - has been
transfigured through E's work or labour within and upon it. It is not just that
new material factors have emerged to be taken into consideration; their emergence
was facilitated only by the removal of evidence that was visible before. The mode
of excavation has also changed - from 'cleaning over' to 'digging segments through'
the ring ditch. It is the same problem, but the problem at a different moment in
time.
All practical problems unfold through time in this way. Unlike analytical prob-
lems they can never be grasped in their entirety at one moment, since many of the
variables are hidden from view and, though anticipated, not known with any cer-
tainty. The material field therefore always presents the possibility of confounding
expectations as to what is likely to emerge, bringing about a shift in strategy for
further excavation, as well as a revision of established interpretations. Consider
for example, the next recorded event in the sequence:-
Returning to this part of the site I found the second segment completed, with E engaged
in cleaning the last of the spoil from the bottom of the feature. The shape of the ditch-
segment had changed completely, however. It was now V-shaped rather than bowl-
shaped, and about 20 cms deeper. I asked E what had happened since my last visit.
E said that he had thought he had finished the segment yesterday. It was similar to
the first segment, with only one fill and gravel sides but he was still unsatisfied with
it; it 'didn't look right' and was 'unsymmetrical'. Then he noticed that the gravel on
one side was dirtier than the gravel on the other side. In an experiment with the tip
of the trowel, he tried taking off some of the dirty gravel, finding that it came off onto
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Figure 22: Sketches of Vertical Section, RE41
cleaner gravel. Further trowelling convinced him that this cleaner gravel was in fact the
true side of the ditch. Re followed this side down and then, once it had bottomed out,
followed the other side up. The resulting V-shaped ditch now 'looked much better'. Not
only was symmetry restored; the segment now 'felt right'. Both sides consisted of clean
gravel surfaces which contrasted markedly with the dirty gravel fill (754/755 - see Fig.22)
visible in the section.
E said that "One of the things that confuses you is you start off with a preconceived
notion.., the shape of the other segment... and expect this one to be the same." Now
he has to go back to the first segment to check that it really has been fully excavated,
in the light of developments in the second segment. It seems highly probable that this
will prove to have a V-shaped cut too - though as E points out, it may be ,just that the
ditch is changing shape along its course.
[rtE4l]
During supervisory visits, R and E together interpreted layers 754 and 755 as
primary erosion and silting deposits respectively, which had accumulated shortly
after the ditch had originally been excavated in the distant past. What has hap-
pened, then, is that the soil boundary between 753 and the two dirty gravel layers
has made the transition from 'archaeological' (ie. a man-made cut) to 'natural'
(ie. the effect of natural silting processes). The new cut or side uncovered by E's
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experiment with the tip of the trowel, on the other hand, has made the transition
from 'natural' to 'archaeological'.
Two points emerge very clearly from the example. The first is that previous
experience of digging ring-ditch segments - not only on this feature, but also on
other parts of the site (and by other workers as well as E) - provides a certain set
of preconceptions as to what they look like, how they should be excavated, etc.
This experience clearly helps the worker to locate and follow down the sides or cut
of the ditch (a task which a novice might find very difficult). But in this instance
it also hindered the operation. By E's own admission, he failed to locate the true
sides because of expectations engendered in the digging of a previous segment.
The way in which past events or events that have taken place elsewhere condition
the act of discovery can be represented schematically as in Fig 23.
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Figure 23: Structuration of RE37/41
The second point is that the unfolding material field has in some sense challenged
or surprised those preconceptions. It has 'acted back' on the cognitive and practical
schemes that gave it form in the first instance. That E is now prepared to revise
his preconceived notions on the basis of what has emerged is indicated by the fact
rtd
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that he is going back to the first segment to re-check the sides and base of the
ditch there. To appreciate to full ramifications of E's findings, however, we have
to consider the chain of events across the site as a whole that was set in motion
by his practical re-evaluation of the ring-ditch sides.
In supervisory visits to E's material field, T and R were concerned not just with the
excavation of this particular ring-ditch, but also with the implications of discoveries
here for the excavation of other ring-ditches on other parts of the site. Given
that layers 754 and 755 were comprised of gravel material, the surface of which
could easily be mistaken for the sides of the ditch, they wondered whether similar
primary layers might have remained unnoticed and undiscovered in other excavated
ditch-segments. Several workers, including myself, were therefore given the task
of re-examining segments that had already been excavated and recorded. Such
re-examinations involved carrying out the same kind of 'experiment' with the tip
of the trowel that E had performed in his segment. Sure enough, many (though
not all) of these ditch segments were shown to have hitherto unnoticed primary
layers. Some had V-shaped cuts, and most turned out to be much deeper than
previously supposed. Further samples had to be taken; section drawings had to be
partially erased and re-drawn; additions and revisions had to be made to context-
sheets. (The first segment excavated by E was one of the many 'finished' segments
to require further excavation and recording. As half-anticipated, it turned out to
have a V-shaped cut just like the second segment).
It was not just 'established' interpretations and 'finished' material fields that were
re-structured by RE37/41. Needless to say, the experience of re-digging already
excavated features made all of us acutely aware of the possibility of mistaking
primary layers for sides. From then on we were 'on the look-out' for erosion
and silting deposits of this kind when excavating further segments through ring-
ditches. Telling the difference between primary layers and sides of features, through
subtle exploration with the trowel, became an aspect of everyday routine which
came 'naturally' to us after a while. RE37/41, then, had major consequences
for subsequent excavation strategy, our perception and understanding of unfolding
material evidence, and our skill in digging and recording it accurately. The 'global'
effects of E's findings can be represented in the following way:-
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Pigure 24: Structuration of Other Events by RE37/41
I have used RE37/41 as an example of a pivotal event, where a perceptual change
in the archaeological/natural status of material evidence in one part of the site
brought about corresponding archaeologica14- . natural transitions in other parts of
the site. But it is important to point out that RE37/40 is by no means unusual
in this respect. Any number of recorded events could have been used to illus-
trate this feedback and cross-fertilization effect. Experience of material evidence
gained by individual workers in material transactions 'feeds back' into the "stock of
knowledge at hand" (Schutz 1971:208) of the excavation team as a whole - through
numerous supervisory visits and other social transactions. This in turn effects the
way we act upon the material field, and thus the form of material evidence ac-
tually encountered. In this way the craft skills of excavation are bound together
with emerging evidence in a practical dialectic which itself unfolds through time.
Transformations of the material field bring about corresponding transformations
or honing of craft skills themselves.
9.7 Negative Practical Analogies
It is interesting to trace back the origin of the 'global' archaeological4-natural
transitions described in Section 9.6 to a particular stage of the practical reasoning
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process in which E wa.s engaged. In RE37, before the actual discovery of the new
sides or cut of the ditch, E was already expressing doubt about the shape of the
excavated segment. The ditch was 'unsymmetrical'; there was something not quite
right about it. When I asked him why a lack of symmetry should bother him, E
had said "Because you expect a ditch to be more or less symmetrical. ..it doesn't
look right how it is... If you 're cutting a ditch you generally cut it in a certain
way.. .not like this."
This might be described as a negative practical analogy, made partially explicit
here. If archaeologists recognize artefactual objects or patterns by reference to
their own causal powers as makers of artifacts themselves (Section 8.5, 8.6, 8.7),
then they recognize the effects of non-human or natural agencies - negatively, as
it were - by the same means. E 'puts himself in the position of' the agent who
originaily dug the ditch, sees how he would dig it in order to see how an agent in the
past might have dug it. Consider the vast range of unspoken assumptions that he
is making here. All the taken-for-granted knowledge of how he uses his own body
to move through space, to grasp and manipulate things, to effect changes in the
material environment through the use of tools, is invoked to help him understand
material evidence in terms of past human agency and to know how best to deal
with it. Causal powers of the body are routinely attributed to the inferred agent
held to be causally responsible for originally excavating the ring-ditch that E is
re-excavating today. And the upshot of this process of deep inference is that (in
terms of analogically-derived schemes of past human action) the soiki boundary
that supposedly represents the 'cut' of the ditch "doesn't look right how it is."
It was this nagging doubt - this slight disjunction between material evidence and
cognitive schemes for apprehending material evidence - that led E (somewhere
between RE37 and RE41) to carry out his 'experiment' with the tip of the trowel.
In other words, it was a negative practical analogy that sparked off the exploratory
process that resulted in the discovery of the V-shaped cut, which in turn gave rise
to 'global' changes across the site as a whole. And when the V-shaped cut was
brought to light by the trowel, it was not completely unexpected; it had in fact
been anticipated before it emerged, and was an object of intention prior to its
manifestation in material form. The negative practical analogy gave rise to this
anticipation in the first instance, and provided the rationale for digging away some
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of the dirty gravel to look for the 'true' sides. This is what I mean when I say
that analogies are embedded in action. They are caught up in the dialectic of
exploration and discovery that Neisser (1976:21) has called "the perceptual cycle".
It is also clear from this example that analogies-in-action can be profoundly cre-
ative operations, producing new meanings, new ways of seeing things and new
ways of doing things - not just for the individual but for the excavation team as
a whole. At the same time, of course, it has to be acknowledged that the new
'ways of seeing' and 'ways of doing' that resulted from E's discovery soon became
conventionalized, to be performed by all of us as a matter of routine. The negative
practical analogy was still there, but had been incorporated in 'common-sense' and
craft skills generally, so that it was reproduced every time someone routinely iden-
tified the top surface of primary fills as 'natural' rather than 'archaeological'. Most
practical analogies have this double aspect, at first produced and then reproduced
in ongoing labour, at once producing original knowledge and reproducing estab-
lished knowledge. They allow experience of unfamiliar evidence to be assimilated
into the stock of knowledge at hand, and for that knowledge to be transformed ac-
cordingly. But they also come to be incorporated into conventional strategies and
perceptual schemes, effecting all subsequent manifestations of material evidence.
In this sense our cognitive schemes, like the material field, can be said to have a
temporal structure - bound up in an unfolding dialectic with emerging material
evidence.
9.8 A Question of Time
Most of the 'natural' evidence we have discussed in this chapter has consisted of
glacial features or, as in the last example, primary erosion and silting deposits
within archaeological features. And in so far as we have referred to the natural
forces held to be causally responsible for observable material effects, we have been
concerned largely with geological processes. But the category of 'natural evidence'
also includes the material effects of the activity of (non-human) life-forms. Tree
root holes and animal burrows are obvious examples. Like geological features,
these are not of immediate concern or significance to archaeologists and for the
most part are consigned to the background. But they do emerge into the sphere of
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archaeological interpretation when they are temporarily mistaken for archaeologi-
cal patterns, or when archaeological features have been disturbed by tree-root or
animal activity. In the following example, W had been given the task of excavat-
ing a cremation-pit, which from surface indications appeared to be cut by another
feature; the status of this later feature as archaeological or natural was not known.
We arrive on the scene when excavation has just been completed:-
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Figure 25: Sketch of RE11
The excavated pit is circular in horizontal section and basin-shaped in profile, about im
in diameter at the surface with sides sloping in to a base, 30 cms deep. Standing on the
base of the pit is a pottery vessel containing black burnt material; this will be lifted by
the conservators once the excavated feature has been planned and photographed.
1. W told me that the feature had been very badly disturbed through truncating and
scoring by later ploughing activity, shattering the vessel within (he pointed to one of the
"ploughmarks" on the surface; it appeared to have ripped through the feature, taking
some of the cremation material with it).
2. I asked him what had happened to the possible feature which, prior to excavation,
had seemed to cut the cremation-pit.
3. IV said that this had turned out to be an "animal burrow", not an archaeological
feature...An animal had burrowed into the side of the pit and underneath the vessel,
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probably contributing to its shattered state (he pointed to a dark area on the gravel
sides of the pit, where the animal had entered).
4. I asked him how he tells the difference between animal and man-made features - how
does he know it is an animal burrow?
5. 'W said that this was established by cleaning over the ground surface next to the
pit... "it seemed to curve off.. it didn't seem like a dug feature. ..The best way of putting
it is that it was irregular, but roughly linear...you'd expect a man-made feature to be
more regular." In following the possible feature along by trowel, he went on, no clear
edges of cut could be found; as soon as an edge appeared it disappeared again, "as you
might expect if it was an animal burrow".
6. I asked if the animal disturbance made it difficult to find the edges of the cremation-
pit.
7. W replied that, once he had established that the disturbance was an animal burrow,
it wasn't too difficult. In emptying out the fill and following the sides of the pit down by
trowel, it was fairly easy to estimate where the sides should be in the area of disturbance,
and to stop digging there.
8. Upon further questioning, VV (slightly exasperated) added that "One of the problems
you will face is that some of us just don't know how we interpret or recognise objects or
features...we just do it...its difficult to explain afterwards exactly how we've done it."
[RE 11]
It is common for diggers, when asked to articulate the difference between archae-
ological and natural evidence, to refer to the 'regularity', 'pattern', 'design', 'sym-
metry', etc, of archaeological objects and the 'irregularity', 'absence of pattern',
'lack of design' and 'asymmetry' of natural objects. W is no exception. He points
to the 'irregularity' of the animal burrows, as compared with the 'regularity' of
archaeological features (5). By looking at the sketch of the material field in Fig.25
we can see what he means. The cut of the cremation-pit is more or less circular
in horizontal section. Except for the area where it had been disturbed by animal
activity, the side of the pit is quite distinct, and was easy to find during the emp-
tying out of the fill. The cremation vessel is placed in an upright position in the
very centre of the pit. The whole arrangement has a geometry and symmetry to
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it that seems to speak to us of human handiwork. And this regularity of form has
a temporal as well as a spatial dimension. This particular arrangement (upright
vessel placed in the centre of a circular pit) has been encountered before, on this
and other sites, and will be encountered many times again - a recurring pattern
that itself indicates some kind of past cultural agency at work.
Compare this with the natural 'animal burrow'. Its edges are fuzzy and imprecise.
In so far as its overall shape can be made out at all, it is irregular, unsymmetrical
and seems to lack any purposeful design. It bears a rough similarly to other animal
burrows that have been encountered before and will be encountered again, but is
actually quite unique in its twists and turns. There is no discernible 'pattern'
to animal burrows either in space or in time. (Note that the formlessness of the
animal burrow not only contrasts with, but also adversely effects, the form of the
archaeological feature).
A simple equation of regular=archaeological and irregular=natural, however, does
not survive the test of experience. Many of the periglacial features discussed earlier
in this chapter, for example, were near-circular or near-rectangular in horizontal
section, with clearly-defined sides that could be followed down to a base. Some
of these were situated in the very centre of ring-ditch circles, and thus seemed
highly likely to be burial-pits. As more and more of these features were excavated,
certain characteristics (eg. the steepness of the sides, the homogenuity of the fill,
etc) recurred again and again. But despite this regularity, all these features were
shown to be natural. And just as there can be regular natural features, so there
can be irregular and indistinct archaeological features. W himself had summed up
this paradox well (Section 9.4) when he said that although regularity was a major
pointer to the 'archaeological' status of a feature, a feature can 'look right' even if
the cut is irregular and 'look wrong' even if the cut is regular.
We will always have difficulty defining the difference between artificial and natural
objects so long as we insist (as our natural common-sense attitude compels us
to) on objectifying the qualities of artefactuality or non-artefactuality onto the
material evidence itself, as though these are objective properties existing quite
independently of our apprehension of them. As I tried to show in Sections 8.5,
8.6 and 8.7, the quality of artefactuality is not in the object itself but in our
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perception of it; that is, in the subject-object transaction which is perception.
The subject makes an active contribution to the constitution of the object as an
artefact. Without any practical knowledge of human agency, the subject would
not be able to perceive the quality of artefactuality in the object. Or to put it
another way, it is the subject's practical knowledge that enables the object to be
constituted, in perception, in terms of human agency.
To locate the quality of artefactuality in the transaction between the subject and
the object, rather than in the object itself, is to transform the whole question of
how we tell the difference between artificial and natural evidence. It is no longer a
question about inert things, but a question about time. For if there is one thing we
can say with certainty about perception it is that it is a temporal process - a dialectic
of exploration and discovery that unfolds through time (Neisser 1976:14). When
W told me how he ascertained that the possible feature cutting the cremation-pit
was an 'animal burrow' rather than an 'archaeological' feature (5), for example,
he was not referring to a static item of evidence - but to an unfolding material
field, under the moving blade of the trowel. The edges appeared and disappeared
as he followed them along by trowel, and it was during this operation that "it
seemed to curve off.. it didn't seem to like a dug feature." The evidence was made
sense of not by standing back and looking on from a disengaged perspective, but
by actively engaging in a material transaction. And as we have seen (Section 5.2),
material evidence engaged in this way always has a temporal structure.
This perhaps explains why it is so hard to articulate how we tell the difference
between 'archaeological' and 'natural' evidence. When W said to me that "some
of us just don't know how we interpret or recognise objects or features. ..we just
do it...its difficult to explain afterwards exactly how we've done it" (8), he finds
himself in a similar quandary to that of St Augustine, who - upon being asked
'what is time?' - answered "If nobody asks me, I know; but if I wished to explain
it to one who should ask me, I do not know." (S.Augustini Confessium Liber XI,
Cap XIV, quoted in translation in Stern 1967:33). The fact that our practical
understanding of time and temporal process is so difficult to explicate suggests
that there is some fundamental link between time as experienced and our own
taken-for-granted agency.
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9.9 Kinds of Agency
Turning back to look at the sketch of the material field in RE11, now ready for
planning and photography (Fig 25), we see that traces of three different kinds of
agency have manifested themselves in the objective material field and have figured
in W's practical reasoning. The first and most important is the agency of humans
in the distant past - the (inferred) subjects who are understood to have made the
pottery vessel, dug the pit, burnt the body, placed the remains in the vessel and the
vessel in the pit, etc. The second is the (natural) agency of the animal that, at some
later date, burrowed into the pit and disturbed the burial remains. The third is the
modern ploughing activity which truncated the top of the archaeological feature,
taking some of the vessel and its contents with it, and which has scored the gravel
surface with plough-marks. In his work W has routinely differentiated between
the three types of evidence, and has built up a picture of the cultural and natural
forces responsible for these observable material effects.
These patterns have come to light, however, only through W's intentional and di-
rected labour upon the material field - removing layers, cleaning surfaces, following
cuts along, emptying out fill, etc. To the three kinds of agency listed above, then,
we should add a fourth. The worker himself has played a major part in bringing
the material field to its present state. Yet traces of this fourth kind of agency
are not to be seen on the sketch; nor will they be seen on the plans and pho-
tographs which might be used to represent the evidence in the excavation report.
Indeed, the material field itself bears only the negative imprint of W's activities (a
magical effect brought about through the application of 'technique' - see Section
5.4). To understand how archaeologists make sense of those other kinds of agency
(the traces of which are visible in the objective material field), however, we have
to bring to light the active role of the working subject as a causal agent in the
constitution of material evidence. It is to this fourth kind of agency, then, that we
turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter X
GIVING FORM: MATERIAL AND COGNITIVE TOOLS
IN ACTION
"Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature, he
also realizes his own purposes in those materials." (Marx 1976:286)
"When we use symbols (either verbal or non-verbal) to distinguish
one class of things or actions from another we are creating artificial
boundaries in a field which is 'naturally' continuous. This notion of
boundary needs to be thought about." (Leach 1976:33)
10.1 Traditional Aspects of Excavation
In Section 4.1 we looked at excavation as a kind of trade; that is, a skilled occupa-
tion associated with a particular range of raw materials, tools and products. But
like all crafts, excavation is not just a trade; it is also a tradition. Skills are passed
on from one worker to another, and from generation to generation, largely through
personal contacts. The 'knack' or 'know-how' of digging cannot be taught in a
classroom or adequately conveyed in a technical manual. It can only be learnt by
actually doing excavation out in the field - by participating in the multiplicity of
material and social transactions that make up any archaeological dig. As Polanyi
(158:53) points out, "An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be trans-
mitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can be passed on only
by example from master to apprentice. This restricts the range of diffusion to that
of personal contacts, and we find accordingly that craftsmanship tends to survive
in closely circumscribed local traditions."
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Of course the many 'local traditions' of excavation practice - the various digging
units across the country - are linked together within an overall oranisational struc-
ture which ensures a certain uniformity of method. Texts also provide standard
points of reference. But since they cannot be prescribed, craft skills of excavation
are not themselves transmitted through these channels. The 'digging circuit' - that
most informal and underestimated of social institutions - is in fact the principal
channel of transmission on a broad scale today. It consists at any one moment of a
few hundred workers scattered on sites across the country, but movement of work-
ers through time from one site to another means that they are bound together in
a close-knit network of social relations. Novices entering the circuit always receive
guidance in the art of trowelling and other excavation skills from more experi-
enced workers. Acquistion of craft-skills, however, depends not just on guidance
and demonstration but also on extended practice of working on a variety of sites,
a variety of soil conditions, a variety of features. A true circuit digger is someone
who has this experience, and who accordingly has become a member of the social
circle that is the digging circuit. The craft skills of excavation, therefore, have
a fundamental orientation to both the social organization of the circuit and to
archaeological materials.
10.2 The Historical Dimension of Craft Skills
In a short but important paper, Evans (1988) points out that many of the percep-
tual and interpretive skills that excavators take for granted today have not always
come so 'naturally' to archaeologists. As he put it, "we assume a functional un-
derstanding, or at least a recognition, of basic archaeological phenomena such as
pits, ditches and houses ... Yet it was precisely these concepts which were assimi-
lated during the first half of this century, and their recognition and operation (eg.
weathering and recutting) were arrived at through a synthesis of direct observation
(experience), 'logic' and analogy. This gradual process of basic entity cognition is
interesting as it questions the premise of the self-definition of 'contexts' / entities
which underlies the modern concept of 'analytical' excavation" (Evans 1988:65).
The idea that archaeologists have developed and sharpened a range of cognitive
tools, as well as practical techniques, for understanding and dealing with archae-
ological evidence - through a gradual (historical) process of trial-and-error in a
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multiplicity of material transactions linked together through time - fits in well
with the general argument of this thesis. A 'cognitive tool' cn be defined as a
conceptual bundle of practical analogies, deep inferences, schemes of past human
action, strategies for dealing with material evidence, etc, the use of which has be-
come established and taken for granted. Cognitive tools, it will be argued, form
as important a part of the general 'toolkit' as material tools do.
The association between cognitive tools and material practices of excavation is
crucial. It was in past material transactions that cognitive tools were fashioned and
honed to their present state. It is in material transactions that novices acquire the
cognitive tools that are embedded in archaeological methods and techniques. And
it is in material transactions that cognitive tools are 'put into practice', applied
to new configurations of evidence, adjusted in practice to take account of that
evidence, and thereby transformed. In this sense cognitive tools are similar to
material tools (see the discussion of the 'wearing down' of the trowel in Section
5.1); both have been shaped to some extent by the material onto which the tool
has been applied in past material transactions. It might also be pointed out that,
in practice, cognitive tools and material tools are actually inseparable, since they
are used together in conjunction with each other to 'make sense' of the material
evidence being worked.
As any historical analysis of digging techniques shows (see Daniel 1950, Barker
1977:13-26), the craft skills of excavation have always been - and by extrapolation,
still are - in a constant state of transformation. It seems reasonable to suppose that
excavation skills will never be 'perfected' as such, but will be subject to further
adaptations and modifications according to the nature of materials encountered
(as well as changing social and political conditions, which after all provide the
rationale for doing archaeology in the first instance). The idea that the worker's
skills, like the material being worked upon, are always in a process of becoming and
are continually being adapted in practice to take account of unique characteristics
of emerging evidence, is close to the notion of 'perfectibilité' outlined by Rousseau
in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755). As Dent (1988:86) explains,
"Rousseau intends nothing sublime or edifying by this notion, only the human
power to learn from experience, to modify objectives and patterns of behaviour
to suit changing circumstances, and so on." It applies not just to the practising
203
individual but also (since his or her skills are, in part, socially derived, and will
subsequently be passed on to others) to the social group as a whOle.
While an ethnography of excavation, which is necessarily context-specific, is nei-
ther the time nor the place for an historical analysis of 'basic entity cognition'
in archaeological practice, what we can do is try and apprehend the (traditional)
cognitive tools used and transformed at this particular time and at this particular
site. For the material and social transactions which take place here must be part
of the wider historical process. Let us take a closer look, then, at one of the princi-
pal cognitive tools employed in identifying, understanding and exploring material
evidence.
10.3 The 'Feature': Object and Concept
The concept of 'feature' is absolutely central to archaeological interpretation and
digging strategy. Many other important cognitive tools, such as the notions of
'cut', 're-cut', 'fill', 'weathering', etc, are all subsidiary to, and only make sense
in terms of, the basic concept of 'feature'. Most of the archaeological patterns
shown in Fig.1 - ring-ditches, cremation-burials, pits, postholes, ditches, etc - are
referred to as 'features' by archaeologists. And there can be natural as well as
archaeological features; animal burrows, tree root holes and glacial hollows are
examples of features understood to have been formed by natural agencies (Section
9.3).
Fig 26 shows how features tended to be classified on this site. Those in the central
column were regarded as objects of significance, to be excavated and recorded.
Those in the left-hand and right-hand columns were only seen to be significant in
so far as they were associated with, or could be mistaken for, features listed in
the central column. Once a feature was shown conclusively to be either 'natural'
or 'modern', rather than 'archaeological', all interest in it as an object in its own
right tended to cease.
An 'archaeological feature' can be described as a partially bounded three-
dimensional configuration in the soil (though it usually manifests itself initially
as a two-dimensional pattern visible on the horizontal ground surface). Archae-
ologists sometimes refer to structures such as hearths and wails as features, but
204
FEATURES
I	 I
NATURAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL MODERN
animal burrows	 postholes	 ploughmarks
tree root holes	 cremation pits 	 tracks
glacial hollows	 fire-pits	 drainage trenches
etc.	 ditches	 etc.
ring-ditches
etc.
Figure 26: Classification of Features
for the most part the term refers to features which have been 'dug', 'excavated'
or 'cut' by agents in the past. Indeed, the edges or sides of the feature consist
of a soil-boundary known as a 'cut', which separates the 'fill' of the feature from
the surrounding soil. The fill may be comprised of several layers, related to each
other in more or less complex stratigraphical sequences, but all these (since they
are inside and enclosed by the cut of the feature) are referred to as 'archaeological'
rather than 'natural'. This applies even to those layers which have been formed
by natural processes, such as weathering, as well as those which have been formed
by deliberate backfilling or deposition on the part of past human agents.
The cut, then, can be regarded as the most important component of an archaeo-
logical feature. It is not just that the very 'cut' we see there on the ground, and the
very term we use to describe it (as already noted, the two are practicaily insepara-
ble), imply intentional human labour as the causal agency responsible for forming
the observable material effect. The cut is the perceived form of the feature - its
outline, its circumference, its compass, its delineation - which makes the feature
stand out as a figure from the general background. Above all else the cut is the
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boundary between the 'archaeological' and the 'natural'. For the cut not only en-
closes the archaeological fill of the feature; it also excludes - as 'ñoñ-archaeological'
or 'natural' - the surrounding soil. (Of course, a feature often 'cuts' archaeological
layers, but these are defined as such by further cuts, or by artefactual material and
other inclusions found within layers).
As Douglas (1966) has shown, material and cognitive boundaries often give rise to
paradox and ambiguity. As the boundary between the 'natural' and the 'archae-
ological', the cut is no exception. It is difficult to say whether the cut falls into
either of these two categories. On the one hand the cut of the feature is understood
to be literally the edge or side 'cut' or 'dug' by some agent in the past (which may
or may not have been subjected to subsequent weathering or re-cutting): in this
sense it is clearly an archaeological pattern. But on the other hand the form of
the feature - the total extent of the surviving cut - only becomes fully apparent
when all the archaeological fill has been removed through excavation. In this sense
the cut is the surface of the natural, which carries only the negative imprint of the
actual material feature. Thus diggers engaged in excavating features often speak
of 'coming down onto the natural' or 'finding the natural sides of the feature'.
We encountered this paradox in Section 9.6, during a discussion of RE41 (see Fig.
22). I referred to the soil boundary between layers 753 and 754/5 as 'archaeological'
when it was interpreted by E as the man-made cut of the ring-ditch, and I referred
to the same soil-boundary as 'natural' when it was re-interpreted by E as a layer
formed within the feature by natural weathering. This was then used as an example
of an archaeological—natural transition. But in the sense that cuts appear to us as
the surface of the natural, and in the sense that any layer within an archeaological
feature is part of the archaeological fill, I could just as easily have used this as an
example of a transition from natural—archaeological.
In the last analysis, however, the meaning of all these terms/concepts ('feature',
'cut', 'ifil', 'archaeological', 'natural', etc) is not in the words themselves, but in
their use. Cognitive tools, like material tools, derive their meaning from how they
are applied in practice. A cut is something to be followed along by trowel; a fill
is something to be emptied out and sampled. Abstract them out of this practical
context and they lose much of their sense. In the following sections, we will try
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to apprehend some of the cognitive tools that are applied in the excavation of
cremation-burials, a particular type of archaeological feature. As we shall see,
meaning is not something that exists solely 'in the head'; on the contrary, it is
inextricably bound up with the emergence of the material patterns themselves. It
is located neither in the subjective mind nor the objective environment, but rather
in the practical relation or transaction between the subject and the object.
10.4 The Excavation of Cremations: A Photographic Essay
(a) Emergence
Unlike most of the features marked on the rough plan of the site (Fig 1), cremation-
burials did not show up on the aerial photographs. They first appeared - as small
charcoal patches on the ground surface - during removal of the ploughsoil. In some
cases the broken rim of a pottery vessel was visible within the blackened soil, but
the 'cut' of the feature was not usually apparent. Whenever such a feature emerged
during the hoeing down of the site, it was cleaned over briskly with a trowel and
marked with a label ("CREMATION") nailed to the ground. Only when general
hoeing was completed did we return to the cremations and subject them to the
full excavation and recording procedure outlined in Section 4.3.
The fact that cremation burials could be so readily identified, from rough surface
manifestations alone, shows that their emergence was not unexpected. Cremation-
burials are common in Bronze Age ring-ditch cemeteries; some of us had encoun-
tered them before on similar sites. This previous experience means that we already
know (or rather anticipate) a great deal more about the feature than is visible on
the ground surface. We expect, for example, the feature to have a clearly defined
'cut', which can be followed down to the 'base' of the cremation-pit. The pit will
contain an archaeological 'fill', comprised of layers quite separate from those out-
side of the cut. And this fill will itself surround the pottery vessel containing the
burial remains.
(b) Finding the Cut
Returning to the feature, with general hoeing completed, the first task of excavation
is to find and delineate the cut of the cremation-pit. Photo 2 shows H engaged
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Photo 2: 'Finding the Cut'
Photo 3: 'The Delineated Cut'
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in this operation. At present the cut is not yet visible; in order to find it, H
is trowelling a shallow spit of soil off the area around the cremation vessel (the
broken outline of which can be seen protruding from the ground surface). The cut,
consisting of a soil boundary between the fill and the natural surround, may be
easy or difficult to find. H may have to trowel deeper in certain places in order to
locate it; once located, she will follow it around until it forms a complete circle or
oval enclosing the pottery vessel.
Photo 3 shows a different feature which has already undergone the trowelling oper-
ation described above. I have incised a line with the tip of the trowel to mark the
cut, which would not otherwise have shown up in the photograph. The fragmented
outline of the pottery vessel can just be picked out inside the cut. This feature
is now ready for pre-x planning and (once the incised line has been erased) pre-x
photography.
The purpose of defining the cut is not just to facilitate the pre-x recording of
the feature, however. The delineated cut provides the parameters within which
subsequent excavation of the feature will take place. Without a cut there would be
no specified boundary where digging should stop, no side to follow down - a state
of affairs which would make further exploration that much more difficult. If it were
not for the cremation-vessel embedded in the ground (implicating the existence of
a 'pit' into which the vessel was placed by some agent in the past, and therefore
the existence of a 'cut' yet to be found), the status of the evidence as a 'feature'
would become wholly uncertain.
(c) Following Down the Cut
After pre-x planning and photography, the exploration of the feature begins in
earnest. Half-sectioning of the cremation-pit involves emptying out the fill, layer
by layer, on one side of the feature only, to facilitate the subsequent drawing of
the pit in vertical section. Usually the troweller proceeds by taking off a spit at a
time, working back from the pottery vessel to the cut or side of the feature, then
following this side down while emptying out the fill. Photo 4 depicts this process
at an early stage. L is using a metal leaf to dislodge soil from the outer face of
the vessel, occasionally switching to using a trowel in order to remove a spit up to
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Photo 5: 'Following down the Cut'
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the side of the feature. Note the 'roughness' of the material field while it is being
worked - characteristic of material transactions. 	 - -
Normally the sides would be expected to slope inwards to form a base directly
underneath the bottom of the pottery vessel (the vessel being understood to have
been 'placed' on the base of the pit before backfiffing of the feature). Photos 5 and
6 show two separate cases of the half-sectioning process nearing completion. In
both instances the cuts or sides of the feature have been relatively easy to follow
down. A slight levering motion with the tip of the trowel pushed into the earth
along the anticipated course of the cut causes the dark fill to 'peel away' from
the orange gravel sides. All kinds of problems can arise, however. The feature
may be disturbed by ploughing, tree root holes or animal activity, which makes
the finding of the cut difficult (see RE 11, Section 9.8). If the feature is cut into
another feature, or brick-earth deposits, the fill may be hard to distinguish visually
from the surrounding soil, making the finding of the soil boundary between them
more a matter of 'feel' than visual discrimination. it is possible to 'over-cut' a
feature - so that the resulting form of the feature is entirely the product of one's
own agency - rather than the agency of humans in the distant past.
Overcutting is essentially a mistake - an anticipation as to where to cut will be that
is 'put into practice' but does not meet its material conditions of satisfaction. The
feature being excavated suddenly 'looks wrong'; it no longer looks like a feature one
has merely discovered, but a feature one has partially created. Our own agency,
normally taken for granted, suddenly takes objective form in the realisation of
the mistake. But mistakes are an important part of any scientific practice for
precisely this reason. In bringing our own agency to light, mistakes facilitate the
re-orientation and adjustment of strategies to take account of the material evidence
being worked. Historically, all the principal cognitive tools of excavation have been
acquired and sharpened through processes of trial-and-error.
Even such a mundane activity as finding and following along the cut of a feature
with a trowel involves multiple inferences about the human agency held to be re-
sponsible for 'cutting' the feature in the distant past. Accordingly, deep inferences
come to be embedded in cognitive tools. One of the cognitive tools that helps a
digger to find an elusive cut is the notion of the economy of past human action.
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:Photo 6: 'Following down the Cut 2'
Photo 7: Toolkit for digging Cremations
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Whenever a cremation-pit was overcut, for example, diggers would often remark
that the pit was 'far too big' for a cremation-vessel that size. Indeed, usually the
cut is found only a short distance, perhaps 6-l2cms, from the outer face of the
pottery vessel contained in the pit. Large urns tend to be set within large pits;
small urns tend to be set within small pits. This gives rise to the view that human
beings in the past were rational agents who, given a simple task to perform (eg.
to bury a cremation vessel in the ground) would accomplish it with the minimum
of effort (eg. by digging a pit no larger than required). D articulated this notion
of economy of effort more fully when, while he was working back from the pottery
vessel to find the cut of a cremation-pit, I asked him how he knew that the cut
would actually be there. He replied that "it's just common-sense... to bury a pot
in the ground you have to dig a pit, and a pit always has a cut... You can also
predict the size of the pit by the size of the pot... If you were buiying a pot that
size (indicates a width of about 20 cms with his hands), you wouldn't dig a pit
that big (indicates a size of im or so), would you?" Note that D is drawing from
his own 'common-sense' ideas about human agency here, by practical analogy as
it were. But the inference about past human action is not simply the application
of analogies drawn from our own practical experience, as human agents ourselves.
It is also based upon observations of, or rather engagements with, actual material
evidence. The concept of economy of effort, so useful in the task of predicting and
locating cuts, is a product of some kind of dialectic between applied conceptual
schemes and emerging material patterns.
A similar dialectic comes into being every time we pick up a trowel to follow a cut
down or along, for the cut rarely goes entirely where you expect it to. Deep infer-
ences - and the cognitive tools and practical analogies mobilised in deep inference
- are part and parcel of the manual labour of digging itself. To follow a cut with
a trowel is to anticipate where the cut is heading (eg. sloping inwards towards
the anticipated base of the pit on which the pot is standing). The anticipation is
founded upon a range of assumptions about past human action and intentions-in-
action (the way the pit was dug, why and how the vessel was placed in the pit,
etc), which may be contradicted by the material evidence. If the cut veers away
from its expected course then it raises a host of questions (eg. why did they dig it
like this? for what purpose?) which may lead on to further, revised, anticipations
about where the cut will go next. And these changing anticipations, bound up in
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a dialectic with emerging material evidence, condition ongoing excavation strategy
from moment to moment - guiding every scrape, probe or levering motion of the
trowel.
Photo 7 shows the material toolkit for this kind of task. (The scene depicted is
not as contrived as it appears. A had actually laid out her tools in this manner
so they were 'to hand' when she needed them). It is comprised of spoons, trowel,
brush, metal leaf, shovel and bucket (containing sample-bag) - each tool having
its own particular use. Not included in the photograph, however, are those most
important tools for manipulating material evidence - the hand and the fingers. It
is not just that the hand holds the tool that works the material. Fingers come into
their own during the later stages of half-sectioning cremation-pits, since they can
work where other tools cannot reach, and perform tasks (such as 'feeling for' the
base of the cremation vessel so as to judge where the pit is likely to bottom out)
that other tools simply cannot do. No technical instrument - for sheer dexterity,
control, versatility, and sensitivity to materials - compares with the human hand.
When all the archaeological fill from one half of the feature has been removed, an
extensive cleaning operation takes place. The most important part of the material
evidence to be cleaned is the vertical section itself (which still has the cremation-
vessel protruding from it). Slicing the section with the edge of the blade of a trowel
shows up the soil-boundaries within the fill, in readiness for the section-drawing
and the photographing of the section.
(d) Following the Cut Around
After the section has been drawn and the photographs taken, the remaining half
of the feature is excavated. This is usually a relatively easy task. The cuts or sides
of the pit have already been located; the digger only has to follow the existing
sides around while emptying out the rest of the fill (nine times out of ten the
second half to be excavated 'mirrors' the shape of the first half, since symmetry
is frequently a characteristic of cremation-pits). The sampling of layers and the
writing of descriptions onto context-sheets takes place at this stage; the layers or
contexts to be sampled and described (given context numbers during the drawing
of the section), and the stratigraphic relationships between them, have already
been identified in preceding material transactions.
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-Photo 8: The Excavated Feature
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Photo 9: Lifting the Cremation Vessel
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Two important transformations occur in this operation. The first is the 'trowelling
away' of the section, which, once drawn, has ceased to be an object of significance.
The second is brought about through the removal of the remaining fill. Because of
this removal, the 'cut' of the feature is no longer a soil-boundary between the 'ar-
chaeological' and the 'natural'; it is now the surface of the natural. Paradoxically,
the full shape or form of the 'archaeological' feature only becomes apparent when
all archaeological evidence (apart from the cremation vessel) has been taken away.
Photo 8 depicts a completely excavated feature, now ready for post-x photography
and planning. It has been rigorously cleaned, with all ridges, footprints, trowel-
marks, spoil and loose crumbs of earth removed or erased. The toolkit shown in
Photo 7 has also been removed, and the placement of the scale and placard indicate
that the feature is once again about to make the transition into a textual object.
(e) Lifting the Cremation-Vessel
When post-x photography and planning is over, the cremation-vessel (inclusive of
its contents) is 'lifted' as soon as possible. This is normally the task of a specialist
conservator, visiting the site for this purpose, but - given the time-consuming
nature of the task and the large number of vessels to be lifted - the finds assistant,
H, has been specially trained in the necessary techniques. While she was engaged
in preparing a vessel for lifting, she explained what she was doing to me. Upon
arriving on the scene, she said, the cremation-pit has already been excavated as
far as possible, leaving the vessel on a small pedestal of unexcavated fill. The first
job is to expose the pot, making it accessible for lifting, and this involves cutting
back the sides of the feature. Then she wraps the fragile vessel in cling-film, silver-
foil and cardboard to protect it. Undercutting the vessel gradually, largely with
her fingers, she injects foam into each undercut area. Eventually, when the vessel
has been undercut all the way round, it is effectively resting on a bed of solidified
foam. Several workers come over to help lift the pot, together with foam and
wrappings, into a wheelbarrow. It is taken to the finds-hut for temporary storage,
and will subsequently be excavated further, its contents examined, in a museum
or a laboratory (see Section 12.6).
Photo 9 shows a cremation-vessel being prepared for lifting, plus the array of
materials employed in this preparation. Note that all the attention and care that
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was formerly directed to (the excavation of) the feature has now shifted onto the
pottery vessel contained within it. The feature itself has ceased to be an object of
significance. Indeed the cut of the feature that was first identified in (a), delineated
in horizontal section in (b), followed down in (c) and followed around in (d) - thus
bringing to light the overall form or shape of the cremation-pit - has now been
'trowelled away' to make the lifting of the vessel possible. Where once there was
a feature (an object of CULTURAL significance) there is now only a hole in the
ground, which will be left open to processes of weathering and subsidence, and so
will gradually undergo the transition back into the NATURAL domain.
In this brief account of the excavation of cremations we have focused on the mate-
rial transactions in which the evidence on the ground is actually manipulated and
transformed through the use of material and cognitive tools. Acts of inscription,
which involve a disengagement from this direct contact, have been left out from
the account (but see Chapter 11). The point that I have tried to make is that the
evidence to be recorded in acts of inscription has already been extensively 'worked'
by archaeologists. A cut, for example, is on the one hand a pattern that was 'cut
by' some human agent in the distant past. But on the other hand, crucially, it
has also been 're-cut', followed down and around with a trowel, by archaeologists
in the present day. The form of the feature as it appears to us is therefore always
a double-ariefact, though our own agency in giving form to the feature may be
objectively hidden to us. We 'take form from' only as we 'give form to' the objects
of our labour.
10.5 Schemes of Past Human Action
We are now in a position to say something more about the cognitive tools that (to-
gether with material tools) are employed in the excavation of cremation-burials.
The concept of a 'cremation-burial' consists of a particular combination of the
concepts of 'feature', 'cut' and 'fill', and entails a particular range of deep infer-
ences about the kind of human action involved in the activity of cremation-burial.
Schemes of past human agency are invoked every time we speak of or think about
a cremation-burial. When applied to an actual material feature these schemes give
rise to anticipations as to what is likely to be found and to strategies for finding
or bringing to light these expected patterns. Thus diggers will always search for
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the 'cut' surrounding a cremation vessel even when it is not visible at that mo-
ment in time. (As D pointed out, "Its just common-sense... to bury a pot in the
ground you have to dig a pit, and a pit always has a cut. ") Usually exploratory
action with the trowel will succeed in locating the expected cut; the digger knows
in advance it is there to be found and roughly where it will be located. In much
the same way, while following down the cut, diggers anticipate where the base of
the pit will be. They know from past experience that the base of the pit is usually
directly underneath the bottom of the pot, and this knowledge definitely helps in
the practical task of searching for and locating the base of the pit.
Let us now try to list some of the assumptions about past human agency that are
implicated in the perception, identification and excavation of cremation-burials.
Deep inferences refer (explicitly or implicitly) to:-
1. the burning of the body (the making of a pyre, the placing of the body on the
fire, the lighting of the fire, the removal of the cremated remains from the fire,
etc.
2. the placing of the remains in the funerary vessel (the scooping or picking up of
the remains, the putting of the ashes into the container).
3. the digging of the pit (the assimilation of digging tools to the hands of the
worker, the putting into action of those tools, the shaping or forming of a
suitably-sized pit to accommodate the vessel).
4. the placing of the vessel in the pit (the picking up of the vessel, the carrying
of the vessel to the pit, the stooping down involved in placing the vessel so it
stands upright on the base of the pit).
5. the backfilling of the pit (the further use of digging tools, etc)
It is characteristic of schemes of past human agency applied to material phenomena
that they are open-ended systems of meaning. Thus the above model is not at all
comprehensive. Any number of further sequences of actions are implicated (eg. the
collection of fuel for the pyre in 1, the manufacture of the funerary vessel used in
2, the making of the digging tools used in 3, etc). Associated with this conception
of human activity in the past are ideas about bodily stance, posture and gait - the
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way humans stand, walk, hold tools, pick things up, manipulate things, interact
with each other. And inferences about actions are also inferences about intentions-
in-action. All the activities listed above are understood as intentional activities,
directed towards the principal objective of burying a deceased person, with all the
intermediary objectives that this entails.
In fact the more we reflect upon what we already know (assume, postulate, take
for granted) about the causal agency responsible for the observable material effects
out there on the ground which we call a 'cremation-burial', the more astounded we
can be by the depth of our common sense or taken for granted knowledge. A whole
field of assumptions about the nature of human agency is embedded in the very
perception of the material pattern, the cremation-burial, itself. For these are not
just inferences that are obtained by deduction or induction from the evidence; they
can actually be perceived as inherent properties of the evidence - that is, as the
perceived qualities of affordance and design (see Sections 8.4 and 8.5). It is self-
evident, for example, that the cremation-pit affords 'containment' of the pottery
vessel and indeed that it was dug or cut with this affordance in mind. This gives
rise to the notion of economy of effort that D articulated in Section 10.4(c). In
the same way it is self-evident that the funerary vessel affords 'containment' of the
cremated remains, and that this too was probably designed specificially for that
purpose. Handles or lugs on the sides of vessel (see Photo 5) so obviously afford
'picking up' and 'carrying' that we can see they were designed to facilitate exactly
those bodily actions.
10.6 The Resistance of the Material Field
Applied cognitive tools or schemes of past human action, then, are inextricably
bound up with the material evidence onto which they are applied. This means
they are fluid rather than fixed, and change to take account of the particular char-
acteristics of emerging material patterns. Although they condition the perception
and understanding of material evidence, they can also be surprised, contradicted
or even refuted entirely by that evidence. They are bound up in a dialectic with
the unfolding material field. The meaning of cognitive tools, like that of material
tools (Section 5.6) is not so much in the tools themselves but in their use.
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It should be clear from the many examples given in the last three chapters that
material evidence encountered does not always conform neatly to expectations
engendered by pre-exisiting conceptual schemes. Archaeological patterns turn out
to be natural, natural patterns turn out to be archaeological. Significant objects
emerge from insignificant contexts. Ring-ditches appear where no ring-ditch was
meant to be. Anticipated cuts may not emerge, or may veer away from their
expected course, and so on. The internal structure of applied schemes (of causal
explanation) shifts to take account of the unexpected.
This applies as much to the excavation of cremation-burials as to any other kind
of feature. In RE 12/14 (Sections 6.4 and 6.5), for example, I was given the
task of excavating an un-urned cremation. Un-urned cremations involve a slightly
different conception of past human action (the cremation material having been
placed straight into the pit without being contained in a pottery vessel, though
some other form of degradable vessel may have been used), and a slightly different
method of excavation, but generally speaking the deep inferences entailed are more
or less the same as in the excavation of urned cremations. In this particular case,
however, the anticipated human remains did not emerge. A deposit of burnt wood
came to light instead. The feature was subject to several competing interpretations
before a provisional interpretation of the evidence as the remains of a 'funeral
pyre' was arrived at. This involved a shift in the perception of the affordances and
design of the feature. The pit was no longer seen to afford the 'containment' and
'internment' of human remains, but rather to afford a suitable place for a fire to
be made and lit - the implication being that the pit was intended or designed for
this latter purpose rather than the former.
Most of the 'fire-pits' found on this site were initially perceived as (un-urned)
cremation-burials. Consider the following example:-
1. H was given the task of excavating an un-urned cremation burial, situated just outside
of a ring-ditch. From surface appearances (a small sub-circular patch of burnt soil and
charcoal) it had all the characteristics of other un-urned cremations encountered on the
site. She had no difficulty in finding and delineating the expected cut of the feature.
As she began half-sectioning the feature, however, a number of burnt flint nodules were
found in the fill, which she put in the finds tray. But in trowelling deeper more and more
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of them came to light. She realised that they were "deliberate inclusions rather than
incidental ones", and accordingly decided to leave then in situ. Cleaning over the surface
of the stones with a metal leaf and a small brush, it became apparent that the sides and
base of the pit (which had turned out to be much shallower than expected) were covered
with these burnt flint nodules. There was no sign of the expected cremation material.
Figure 27: Sketch of RE5O
She now calls the feature a "fire-pit" rather than a cremation burial. The pit could have
been used as the base of a funeral pyre, she said, which was then truncated by modern
ploughing, but she found it difficult to imagine what purpose the stones would have
served. She thought it much more likely that the pit was used for cooking or boiling
something (the stones being used to retain the heat of the fire).
[RE 50]
2. I returned to this part of the site the next day. Excavation of the feature had now
been completed, and H was engaged in planning and otherwise recording it. She told me
that 217 burnt flints and 132 unburnt flints and pebbles (which has been planned in situ,
then removed) were found in this one small pit. There were two principal layers in the
fill - a layer of dark burnt soil and charcoal at the top and a layer of sand at the bottom,
with the flints situated on the interface between them (and not, as previously thought,
lying on the base of the pit). Slightly deeper than formerly supposed, the pit is about
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2Ocms in depth. H said she had no doubt that the feature had been "deliberately dug"
(rather than being a natural hollow), and that the burnt flint nodules and pebbles had
been "deliberately placed" in the pit. But she did not think that a fire had actually been
lit inside the feature; if this had happened, she said, then you would expect the sides
of the feature and the surrounding soil to show traces of burning. Having specifically
looked for these traces, and having failed to find them, she thought the actual fire must
have taken place elsewhere, with the material from the fire scooped up and deposited in
the pit. Whether this was a ritual deposit or whether it really was connected with the
activity of cooking, she was not sure.
[RE58]
The example RE 50/58 illustrates the point that deep inferences (ie. about past
human agency) are embedded in the routine manual tasks of excavation. In the
context of practical reasoning (see Section 5.5), the material field is constituted in
terms of action-meanings - not only the action-meanings that relate the material
to the digger's own purposeful activity, but also action-meanings that relate the
material to the inferred activity of agents in the past. These two kinds of action-
meanings, moreover, are inter-connected. How H interprets the material in terms
of past human action (eg. the realisation that the ffint nodules had been deliber-
ately placed in the pit) conditions her ongoing strategy for excavating the feature
(eg. leaving the stones in situ and cleaning their surfaces for planning rather than
removing them with the rest of the fill).
It also illustrates the point that deep inferences are concerned just as much with
past intentions as with past actions. Again, the two are practically inseparable,
for what we are dealing with here are inferences about intentions-in-action. To say
that material items were associated with such tasks as interring cremated remains,
lighting a fire or cooking is automatically to imply that past human agents were
putting into practice the projects and purposes entailed in these activities. Indeed,
H makes this quite explicit when she speaks of the pit having been "deliberately
dug" or the stones having been "deliberately placed" in the pit. The fact that
the stones were deliberate inclusions rather than incidental ones had important
implications for excavation strategy. In fact it is clear that inferences about past
intentions-in-action are inextricably bound up with the intentions-in-action of H
herself.
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Most important, the example illustrates how action-meanings (the perceived a!-
fordances and design of material patterns) shift and change Through time, and
how our conception of the past human agency responsible for producing the ma-
terial patterns changes accordingly. What started out as an un-urned cremation
burial suddenly made the transition to a fire-pit, involving a radical shift from one
scheme of human action to another. But in so far as the labelling of the feature
as a 'fire-pit' invokes a whole field of assumptions about the sequences of actions
involved in making a fire in a pit (the digging of the pit, the collection of the fuel,
the lighting of the fire, etc), this scheme also had to be adjusted and modified to
take account of emerging evidence. Lack of burnt material on the sides of the pit
indicated that it did not seem to have been the actual site of the fire. In the light
of the absence of this confirmatory evidence, H worked out a possible scenario
to explain the situation. The fire itself must have been situated elsewhere, and
the material from the fire scooped up and carried to this spot. Note how these
inferences are based upon a further set of assumptions about human locomotory
and manipulatory powers. Note also that the perception of the flint nodules as
affording 'the retainment of heat for cooking purposes' changes the affordances and
design of the pit also. If the stones were used for cooking then it is highly likely
that the pit was conceived of and dug (ie. designed) with this purpose in mind.
Ongoing excavation involves multiple shifts of this kind in the perception of the
affordances and design of material evidence.
10.7 A Cognitive Toolkit
Just as the meaning of one material tool relates to the meaning of all the other
(Section 5.6), so cognitive tools 'make sense' only when taken in conjunction with
other cognitive tools. A 'feature' would be meaningless without a 'cut' and a 'fill',
and vice-versa, for all these concepts are inter-connected. So too are the conceptual
schemes associated with different kinds of features. In this section we look briefly
at concrete examples of the conjunction of the meaning of cremation-burials and
the meaning of ring-ditches, as these coincide in the context of practical excavation
tasks.
As noted in Chapter 3, most of the cremation-pits were situated outside and be-
tween the ring-ditches (see Fig.l). A few were actually cut into the ditch-fills.
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Thus for the most part they could be regarded as a separate form of burial rite,
later than the ring-ditches but deposited while the burial mounds of the ring-ditch
cemetery were still standing. Those cremation-burials found to be situated inside
and enclosed by ring-ditches were a different matter, however. To be 'enclosed
by' a ring-ditch entails not just the spatial enclosure of one material pattern by
another, but also the enclosure of one concept by another concept. Our schemes of
past human agency associated with cremation-burials are subsumed into schemes
associated with ring-ditches - and both are transfigured as a result.
Consider, for instance, the cluster of 3 cremation-burials shown in Fig.21 (RE27,
Section 9.5). They represent an isolated group of cremations, situated a con-
siderable distance away from the main group of ring-ditches. Indeed, the digger
concerned is treating them as an isolated cluster, unrelated to any other feature
nearby. The area of ground that A has opened is small; she is extending the area
only to follow along a vague patch of dark soil whose status as archaeological or
natural is uncertain. Now turn to Fig.8 (RE4O, Section 5.2). This shows the same
cluster of cremations at a different scale, after the recent discovery of a ring-ditch.
At least, I say they are the same features - but actually they have been trans-
formed. They are no longer isolated but enclosed, and their new setting means
that we perceive them in a completely different light.
These cremation-burials are now understood to have been covered over by a burial
mound shortly after their deposition. The sequence of past human action implied
is something like this: the cremation-pit was dug, the cremated remains were
deposited in the pit, the pit was backfilled, a ring-ditch was dug around the central
cremations and the spoil from the excavated ditch was heaped over the top to form
a burial-mound. Note how the affordances and design of the two kinds of features
relate the one to the other. The cremations afford a central cluster of points around
which the ring ditch can be orientated and over which the burial mound can be
heaped. The ring-ditch affords a boundary with which to enclose the cremations
and a source of material for the covering mound. What A and D are dealing
with, then, is not a collection or aggregate of individual patterns of evidence, but
inter-related parts of the same pattern. This is why the diggers have extended the
area being trowelled - so they can see the pattern as a whole.
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A's discovery of a ring-ditch enclosing the cremations in this area meant that there
were now two cremation-enclosing ring-ditches in near proximity to each other, set
apart from the main group (which were thought to have enclosed inhumation-
burials). These were regarded as a kind of hybrid, a transitional form of burial
rite which incorporated the main elements of both the earlier phase of ring-ditches
and the later phase of cremations. The question now arose as to whether other
cremations nearby might also be enclosed by as yet undiscovered ring ditches.
The following two examples illustrate both the anticipation that encircling ditches
would be found and the searching for these anticipated patterns. In the first case a
further ring-ditch is indeed discovered; in the second a ring-ditch seems to emerge
but is subsequently shown to be a natural, rather than archaeological, pattern.
Towards the end of the dig E was given the task of finding out whether a ring-ditch was
visible on the ground surface, which had formerly been taken to consist of wholly natural
brick-earth. He proceeded by digging four shallow trenches through the brick-earth in
the form of a cross, with the cremation at its centre. At a distance of about 2m from
the central cremation, he thought he could see the 'shadow' of a ring-ditch in one of the
arms of the cross, but was not certain about it. He then opened up two areas between
the arms of the cross to try and follow this possible ring-ditch along. Although the fill
of the ditch was very similar to the surrounding brick-earth, he succeeded in locating
the inner and outer cuts - which, as half-expected, curved round in two partial circles
around the central cremation. The existence of the ring-ditch was confirmed when, in
digging a segment through the possible feature he was able to follow the cuts down to a
base. The ditch had a V-shaped cut characteristic of ring-ditches on this site.
[RN 158]
In this case, then, the anticipation that a ring-ditch would be found (engendered
by former discoveries elsewhere on the site) met with its material conditions of
satisfaction. Now consider an opposite case. The same strategy for finding the
anticipated ring-ditch is deployed, but no actual ring-ditch is forthcoming.
G was given a practically identical task. Again the cremation-burial in question had
already been excavated, and was situated within what had formerly been taken to be
natural brick-earth. No ring-ditch was visible on the ground surface. Like E, she pro-
ceeded by digging four shallow trenches outwards from the cremation-pit in the form
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of a cross. In one of the arms of the cross, about 3m from the central cremation, she
found what appeared to be a portion of a ring-ditch, with what siemed to be very clear
inner and outer cuts. The areas between the arms of the cross were opened up so that
G could follow these cuts along. But instead of a ring-ditch, trowelling brought to light
a labyrinthine pattern of tunnels and galleries, almost certainly those of a former bad-
ger's set. Despite further exploration and the opening up of more adjoining areas, no
ring-ditch could be found. The cremation-vessel remained an isolated feature, situated
outside of the ring-ditches rather than enclosed by one.
[RN 176-7, 181]
This serves as yet another example of the resistance of the material field, one of
the main themes of this chapter and the last. Pre-existing schemes may lead us
to anticipate the emergence of material patterns before they actually appear, and
even to see the anticipated pattern where it does not in fact exist (eg. the initial
perception of the dark fill of the animal burrow as a ring-ditch). But in the context
of further exploration the material field always has the capacity to thwart our
projects and purposes, to surprise our preconceived ideas and to force modification
of our strategies and interpretations to take account of what is 'actually there' (or,
as in this case, 'not-there').
Most importantly for the present argument, though, the two examples show how
the concepts of 'ring-ditch' and 'cremation-burial' come to be combined in what
archaeologists actually do. Relations of inclusion/exclusion, inside/outside and
centre/periphery not only characterize the material pattern we may see out there
on the ground, or the pattern as we conceive of it in our heads, but also the way
we approach, search for, manipulate and explore the material field.
10.8 Inferences about Past Human Cognition
In so far as a ring-ditch is understood to form a boundary around cremation-burials
or some other feature, it is always understood as a cognitive as well as a material
boundary, for people in the past just as it is for ourselves. Practical reasoning,
unlike analytical reasoning (see, for example, the well-known 'ladder of inference'
model. Hawkes 1954; 161-2), does not draw any strict dividing line between infer-
ences about material function and inferences about cognitive significance. Indeed,
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material patterns such as ring-ditches have a significance for archaeologists pre-
cisely because they are understood to have had a significanc for people in the
past.
We have already seen how 'natural' features enclosed by ring-ditches are imbued
with a significance that they would not have if they were unenclosed; they are
likely to be subject to excavation and sampling whereas similar features situated
outside are not (see Section 9.4 for T's reasons for this). In the last section, too, we
saw how cremation-burials enclosed by ring-ditches are perceived quite differently
from isolated cremations, especially if situated in the centre of the circle formed by
the ring-ditch. The enclosed cremation is seen as providing the reason or rationale
for the digging of the ring-ditch and the construction of the burial mound in the
distant past. The ring-ditch was designed; so the speak, to enclose the burial. The
mound was designed to cover the burial. When we have this conception of past
human intentions in mind, it is almost impossible to perceive the cremation as a
pattern in its own right separate from the enclosing ring-ditch.
Just as archaeologists sometimes anticipate that an isolated cremation-burial might
be enclosed by a ring-ditch, devising strategies of excavation to test this prediction,
so they sometimes anticipate a burial yet-to-be discovered in the interior of a ring-
ditch and set out to actively search for it. Towards the end of the dig, a great deal of
effort was directed towards the examination of ring-ditch interiors. In several cases
the 'natural' gravel surfaces inside ring-ditches were trowelled down a considerable
depth in an unsuccessful search for burials. None of the expected inhumation-
burials were found, and it was concluded that the bodies must have been laid
down on the ground surface rather than buried in pits, and aB trace of them
removed by subsequent ploughing activity. That is, ring-ditches are understood to
afford the enclosure of burials, to have been designed for this purpose, even when
no actual burials are apparent.
Such preconceptions (about the significance that these enclosed areas had for peo-
ple in the past) clearly owe their origin to experience acquired on the other Bronze
Age sites, where ring-ditches do normally enclose burials of one kind or another.
They must also draw from wider cultural experience of divisions between the 'sa-
cred' and the 'profane'. A whole range of standardised deep inferences (accumu-
-
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lated through years of excavation and generations of archaeologists working on a
variety of sites) and analogies (drawn from all aspects of life) are embedded in
the repertoire of cognitive tools available for use on this site. Essentially taken-
for-granted, such cognitive tools and the deep inferences they contain are for the
most part implicit in our actions and perceptions rather then explicity formulated.
It is only when the material encountered in some way contradicts or surprises
pre-existing schemes that they are brought to critical attention and revised to
take account of that evidence (see, for example, E's revision of ideas about how
past human agents would have dug a ditch, in the light of unfolding evidence
which "didn't look right" RE 37/41, Sections 9.6 and 9.7). This is really all that
verbally-formulated deep inferences are - a making explicit and adjustment of tacit
schemes of past human agency to make sense of unique characteristics of material
uncovered. These schemes are not conjured up out of thin air. They are there
all the time; it is just that we have become so used to using them that we do not
notice them any more.
There is nothing special about deep inference. In our everyday social existence
we routinely infer other people's intentions-in-action, and the significances that
things have for them, from the material effects of their actions. (see Tagiuri and
Petrullo 1958, Jaspars et al 1983, and other work on attribution theory and person-
perception in psychology). As Heider puts it, "Of great importance for our picture
of the social environment is the attribution of events to causal sources. It makes a
real difference, for example, whether a person discovers that the stick which struck
him fell from a rotting tree or was hurled by an enemy. Attribution in terms
of impersonal and personal causes, and with the latter, in terms of intent, are
everyday occurrences that determine much of our understanding of and reaction
to our surroundings" (Heider 1958:16).
10.9 Symbols of the Body
It is not just ring-ditches, of course, that are understood to have formed a boundary,
of symbolic significance, for people in the past. The whole group of ring-ditches
and cremations is 'bounded' by the ditch that runs across the site from SW - NE.
As it happened, the status of the ditch as an integral part of the cemetery was not
proven, and may have been a much later feature, but the notion of the cemetery
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as a bounded area, set apart for the burial of bodies, remained. The existence
of this boundary (real or conceptualised), separating as it were the sacred from
the profane, effects our perception and understanding of all the material features
within it, binding them together into a single pattern or set of patterns related to
each other. On a conceptual level, too (in so far as cognition can be seperated from
perception and action) the concepts of 'ring-ditch', 'cremation-burial', 'fire-pit', etc
are organized within the single encompassing concept of 'cemetery'.
One of the interesting paradoxes of this research project is that while the ethnog-
rapher has been primarily concerned with the active role of the body in bringing
about the transformation of NATURAL objects into CULTURAL objects (that
is, the transition of hitherto unseen and untouched objects into the realm of ar-
chaeological knowledge in the present day), the archaeologists under study have
been primarily concerned with the ways in which people in the past dealt with
the transition of the human body from the cultural domain back to nature again.
All burial practices, despite their cross-cultural diversity (Ucko 1969) involve this
culture-nature transition. And while the ethnographer has been interested in the
subject-object transaction through which the NATURE-CULTURE transition is
accomplished, the archaeologists have been interested in those past cultural activ-
ities which, in dealing with the transition of the body from culture back to nature,
also dealt with the transition of a subject (that is, a person, a social being, an
active source of intentional effects) into an object (that is, something which can
be cremated, placed in a funerary urn and buried in the ground).
Archaeologists excavating burial sites always implicitly understand that the social
mediations of life-death transitions which once took place there were charged with
symbolic significance, whatever the nature of that significance may have been.
They know that the ring-ditches, burial mounds, cremation-pits, etc., were once
material symbols, with a cognitive as well as a material dimension. And they
know also that the meaning of these material symbols centred on that most potent
symbol of all - the human body. The centrality of the body is evident wherever
the funerary urn and its contents is found to be placed upright at the very centre
of a circular pit, or the burial pit is found to be situated in the centre of a ring-
ditch circle. Whatever else these material patterns may have represented, whatever
other cultural meanings they may have carried, they are first and foremost symbols
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of the body. The paradox is that in objectively apprehending this symbolically-
centred 'body as object' or 'body as material thing', archaeologists necessarily and
routinely place their own (subjective) bodies - the source of all their understanding
- in the background.
To bring the living, acting, perceiving, thinking, knowing, moving and exploring
body to the centre of archaeological discourse is the principal task of this thesis.
In order to accomplish this, however, we first of all have to show how the objects of
archaeological discourse come to be abstracted out of the context of bodily action
in which they are initially encountered and constituted. This is the task of Chapter
11.
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Chapter XI
ACTS OF INSCRIPTION AND THE CLOSURE OF THE
ACT OF DISCOVERY
"An image is a sight which has been recreated or reproduced. It is an
appearance, or a set of appearances, which has been detached from
the place and time in which it first made its appearance and preserved
Every image embodies a way of seeing" (Berger 1972: 9-10).
11.1 The Act of Inscription as Boundary or Threshold
It was stated right at the start of the fieldwork-report that a full ethnographic
account of excavation practices would not be attempted; some aspects would be
highlighted and others neglected, according to the interests and point of view of
the ethnographer. Thus Chapters 5-10 have been concerned largely with the actual
digging, exploration and manipulation of material evidence - the material transac-
tions which precede inscription - rather than the act of inscription itself. Little has
been said about the activities of planning, section-drawing, writing context-sheets,
sampling, labeffing, photography, etc, which are no less important parts of archae-
ological practice. Such neglect naturally arises from the attempt to apprehend the
'initial encounter' or 'original contact' between archaeologists and the object of
their labour - transactions which are not to be found in acts of inscription, where
material remains have already been meaningfully-constituted and 'prepared' in
previous operations. Nevertheless it is important now to turn our attention onto
these inscriptive practices. For in forcing a closure on the act of discovery, acts
of inscription form its boundaries or limits. By sketching out the nature of these
boundaries we will be better able to delineate and define the act of discovery.
Boundaries occur in social time as well as in social space. It is well known in anthro-
pology that the passage of an individual through social life is generally marked by
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'rites of transition' (Van Gennep 1960, Leach 1976). As Leach (1976:34) explains,
"He (she) moves from one social status to another in a series of discontinuous
jumps - child to adult, unmarried to married, living to dead, sick to healthy. The
occupancy of each status constitutes a period of social time of social duration, but
the ritual which marks the transition - puberty rite, wedding, funeral, healing rit-
ual - is an interval of social timelessness." What is not so well known, however, is
that objects appropriated from the natural world to be assimilated into the social
realm may also have to undergo formalized transitions. In this sense the act of
inscription can be regarded as a kind of threshold, through which material remains
must pass if they are to achieve the transition into (textual) data and thereby gain
entry into the theoretical or analytical domain.
On the one hand (when we adopt the natural attitude, or common-sense perspec-
tive), this transition may be seen as a straightforward matter of measuring, de-
scribing and copying - the copy being seen as more or less equivalent to the object
copied. But on the other hand (if we suspend as far as possible our common-sense,
to try and look at these practices as if for the first time), the transition - far from
being mundane - can be perceived to be more of an alchemic process, in which a
base raw material is literally transmuted into something else entirely. For what
was once a concrete entity 'out there' on the ground - an entity that could be
touched, grasped, manipulated, explored - now becomes a configuration of written
signs on a page, or a two-dimensional image on a piece of planning paper. The
textual symbol that is the product of acts of inscription not only stands for the
object; in a very real sense it becomes the object, albeit in a symbolic rather than
a material form. And once the production of the textual symbol is accomplished,
the actual material object itself becomes to all intents and purposes immaterial,
as if its essential value has been extracted and taken away. That is, the material
evidence which was so carefully brought to light, fashioned, scrutinised so closely,
can now be trowelled away to reveal further patterns (or backfilled, as no longer
relevant to our projects).
11.2 Imposition of the Textual Grid
By abstracting an object out of the flux and open-endedness of everyday experi-
ence, and re-constituting it into the relatively static domain of textual symbols, the
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act of inscription brings to a close the temporal processes which characterised the
act of discovery. It is a de-temporalising process, and aJI the tools-for-CULTURE
used to effect the transformation are essentially instruments of de-temporalisation,
or instruments of closure. In this sense they are quite different from tools-for-
NATURE, which are instruments of temporalit,r that is, tools for opening up,
manipulating and exploring the material field. This is the fundamental difference
between the two categories of implements identified in Chapter 4.
There are other differences. As outlined in Section 5.6, tools-for-NATURE have a
referential structure orientated towards the material upon which they are used -
the objects to be discovered, the features to be excavated, the cuts to be followed
down and along, the layers to be removed. Tools-for-CULTURE do not. Their
principal orientation is towards the text, or the excavation report yet to be written
and produced. They point, in other words, not so much to the raw material of
archaeological practice, but rather to the end-product.
To this end, all tools-for-CULTURE embody what might be called the 'textual
grid'. The textual grid can take various forms. Perhaps its most obvious manifes-
tation is the planning-frame - a im square wooden frame supporting an internal
lattice-work of strings in a pattern of 10cm or 20cm squares, which correspond
to the graph squares marked on the planning paper. In planning-events (stages 3
and 9 of the excavation procedure outlined in section 4.3), the planning-frame is
placed over the horizontal surface to be drawn, the patterns visible on the ground
are measured by eye through the frame and marked on the plan. The frame has
the effect of super-imposing the textual grid over the patterns to be recorded, or-
ganizing those patterns within the structure of the grid. Every pattern represented
on the planning-paper is a product of the 'way of seeing' entailed in the use of the
planning-frame. The observer is disengaged, detached, distanced. A whole stance
of the body is implicated. With a planning board in one hand (or lodged on the
upper arm) and a pencil in the other, the planner stoops down over the frame to
draw each part of the patterns as seen from directly above, taking a square at a
time. When all the squares have been drawn the planning-frame itself is shifted
to an adjacent position and the process begins again.
To know how to use the planning-grid is to know how to perform - in Heideggerian
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terms - a de-woriding operation, whereby "certain characters of the world are dis-
counted or 'levelled off'... in such a way that what remains satisfies a criterion of
pure objectivity" (Olafson 1987: 36-7). What remains is simply the objective mea-
surement itself - the judgement of distance made by eye through the squares of the
grid. It is this measurement that is marked on the plan, and the aggregate of such
measurements that comprises the finished drawing. [But that which is measured
has already been constituted as a meaningful object prior to the act of inscription;
this, indeed, is why the object is being measured. Its meaning or relevance, then,
always finds its way into the drawing, as a kind of implicit qualitative presence,
underlying or permeating the explicit objective measurements. As Merleau-Ponty
(1968:215) puts it, "Meaning is invisible.., the invisible is the secret counterpart
of the visible, it appears only within it... one cannot see it there and every effort
to see it there makes it disappear, but it is in the line of the visible, it is its virtual
focus, it is inscribed within it"].
One of the characters of the world that is discounted or levelled off, however, is
the perspective of the perceiving subject (her position, point of view, standpoint,
stance, posture - note how all these terms imply a cognitive as well as a phys-
ical orientation towards the world). This is a consequence of the conventional
two-dimensional mode of representation employed. In contrast to other forms of
realist depiction, archaeological drawings do not make use of the method of per-
spective developed by Brunelleschi and Alberti during the Renaissance (Kubovy
1989). 'Whereas perspective creates an impression of realism precisely by speci-
fying information about the position of the viewer or subject - so that when we
look at a painting its perspective, so to speak, draws us into the scene and places
us in a spatial relationship with the objects depicted (Mey 1982: 222-6) - the ar-
chaeological method of drawing creates an impression of realism precisely by not
specifying any information about the position of the viewer or subject. The plan-
ner effectively draws himself or herself out of the picture, which means that any
subsequent viewer is also forced to take a transcendental, disembodied and unco-
ordinated perspective upon the evidence depicted. The evidence can be considered
to be 'objective' in the sense that it now stands on its own, and can be taken to
exist independently of individual or subjective point of view.
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It is not that archaeological drawings are unrealistic because they do not have
perspective; it is simply that they re-construct reality for us in a different way,
according to a scientific rather than an artistic set of conventions. In the light of
these conventions, any explicit subjective influence in the drawing would detract
from its 'scientific' realism. As Goodman (1968:37-9) argues, realism in depiction
is culturally relative, "determined by the system of representation standard for a
given culture or person at a given time", and therefore as much a matter of habit
(the symbolic forms we are used to using) as one of imitation or copying.
[This applies just as much to the forms of representation used by the ethnographer
(refer to the many sketches of material fields in this fieldwork report). Although the
position of archaeologists working the material field is usually marked in sketches,
the position or point of view of the ethnographer is not. Where is the ethnogra-
pher in these pictures? He is at once everywhere and nowhere, apparently seeing
everything at once from some point high in the sky. His situated, partial and
embodied perspective within the material field has been erased, and this has been
replaced with the perspective of a transcendental or disembodied observer. The
ethnographer haunts the pictures, in the same way as the subjective presence of
archaeological practicioners underlies and permeates all objective representations
of material evidence].
11.3 Measuring Devices
The tool kit of the archaeological recorder contains many measuring devices - cloth
tapes, hand-tapes, plumb-bob, etc - which also provide the means for detaching ob-
jective properties or measurements from the material field, while at the same time
'levelling off' any connection between the object measured and the measuring sub-
ject. Indeed, the principle of objective measurement embodied in these instruments
(and exemplified in the theodolite - always set up on its tripod somewhere near
the centre of the site) could be said to provide the basic rational of archaeolog-
ical recording. That such instruments are used to implement the textual grid is
demonstrated by the ease with which they can be converted into the equivalent of
a planning-frame. In section-drawing - the planning of vertical surfaces - one line
of a vertical grid is formed by a string above the section with a tape-measure run-
ning alongside it. This datum-line, held in place with nails and pegs, is carefully
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aligned with the aid of spirit-level or theodolite so as to be precisely horizontal.
The vertical lines of the grid are formed as they are needed by the use of plumb-bob
and hand-tape in measuring distances from the vertical datum.
In section-drawing, as in planning, each part of the material pattern is to be drawn
as if viewed from directly in front; that is, with the line of view perpendicular
to the surface being depicted. The object of the exercise is not to capture an
impression of movement or a fleeting glimpse of a passing moment (as in, say,
watercolour painting); indeed, the material field being drawn is characterized by
a lack of movement, at least for the duration of the recording-event. Lines can be
measured and re-measured, rubbed out and re-drawn several times. On the other
hand (whereas a painter would tend to take up a fixed viewpoint on a scene) the
recorder, with his or her more portable toolkit, constantly changes position. The
finished drawing will have a concreteness or solidity expressive of the immobility
of the object depicted, relative to the mobility of the observing subject.
Archaeological practitioners not only view the world through grids of measurement
(in acts of inscription); they also organize their activity (in material transactions
as well as acts of inscription) within a grid of 20m squares - marked out by wooden
grid-pegs driven into the ground. Looking back through the various sketches of
material fields, the reader will see that most of the areas opened up are square or
rectangular in shape, with their edges or 'limits of troweffing' running parallel to
the lines of the site grid. In many cases the direction in which workers are trow-
elling, the direction they are facing, their stance and point of view, are orientated
accordingly. In other words, the textual grid constitutes for us a kind of working
space; the workers are situated, their activity organized, within this space.
The textual grid takes a slightly different form in the measurement of soil colour.
By comparing a moistened sample of a layer with the colour samples provided
in the Munsell Colour Chart, the recorder is able to fix the colour of the layer
(which, in reality, varies from time to time according to the light, and from person
to person according to who is perceiving it) into a single number and description,
such as '10 yr 5/8 yellowish-brown'. The same applies to measurement of soil
texture and consistence. Although no tools apart from the human hand are used
to measure such properties, a standardised terminology serves to 'quantify' or
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'objectify' the measurement. Thus the description 'sandy silt loam', for example,
actually conveys quite specific information about the size of soil particles and the
structure of the soil. What is levelled off by the use of this kind of language, of
course, is the subjective 'feel' of the material to the touch, as it varies from one
person to another.
Soil descriptions and measurements are written onto context-sheets, which also
embody the textual grid (although not in the form of graph squares). Context-
sheets provide a standard format for the description of all layers and features.
Each sheet is divided into over 40 compartments, with headings and spaces for
the description of length, breadth, depth, colour, texture, consistence, inclusions,
stratigraphic relationships to other contexts, method of excavation, interpretation,
and so on. In this way a material entity that was previously experienced as a
unity or whole is 'split up' into a multiplicity of separate properties (of which its
'method of excavation' and 'interpretation', formerly bound up in an unfolding
practical dialectic, are only two). The context-sheet also provides spaces for the
listing of other forms of data (eg. photos, sections, plans, samples, finds, etc)
relating to that particular context - testifying to a further 'splitting up' of the
entity into myriad textual forms. All this information, together with site code,
grid reference, levels, etc, comes under a single 'context number'. The layer or
feature which has been described on a context-sheet henceforward becomes that
number, and will be referred to as such in any subsequent social transactions.
Even pencils, pens, rulers, erasers and other drawing and working implements, if
they do not exactly embody the textual grid themselves, have a basic orientation
towards it. They are used to draw in the patterns on the graph squares of the
planning paper, or to write in the descriptions and measurements in the boxes
provided on context-sheets. In fact all the tools-for-CULTURE, taken together,
embody and comprise the textual grid, while implementing it at the same time
- transforming material remains into data and rendering that data accessible to
subsequent sorting, cross-reference and analysis.
11.4 Social Transactions and the Merging of Perspectives II
In Sections 6.4 and 6.5 the social dimension of material transactions was pointed
out. In relation to a particular (unfolding) pattern of material evidence, it was
237
shown how different points of view are brought to bear upon the emerging object,
and how these various perspectives come to merge through time into a common
understanding and perception of that object. Acts of inscription, of course, also
take place within a network of social relations and social transactions. In order to
demonstrate the social dimension of acts of inscription, let us take up the story
of that particular pattern of evidence once again (the reader is referred back to
RE 12/14, Section 6.4, for the necessary background information). The sequence
of events described below follows on directly from where we left off, as the 'fire-
pit' enters one of the many inscriptive phases of excavation (the fifth and sixth
stages of excavation procedure outlined in Section 4.3). Again, supervisory visits
are marked with an asterisk.
[I cleaned up the half-excavated feature and the immediate surroundings by scraping
gently over all the surfaces with a trowel, and removed the various tools from the vicinity,
in preparation for photography]
5* R caine over to take photographs of the section. [After R had finished and left, I set
up the tapes, datum-line, etc, and drew the section, filling in the context-sheets at the
same time. The relationship between the charcoal mass (575) and the outer fill (568), as
these appeared in the section, seemed quite clear. 575 was contained by 568. This, at
least, is how I drew the relationship on the plan and described it on the context-sheets
(see Fig 28)].
6.* (i) R came back to check the recording. After studying the drawing and then
(picking up a trowel) closely examining the section itself, he pointed out that, although
the drawing was technically correct, it did not "make sense" in terms of our interpretation
of 575 as the remains of a fire, truncated by later ploughing. Nor did he agree with the
description of the relationship between the two contexts ('568 contains/is contemporary
with 575'). He said that if 575 had been an un-urned cremation - deposited during the
backfiuing of the pit - it would make sense for it to be contained by the outerfihl. But if
575 was a fire, resting on 568, how can 568 also cover the fire after it had burnt out?
(ii). There followed a discussion about whether 575 could have been burnt elsewhere,
to be deposited in the pit at a later date in the manner of an un-urned cremation. But
we decided this was unlikely to have been the case, since (an investigation with the tip
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239
of a trowel showed that) the gravel sides of the feature contained specks of carbonised
material, indicating that 575 had been burnt in situ.	 -
(iii) R resolved the problem by pointing out that it was only at the section that 568
was covering 575; in the unexcavated half of the feature 575 was showing through the
weathered surface of 568 (trowelling affirmed this point). It was as though the tip of a
plough had cut a narrow groove into 575, dragging material from 568 into the groove
(indeed, we then looked for and found the continuation of this plough-cut either side of
the feature). The placement of the section along the line of the groove was in this sense
rather unfortunate, he said, since it depicted an untypical aspect of the evidence as a
whole.
(iv) Looking at the section-drawing again, R said that it gave the impression that 575
was a complete deposit contained within 568 whereas, on the contary, all the evidence
pointed to the fact that 575 was above 568, and, far from being complete, had been
truncated by later ploughing activity. This meant that the drawing and description were
wrong and had to be changed.
(v) The first thing to do, R told me, was to alter the description of relationship on the
context sheet. Instead of 568 containing (and therefore contemporary with) 575, 568
should be described as below (and therefore earlier than) 575. The next task was to
alter the section-drawing so that it correlated with the description. The best way to
do this, we decided, was to measure and draw the average height of 575 away from the
section, rather than the points on its upper surface where it actually met the section; this
would show 575 coming right up to ground level, above 568. We both agreed that the
correction would result in a more accurate portrayal of the evidence. R added that "it's
very important to make sense of the evidence at the recording-stage, while the evidence
itself is still around... otherwise the records will be meaningless for post-excavation
people." He went away to check other section-drawings in progress elsewhere on the site.
[following R's instructions, I re-described the relationship between the two contexts, and
re-drew the section (see Fig. 29)].
[RE14]
The general practice on this site was for workers to plan, draw and describe the
features which they themselves were involved in excavating. Recording was sel-
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dom a solitary task, however. All drawings and context-sheets completed had to
be 'checked' by a supervisor, which meant that the act of inscription was usually
punctuated by supervisory visits. Such visits often developed into a detailed dis-
cussion about the nature and meaning of the evidence and how best to represent
it. In effect, instructions given by supervisors ensured that the mode of represen-
tation employed - and the way of seeing associated with this mode - was standard
practice across the site as a whole, in line with broader archaeological conventions.
It was by no means unusual for these exchanges between supervisor and worker to
result in a radical alteration of the plans and descriptions being produced, as in
this example.
Because everyone knows that the material evidence itself is something transient
(the section being drawn here, for example, will be excavated away once recording
is completed), considerable care is devoted to, as R puts it (6.v) 'making sense' of
the evidence while it is still around. There is a general feeling that the evidence
has to be made sense of before it can be depicted properly. The chain of material
transactions (that led up to the act of inscription) and the detailed discussions,
re-working of the evidence and re-drawing of the section (that constitute the act
of inscription) are all part of this process of 'making sense' that R refers to.
One of the difficulties in producing a faithful representation of the object is that
in reality its meaning is fluid and uncertain; there are a variety of ways in which
its 'sense' can be constituted, depending on point of view. It is well-known out in
the field that, while experienced excavators to some extent share a common way
of looking at things, they may see quite different relationships and significances in
the same archaeological surface. Even just one worker can switch or shift between
alternative points of view. Different points of view can lead to different measure-
ments being taken, and therefore to depictions that radically contradict each other.
(Compare, for example, Figs 28 and 29. Although superficially similar, they carry
very different implications concerning the meaning of the evidence; these are artic-
ulated by R in 6:ii). This does not mean, however, that depictions produced are
entirely relative to individual points of view. Alternative perspectives are brought
together and merged during the social transactions that are inter-bedded with acts
of inscription; fluid meanings are, so to speak, solidified or crystalized into a social
consensus, of which the depiction itself is a product.
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It is also the case that the meaning of the evidence to be represented is not self-
contained, but is context-dependant (by 'context' I mean the ivider context of
environment and practices, rather than the narrow archaeological sense). Thus
the section itself is made sense of in terms of (our knowledge of) the feature as a
whole, and the site in general. Indeed, the main criticism R levelled against the
original drawing was that it did not take enough account of the understanding we
had reached of the feature as a 'fire' (6:i); this involved implicit reference to many
previous interpretive events and to aspects of the evidence outside of the section
itself. Also, when we were considering whether or not the carbonised material
was burnt in situ (6:11), we transferred our attention to the sides of the feature
(re-engaging in a material transaction) to resolve the problem. And again, the
final decision to favour one possible depiction over another was based upon an
exploration of the area adjacent to the feature, where an anticipated plough-mark
was found to confirm R's interpretation of the section (6.iii); the very idea that the
feature could have been truncated by later ploughing referred to, amongst other
things, the plough soil encountered across the site as a whole when the excavation
trench was first opened up.
All this goes to show that a great deal more goes into the representation of the
object than simply a measurement/depiction of material form and properties. The
representation is meaningful because it contains information about perceived rela-
tionships (both within the object, and between the object and others in its spatial-
temporal context). If these relationships had been left out, the representation
- as R argues (6:v) - would be "meaningless", or at least very misleading, for
post-excavation workers.
However, those relationships which are perceived to exist 'out there' in the envi-
ronment, and which are represented on plan as objective properties of the material
field, are in an important sense also relationships between the perceiver(s) and the
object(s) perceived. Indeed, perception itself is the subject-object relation, and it
is the general character of perception that the objective environment always spec-
ifies information about the situation of the subject within that environment. As
Gibson (1979- :126) argues, "Information about the self accompanies information
about the environment, and the two are inseparable... Perception has two poles,
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the subjective and the objective, and information is available to specify both. One
perceives the environment and co-perceives oneself."
Gibson identifies three ways in which the environment informs the perceiver about
his or her own changing position from moment to moment - "the sweeping of the
field of view via the ambient array in the case of head turning, the protrusion
of special shapes into the field of view in the case of limb-movement (especially
manipulation), and the flow of the ambient array in the case of locomotion." (Gib-
son 1979:126; see also Lee and Aranson 1974, Lee and Lishman 1975). To these
kinds of 'visual kinesthesis' we can also add the, perhaps more important, tactile
kinesthesis. To touch something, as Merleau-Ponty (1962: 100) and Berger (972:
8-9) point out, is to situate oneself in relation to the object touched (the tool one
is holding, the material field one is working, the ground one is standing upon, etc).
Yet it is precisely these subject-object relations that are left out or erased from
the representation of the object in the act of inscription.
Whenever archaeologists are engaged in perceiving an object - whether manipulat-
ing it through the use of hands or tools, standing back to observe it in a detached
manner, walking around it or get different points of view, discussing it with oth-
ers, or measuring and drawing it - information about their own point of view and
situation generally is always present in the objective material field. But archaeo-
logical drawings and descriptions tend to give the opposite impression. The object
is represented as if it was perceived by a disembodied observer, as if it existed
independently of a perceiving subject. And this severing of any explicit relations
between the subject and the object somehow makes the representation seem more
'concrete' and more 'real'.
The purpose of archaeological recording (which also supplies its rationale) could
be said to produce an objective representation of material evidence. And once we
understand objectivity as an inter-subjective construction, it is easy to see why
the perspective method of drawing is inappropriate for archaeological purposes.
For if the perspective method achieves its effect of realism by drawing the viewer
into the scene, it can necessarily only give us one point of view upon a field of
objects, from only one angle, in only one light, at only one moment in time. Yet,
as we have seen, the non-perspective drawing produced in the act of inscription is
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actually the distillation of many points of view. It is not just that the recorder has
moved around, scanning and measuring each part of the pattern in turn, rather
than observing the pattern in its totality from a fixed viewpoint [One is reminded
of Cezanne's experiments with non-perspective methods in some of his landscape
paintings - in order to show "the more complete object in the mind" rather than the
object as seen from one particular vantage-point (quoted in Dubery and Wifiats
1983:24)1. The object has been studied from all angles, in all lights, at many
moments in time, by more than one worker. Alternative perspectives upon the
object have been merged and shared in a chain of social transactions, forged into
a social consensus about the meaning of the object, then fixed into a single, static
image. "The concrete is concrete", as Marx (1973:101) says, "because it is the
summation of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse."
In this way the depiction comes to represent, not so much an individual's sub-
jective point of view, but rather the inter-subjective perspective attained by the
social group, the excavation team, as a whole (through the medium of conventional
technologies, exemplified by the textual grid). Such a perspective is necessarily a
transcendental one, since it exists, so to speak, over and above the heads of individ-
ual workers. It is a perspective, moreover, that belongs as much to the community
of readers and researchers (the consumers of data) as it does to the excavation
team (the producers of data) - for we all share a common system of representation,
a common language and code of textual conventions. The objectivity of data is
produced in accordance with the requirements of the archaeological community as
a whole; the very solidity and concreteness of recorded evidence, then, is product
and reproducer of the solidarity of the archaeological community.
In RE14 we saw the transition of layers into numbers, soil boundaries into lines
on a piece of planning paper, perceived relationships into written descriptions on
context-sheets, and so on. The plans, photos, notes, samples, etc that are pro-
duced in the act of inscription are the end-products of the excavation process.
What is truly extraordinary is that, in subsequent analysis, these will come to be
regarded as the pristine, theoretically-neutral raw material for archaeological in-
terpretation. And no kind of data is seen to be more 'objective', or more free from
subjective point of view, than the photograph (which, paradoxically, does incorpo-
rate the perspective method of representation). As one handbook on archaeological
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photography puts it, "The camera is unselective, recording everything that it can
distinguish in the field of view, whether the photographer can understand what he
sees before him or not"; photographs, therefore, "provide a completely objective
and unbiased view of things, as they actually were" (Conlon 1973:55). It is to the
phenomenon of the camera, then, that we now turn.
11.5 The Camera
Just as the trowel was identified in Chapter 5 as a special case of tools-for-
NATURE, so the camera can be identified as a special case of tools-for-CULTURE.
Of all the instruments used in acts of inscription, the camera is generally considered
to be the instrument par excellence for depicting the material field 'realistically'.
The privileged status of the camera is of course not restricted to archaeology.
Photographs are used as evidence in courts of law, as records or documents in hos-
pitals, schools, prisons, scientific establishments, museums and other institutions;
they figure prominently, as representative of facts, in newspapers, books, pass-
ports, licences, etc (Tagg 1988). Certainly they are an important component of
the record that archaeologists make of material remains encountered in excavation.
Whereas the trowel is commonly used by all members of the excavation team,
however, the use of the site camera is restricted to just two or three workers.
Only the director and supervisor took photographs as a general rule (one other
worker was being trained to use the camera, but was always being supervised and
instructed when he did so). Given that most workers participated fully in all other
on-site recording activites, this restriction of usage to senior personnel suggests
that there is something quite special about the art of taking photographs on an
archaeological site.
It would be wrong to suppose, however, that the skill of archaeological photography
consists merely of a technical competence in the handling and use of the camera;
the photographer has to have some experience of using a camera in relation to
archaeological materials. Indeed, the task of making significant patterns on the
ground stand out in the photograph involves not just the taking of the picture
itself, but also a certain amount of preparation of the material field.
Much of this preparation has generally already been accomplished prior to the
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arrival of the photographer on the scene - that is, the evidence has been constituted
as a significant object in a chain of material and social transactions leading up to
the photographic event. This, after all, is why the photographer is there - because
there is a significant object to be photographed. It is also the case that the material
field has already been constituted specifically for photography. A considerable
amount of labour has gone into the cleaning operation that always precedes the
act of inscription (scraping surfaces smooth, sharpening soil boundaries, removing
soil and any loose crumbs of earth, erasing foot-prints and trowel-marks, and the
moving of any tools-for-NATURE out of the way - see RE61, Section 4.3).
11.5.1 The Placard
The arrival of the photographer/supervisor initially takes the form of an inspection
of the evidence to be depicted. Sometimes instructions are given as to how to clean
the evidence further, so that the worker re-engages in a material transaction to
re-constitute the object, and the photographer goes away to come back and take
the pictures later. Once satisfied, however, the photographer completes prepara-
tions by setting out the placard (detailing site code, feature number, etc.), scales,
direction arrow and other tools-for-CULTURE on the material field. The setting
up of the placard is particularly interesting. The photographer carries with him
a small plastic case containing a large number of plastic letters and numbers. He
sorts through these until the required signs are located; these are then affixed onto
the placard, the total arrangement of words being moved this way and that to
achieve the desired spacing - the placard then being carefully placed and propped
up next to the feature.
This manipulation and placement of plastic letters is such a mundane, everyday
occurrence that somehow in order to focus our attention upon it at all - in order to
perceive the activity as interesting and worthy of comment - we have to perform
an active operation of our own upon the spectacle. That is, we have to make a
conscious shift in mental gear and achieve, to borrow the title of Arthur Danto's
book, a 'transfiguration of the commonplace' (Danto 1981).
At a stroke, the placement of the placard onto the material field transforms that
field into a textual object. Letters and numbers are placed upon it as if they were
being written onto a parchment - and indeed with this action the field becomes
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a text. Already constituted as a significant object in prior material transactions,
the material evidence now becomes a field of signs and signifidations. The signs,
moreover, do not just refer to the material evidence directly in view; they also
serve to subsume the evidence into a much larger system of signs and significations
that includes, on a local level, the many plans, notes, labels, descriptions, etc of
site recording - and ultimately the entire network of archaeological information
stored in books, archives, libraries and museums. This transformation, impor-
tantly, occurs before the photograph is taken; the photograph itself serves only to
reproduce a pre-existent text. In this sense the photograph can indeed be regarded
as 'documentary' - a straightforward copy, literally a photo-copy, of the prepared
and inscribed material field.
11.5.2 The Scales
Another important aspect of the preparation of the material field that the pho-
tographer has to attend to is the setting out of scales or ranging poles. When
the photograph is taken from directly above a horizontal surface, or directly in
front of a vertical surface, this operation is a fairly straightforward one. Scales are
generally placed on the ground parallel to the sides of the viewfinder/borders of
the picture, so that even if only one scale is used the picture is given a grid-like
structure, similar to the grids printed on planning-paper. Any subsequent viewer
of the photograph (henceforward referred to as the Reader) will therefore find her-
self or himself looking at the evidence from directly above or directly in front -
through an interposed (invisible but nevertheless present) grid, which provides an
objective guide to the size of the objects depicted - in much the same way as (s)he
looks at a plan. That is, a transcendental perspective has been constructed for the
Reader by the photographer.
Many surfaces are too large to be photographed in this way. Often the photogra-
pher would try to attain a viewpoint as near as possible to the perpendicular by
standing on a chair or a stepladder, or even on the scaffolding tower. When the
picture plane was not quite parallel to the surface being photographed, the setting
out of scales no longer conformed to an easily identified rule. Indeed, the more
oblique the angle of shot, the more complex the procedure of positioning the scales
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seems to become. As the following example demonstrates, the setting out of scales
may take considerable time, effort and skill:-
[The feature to be photographed is the ditch which runs straight across the entire length
of the site from NE-SW. I have just completed the excavation of a segment of the ditch.
The segment is 2m long, im wide and 3Ocms deep, situated next to the NE edge of
the excavation-trench. This segment has been extensively cleaned, in preparation for
photography]
R arrived to take the photos, bringing with him a camera case, chair, a number of scales
and ranging poles, etc. The placard was set up. Three sets of black and white/colour
photos were taken from three different positions - from the SW, from the NW (some
while standing on the chair to achieve the required angle) and from the NE baulk. Each
time R took up a new position it was necessary to re-position the placard and scales
relative to the camera. Here we look at the positioning of scales only in relation to the
last of these vantage-points.
II. told me to place a horizontal scale (A) along the top of the section, with the placard
behind it, and a vertical scale (B) set against the section. Looking through the viewfinder
- adjusting the aperture and focus and shifting his own position - he gave me instructions
as to how to move scale B (by moving the top to the left or the right) and scale A (by
swinging one end towards or away from him) in order that they should appear to be
precisely vertical and horizontal. The placard then had to be re-positioned so it was
not obscured by the vertical scale. Once satisfied with this arrangement, he asked me to
place a ranging-pole (C) along one edge of the ditch; this also required some adjustment,
as I then had to swing the further end of the ranging-pole towards the ditch, in order
that it should appear to be perpendicular to scale A, as seen through the camera. All
the scales then had to be finely adjusted. Only upon completion of this joint task, which
took at least two minutes to accomplish, did R actually begin to take the photographs.
When R had finished, I took a photograph of my own from approximately the same
position and angle - see Photo 10.
[RE19]
The example shows that scales or ranging-poles are not placed haphazardly upon
the material field; their exact positioning is clearly important. But on the other
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Photo 10: Scales and Placard (RE19)
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hand, the arrangement of scales in Photo 10 is not the same as that in other
photographs of other material fields. Each material field to be photographed seems
to present a more or less unique situation and task, and to lead to a more or
less unique arrangement of scales being set out. Indeed, it is apparent from the
description of the activity of arranging that scales are positioned according to a
complex and inter-related set of variables:-
1. the material field, its topographical character, the shape and proportions
of the feature (eg. scales A and C are placed parallel to the side and section
respectively of the excavated ditch segment; scale B is placed vertically
on the base of the ditch at the very centre of the section), as well as the
'meaning' of the evidence - see 4.
2. the horizon, and other objects or surfaces in the environment, by reference
to which the photographer judges the horizontal and vertical (eg. scales A
and C are horizontal; scale B is vertical; the camera/picture plane, though
pitched at an angle away from the vertical, has a horizontal axis).
3. the viewpoint taken up by the photographer/camera. (eg. scale A is
positioned so that it is parallel to the picture plane, and perpendicular to
the vertical axis of the photographer's body; the other two scales are also
orientated in relation to his point of view).
4. the cognitive stance adopted by the photographer; his intentions, pur-
poses and understanding of the evidence (eg. the total arrangement of scales
effectively frames the significant object, so that it stands out in the picture,
leaving those objects which are not perceived to be significant - such as the
two ploughmarks behind scale B - very definately in the background).
5. the system of scales as a whole; each scale is orientated relative to all
the others (eg. scale A is perpendicular to scale B, which is perpendicular
to scale C).
Perhaps the most important variables are 3 and 4; that is, the physical and cog-
nitive standpoint adopted by the photographer. If the photographer shifts his
position only slightly the whole arrangement (5) will be skewed; the scales wifi
have to be re-adjusted with reference to a new horizon (2), which of course is
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also relative to the photographer's point of view. Because 3 and 4 are not static
but changeable (at least until the picture is taken), 2 and 5 are also of a shifting
character; this explains why the scales have to be continually re-positioned or re-
orientated by a co-worker, while the photographer moves this way and that to find
the best vantage-point and angle. [The only variable which could be said to be
independent of his point of view is 1; this has been brought to light and shaped in a
chain of material transactions preceding the act of inscription. But since the prac-
tical constitution of the object was directed and monitored by the photographer,
in his role as supervisor, we find that even this variable is inextricably bound up
with his cognitive standpoint, at least in a historical sense.] To find a constant in
this type of situation we should look not so much at the photographer or the ma-
terial environment, but rather at the instrument through which the subject-object
relation is mediated; that is, the camera itself.
6. the mode of representation that is embodied in the camera. It is well
known that the camera embodies in its very design geometrical principals simi-
lar to those of the perspective method of drawing. As Tagg (1983:3) puts it, the
camera "owes its structure not to the model of the eye, but to a particular the-
oretical conception of the problems of representing space in two dimensions."
This means that, unless a transcendental perspective is specifically constructed
as an artifice of the photographer - eg. by taking a picture of a flat surface from
directly above - a point of view is always specified in the scene depicted. The
viewer (Reader) of a photograph can usually judge her own virtual position,
which coincides with the real position of the photographer when the picture
was taken, from various perspectual cues in the scene (the location of the hori-
zon, the relative size of objects, the varying texture of the ground surface as it
recedes into the distance, etc). Oblique photography is therefore quite different
from vertical photography or planning; scales and other tools-for-CULTURE
have to be set out in accordance with the rules of perspective.
Despite the perspectivism (or perspecti-vision) that is inherent in the camera,
many archaeological photographs would still be characterized by a certain 'flatness'
or lack of depth if it were not for the use of scales. This is because detailed shots
of ground surfaces do not usually show the horizon in the background, or familiar
objects such as trees or people, by reference to which the Reader can situate
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herself in relation to the material field. In the absence of any supplementary
cues, a material object depicted may be of indeterminate size an indeterminate
distance away, of indeterminate dimensions, and even of indeterminate orientation
relative to the Reader. The principal function of the scales is to supply the missing
information that would enable the camera to construct a representation of three-
dimensional space; they are used (as the term 'ranging pole' suggests) to arrange
space or to set out a range, and this always has the effect of specifying a perspective
or point of view for the Reader.
Let us consider what Photo 10 would look like if the scales were not there. Because
of the oblique angle of the shot there are enough perspectival cues in the scene to
specify which way up the picture is meant to be viewed - or, to put it in different
words, which way up the Reader is meant to orientate herself in relation to the
picture. The Reader can situate herself upon the grass baulk, looking down the
centre of the base of the ditch as it extends away from her. But although the
Reader can tell that the grass is raised above the level of the trowelled surface,
she cannot tell by how much; nor can she tell how far away from her viewpoint
the various parts of that surface are. She cannot tell, therefore, the size of the
ditch-segment. It is also difficult for her to ascertain whether she is looking down
at a horizontal ground surface, or straight ahead at a surface which slopes uphill.
This makes it hard for her to judge the shape of the ditch-segment; ie. whether
the sides of the ditch are parallel, whether the ditch is wider at one end than the
other, how deep the ditch is, etc.
Within the perspective system of representation, then, the size and shape of ob-
jects, and the distance between objects, is always relative to a point of view.
What has happened here is that the camera has constructed a partial perspective
or point of view for the Reader. Let us now see how the scales are set out in order
to complete the task that the camera on its own would have left unfinished.
• In providing an objective guide to the size of the object, the scales inform the
Reader how near or far her virtual point of view is in relation to the object;
that is, in fixing the size of the object, the scales necessarily fix the distance
between the object and the observer. In this case, for example, the Reader
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can tacitly situate herself (ie. without any overt calculation) approximately
3m away from the section facing her. 	 -
• Scales A and C set out a horizontal plane; the section, together with scale B,
sets out a vertical plane. These provide the Reader with information not just
about the material field (eg. that the ground surface is more or less horizontal)
but also about her own position and posture (eg. that she is looking down,
rather than straight ahead). It enables her to orientate the vertical axis of her
body relative to the ground surface on which she is standing and the section
which is facing her.
• Scale A provides a transversal line. Scale C provides an orthogonal line. Scale
B, situated at the very centre of the section of a symmetrical feature, and form-
ing an axis of symmetry both for the feature and the photograph as a whole,
provides - if a line is extended from it in both directions - the principal ray that
links the spectator point with the central vanishing point (for clarification of all
these terms, see Kubovy 1989). The central vanishing point - where principal
ray and orthogonals converge (note that lines drawn through scale C, scale B,
and the two sides of the ditch segment all converge on a single point) is situated
on the horizon. Thus the scales, together with other cues, specify the approx-
imate position of the horizon, which is not itself in the picture. The horizon,
in turn, enables the Reader to orientate herself further in relation to the scene
(ie. it tells her the level of her eyes if she raises her head to look straight in
front of her).
[Note that the Reader does not require a knowledge of the theory of perspective in
order to see three-dimensional space in two-dimensions, any more than the pho-
tographer requires such a knowledge in order to construct a representation of this
space. Both Reader and photographer can tacitly comprehend their position rel-
ative to the horizon without having to work it out explicity in geometrical terms.
What is required, however, is a familiarity with the conventional mode of repre-
sentation employed. As Herskovits (1948:381) points out, people in other cultures
who are innocent of the method of perspective and the art of photography may
see a photographic image as merely "a meaningless arrangement of varying shades
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Figure 30: A Matter of Perspective
of grey on a piece of paper." (see also Hudson 1960, Cole and Scribner 1974:64-80,
Layton 1977)].
If archaeological photography necessarily makes use of the method of perspective
embodied in the camera, however, it does so according to a specific set of con-
ventions or customs. As we have seen (Section 11.2), it is conventional practice
not to specify individual perspective in other forms of depiction, and to a certain
extent this applies to photography as well. That is, scales can be manipulated in
such a way as to not only draw the Reader into the scene - providing her with a
particular point of view - but also to simultaneously cancel out that point of view
by providing her with the means to adopt a transcendental perspective, looking
down upon the evidence from directly above:-
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• Whereas the vertical scale B forms an axis of symmetry, the transversal scale
A forms an artificial horizon, separating neatly the foregrouind from the back-
ground. This artificial horizon marks the end of the depth of field that has
been constructed with the scales. (Scale C places scales A and B, and the
section itself, a certain distance away from the picture plane; scale B places the
base of the ditch a certain distance away from the horizontal plane defined by
scales A and C; the background, as a result, is noticeably 'flat' compared to
the foreground).
• In framing the significant object, the scales not only set out a space for the
Reader; they also tell her where to focus her attentive gaze within that space.
(A subtle framing of the object has already been achieved in the cleaning
operation which preceded the act of inscription. Only the ditch segment and
a small area of the surrounding gravel has been trowelled, making it stand
out from the background. A more diffuse framing is achieved by focusing the
camera upon the significant object, so that irrelevant details will be out of
focus).
• In so far as scales A and C constitute a frame, this frame is positioned so as
to provide the maximum facility for objective measurement of the significant
object. The 50cm subdivisions of the scales enable the Reader to construct
a conceptual grid over the segment - see Fig.31. Note that the part of the
segment which is visible is neatly and inclusively covered by just six squares of
the grid.
In this way it can be seen that the scales, set out according to the rules of perspec-
tive, provide the Reader with the equivalent of a planning-frame or planning-grid.
As already noted, planning grids should be looked through from above rather than
from an oblique angle - otherwise measurements taken by eye with reference to
the grid will be distorted. The Reader is invited, so to speak, to transcend her
embodied situation upon the grass baulk (to forget that it was the photographer's
presence in exactly the same spot that provided her with this perspective and
vantage-point) and to measure each part of the evidence as if she was floating
freely above it, looking down through the grid from a perpendicular angle. In
other words, she is invited to take a transcendental perspective upon the scene.
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Figure 31: The Horizontal Grid
Even when the photograph is taken from an oblique angle, then, the method
of setting out the scales is orientated towards the ideal of vertical photography
and photogrammetry. As the physicist, Ziman (1978:87) remarks, "The ideal of
scientific photography... is to approach as closely as possible to a 'diagram' where
the underlying conceptual structure is emphasised, stripped of all inessential detail.
Indeed, the marvellous LANDSAT photographs of the surface of the earth taken
from a satellite [compare with aerial photographs of archaeological sites] ... are
almost perfect maps whose 'subjective' characteristics have been eliminated by
putting the point of observation high in the sky, far above any human eye."
A vertical grid, of course, is also created by the positioning of scales A and B. The
Reader can view the section through the grid as if she was standing directly in front
of the section instead of looking down at it. The horizontal and vertical grids, taken
together, provide the Reader with multiple perspectives upon the scene.
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11.6 The Virtual Presence of the Reader on Site
During the discussion on the setting out of the scales for photography, we made
something of an excursion away from the practical events of excavation to consider
the position of the Reader. This excursion from real space into textual space was
necessary because, in a very real sense, the Reader was virtually present - as the
consumer for whom the product was intended - in the photographic event. Indeed,
the object was constituted, fashioned and framed according to the requirements of
the Reader. This is true to a certain extent of all material transactions and acts
of inscription, but is especially noticeable in the taking of photographs. Perhaps
the main reason why the usage of cameras is restricted to senior personnel is
that the ability to construct a transcendental perspective for the Reader (with
an instrument that, by its very design and construction, embodies a mode of
representation specifying individual point of view) comprises a large part of the
skill of archaeological photography. The photographer has to be familiar with
conventional modes of representation employed in archaeological texts - has to
know what would 'look right' and 'look wrong' to the Reader in the light of those
conventions. Ordinary diggers, who live and work mainly outside the academic
world of textual production, may not have this familiarity.
Most of the practices we have looked at that are associated with site photography
are oriented by and towards textual conventions. The cleaning of the material
field, the removal of tools-for-NATURE, the placement of tools-for-CULTURE,
the use of the perpendicular angle, the setting out of a grid, etc. - even the way
the photographer ensures that his own shadow is not cast over the evidence to be
depicted - are all activities which are oriented towards the Reader, constituting that
evidence as a textual object for the activity of reading. It is significant that, when
a photograph is taken for working purposes only (ie. not for textual reproduction)
such conventions are considerably relaxed. The material field may not be cleaned
so rigorously, tools-for-NATURE may be left lying on the ground, scales are set
down quickly rather than methodically, and the photographer is likely to take the
picture from the most convenient angle instead of spending several minutes finding
the 'right' vantage-point.
The close relationship between the photographer and the Reader is evident in
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the photograph itself. The Reader's point of view is the photographer's point
of view, and vice-versa. It is as if two bodies had merged intO one, to occupy
the same position within the same horizon - to bring about, in Gadamer's (1975)
well-known phrase, a "fusion of horizons". In this sense the actual taking of the
photograph (and the subsequent viewing of it) can be characterised as an inter-
section or conjunction of practical space and textual space - a concrete moment
when the photographer inifitrates the text, and the Reader, so to speak, steps into
practical situations.
The Reader referred to, of course, is not an individual person but a composite
personage, encompassing all expected readers, embodying the conventions, cus-
toms, modes and styles of representation prevalent in a particular field of textual
production at a particular time. It is this virtual Reader who occupies, as it were,
the seat of authority - who directs, prescribes and instructs the proceedings - and
for whom all practitioners are essentially instruments. There is definitely a sense
in which, during the everyday events of excavation, the Reader is looking over all
our shoulders. Far from the Reader being held captive and imprisoned within the
forms of representation produced by practitioners, the opposite is nearer to the
truth. It is as much a case of the practitoners orientating their activity towards
the Reader as the other way round.
The requirements of the Reader are, as we have seen, somewhat paradoxical. On
the one hand the Reader requires the evidence to be constituted for reading in par-
ticular ways (brought to light, shaped, cleaned, measured, represented in textual
form). But on the other hand the Reader requires the evidence to be constituted
in such a way that it should appear not to have been constituted, by removing all
traces of the fashioning processes (footprints, trowel-marks, tools-for-NATURE,
the skilled workers themselves, individual viewpoints, etc.) in the very process of
fashioning it. The paradox is that the object which can be taken by the Reader to
be independent of subjective point of view has actually been shaped to fit many
such perspectives, merged and brought to bear upon the object during intensive
subject-subject and subject-object activity. And a great deal of work or labour has
gone into the shaping and framing of the object so that it should seem as though
it is not the product of work or labour (cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979:240). This,
after all, is how objectivity is constructed "There is no escape from the work of
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constructing an object", Bourdieu (1988:6) argues; "There is no object that does
not imply a viewpoint, even if it is an object produced with the intention of abol-
ishing one's viewpoint - the intention of overcoming the partial perspective that is
associated with holding a position within the space being studied."
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260
Chapter XII
TIME, AGENCY AND REFLEXIVITY
12.1 The Material Culture of Material Culture
As the reflexive or ironic form of ethno-archaeology, the preceding ethnography of
archaeology has retained the general ethno-archaeological interest in the study of
material culture. The focus, however, is on the material culture of archaeologists
themselves - not just the material culture of past societies which, by virtue of being
appropriated by archaeologists in the act of discovery, becomes their material cul -
ture too, but also and especially the material culture through which archaeologists
apprehend the material culture of others.
Turning the outward-looking gaze back on the treasure-house of material items of
equipment stored in the toolshed and the planning-hut is a strategy that is likely
to cause surprise. Such implements are rarely if ever constituted as the objects
of attention in themselves; they are used to work upon other objects, and it is
those objects being worked that occupy attention. Tools such as trowels, spades,
brushes, cameras, scales, theodolites and planning-frames are the mundane things
of everyday life for archaeologists working out in the field. Yet these are the imple-
ments through which the objects of knowledge are brought to light, manipulated,
meaningfully-constituted and transformed into textual data. It is precisely these
mundane articles that mediate the subject-object and culture-nature transactions
that characterise excavation activity. Any general (ie. reflexive) theory of material
culture should start here.
The paradox has come to light that we know the least about that which we know
the most; the familiar and the close-to home are more estranged from us than
the unfamiliar and the culturally distant. In studying the material culture of the
distant Other, the role of our own material culture has become objectively hidden
to us.
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Hidden also is the role of our own agency (associated with the use of tools) in
the constitution of objective meanings. This agency is at once ôonverjtional and
creative. Tools-for-CULTURE deployed in acts of inscription (Chapter 11), for ex-
ample, are particularly powerful vehicles for the reproduction of established 'ways
of seeing' - modes of perception and representation which derive their authority
from texts and textual conventions. It is through the imposition of the 'textual
grid' that theory maintalns its hegemony over the practical domain, removing all
trace of the active contribution of the agents of discovery from its objective 'data'.
The tools-for-NATURE used in material transactions (Chapter 4), on the other
hand, are vehicles for the reproduction of tried and trusted 'ways of doing' (cf.
Woolgar 1988:85 on the role of pipettes and other utensils in laboratory science:-
"even such mundane objects encapsulate and sustain the culture of the laboratory,
its beliefs, results and decisions from the past embodied in material artefacts.").
The craft skills of excavation are inseparable from the tools through which they
are applied; to aquire those skills one has learn how to use the appropriate digging
tools. In this sense our material culture is not just the medium or conductor of our
intentions in shaping other objects; it is also a medium through which the accumu-
lated experience of generations of practitioners shapes the actions and perceptions
of the tool-using subject.
This is not to deny the creative role of the agent or subject who uses the tool.
The "habitus" (Bourdieu 1977) that comes to be objectified in material culture is
both product and reproducer of praxis; although it structures the actions of the
working subject it is also structured by those actions - ci. Sartre's (1976) concept
of the "practico-inert", or matter in which past praxis is embedded . In Chapters
9 and 10 many examples were given of workers improvising conventional strategies
from moment to moment to take account of emerging evidence. It is through the
practical dialectic that unfolds between (the cultural skills of) the working subject
and the (natural) object of labour that craft skills (and the action-meanings of
'tools of the trade') are transformecL Like human action itself, then, the action-
meanings of tools have a "duality of structure" (Giddens 1984:297-304).
Tools derive their meaning from their mediating role in the relation between the
subject and the object, and between culture and nature. Ingold (1986:28) points
out the absurdity of treating the 'forces of production' of a given society as simply
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an inventory of tools, considered as things in themselves. Tools derive their 'force'
from the intentional cultural agents who make and use them,-in relation to the
'resistance' of the objective material environment. Without a force there would
be no resistance, and without resistance there would be no conception of force.
As the means by which the subject acts upon the object, and one of the channels
through which the object acts back upon the subject, the tool is the subject-object
relation, in an objectified form.
If an analysis of the tool is absolutely central to our understanding of the transac-
tion between the subject and the object, the opposite also holds true. We cannot
apprehend the meaning of a tool independently of the subject-object relation. Even
artefacts which are discovered in the ground - the artefacts of other cultures - have
a referential structure which relates them to the capabilities and powers of the hu-
man body ( how they can be held, manipulated, put to use - see especially RE23,
Section 8.6). Archaeologists routinely perceive and interpret the artefacts they dis-
cover in terms of the action-possibilities of their own bodies, attributing their own
taken-for-granted powers of agency to the (inferred) subject held to be causally
responsible for making/using those artefacts. A theory of material culture, then,
is nothing if not linked to a theory of the body (see Blacking 1977, Douglas 1970,
Turner 1984).
The paradox is that the objects and patterns which archaeologists discover in exca-
vation are not only the products or artefacts of past human action. Worked upon
and brought to light through the use of material and cognitive tools in the act of
discovery, these become our products or artefacts too. Inevitably and unavoidably
they are double-artefacts - a point that has enormous implications for archaeologi-
cal epistemology, which tends to exclude the very idea of the causal agency of the
archaeologist in the production of data. To bring this agency to critical attention,
this thesis has had to adopt the kind of strict reflexivity recommended by Bourdieu
(1991); ie. that sociologists (and, by extrapolation, archaeologists) should treat
their own activity in the same way as they treat the activity of the subjects/objects
of their research. As cultural beings ourselves, our own work, material culture and
products should not be exempt from sociological and ethno-archaeological expla-
nation.
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12.2 A Question of Reflexivity
Reflexivity implies a kind of 'turning', or 'springing back'. In order to show how
the findings of the fieldwork report can be integrated into archaeological knowledge
it is necessary to make full use of the reflexive turn. For many of the arguments
put forward here are already well known to archaeological theory; it is just that
they are normally applied to the study of the distant Other, rarely to the activity
of archaeologists themselves. Bringing archaeological explanation back to bear
upon itself is an operation that, by virture of rarely being performed, may lead
to surprising results. Here we draw from an excellent paper entitled "Context,
structure and efficacy in palaeolithic art and design" by Margaret Conkey (1980).
"The process of artefact manufacture, a transformation of nature into cul-
ture (which then is most often used to mediate between nature and culture),
creates a form from raw materials." (Conkey 1980:233)
This definition serves us well, because it is as applicable to archaeological prac-
tice as it is to the practices of Palaeolithic artists. Archaeologists create a form
(data, explanation, knowledge about the past) from a raw material (material
mains). This raw material is natural in the sense that, prior to its emergence and
manipulation by archaeologists in the act of discovery, it existed independently of
archaeological knowledge and practices. Data, however, are indisputably cultural,
in the sense that they depend for their existence on archaeological practice; they
are generated from material remains in practice. Any archaeological excavation
simultaneously destroys material remains and creates data, and can therefore be
regarded as a transformation of nature into culture. Knowledge produced in this
way is subsequently utilised on other excavations to mediate between nature and
culture.
"The transformation of a piece of raw material, whether bone, antler or
cave wall, into an artefact or cultural product is a form of communication.
In Palaeolithic art not just any bone, antler or cave wail was selected ... the
selection of raw material and morphology plays a great role in the design
process. It is this that constrains decorative choice and generates structural
princip1.s' (Conkey 1980:243)
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Here too we find a direct parallel in archaeological practice. The transformation of
material remains into data is also, of course, a form of communication - precisely
because these data have to be meaningful within the system of signs, models,
theories, etc, that constitutes archaeological knowledge. As in Upper Palaeolithic
art, not just any raw materials are selected. Material remains are selected only if
they are perceived to be relevant to the existing system of knowledge, while others
are perceived to be irrelevant, or simply not perceived at all. The selection of
material remains thus plays an important part in the design process of knowledge
construction: it constrains the range of possible interpretation and generates
(reproduces) structural principals of archaeological thought.
"Studies of eskimo carvers suggest that the artists do not conceive that
they are applying or adding a pattern or form to the raw material. Rather,
the form or pattern exists in the raw material, and they view their work as
being about releasing those forms from the material." (Conkey 1980:234)
Like the eskimo carvers, many archaeologists do not conceive they are applying
or adding a pattern or form to their raw material. Facts about the past are
considered to be an inherent property of the material record. Archaeologists tend
to view their work as being about releasing (discovering) those facts.
In common with other archaeologists dealing with Upper Palaeolithic mate-
rial, Conkey identifies analogy as a crucial principle involved in the artistic
process. "(The artistic process) is not one of merely seeing appropriate
shapes and bosses, of projecting images onto, or 'seeing' images in, any
cave formation or piece of antler. Rather, an extension of class through
analogy takes place. The class of bison-rumps, for example, is extended to
include certain cave wall shapes that, with a certain amount of treatment
(eg. painting) and in a certain context of action, can stand for a bison-
rump... In this sense the artistic process depends on additives; one must
add not only aspects of form.., but also a context in which to release the
image, to effect the extension of class" (Conkey 1980:242).
The ability to use analogy is deeply embedded in human cognitive processes and
in human praxis. As human beings themselves, archaeologists are also analog-
ical practitioners. When an archaeologist interprets a configuration of material
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evidence as a 'burial-pit' for example, an extension of class through analogy
occurs. The class of burial-pits is extended to include certain material phenomena
which, with a certain amount of treatment (eg. the manipulation of the mate-
rial field through the use of tools) and in a certain context of action (notions
of human agency analogically transposed from the archaeologist's own practical
experience to his or her concept of the past) can stand for a burial-pit. It is only
by adding form and context in this way that the image (fact) of a burial-pit can
be released from (discovered in) material remains.
"Perhaps it could be argued that engravers or painters were often not so
much applying culture to nature.. .as extracting culture from nature, for
the image and part of its meaning is in the raw material that is selected
for modification. The paradox of the artistic process is that, at least on
one level, the artist is trying to leave culture behind and move toward
nature, to create natural forms and depictions.. .However, the created object
is inevitably cultural, and the natural component is transformed from an
object to a sign." (Conkey 1980:234)
In this and other passages Conkey draws attention to the dialectic between the
artist and raw material, (or - by analogy - between the archaeologist and the
material field being worked in the act of discovery). Like engravers and painters,
the archaeologist tries to leave cultural preconceptions behind in order to produce
'natural' representations of material evidence. But since archaeological practice is
itself a cultural phenomenon, the created object (data, knowledge of the past)
is inevitably cultural too, and the natural component (material remains) is
transformed from an object to a sign.
Of course there are vast differences between archaeological practices in the present
day and the practices of Upper Palaeolithic artists (just as there are between
prehistoric cave-painters and contemporary Eskimo carvers). Perhaps the main
difference is that the natural object or raw material selected and worked by ar-
chaeologists has already been fashioned or effected in some way through human
activity in the past. There are also different objectives and rationales entailed in
'art', however utilitarian, and 'science'. And the historical and cultural contexts
of these practices are completely different. Nevertheless there is a common ground
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underlying the differences, for both Palaeolithic artist and present-day archaeol-
ogist are engaged in a process of production - the fashioning of a product from a
raw material, through the use of material and cognitive tools. If a kind of 'labour
process' theory is applicable to the one, then it is applicable to the other too.
12.3 Analogies-in-Action: Analogies-of-Action
In the last section I used an archaeological account of the process of artefact
manufacture in the past, by analogy as it were, to shed light on the production of
a very different kind of artefactual product (archaeological data) in the present day.
Normally, however, the analogy works the other way. Archaeologists draw from
their own practical experience, as the users and makers of artefacts themselves, to
constitute the objects they discover in terms of past human agency. By turning
the analogy back in on itself, I have tried to highlight the analogical structure of
archaeological interpretation.
This fits in with the account of the metaphorical structure of cognition and per-
ception developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who argue that we understand
actions, objects and events in terms of "experiential gestalts" - multidimensional
structures of meaning (themselves derived from past experience) that organize on-
going experience into structured and meaningful wholes. Whenever we interpret
a discovered object as a hammerstone, for example, we draw from our own expe-
rience of the kinds of motor-movements and intentions-in-action associated with
the activity of hammering. And these bodily analogies inevitably carry a cultural
overload (see Section 12.4). In this sense "every experience takes place within a
vast network of cultural presuppositions... Cultural assumptions, values and atti-
tudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place on an experience
as we choose.. .we experience our 'world' in such a way that our culture is already
present in the very experience itself' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:57).
It also fits with Leatherdale's (1974:1-32) account of the role of analogy and
metaphor in science. Leatherdale distinguishes between 'manifest analogy' (based
on similarity of properties) and 'imported analogy' (based on inferred similarity
of underlying or causal relational structures). He argues that the British em-
piricist tradition has tended to concentrate on the former at the expense of the
latter, leading to a view of analogy as a linear transfer of ideas in a step-by-step,
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quasi-deductive process. It is easy to find the emphasis on manifest analogy in
archaeological theory. As Stiles (1977) explains, "A specific set of ethnographic
data is compared to an analogous set of archaeological data. First one formally
describes the physical characteristics of the archaeological material in question. A
potential ethnographic analogy is then recognized, of which the analogous physical
properties are examined. The degree to which the two set of properties agree de-
termines the probability of the activity which gave rise to the archaeological data
being analogous with the ethnographically observed data." (For a critique of this
method of reasoning, see Hodder 1982a:16-27).
Imported analogy, on the other hand, is more a matter of 'perception', 'noticing',
'recognition' or 'discovering' than formal logical reasoning (Leatherdale 1974:140).
It is an act, which involves the importation of past experience into the perceptual
domain, to make sense of present experience. Unlike manifest analogy, it does
not depend upon properties and attributes being shared by source and target
sides of the analogy. As an example of imported analogy we could perhaps cite
Rutherford's planetary model of the structure of the atom. There are no obvious or
manifest properties shared by the solar system and the atom, but the importation
of a set of relations out of the concept of the solar-system and into the concept of
the atom enables the sub-atomic system to be meaningfully-constituted in terms
of that relational field (Uemov 1970). The practical analogies which take place in
excavation are of this relational kind, except that the relational field within which
discovered objects are interpreted - far from being an abstract concept - is the
practical space of the body itself. The manifest properties of a discovered artefact
may or may not have parallels in our own cultural experience, but archaeologists
can still perceive its artefactuality and design - can still meaningfully-constitute
the object in terms of past human agency - by reference to the action-possibilities
and action-limitations of the body, with which we are all so familiar.
Crucially, such analogies are not only about action; they also occur in action. This
has important implications for our understanding of the analogical constitution
of material evidence. It would be quite wrong to argue, like Dalton (1981), that
analogy restricts the range of archaeological interpretation to the explanation of
cultural forms that are paralleled in present-day societies. This applies only to the
use of manifest analogyoranalogical arguments - not to the use of imported analogy
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or analogies-in-action. In action, the analogical practicioner is never dealing with
a static set of data, but always with a changing field of phenomena. It is true
that cultural presuppositions lead us to interpret material evidence in particular
ways, and therefore to particular strategies for digging and manipulating that
evidence. But it is also the case that, as the configurations of evidence continue to
emerge from the unfolding material field, they frequently 'contradict', 'surprise' or
'resist' the applied analogical schemes. Schemes have to be modified or changed in
practice to take account of emerging evidence, leading to different anticipations as
to what is likely to emerge, and therefore to modifications of strategies for further
excavation. Thus the object acts back upon the subject, and nature acts back upon
culture. Instead of a one-way projection of culture onto nature there is a dialectic
- a dialectic that unravels through time in the context of practical labour. In this
context analogy can be a profoundly creative operation (see the account of RE
37/41 in Sections 9.6 and 9.7). As Leatherdale (1974:22) argues, "what imported
analogy and the 'analogical act' lead to is not a limited inference to such-and-such
a property or properties, but a multi-dimensional gestalt-like insight into new ways
of looking at phenomena."
Imported analogies (analogies-in-action: analogies-about-action) are embedded in
the data or facts which are the products of the act of discovery, and underly the
manifest analogies which are explicitly drawn between archaeological and ethno-
graphic data in theoretical discourse. Largely tacit and taken-for-granted, they
are at once "trangressions of the symbolic order and the limits it sets" (Certeau
1984:54), enabling the production of original knowledge as well as the reproduction
of existing structures of meaning. In the act of discovery, knowledge is not only
reproduced; it is also transformed
12.4 The Paradox of the Body
The practical analogies embedded in the perception of material remains are based
upon and drawn from experience of the body - not so much the body as an an-
alytical concept, but rather the 'body-as-lived'. We are all familiar with what it
is like to be embodied in the world, capable of moving around and exploring the
environment - being able, as an active source of causal powers, to effect changes
in that environment, to manipulate, displace, order and transform the material
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things encountered in everyday life. It is because we experience ourselves as inten-
tional, purposeful agents that we impute the same powers of foresight and intent
to other human agents - attributing to them the basic abilities of the body to put
intentions into action and achieve objective results. Thus we find that whenever
archaeologists engage in deep inference they always constitute the inferred subjects
(the people in the past held to be causally responsible for producing observable
material effects) as human beings, very much like ourselves.
In this sense the body serves as the basis of practical analogies. Archaeologists
tacitly draw from knowledge of the body to make inferences that cut across cultural
differences between ourselves and people in the past, the assumption being that the
body is a universal or 'natural' feature of human existence. All human beings are
embodied in the world, and this embodiment takes a characteristic form because it
is genetically prescribed. So although human action may be subject to an infinite
range of socio-cultural transformations, cultural action has a natural foundation
and operates within natural limits. An implicit understanding of this 'natural'
body and its 'natural' forms of action enables the interpretation of the material
effects of human agency (though it may constrain the interpretation of the material
remains of pre-sapien hominids - see Binford 1981 for an account of how our taken
for granted assumptions about 'human' action may condition our understanding
of hominid behaviour).
But the body is not only the most natural feature of human existence; it is also the
most culturaL All culture-nature paradoxes (including the central anthropological
problem of squaring the diversity of cultural forms with the unity of the human
species) have their origin here. For the body is saturated with social symbolism,
skills, habits, rationales, attitudes, conventional ways of seeing and doing things,
as well as being the primary vehicle for the reproduction of those social values
in practice - which means that the body is not only culturally and historically
situated, but also the vehicle through which socio-cultural change is brought about.
For these reasons practical analogies, which have the body as basis and source,
always carry with them cultural values and presuppositions - transposed from the
(setting of) the present into (the concept of) the past. This cultural 'baggage'
inevitably constrains archaeological interpretation, in ways that are never easy for
us to discern.
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Recent work in feminist archaeology, for example, has brought to light the intimate
connection between gender-relations in the present day and gender-relations that
are manifested in explanations of the past (Conkey and Spector 1984; Gero and
Conkey 1991; see also the various contributions in Archaeological Review from
Cambridge 1988, vol 7:1). Exactly how contemporary power-structures related to
gender 'get into' our knowledge of the past is a contentious issue, but it seems
likely that analogy, or a process akin to analogy, plays a major part. It seems
likely too that, since gender relations are impressed upon and 'lived' by the body,
such processes are embedded in perception and bodily action as well as in texts
and theoretical discourse. Simone de Beauvoir (1952) argued that women tend to
be constituted more as 'other' than as true subjects, and it is certainly the case
that, when archaeologists engage in deep inference - which involves the (analogical)
constitution of an (inferred) subject held to be causally responsible for producing
archaeological patterns - the constituted subject is predominantly male. Hence we
have the concepts of 'man the hunter' and 'man the toolmaker', with women seen
to play only a marginal role in human evolution and historical process (Dobres
1988:33-4). A whole prehistory has yet to be written that incorporates women,
alongside men, as active agents (Gero 1991).
Gender theorists have also pointed out that women tend to be metaphorically
identified with nature rather than culture (Ortner 1974:72). Only recently has it
become clear just how deeply the symbolism of "natural women, cultured men"
(Sydie 1987) is embedded in archaeological explanation of the past. In excavation
practice, of course, archaeologists set up a very powerful nature/culture dichotomy
which is enmeshed in the actual perception and manipulation of the material evi-
dence itself. The 'natural' is the background against which archaeological patterns
stand out, or the vast remainder of material evidence which is thrown away or not
excavated. Is it possible that the role of women as active producers in the past
remains largely hidden because it is in some way associated with this 'natural'?
No doubt there are myriad other ways in which practical analogies constrain ar-
chaeological interpretation. In this thesis, however, I have been more concerned
to highlight the ways in which analogy enables archaeological interpretation to
take place in the first instance. It is through a kind of analogy, after all, that
the changing conceptions of agency, subjectivity and gender in the present day
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are beginning to change our perception of material remains and lead to a fuller
'engendered' understanding of the human past (Conkey 1991). -
12.5 The Body and Time
One of the problems in bringing the concept of the body to the surface of archae-
ological discourse is that the body itself defies analysis. In everyday practice the
body is normally experienced as the 'I' or subject from which a point of view is
taken upon the objective world, or as the instrument of our intentions in acting
upon that world. To constitute the body as the subject or object of analysis is
literally to transform it from a subject to an object, and involves conceptually sit-
uating ourselves outside of the body in order to take a point of view upon it. The
Cartesian dualisms of mind/body, thought/action, theory/practice, etc, are the
inevitable products of this operation, whereby a 'disembodied' or 'transcendental'
perspective is taken up upon the body and its practices. The moment we try to
analyse the body-as-lived we find that we have a corpse on our hands, and that we
are engaged in a process of dissection. Analysis tends to de-temporalise the body,
the very essence of which is temporality.
It is not just that the body's activity takes place in time, but that time itself is
inscribed in this activity; "Any action, as an intended bringing about of an ef-
fect, has a certain trajectory, a relation of before and after within it" (Hampshire
1965:72). In excavation practice, the actions of the embodied subject imbue mate-
rial culture (the tools he or she is using) and the material field (the evidence he or
she is working upon) with a temporal structure. When in the context of this prac-
tical labour the embodied subject engages in deep inference to make sense of the
unfolding material field, the activity of the (inferred) subject who is assumed to be
causally responsible for producing archaeological patterns is imbued with a tempo-
ral structure too. Inferences about past human activity always involves inferences
about the temporal sequence of bodily actions and intentions-in-action entailed in
that activity. it is through our own experience of time, as agents of temporality
ourselves, that we are able to conceptualise the temporality of past human action.
The very notions of time and causality that are transposed into our concept of the
past, and enable us to meaningfully-constitute material evidence in terms of past
human action, are derived from our own practical transactions with the world. As
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Hampshire (1965:73) puts it, " 'with a view to' and 'in order to' are unavoidable
idioms in giving the sense of an action, the arrow of agency passing through the
present and pointing forward in time. We are always looking at the present situa-
tion as arising from the immediate past through some agency, and as passing into
some other situation by some force or agency which is operative now. The cate-
gories of causal explanation have in this way their roots within our own experience
of ourselves as agents." Lakoff and Johnson also argue that the metaphorical struc-
ture of cognition is grounded in practical experience (see especially their account of
how direct manipulation gives rise to a prototypical 'gestalt' of causation, which is
elaborated upon metaphorically and is fundamental to our general understanding
of the world. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 69-76).
Paradoxically, then, the body is both agent and patient, both the giver and taker of
meaning. Skills are acquired, knowledge is 'embodied', only so far as the embodied
subject has explored and acted upon the environment. For it is in the practical
context of such transactions that the world presents itself as a kind of resistance
to applied force. Projects fail, tools break down, unexpected circumstances arise,
etc - in this sense too nature imposes limits on cultural action. In overcoming such
resistance we are engaged in the dialectic of nature-culture; by transforming nature
we transform ourselves. Practical skills are at once the result of this dialectic and
the means by which it is carried on. Thus 'embodiment' refers not just to the body
but also to the environment in which it is situated; the environment (including the
unfolding material field and the emergent object) is a crucial aspect of the act of
discovery. In fact it is only by reference to the surrounding environment, as well as
the embodied subject, that the act of discovery can be apprehended, its structure
outlined, its range delineated. It is to the limits of the act of discovery that we
now turn.
12.6 The Limits of the Act of Discovery
The act of discovery has been defined as an original encounter with the world, or
transaction between the subject and the object. It cannot be clearly distinguished
from that which is not the act of discovery, simply because most waking human
life is a form of exploration - an active perceiving of the world - which is also a
form of discovery. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that any kind of scientific
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analysis (from the Greek analuein; to unloose, to detach), while it may increase
our theoretical understanding, involves a progressive distancing Of ourselves from
direct 'lived' experience of the object in question. Consider, for example, the
following sequence of events:-
1. A small circular feature is uncovered, recognized as significant, excavated,
and found to contain a cremation-vessel, which reveals to the archaeologist
the original purpose of the feature as a whole (ie. a cremation burial pit).
2. The cremation vessel, which has been removed intact from the feature and
site where it was discovered, is excavated in a museum or laboratory. The
contents of the vessel (charred human bone, artefactual material, seeds, etc)
may reveal something about the nature of the burial rite, the status of the
cremated person, and so on.
3. Seeds and other botanical material found in the vessel may be sent to a
specialized laboratory for detailed examination under a microscope. Iden-
tification of ecofactual material may provide information about the ancient
landscape, agricultural system, diet, etc.
Each stage of analysis is an act of discovery - an original contact with some aspect of
the world, producing new knowledge about that world. But as our focus narrows
and we dissect the original entity into ever smaller pieces, there is definitely a
sense in which the totality of our experience of the object diminishes. The act of
discovery is still there, but seems to contract or recede into the distance, in a series
of step-like regressions.
Note for example, that as we move from 1 to 3, there is a progressive constriction
of the horizon. 1 takes place out in the open air, in the sun and the rain, under
the dome of the sky. 2 occurs in a building, or more precisely in a room, closed
in by four walls and a ceiling. 3 is carried out under a microscope, the horizon in
this case being the borders of the slide.
The contraction of the horizon is linked exponentially to a progressive increase
in the degree of instrumentation. 1 involves the use of relatively crude imple-
ments (trowel, spade, shovel, wheelbarrow, etc) as well as direct manipulation of
the material with the hands. In 2 natural sunlight is replaced by electric light;
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the environment of the room is artificially controlled by central heating and air
conditioning; the ground is replaced by a table as a working surface; much finer
implements are used in the excavation of cremation-vessel contents than those
employed by archaeologists out in the field. In 3 the examination of botanical
evidence takes place with the aid of highly complex scientific instruments, in the
wholly artificial environment of a laboratory. At this stage the seeing of the ob-
ject is mediated by the microscope, and touching is also mediated by the use of
intermediary devices. Direct bodily experience of the object, then, decreases as
the degree of instrumentation increases.
Because each step, in dissecting the object further, leaves behind more and more of
the total context, there is an increasing reliance on text. Text supplies the missing
context. Take the textual dimension away from the object in 2 and you are still left
with an object of archaeological significance, but an unprovenanced one. Take the
textual dimension away from the object in 3 and you are just left with a handful
of seeds.
As our attention narrows to explore the object in more and more detail, then,
there is more and more reliance upon text and instrumentation, less and less direct
bodily experience of the object and its original context - a progressive distancing
of the observer from the observed. Paradoxically, however, the horizon or scope
of our understanding seems to expand outwards as the physical horizon closes in
on us. While in 1 the horizon of understanding encompasses only the context of
practical human action in which the object was ntially formed (eg. the digging
of the pit, the depositing of the vessel in the pit, etc), in 2 a great deal more
can potentially be discovered about the wider context of past social organization,
ritual practices, etc, and in 3 the horizon encompasses a conception of the ancient
environment as a whole. This appears to be a characteristic of scientific analysis
in general: increased theoretical understanding is gained at the cost of placing a
distance between ourselves and the object of analysis.
In subsequent stages of knowledge-production (the writing of theses, textbooks,
theoretical works, etc) we reach the limits of the act of discovery. In so far as
we come to rely solely on other texts - the reports written, for example, by the
observers in 1, 2 and 3 - we tend to lose sight of the act of discovery and all
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contact with the actual material object itself. Language presents us with the
means of detaching 'lived' meanings completely from their expérléntial context. It
is possible to build edifice upon edifice of texts, each grounded in previous texts.
Analysis of texts or (textual) data is still a form of discovery, of course, involving
a subject (reader) and object (text), but it is discovery of quite a different order.
That is, it is the discovery of hidden or buried meanings amongst an accumulation
of signs and signification; these meanings may or may not bear any relation to
the things in the outside world to which they are understood to refer. Indeed,
the ideology of representation - the notion (in empiricism) that the text exactly
corresponds to reality, or (in post-modernism and literary theory) that the text
creates reality - leads inevitably to an alienation from the act of discovery proper
and the world-as-experienced. The act of discovery ends as soon as we complete
the transition from lifeworid to text.
It could be argued, of course, that the act of discovery does not begin with the un-
covering and recognition of an object or feature, that this event is itself pre-figured
by and causally dependent upon a sequence of preceding events. For example:-
3. The site is recognized as an area of archaeological significance from
crop-mark patterns on aerial photographs.
2. The plough-soil is removed to reveal the archaeological surface under-
neath, during the opening of the excavation trench.
1. The feature is uncovered, recognised and excavated.
In fact we find the same step-like regression in the approach to the act of discovery
as we did in the departure from it. Each event entails a different scale of observa-
tion. As we move from 1 back to 3, there is an increasing degree of instrumentation
(eg. 'digging' tools in 1, mechanical earth-moving machinery in 2, aeroplane and
camera in 3), an increasing reliance on text (or, in this case, photographs; the
siting of the excavation trench in 2 is informed by the aerial photographs taken in
3) and a progressive distancing of the observer from the observed. In step 3, direct
bodily contact with the object, even contact mediated through the use of tools,
has been lost entirely.
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There is also a progressive constriction of the horizon. The open horizon of 1 is re-
placed by a partial or truncated horizon in 2 (since the operator of the earth-moving
machine, sitting in the driver's cab, is compelled by the seating arrangement to
face in one direction; surveying the whole sweep of the horizon would entail turning
the machine a complete revolution). In 3 the horizon is provided by the viewfinder
of the camera, or the borders of the aerial photograph. Anyone looking at the
aerial photograph - which is a representation or sign of the object rather than the
object itself - is entirely removed from the act of discovery.
Of course, it is possible to discover in an aerial photograph patterns of archaeo-
logical evidence which have never been noticed before, either from the air or from
the ground. But in so far as this constitutes an act of discovery, it is a transaction
between the viewer as subject and the photograph as object. The real objects,
the material patterns themselves, do not figure in the transaction. This is what I
mean when I say that discoveries in texts (or photographs) are of an entirely dif-
ferent order. They may provide the rationale and purpose for engaging in an act
of discovery proper, just as the act of discovery provides the raw material or data
for further theoretical analysis. There is constant feedback and cross-fertilization
between the practical and theoretical domains. But generally speaking the act of
discovery occurs in the lifeworld, not in the text.
While accepting that the act of discovery can occur in progressively more diffuse
forms (2 and 3), then, we can now say something more about the act of discovery
proper (1). It takes place in the zone of focal attention, immediately in front of
the body. The emerging object is within sight, within reach; it can be directly
touched and manipulated with the hands, or with tools assimilated to the hands.
There is a minimum of distance, a minimum of intervening technology, between
the subject and the object. And there is no artificial horizon - such as the borders
of a photograph or the borders of a microscope slide - seperating the object under
investigation from the material and social environment in which the research takes
place. In the act of discovery, the meaning of an object is derived not so much
from accompanying inscriptions, but from its immediate material context (Section
8.3), and in relation to the total configuration of evidence across the site as a whole
(Section 3.2). An archaeological feature is a part of the site, which is a part of the
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general landscape, which is circumscribed only by the natural horizon, where the
earth meets the sky.
Perception has to be understood in this environmental context (Ittelson 1973,
Gibson 1979). The way in which material evidence is encountered on excavation is
conditioned by such factors as the weather. Frost may freeze the uppermost layers
of features (making archaeological patterns stand out a brilliant white against the
natural gravels, but rendering excavation difficult). Rain brings hitherto unseen
patterns to light or washes away the material results of a whole day's work. The
sun dries out the soil, causing clearly delineated soil-boundaries to vanish into
thin air. It casts shadows over the ground surface, obscuring significant patterns
further. But it also provides the light (far superior to electric light) that enables us
to see these patterns in the first instance. And a cold wind blowing off the estuary
not only sheds a thin film of dust from the quarry over the site; it also (or at least
it did on one occasion) brought the photography tower crashing to the ground, and
blew away our tea-hut. All this is part of the act of discovery. There are many
differences between scientific work which takes place outside in natural light and
open air, and scientific work which takes place in the artificial environment of a
museum or a laboratory.
But the site is not comprised of material patterns alone: in an important sense it
is comprised of workers and their working activity as well as the material which is
being worked upon. The material environment is the social environment. When
workers move around the site (on the network of planks laid out on the ground
surface), for example, they travel not just from place to place but from person to
person (Section 6.4). And these social transactions or 'visits' play a crucial role in
the constitution of objective meanings (Section 6.5). As Ittelson (1973:15) points
out, "environments are almost without exception encountered as part of a social
activity: other people are always part of the situation and environment perception
is largely a social phenomenon."
The individual subject is a participant in the environment, and the environment
perceived is always relative to the point of view of this participant. If we look out
across the site as it stretches towards the horizon, for instance, the horizon itself
specifies our own position at the very centre of its circle, and our vertical stance or
278
APhoto 11: The Horizon
posture relative to its horizontal, eye-level plane. Properly speaking, the horizon
is neither purely objective nor purely subjective, but rather a mixture of both.
In one sense the horizon is something we carry about with us wherever we go: it
frames the terrestrial environment in such a way that the objects within it, and the
spatial relationships between these objects, are perceived in relation (eg. near/far,
right/left, up/down) to our own central position and posture. In another sense we
retain our vertical stance - our balance - by continual reference to a horizon which
is very definitely 'out there'.
Normally it is the things within the horizon, not the horizon itself, that occupy
our attention. For the most part the horizon, like the body, is in the background -
rarely attended to as an object in itself. Only occasionally, at sunrise or sunset for
example (see Photo 11) does the horizon attract our interest. Focusing attention
on the horizon is always a reflective moment, simply because it specifies our own
body, as a kind of axis mundi, at the centre of the world perceived.
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12.7 Reconstituting the Subject and the Object
In attempting to 'escape from the text', this research project has been to some
extent opposed to the principal trend in post-modernist thought. Emphasis on the
text and other forms of discourse as the means by which knowledge is constituted
has led post-modernists to disregard the role of practical or non-discursive agency
in the production of knowledge. Indeed, it has been necessary to "reclaim reality" -
to use Bhaskar's (1989) phrase - from the textual theorists. I have tried to counter
their 'de-centreing' of the subject with a 're-centreing' of the subject. But this
does not imply a return to the Cartesian transcendental subject, divorced from
the world of objects. The subjects or 'knowers' of the fieldwork report are real
subjects - causal agents in the production of knowledge. They are embodied within
the objective environment, which means that they are always historically, socially
and materially situat&L Far from taking up a transcendental perspective upon
the world of things, they themselves occupy a space - a point of view - within the
world. They have hands to touch and transform as well as eyes to see, and their
feet are firmly planted on the surface of the earth. It is only in the act of inscription
that, through the imposition of the textual grid, they construct a transcendental
perspective upon the object of their labour, and thereby transform those objects
into the 'raw material' for subsequent theoretical analysis.
To reconstitute the subject in this way is also to reconstitute the object. We are
accustomed to conceiving of the object as a static and concrete entity - a plan in an
excavation report or an artefact in a museum. But in the act of discovery the object
has not yet been de-temporalised through the imposition of the textual grid. As
it emerges from the unfolding material field in the context of practical labour - as
it takes form in our perception and manipulation of it - the object has a temporal
structure. Bound up in a dialectic with the explorations of the subject, its form is
incomplete, its meaning uncertain. On the one hand it has a certain pliability to
it, so that it can be shaped (both manually and cognitively) to fit our preconceived
ideas. But on the other hand it has a hardness and resistance that refuses to let us
shape it as we please; it re-shapes our ideas about it even as it is shaped by them.
The dialectic that unfolds from moment to moment between the subject and the
object can be characterised as the ontological ground of archaeological knowledge.
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The reconstitution of the subject and the object (as a dialectical totality) is as
opposed to the 'objectivism' of traditional epistemologies as it is to the 'subjec-
tivism' of post-structuralism. Clearly objectivist schools have to take on board a
recognition of the active contribution of the subject in the production of objective
knowledge, and to recognise also that this knowledge is shaped in part by the social
and historical conditions of its production. But this does not necessarily imply a
shift to outright relativism. In the context of practical labour, the object acts back
upon the subject, and nature acts back upon culture - and it is precisely an ac-
count of this 'recalcitrant' object that is missing from post-structuralist and other
relativist schools of thought. A focus on practice, then, presents the means of over-
coming the so-called 'problem of relativism', and transcending the subject-object
dichotomy that is so deeply entrenched in modern thought.
Thus the principal intention of carrying out an ethnography of excavation has
been to explore the nature of subject-object transactions on one of the 'sites' of
the production of archaeological knowledge - and thereby to open up a field which
has hitherto remained hidden and unexplored within the sphere of archaeological
discourse.
12.8 New Perspectives: Avenues for Further Research
An ethnographic perspective upon archaeological practice leads to a view of knowl-
edge production very different from that put forward by standard epistemologies.
As Barnes and Edge (1982:3-4) point out, philosophies of science are often heav-
ily idealized accounts which may bear little relation to what actually happens in
practice: "the present need is for a general description which treats the beliefs and
practices of scientists in a completely down-to-earth, matter-of-fact way... The real
difficulty is the daunting extent of our ignorance of the basic features of scientific
activity and scientific inference, but in truth this is no greater than that routinely
faced by sociologists and anthropologists when they study other forms of culture."
Of particular importance, then, is the need for other ethnographies of archaeologi -
cal practice to be undertaken. The fieldwork results reported here are site-specific,
and specific also to the idiosyncratic point of view of the ethnographer. Apart
from the fact that a comparative base needs to be established, subsequent field-
281
work reports will no doubt show up the weaknesses of this thesis, and contribute
insights into archaeological practice that have not occurred to the present writer.
The idea of an ethnography of archaeology is emerging spontaneously and inde-
pendently in various parts of the world. Of especial interest is a project which
seeks to use the ethnographic perspective to explore issues of gender in archaeo-
logical practice (Joan Gero: personal communication). Failure to grasp excavation
as an 'engendered' praxis was a feature of my own fieldwork. Indeed, the very
gender-neutrality of the fieldwork report serves as a good example of how one's
own point of view, in bringing some issues to the foreground, inevitably places
others in the background. Nevertheless there is a common ground that links the
research presented here with the feminist project. Both are concerned with, as
Bhaskar (1989) puts it, "reclaiming reality" for sections of the community whose
subjectivity and agency tends to be played down or denied within conventional
theoretical discourse. And this project of reconstituting (the idea of) the subject
in the present day is inextricably bound up with the project of reconstituting (the
idea of) the archaeological subject in the (inferred) distant past - see Gero (1991)
on women's roles in the production of stone tools in prehistory.
An archaeological excavation can provide the setting for many different research
projects and methodologies. Almost any major problem that has arisen in the-'
oretical discourse can be 'brought down to earth' and 'grounded' in practice. I
hope I have sketched out the lines upon which such an 'existential archaeology'
or 'archaeology of experience' might proceed. (There are of course many stages
of knowledge-production which precede and follow on from the act of discovery -
eg. management decisions, negotiations with landowners, post-excavation sorting,
laboratory testing, cross-referencing and dating of finds, etc, right up to the writ-
ing and production of the text itself. An ethnography can be pitched on any of
these levels).
This is not to recommend that an army of ethnographers should descend upon
practitioners - only that a fraction of the consideration we give to the study of
the distant Other should be devoted to the study of our own material culture and
practices (through which we produce and reproduce our knowledge of the Other).
It is, after all, by taking up a perspective on others which we never take up on
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ourselves that the myth of the 'primitive' has been constructed and maintained
(Kuper 1988). Laurens van der Post (1955) warned that the western world has
become a kind of "one-eyed giant", which has forgotten how to "balance the fixed
outward stare with a questioning inner glance." A reflexive archaeology must seek
to re-open that closed inward-looking eye.
This thesis, then, has not just been about practice. It has attempted to taclde
the issues of analogy and perspective on a theoretical level too. Indeed, the idea
of an ethnography of archaeological practice arose in the first instance out of a
questioning of established 'root-metaphors' or 'basic analogies', and the general
perspectives upon the world that these give rise to. By shifting from the metaphor
of material remain as MATERIAL RECORD or TEXT (an ancient metaphor based
ultimately on the theological idea of the liber mundi - see Dalferth 1988:67-70) to
the metaphor of material remains as RAW MATERIAL, it has been possible to
construct not so much a replacement but an alternative theoretical standpoint.
There are other possible root-metaphors; some may prove to be fertile and appro-
priate, others not. Further exploration of the metaphors that lie at the heart of
scientific thinking and practice is likely to lead to very different research projects,
new ways of looking at things, and the opening up of new fields.
12.9 The Ironic Twist
Irony has figured prominently in this thesis; the bringing back of the archaeolog-
ical perspective to bear upon archaeologists themselves is itself a kind of 'ironic
twist'. It is time, then, that the ethnographer too should be subjected to the same
treatment.
The irony of a text that claims to 'escape from the text' will not have escaped the
reader. In the last analysis it has to be acknowledged that, since all the findings
of fieldwork have been translated into textual form, any escape from the text has
only been a partial and temporary one. Acts of inscription (note-taking, sketching,
taking photographs) formed a large part of the actual fieldwork experience. The
textual data thus produced have been subject to further processing and analysis,
leading up to the writing of the thesis itself. Events have been de-temporalised,
re-ordered, artificially-bounded, abstracted out of the flux of experience in which
they took place. In accordance with standard conventions of ethnographic writing,
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whole areas or dimensions of human action have been 'written out' (eg. the per-
sonalities of diggers, which are manifested in everything they do and say). On the
other hand, the names and utterances of numerous well-known academic figures
have been 'written in' - partly for the purpose of lending 'authority' to the text. In
sum, just about all the general criticisms made of excavation-reports in Chapter
2 apply to this text also. And in trying to bring to light what is lost through
the imposition of the 'textual grid' (Chapter 11), the ethnographer has imposed a
textual grid of his own.
A further irony lies in the claim that the thesis has somehow apprehended the
elusive subject-object relation. It is certainly true that the taking up of an ethno-
graphic perspective has facilitated the constitution of the act of discovery (the
subject-object transactions which characterise excavation practice) as the object
of study. But the real subject - the ethnographer, or indeed the reader - has for the
most part remained in the background. It could therefore be argued, quite rightly,
that the subject-object relation has not been apprehended at all. This is the cen-
tral paradox that I have been most concerned to bring to light. As J.W.Dunne
(1956:13) so cogently puts it:-
"It is impossible for you, who are part of the universe, to achieve the viewpoint
of an observer standing outside that universe that includes you. You can only
see one end of the stick; for the other end is you."
284
Bibliography
Arbib, M. and Hesse, M. 1986
The construction of reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ascher, R. 1961
'Analogy in archaeological interpretation', in S. W. Journal of Anthropology
17, 317-25.
Ashmore, M. 1989
The reflexive thesis: wrighting sociology of scientific knowledge, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press.
Ayer, A. 1956
The problem of knowledge, London, Macmillan.
Bachelard, G. 1964a
The psychoanalysis of fire (trans. by A.C.M.Ross), London, Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Bachelard, 0. 1964b
The poetics of space (trans. by M.Jolas), New York, Orion Press.
Bapty, I. and Yates, T. 1990
Archaeology after structuralism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Barker, P. 1977
Techniques of archaeological excavation, London, Batsford.
Barnes, B. and Edge, D. (eds) 1982
Science in Context, Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
Barrett, J. 1987/8
'Fields of discourse: reconstituting a social archaeology', in Critique of An-
thropology 7:3, 5-16.
Bateson, 0. 1965
Naven (2nd edition), Stanford, California University Press.
Baurnan, Z. 1973
Culture as praxis, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Bensman, J. and Lilienfield, R. 1973
Craft and consciousness; occupational technique and the development of
world images, New York, John Wiley and Sons.
285
Benthall, J. 1976
The body electric, London, Thames and Hudson.
Bender, B. 1989
'Comments on archaeology into the 1990s', in Norwegian Archaeological
Review 22:1, 12-14.
Ben-Zeev, A. 1989
'Explaining the subject-object relation in perception', in Social Research
56:2, 511-542.
Berger, J. 1972
Ways of seeing, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. 1967
The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge,
New York, Anchor Books.
Bernstein, R. J. 1971
Praxis and action, London, Duckworth.
Bhaskar, R. 1975
A realist theory of science, Leeds, Leeds Books.
Bhaskar, R. 1989
Reclaiming reality, London, Verso.
Biemel, W. 1977
Martin Heidegger: an illustrated study (trans by J.L.Mehta), London, Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul.
Binford, L. R. 1967
'Smudge pits and hide smoking: the use of analogy in archaeological rea-
soning', in American Antiquity 32, 1-12.
Binford, L. R. 1976
'Forty-seven trips: a case study in the character of archaeological formation
processes', in Hall, E. S. (ed) Contributions to anthropology: the interior
people of Northern Alaska, Archaeological Survey of Canada 49, Ottawa.
Biuford, L. R. 1978
Nunamuit ethnoarchaeology, New York, Academic Press.
Binford, L. R. 1980
'Willow smoke and dog's tails: hunter-gatherer settlement systems and ar-
chaeological site formation', in American Antiquity 45, 4-20.
Binford, L. R. 1981
Bones: ancient men and modern myths, New York, Academic Press.
Binford, L. R. 1982
286
'Meaning, inference and the material record', in Renfrew, C. and Shennan,
S. (eds) Ranking, resource and exchange: aspects of the archaeology of early
European society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 126-163.
Binford, L. R.
'Data, relativism and archaeological science', in Man (n. ․) 22, 391-404.
Binford, L. R.. and Binford, S. R. 1968
New perspectives in archaeology, Chicago, Aldine.
Black, M. 1962
Models and metaphors, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Blacking, J. (ed) 1977
The anthropology of the body, London, Academic Press.
Blake, W. 1979
Blake 's poetry and designs (edited by M.L.Johnson and J.E.Grant), New
York, W.W.Norton and Co.
Bloch, M. 1971
Placing the dead: tombs, ancestral villages and kinship organization in
Madagascar, London, Seminar Press.
Bloch, M. 1977
'The past and the present in the present', in Man (n. ․) 12, 278-292.
Bloch, M. 1986
From blessing to violence: history and ideology in the circumcision ritual of
the Merina of Madagascar, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Bloor, D. 1983
Wittgenstein: a social theory of knowledge, London, Macmillan.
Bourdieu, P. 1973
'The Berber house', in Douglas 1973, 98-110.
Bourdieu, P. 1975
'The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress
of reason', in Social Science Information 14, 19-47.
Bourdieu, P. 1977
Outline of a theory of practice, (trans by R.Nice) Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. 1988
Homo academjcus (trans by P.Collier), Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. 1990
The logic of practice (trans by R.Nice), Cambridge, Polity Press.
287
Bourdieu, P. 1991
In other words: essays towards a reflexive sociology, Stanford, Stanford
University Press.
Boyne, R. 1988
'The art of the body in the discourse of postmodernity', in Theory, Culture
and Society 5, 527-42.
Bracher, M. 1985
Being form 'd: thinking through Blake 's Milton, New York, Clinamen Stud-
ies.
Brannigan, A. 1981
The social basis of scientific discoveries, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Burne, C.S. and Jackson G.F. 1983-86
Shropshire folklore.
CaJlinicos, A. 1989
Against postmodernism: a marxist critique, Cambridge, Polity Press.
Certeau, M. de 1984
The practice of everyday life (trans by S.F.Rendall), Berkeley, University
of California Press.
Cicourel, A.V. 1973
Cognitive sociology, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Clifford, J. and Marcus, G.E. (eds) 1986
Writing culture: the poetics and politics of ethnography, Berkeley, University
of California Press.
Cole, M. and Scribner, S. 1974
Culture and thought, New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Conkey, M.W. 1980
'Context, structure and efficacy in palaeolithic art and design', in Foster
and Brandes 1980, 225-248.
Conkey, M.W. and Spector, J. 1984
'Archaeology and the study of gender', in Schiffer, M. (ed) Advances in
archaeological method and theory 7, 1-38.
Conkey, M.W. 1991
'Contexts of action, contexts for power': material culture and gender in the
Magdelanian', in Gero and Conkey 1991, 57-92.
Conlon, V.M. 1973
Camera techniques in archaeology, London, John Baker.
288
Cooley, M. 1980
Architect or bee?, Slough, Langley Technical Services.
Coulter, J. 1989
Mind in action, Cambridge, Polity Press.
Cronin, B. 1984
The citation process, London, Taylor Graham.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. and Rochberg-Halton, E. 1981
The meaning of things: domestic symbols and the self, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Cushman, D. and Marcus, G. 1982
'Ethnographies as texts' in Annual Review of Anthropology 11, 25-69.
Dalferth, I.U. 1988
Theology and philosophy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Dalton, G. 1981
'Anthropological models in archaeological perspective', in Hodder,I., Isaac,
G. and Hammond, N. (eds) Pattern of the past, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Daniel, G. 1950
A hundred years of archaeology, London, Duckworth.
Daniel, G. and Renfrew, C. 1988
The idea of prehistory, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
Danto, A.C. 1975
Sartre, Glasgow, Collins.
Danto, A.C. 1981
The transfiguration of common-sense, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Deacon, A.B. and Wedgewood, C. 1970
Malekula: a vanishing people in the New Hebrides, Ousterhout, Anthropo-
logical Publications.
de Beauvoir, S. 1952
The second sex (trans by H.M.Parshley), New York, Alfred.K.Knopf.
De Boer, W.R. and Lathrap, D.W. 1979
'The making and breaking of Shipibo-Conibo ceramics', in Kramer 1979,
102-138.
Dent, N.J.H. 1988
Rousseau: an introduction to his psychological, social and political theory,
Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
289
Derrida, J. 1977
Of Grammatology (trans by G.C.Spivak), Baltimore, John Hopkins Univer-
sity Press.
Dewey, J. 1929
Experience and nature, London, George Allen and Unwin.
Dewey, J. and Bentley, A.F. 1949
Knowing and the known, Boston, Beacon Press.
Dobres, M-A. 1988
'Feminist archaeology and inquiries into gender relations', in Archaeological
Review from Cambridge 7:1, 30-44.
Douglas, J.D. and Johnson, J.M. (eds) 1977
Existential sociology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Douglas, M. 1966
Purity and Danger, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Douglas, M. 1970
Natural symbols, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Douglas, M. 1972
'Self-evidence', in Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute for
1972.
Douglas, M. (ed) 1973
Rules and meanings, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Douglas, M. 1980
Evans-Pritchard, Sussex, Harvester Press.
Dubery, F. and Willats, J. 1983
Perspective and other dratiring systems, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold
Company.
Dunne, J.W. 1956
Nothing dies (2nd edition), London.
Eliot, T.S. 1944
Four quartets London, Faber and Faber.
Evans, C. 1988
'Monuments and analogy: the interpretation of causewayed enclosures', in
Burgess.C. et al Enclosures and defences in the neolithic of western Europe,
Part I, BAR (I.S) 403(i), 47-73.
Fabian, J. 1983
Time and the other, New York, Columbia University Press.
290
Fagan, B.M. 1980
People of the earth (3rd edition), Boston, Little.	 -
Fleck, L. 1979
Genesis and development of a scientific fact, Chicago, Chicago University
Press.
Freeman, C.G. 1968
'A theoretical framework for understanding archaeological materials', in
Lee, R.B. and De Yore, I. (eds) Man the hunter, Chicago, Aldine, 262-267.
Foster, M.L. and Brandes, S.H. 1980
Symbol as sense: new approaches to the analysis of meaning, New York,
Academic Press.
Gadamer, H-G. 1975
Truth and method, New York, Continuum.
Gadamer, H-G. 1976
Philosophical hermeneutics (trans and edited by D.E.Linge), Berkeley, Uni-
versity of California Press.
Geertz, C. 1973
The interpretation of cultures, New York, Basic Books.
Geertz, C. 1983
Local knowledge: further essays in interpretive anthropology, New York,
Basic Books.
Geertz, C. 1984
'Distinguished lecture: anti-anti-relativism', in American Anthropologist
86:2, 263-278.
Geertz, C. 1988
Works and Lives, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Gero, J.M. 1991
'Genderlithics: women's roles in stone tool production', in Gero and Conkey
1991, 163-193.
Gero, J.M. and Conkey, M.W. (eds) 1991
Engendering archaeology: women and prehistory, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Gibson, J.J. 1979
The ecological approach to visual perception, Boston, Houghton Muffin.
Gibson, J.J. 1982
Reasons for realism: selected essays of James.J.Gibson (edited by E.Reed
and R.Jones), Hillsdale, Eribaum Associates.
Giddens, A. 1976
291
New rules of sociological method, London, Hutchinson.
Giddens, A. 1984
The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration, Cam-
bridge, Polity Press.
Gombrich, E. 1960
Art and illusion a study in the psychology of pictorial representation, Lon-
don, Phaidon.
Goodman, N. 1968
Languages of art, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Gould, R.A. (ed) 1978
Explorations in ethnoarchaeology, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico
Press.
Gould, R.A. 1980
Living archaeology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Gould, R.A. and Schiffer, M. (eds) 1981
Modern material culture: the archaeology of us, New York, Academic Press.
Grinsell, L., Rahtz, P., and Price-Williams, D. 1974
The preparation of archaeological reports (2nd edition), London, Baker.
Gurvitsch, A. 1970
'Problems of the Life-world', in Natanson, M. (ed) Phenomenology and
social reality: essays in memory of Alfred Schutz, The Hague, Martinus
Nijhoff.
Hampshire, S. 1965
Thought and action (3rd edition), London, Chatto and Windus.
Harding, A.F. and Coles, J.M. 1979
The bronze age in Europe, London, Methuen.
Harre, R. 1986
Varieties of realism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Harris, E.C. 1979
Principles of archaeological stratigraphy, London, Academic Press.
Hawkes, C. 1954
'Archaeological theory and method: some suggestions from the Old World',
in American Anthropology 56, 155-168.
Hawkins, D.J.B. 1954
Being and becoming: an essay towards a critical metaphysics, London,
Sheed and Ward.
292
Heidegger, M. 1962
Being and time (trans by J.Maquarrie and E.Robinson), Oxford, Basil
Blackwell.
Heidegger, M. 1977
The question concerning technology (trans by W.Lovitt), New York, Harper
and Row.
Heidegger, M. 1988
The basic problems of phenomenology (trans by A.Hofstadter), Indianapolis,
Indiana University Press.
Heider, F. 1958
The psychology of interpersonal relations, New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Henderson, W. 1879
Notes on the folklore of the northern counties of England and the Borders,
London.
Herskorits, M.J. 1948
Man and his works, New York, Alfred.A.Knopf.
Hodder, I. 1982a
The present past, London, Batsford.
Hodder, I. 1982b
Symbols in action: ethnoarchaeological studies of material culture, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
Hodder, I. 1982c
'Theoretical archaeology: a reactionary view', in Hodder, I. (ed) Symbolic
and structural archaeology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1-16.
Hodder, I. 1985
'Post-processual archaeology', in Schiffer, M. (ed) Advances in Archaeolog-
ical Method and Theory 8, New York, Academic Press, 1-25.
Hodder, I. 1986
Reading the past: current approaches to interpretation in archaeology, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
Hodder, I. 1987a
The archaeology of contextual meanings, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Hodder, I. 1987b
'Reading Bell reading 'Reading the past", in Archaeological Review from
Cambridge 6:1, 87-91.
Hodder, I. 1989
293
'Writing archaeology: site reports in context', in Antiquity 68, 268-274.
Holy, L. (ed) 1987
Comparative anthropology, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Honneth, A. and Joas, H. 1988
Social action and human nature, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Hudson, W. 1960
'Pictorial depth-perception in sub-cultural groups in Africa', in Journal of
Social Psychology 5, 183-208.
Hudson, W.D. 1974
A philosophical approach to religion, London, Macmillan.
Husserl, E. 1964
The idea of phenomenology (trans by W.P.Alton and G.Nakhnikian), The
Hague, Nijhoff.
Ingold, T. 1986
The appropriation of nature, Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Ittelson, W.H. (ed) 1973
Environment and perception, New York, Seminar Press.
Ittelson, W.H. and Cantril, H. 1954
Perception: a transactional approach, New York, Doubleday.
Jaspars, J., Fincham, F.D. and Hewstone, M. (eds) 1983
Attribution theory and research, London, Academic Press.
Johnson, M. 1987
Body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning, imagination and reason,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Kitahara-Frisch, J. 1980
'Symbolizing technology as a key to human evolution', in Foster and Bran-
des 1980, 211-223.
Knorr-Cetina, K.D. 1981
The manufacture of knowledge: an essay on the constructivist and contex-
tual nature of science, Oxford, Pergamon.
Knorr-Cetina, K.D. 1983
'The ethnographic study of scientific work: towards a constructivist inter-
pretation of science', in Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983, 115-140.
Knorr-Cetjna, K.D. and Mulkay, M. (eds) 1983
Science observed: perspectives on the social study of science, London, Sage.
Koestler, A. 1969
294
The act of creation, London, Hutchinson.
Kolakowski, L. 1988
Metaphysical horror, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Kramer, C. (ed) 1979
Ethnoarchaeology: implications of ethnography for archaeology, New York,
Columbia University Press.
Kubovy, M. 1989
The psychology of perspective and Renaissance art, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Kuhn, T.S. 1962
The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Kuper, A. 1988
The invention of primitive society: transformations of an illusion, London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Kwant, R.C. 1965
Phenomenology of language, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press.
Lakoff, G. 1989
'Some empirical results about the nature of concepts', in Mind and Language
14:1, 103-129.
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. 1980
Metaphors we live by, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Langlord, G. 1971
Human action, New York, Doubleday.
Latour, B. 1988
'A relativistic account of Einstein's relativity', in Social Studies of Science
18:1, 3-44.
Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. 1979
Laboratory life: the social construction of scientific facts, Beverly Hills,
Sage.
Lawson, H. 1985
Reflexivity: the post-modern predicament London, Hutchinson.
Layton, R.H. 1977
'Naturalism and cultural relativity in art', in Ucko, P.J. (ed) Form in indige-
nous art: schematisation in the art of aboriginal Australia and prehistoric
Europe, London, Duckworth.
Layton, R.H. 1981
The anthropology of art, London, Granada.
295
Layton, R.H. 1987
'The use of ethnographic parallels in interpreting upper palaeolithic rock
art', in Holy 1987, 210-239.
Layton, R.H. (ed) 1989
Conflict in the archaeology of living traditions, London, Unwin Hyman.
Leach, E. 1976
Culture and communication: the logic by which symbols are connected, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
Leatherdale, W.H. 1974
The role of analogy, model and metaphor in science, Amsterdam, North
Holland Publishing Co.
Lee, D.N. and Aronson, E. 1974
'Visual proprioceptive control of standing in human infants', in Perception
and Psychophysics 15, 529-532.
Lee, D.N. and Lishman, J.R. 1975
'Visual proprioceptive control of stance', in Journal of Human Movement
Studies 1: 87-95.
Legge, D. and Barber, P.J. 1976
Information and skill, London, Methuen.
Levi-Strauss, C. 1969
The raw and the cooked, New York, Harper and Row.
Ley, D. 1977
'Social geography and the taken-for-granted world', in Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers (N.S) 2:4, 498-512.
Limbrey, S. 1975
Soil science and archaeology, London, Academic Press.
Losonsky, M. 1990
'The nature of artifacts', in Philosophy 65:251, 81-88.
Lucie-Smith, E. 1981
The story of craft: the craftsman's role in society, Oxford, Phaidon.
Lynch, M. 1985
Art and artifact in laboratory science: a study of shop work and shop talk
in a research laboratory, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Marcus, G.E. and Cushman, D. 1982
'Ethnographies as texts', in Annual Review of Anthropology 11, 25-69.
Marcus, G.E. and Fischer, M.M.J. 1986
Anthropology as cultural critique: an experimental moment in the human
296
sciences, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Markus, G. 1978
Marxism and anthropology: the concept of human essence in the philosophy
of Marx, Assen (the Netherlands), Van Gorcum.
Marwick, E.W. 1975
The folklore of Orkney and Shetland London, Batsford.
Marx, K. 1967
Writings of the young Marx (edited by L.D.Easton and K.H.Guddat), New
York, Doubleday.
Marx, K. 1973
Grundisse (trans by M .Nicolaus), Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Marx, K. 1976
Capital, vol I, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Mauss, M. 1979
Sociology and psychology (trans by B.Brewster), London, Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962
Phenomenology of perception (trans by C.Smith), London, Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964
The primacy of perception, Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1968
The Visible and the invisible (trans by A.Lingis), Evanston, Northwestern
University Press.
Mey, M.de 1982
The cognitive paradigm, Dordrecht, Reidel.
Miller, D. 1983
'Things ain't what they used to be', in Royal Anthropological Institute News
59, 5-7.
Miller, D. 1987
Material culture and mass consumption, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Monod, J. 1972
Chance and necessity, Glasgow, Collins.
Morris, B. 1989
'Notes on the dualistic world view of Tim Ingold', in Critique of Anthropol-
ogy 9:3, 71-79.
297
Mulkay, M. 1979
Science and the sociology of knowledge, London, Allen and.
 Unwin.
Neisser, U. 1976
Cognition and reality, San Francisco, W.H.Freeman.
Nisbet, R.A. 1969
Social change and history, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Oaldey, K.P. 1954
'Skill as a human possession' in Singer, C. (ed) A history of technology I,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1-37.
Oakley, K.P. 1963
Man the toolmaker, fifth edition, London, British Museum Publications.
Olafson, F.A. 1987
Heidegger and the philosophy of minc4 New Haven, Yale University Press.
Orme, B. 1981
Anthropology for archaeologists: an introduction, London, Duckworth.
Ortner, S.B. 1974
'Is female to male as male is to culture?' in Rosaldo, M.Z. and Lamphere,
L. (eds) Women, culture and society, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Patrik, L.E. 1985
'Is there an archaeological record?', in Schiffer,M.B.(ed) Advances in ar-
chaeological method and theory 8, New York, Academic Press.
Patterson, T.C. 1989
'History and the post-processual archaeologies', in Man (n. ․) 24, 555-566.
Pepper, S. 1942
World hypotheses, Berkeley, University of California Press.
Piaget, J. 1971
Structuralisin (trans by C.Maschler), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. 1969
The psychology of the child, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Pickles, J. 1985 Phenomenology, science and geography: spatiality in the human
sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Pinsky, V. and Wylie, A. (eds) 1989
Critical traditions in contemporary archaeology: essays in the philosophy,
history and socio-politics of archaeology, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Pitcairn, R.L. 1833
298
Ancient criminal tales of Scotland, vol III, part II.
Pitt-Rivers, A.H.F.L. 1898
Excavations in Cranborne Chase iv, London.
Polanyi, M. 1958
Personal knowledge, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Polanyi, M. 1959
The study of Man, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Polanyi, M. 1967
The tacit dimension, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Rabinow, P. 1977
Reflections on fieldwork in Morocco, Berkeley, the University of California
Press.
Rathje, W.L. 1981
'A manifesto for modern material culture studies' in Gould and Schiffer
1981, 51-56.
Ravetz, J.R. 1971
Scientific knowledge and its social problems, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Renfrew, C. 1989
'Comments on archaeology into the 1990s', in Norwegian Archaeological
Review 2E:1, 33-41.
Richardeon, J. 1986
Existential epistemology, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Rogoff, B. and Lave, J. 1984
Everyday cognition: its development in social context, Cambridge (Mass),
Harvard University Press.
Rosch, E. 1978
'Principles of categorization', in Rosch,E. and Lloyd, B.B. (eds) Cognition
and Categorization, Hillsdale, Eribaum Associates, 27-48.
Rousseau, J-J. 1913
The social contract, discourses (trans by G.D.H.Cole), London.
Rowling, M. 1976
The folklore of the Lake District, London, Batsford.
Rubia-Barcia, J. and Zeitlin, M.A. (eds) 1967
Unamuno: creator and creation, Los Angeles, University of California Press.
Ryle, G. 1949
The concept of mind, London, Hutchinson.
299
Sabloff, J.A., Binford, L.R. and Macanany, P.A. 1987
'Understanding the archaeological record', in Antiquity 61,• 203-209.
Samuels, M.S. 1978
'Existentialism and human geography', in Ley, D. and Samuels, M.S. Hu-
manistic geography, Chicago, Maroufa Press, 22-40.
Sartre, J-P. 1947
Existentialism and humanism (trans by P.Mairet), London, Methuen.
Sartre, J-P. 1957
Being and nothingness (trans by H.Barnes), London, Methuen.
Sartre, J-P. 1976
Critique of dialectical reason (trans by A.Sheridan-Smith), London, NLB.
Schiffer, M.B. 1976
Behavioural archaeology, New York, Academic Press.
Schiffer, M.B. 1983
'Towards the identification of formation processes', in American Antiquity
37, 156-165.
Scholte, B. 1986
'The charmed circle of Geertz's hermeneutics: a neo-marxist critique', in
Critique of Anthropology 6:1, 5-15.
Schutz, A. 1964
Studies in social theory: collected papers, vol II (ed by A.Broderson), The
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
Schutz, A. 1971
The problem of social reality: collected papers, vol I (ed by M.Natanson),
The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
Schutz, A. 1973
'The frame of unquestioned constructs' in Douglas 1973, 18-20.
Schutz, A. and Luckmann, T. 1973
The structures of the life-world (trans by R.M.Zaner and H.T.Engelhardt),
London, Heinemann.
Searle, J.R. 1984
Minds, brains and science, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Shanks, M. and Tilley, C. 1987a
Reconstructing archaeology: theory and practice, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Shanks, M. and Tilley, C. 1987b
Social theory and archaeology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
300
Shanks, M. and Tilley, C. 1989
Archaeology into the 1990s', in Norwegian Archaeological Review 22:1,
1-12, 42-54.
Shotter, J. 1990 'Underlabourers for science, or toolmakers for society?', in History
of the Human Sciences 3:3.
Silverman, E.R. 1990
'Clifford Geertz: towards a more "thick" understanding?', in Tilley (ed)
1990, 121-159.
Smith, D. 1977
'The social construction of documentary reality', in Sociological Inquiry 44,
25 7-288.
Sohn-Rethel, A. 1978
Intellectual and manual labour, London, Macmillan.
Spencer, J. 1989
'Anthropology as a kind of writing', in Man (n. ․) 24, 145-64.
Sperber, D. 1985
On anthropological knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Stern, A. 1967
'Unamuno: pioneer of existentialism' in Rubia-Barcia and Zeitlin 1967, 26-
47.
Stiles, D. 1977
'Ethnoarchaeology: a discussion of methods and applications', in Man (n. ․)
12, 86-99.
Stocking, G.W. (ed) 1983
Observers observed: essays on ethnographic fieldwork, Madison, University
of Wisconsin Press.
Street, B. 1989
review of Tylor 1987, in Man (n. ․) 24, 366-8.
Sullivan, A.P. 1978
'Inference and evidence in archaeology: a discussion of the conceptual prob-
lems', in Schiffer, M.B. (ed) Advances in archaeological method and theory
1, New York, Academic Press, 183-222.
Sydie, R.A. 1987
Natural women, cultured men: a feminist perspective on sociological theory,
Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
Tagg, J. 1988
The burden of representation: essays on photographies and histories, Lon-
301
don, Macmillan.
Tagiuri, R. and Petrullo, L. (eds) 1958
Person perception and interpersonal behaviour, Stanford, Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Tempels, P. 1959
Bantu philosophy, Paris, Presence Africaine.
Tilley, C. 1989
'Excavation as theatre', in Antiquity 63, 275-280.
Tilley, C. (ed) 1990
Reading material culture, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Thompson, P. 1983
The nature of work, London, Macmillan.
Turner, B.S. 1984
The body and society: explorations in social theory, London, Basil Blackwell.
Turner, V.W. 1968
The drums of affliction: a study of religious processes among the Ndembu
of Zambia, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Turner, V.W. 1974
Dramas, fields and metaphors, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Turner, V.W. 1975
'Symbolic studies', in Annual Review of Anthropology 4, 145-161.
Tylor, S.A. 1987
The unspeakable: discourse, dialogue and rhetoric in the post-modern world,
Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.
Ucko, P.J. 1969
'Ethnography and the archaeological interpretation of funerary remains' in
World Archaeology 1, 262-280.
Uemov, A.I. 1970
'The basic forms and rules of inference by analogy', in Tavanec, P.V. (ed)
Problems of the logic of scientific knowledge, Dordrecht, Riedel, 266-311.
Unamuno, M. de 1931
The tragic sense of life in men
Flitch), London, Macmillan.
and in peoples (trans by J.E.Crawford-
Van der Post, L. 1955
The dark eye in Africa, London, Hogarth Press.
Warrilow, W., Owen, G. and Britnell, W. 1986
302
'Eight ring-ditches at Four Crosses, Llandysilio, Powys, 1981-85' in Pro-
ceedings of the Prehistoric Society 52, 53-87.
Watson, P.J. 1973
'Explanations and models: the prehistorian as philosopher of science and
the prehistorian as excavator of the past', in Renfrew, C. (ed) The expla-
nation of culture change, London, Duckworth, 47-52.
Watson, P.J., Leblanc, S.A. and Redman C.L. 1971
Explanation in archaeology: an explicitly scientific approach, New York,
Columbia University Press.
Welford, A.T. 1970
'On the nature of skill' in Legge, D. (ed) Skills, Harmondsworth, Penguin,
21-32.
Williamson, C. 1990
'Attitudes towards the body: philosophy and common-sense' in Philosoph-
ical Quarterly O:161, 466-488.
Wittgenstein, L. l967a
Philosophical investigations (3rd edition, trans by G.Anscombe), Oxford,
Basil Blackwefl.
Wittgenstein, L. 1967b
Zettel (trans by G.Anscombe), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 1969
The blue and brown books, Oxford, Blackweil.
Woolgar, S. 1988a
Science: the very idea, London, Tavistock Publications.
Woolgar, S. (ed) 1988b
Knowledge and reflexivity: new frontiers in the sociology of knowledge, Lon-
don, Sage.
Wylie, A. 1985 'The reaction against analogy', in Schiffer, M.B. (ed) Advances in
archaeological method and theory 8, New York, Academic Press, 63-111.
Yates, T. 1990 'Derrida: there is nothing outside of the text', in Tilley 1990,
206-280.
Ziman, J. 1978 Reliable knowledge: an exploration of the grounds for belief in
science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
303
Appendix A
Notes on Sketches
Sketches were drawn out on site, during interviews. They attempt to capture
something of the present state of emerging patterns of significance, the position of
workers within the material field, the direction they are facing and the tools they
are using, and the direction in which the material field is unfolding as it is being
worked. Originally intended for personal reference only, it was found necessary
in writing the text to provide the reader with some pictorial representations as a
supplement to the written descriptions of material evidence encountered. I have
modified sketches slightly to make them suitable for inclusion in the text.
In putting them into the text, however, I have taken care to retain something of
their character as sketches, rather than reify them into concrete facts by the use
of heavy inked-in lines or printed letters. The sketches represent a fleeting glimpse
of a field that was always changing - a moment captured and abstracted out of
the flux of ongoing experience. They were drawn hurriedly, often in windy or wet
conditions, sometimes with freezing hands. The reader is reminded that they are
neither wholly accurate nor comprehensive representations of material evidence.
Scales given are approximate. And I have included only those material patterns
directly in view which were relevant to my discussions with workers on the scene.
As the archaeological reader will observe, I have adapted the forms of depiction
that archaeologists use in planning material evidence to my own ends. Like plans,
the sketches are two-dimensional - except where hashers indicate sloping ground
or sides of features. Other symbols are:-
- - - - or _______	 edges, outlines or cuts of features, depending on their de-
gree of clarity.
limits of trowelled area, section-lines, or any pattern im-
-. -. -.
	 posed upon the material field by archaeologists them-
selves.
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location of finds, usually marked with a label or a finds-
bag nailed to the ground.
5 :	 the worker, the direction he or she is facing, and the tools
being used.
the line of spoil in front of the worker, and the direction in
which the material field is unfolding as it is being worked.
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Appendix B
'Natural Artefacts': Postscript to Chapter 8
By definition, artefacts are the products and instruments of human (cultural)
agency. It is of some comparative interest, then, that in the not-too-distant
past prehistoric artefacts were interpreted as the effects of natural or super'nat-
ural agency. The folklore literature of Britain, Ireland and Scandinavia contains
many references to the discovery of 'thunderbolts' and 'elf-arrows' - objects which
today would be seen to be stone axes or arrowheads of cultural rather than (super)
natural origin (Daniel 1950:26, Hodder 1982a:32). This does not mean, however,
that rural people of former times, without the benefit of recent advances in ar-
chaeological and ethnographic knowledge, were unable to perceive the qualities of
artefactuality and design in material objects; it is simply that their concept of
nature was different from ours. Nature, to some extent at least, was 'peopled' by
spirits, elves, gods, etc; it was, in short, an anthropomorphized nature. Discovered
artefacts were perceived and interpreted within such supernatural schemes, giving
rise to the apparent contradiction of 'natural artefacts'.
Elf-arrows - otherwise known as elf-shot, elf-darts, elf-bolts, etc - are a recurring
motif in country lore. In the Icelandic Bandamanna Saga a Viking named Hermund
is said to have died from the wound of an invisible elf-arrow after hearing the chime
of a bow-string while out riding on the open fell (elves were believed to inhabit
Alfheim, one of the nine realms of Norse cosmology). Even as late as 1884 there
was a man still living in Orkney who was "lame from the effects of an arrow
which was shot into his back when he was ploughing by a hill-trow" (quoted in
Marwick 1975:44). In these stories, and many others like them, there is a very
clear conception of how arrowheads were used, the kind of tools they were used
with, the function and purpose of this total instrumental complex in the context
of an intentional activity. Indeed, the context of use of these artefacts is implied
by the very name 'elf-arrow'. lithe necessary skills, purposes, intentions-in-action
and sequence of motor-movements associated with archery have been ascribed to
a supernatural being, there is nevertheless a basic understanding of human agency
- analogically transposed into the supernatural domain.
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Writing in 1816, Wilkie records that "... a few years ago a ploughman in Eltrick
Forest obtained an elf-stone thus. While ploughing a field h heard a whizzing
sound... and looking up perceived a stone aimed at one of his horses.. .it fell by
the animal's side. He stopped and picked up the stone but found its angles so
sharp that they cut his hand"(quoted in Henderson 1866:185-6). Although in
this instance the object is labelled as an 'elf-stone' rather than an 'elf-arrow', the
function of the stone as a projectile was self-evident to the ploughman. Exactly
how he understood the missile to have been sent forth - thrown perhaps? - is not
clear. But the perceived fact that the stone had been 'aimed' implies an act of
intent, a purpose and a carrying out of that purpose, on the part of some invisible
agent. In this way he attributes cognitive powers of foresight and intent to the
supernatural being, in much Lhe same way as archaeologists do to past human
agents.
The structure of the act of discovery in this case is broadly similar to that of
archaeological acts of discovery. The encounter occurs in the context of an ongoing
practical task, in which the ground is being worked by means of tools. Because
it is being worked, the material field has a temporal structure; it unfolds through
time, with new objects - previously hidden - continually being brought to light.
Probably the ploughman treated his work as a matter of routine. But suddenly
an object emerged which disrupted routine, and prompted him to pick it up and
examine it more closely. This is a good example of the 'jumping out' of a significant
object. Almost certainly the object seemed to fly through the air because it had
been dislodged by the plough, along with many other stones; though it is also
apparent that the ploughman's selective attention immediately 'jumped out' and
alighted on this particular object, passing over all the others. One might say that
there was something about this object which engaged his active attention, or one
could say that there was something about his active attention which engaged the
object. The ploughman had perhaps seen or heard about elf-stones before; at
any rate he evidently had some pre-existing conceptual scheme for recognising and
interpreting such things. The moment it emerged from the (super)natural domain
it was transformed into an object of cultural significance - a material symbol, with
both material and cognitive dimensions.
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Elf-stones and elf-arrows were clearly part of much wider sets of beliefs concerned
with the everyday routines of rural life. Although these must have varied con-
siderably from place to place, common themes recur in the literature. One of
these is 'elf-shot' - a generic term for a range of ailments that afflicted farm ani-
mals, thought to have been caused by wounding from elf-arrows. There are spells
against elf-shot in the Anglo-Saxon Charm-books, and up until recent times many
districts had their own favoured remedy or cure. Sometimes the cure would in-
volve the application of another arrowhead to the wound (Rowling 1976:29). Thus
elf-arrows were regarded as valuable objects, to be retained and prized rather than
thrown away. Writing in his diary for 27 June, 1712, Bishop Nicholson noted "By
Cardonac to Bowness (on Solway) where we saw several Elf-Arrows, too precious
(for the cure of Cattle Elf-Shot) to be parted with" (quoted in Rowling 1976:29).
Given the existence of this widespread set of beliefs it is easy to see how elf-arrows
were actively searched for as well as merely chanced upon. And each discovered
arrowhead would tend to confirm and reproduce the belief in the supernatural
being thought to have been responsible for shooting the object.
Underlying conceptions of how arrowheads were used was the perceived fact that
they had been made. The craftmanship and design of an intricately-wrought ar-
rowhead, discovered in the earth, was a source of interest to them just as it is to
ourselves - even if their historical and cultural backgrounds led them to draw differ-
ent conclusions about its origin. Accordingly, people speculated about the context
of manufacture as well as the context of use. In the confessions of a 17th century
Scottish witch, for example, it is stated that "As for elf arrow-heids, the Divell
shapes them with his own hand, and syne delivers them to elf-boys, who whittle
and dights them with a sharp thing like a paking needle" (Isobel Gowdie, quoted
in Pitcairn 1833:602-16). Gowdie invokes two basic stages of artefact-production
in this extract - first, the rough shaping and, second, the finishing or fine chipping
- which means that she also has to infer the existence of tools (eg. the paking
needle) for working the artefact, as well as a designer to intend the product and
to carry out those intentions through the use of tools. This instrumental complex
is placed squarely within the practical space of the body - that is, being held,
manipulated and fashioned in the hands, albeit those of a super-natural artificer.
It is no coincidence that such supernatural beings have hands and arms and cre-
ative powers very much the same as those of human agents, for a practical analogy
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underlies their very existence as objects, or rather subjects, of belief. The artefact
is constituted as the material effect of their (inferred) intentional activity. Within
a very different set of cultural meanings, then, Gowdie actually comes quite close
to the form of archaeological interpretation.
If discovered objects which seemed to exhibit design have always attracted atten-
tion and demanded some sort of explanation from their discoverers, however, the
function and purpose (or context of use) of these objects was not always correctly
identified. Arrowheads have been perceived as 'elf-spurs' or 'breast-pins' (Rowling
1976:29). These alternative interpretations nevertheless reveal the body as the
implicit common denominator in all identifications of the function of artefacts.
For the artefact is constituted as such in terms of the action possibilities of the
body - how the artefact can be put to use in action. Probably in these cases the
inferring subjects were used to using and wearing spurs (in the activity of riding)
and breast-pins (in the activity of dressing), but relatively unfamiliar with the use
of arrowheads (in the activity of archery). It may even be that these are male
and female interpretations of the same kind of object. At any rate it is easy to see
how the analogical transposition of bodily skills, whereby the inferring subject sees
how (s)he would use the object in order to judge how an agent in the supernatural
domain might have used it, at once enables and constrains the interpretation of
artefacts. The range of deep inference is circumscribed to a certain extent by the
limits of the subject's own knowledge and experience. Thus an object "about as
large as a penny piece, with a hole in the middle for the handle to go through",
discovered during ploughing, could be interpreted as a "fairy-grindstone", though
we would probably recognise it today as a spindle-whorl (Burne and Jackson 1883-
6:369). This example illustrates the point that an object can be constituted as
an artefact even when its function is not immediately obvious; a familiar function
may be ascribed to it to account for the presence of design in the object, which
attracted the finder's attention to it in the first instance.
'Thunderbolts' seem to represent a different class of discovered object in the sense
that, unlike elf-arrows, no particular function or use seems to have been attributed
to them. Indeed, a superficial analysis might conclude that the worked stone
tools (and natural objects such as belemnites and rock-crystals) interpreted as
thunderbolts were not seen as artefacts at all, but rather as wholly the effects
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of natural agency. Once again, however, we have to remember that nature was
conceived of in anthropomorphized terms. When this is appreciated it becomes
clear that thunderbolts were constituted as objects of significance precisely because
of their perceived artefactual character.
In classical times thunderbolts were associated with Zeus, the father of the Greek
gods, and the equivalent Roman deity, Jupiter. Jupiter was usually depicted car-
rying a thunderbolt and a double-headed axe, and indeed was sometimes known
as F'ulgur - god of the thunderbolt. Kept in his temple on the Capitoline Hill
were the lapides silices, or stones (probably prehistoric artefacts) believed to be
thunderbolts, of which Jupiter was regarded as the nurnen or resident-spirit. Pliny
explicitly states that thunderbolts are darted by Jupiter. (My source for all this
information is the Encyclopaedia Brit/anica). The equivalent sky-god worshipped
by the Germanic peoples was Thor, whose name - meaning thunder - still survives
as one of our days of the week. The thunderbolt was believed to be a missile thrown
by Thor, which explains why such objects were often valued and prized as things
of great power - not just as the material effects of thunder and lightning, but also
as protection against it. In Orkney and Shetland it was common practice until
recent times for thunderbolts to be placed in chimneys for this protective purpose.
Marwick (1975:65) records the finding of a stone axe in the chimney cheek of an
old cottage in Lerwick, Orkney, in 1974.
Consider Jupiter with his double-headed axe, or Thor with his hammer Mjollnir
- and we find that we have in mind the image of an intentional and embodied
agent, modelled on the human body (look at the many ancient depictions of these
deities to confirm this view). Tools are assimilated to the body and activated
by intentions-in-action in much the same way as they would be by any human
agent. Human powers and capabilities have been analogically-transposed onto
the supernatural plane, to be constituted as the causal agency responsible for
observable natural events (the striking of the hammer or axe upon a raw material
being seen as synonymous, or symbolically equivalent to, the flashing of lighting
and the sound of thunder), as well as for the material effect, the thunderbolt, itself.
As Sartre (1947:28) argued, "When we think of God as the creator, we are thinking
of him, most of the time, as a supernal artisan."
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The ability to recognize and interpret the artefacts of other cultures and other
times, then, is not specific to archaeologists. Prehistoric arrowheads and other
stone tools, discovered in the earth, have been constituted as objects of cultural
significance long before archaeologists introduced the concept of a prehistory to
provide a rational explanation for their origin. If such objects have been subject
to a range of socio-cultural and mythical transformations - so that arrowheads
were thought to have been shot by elves in the immediate past rather than by
human agents in the distant past, and stones axes were thought to have been
wrought and hurled by a supernatural deity - there is nevertheless a common basis
of understanding underlying the differences. This common basis lies in the fact that
discovered artefacts - whether seen to be of archaeological or supernatural origin -
are apprehended, evaluated and interpreted in terms of the action-possibilites of the
human body. That is, the common basis lies not so much in the objects perceived
(which provide the same raw material for different cultural interpretations), or for
that matter in the perceiving subjects (who bring different cultural meanings to
bear upon the object) but rather in the perceiving-relation or transaction between
the subject and the object.
What happens when an artefact is perceived as a thing-in-itself, divorced from the
practical space of the body? The seventeenth century botanist, Ulisses Aldrovandi,
described stone tools as "due to an admixture of a certain exhalation of thunder
and lightning with metallic matter, chiefly in dark clouds, which is coagulated by
the circumfused moisture and conglutinated into a mass (like flour with water) and
subsequently indurated by heat, like a brick." At roughly the same time Tollius
claimed chipped flints to be "generated in the sky by a fulgurous exhalation con-
globed in a cloud by the circumposed humour" (Both these are quoted in Daniel
1950:26 and Hodder 1982a:32).
Such early scientific explanations clearly retain the folk-identification of stone arte-
facts as thunderbolts, yet reject any notion of supernatural origin. The possibility
of human workmanship being responsible for producing the objects does not seem
to have been considered - probably because there was no concept of a human
prehistory around at that time. Aldrovandi and Tollius therefore had to resort
to a 'natural' explanation (showing, incidentally, that artefacts can be mistaken
for natural objects in much the same way as natural objects can sometimes be
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mistaken for artefacts). The curious mixture of mythic and rational explanation,
deriving from a clash between an anthropomorphised nature and an objectivised
nature, is remarkably reminiscent of the conversation concerning thunderstorms in
Aristophenes' satirical play 'Clouds' 364-384. Note how any concept of the object's
function in a context of use or intended purpose in a context of manufacture, plus
any notion of design, has been lost completely. This is because it has been concep-
tually placed at a distance and removed from the practical space of the body (cf.
the criticism of those modern archaeological methods of classification and analysis
that "engage in a kind of 'artefact-physics', in which the form and distribution
of behavioural by-products are measured in a behavioural vacuum" De Boer and
Lathrap 1979:103). Accordingly, the instrumental value of the object disappears.
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